Economic Doping

Robert Kurz

Crises come and go, but capitalism remains. Liberal and left-wing theorists alike are convinced of this. How is a major economic crisis overcome? By devaluing surplus capital in all its forms (means of production, labor power, commodities, money capital). After that, it can supposedly go on and on. The economics professors call this “adjustment,” the academic leftists “cleanup.” Since the fall of 2009, it has generally been said that the new global economic crisis is already over. But the great devaluation or shakeout has not taken place at all. Instead, there has been “rescue” by hook or by crook. According to the official economists’ own views as well as those of their leftist colleagues, this would prove that the real devaluation shock has yet to come.

Perhaps the pragmatists were wiser than the theorists because they sensed that only economically scorched earth would remain after the global shakeout. Admittedly, their rescue measures only push the elementary problem in front of them and let it grow into ever greater dimensions. For more than 20 years, the global economy has lived mainly on financial doping. For a long time, it was the financial bubbles that created purchasing power without a real basis, then, since the turn of the century, the central banks and state budgets. The mobilization of labor in China, India and Europe was based solely on one-sided deficit cycles. Ultimately, the production processes stimulated in this way are “invalid.” They must end with the devaluation of all their components. Thus, while the theorists will be proved right, no new prospects for global capital valorization will follow from this.

One can speak of a paralysis of economic theory and economic or monetary policy. This is also evidenced by the fierce controversies in the economic guild and in governments. The neoliberal hardliners, such as the ECB chief economist Jürgen Stark, who has just resigned, want to accept an end of the horror because they believe their ideology more than reality. The pragmatists, on the other hand, want to extend fiscal policy doping excessively, even though in doing so they are always piling up new fuel for the inevitable devaluation shock. At present, government stimulus programs are coming to an end everywhere, and immediately growth rates are falling at a remarkable pace – just like a doped-up runner runs out of air when he runs out of dope. The next global recession is just around the corner. In the USA, President Obama already wants to put together a new mega stimulus package without knowing where he is going to get the money for it.

The unsolvable capitalist dilemma can also be formulated differently. As long as only the thoroughly ailing financial system is propped up with ever new measures, the crisis will remain in abeyance, so to speak. But as soon as insubstantial money creation turns into real demand, demonetization, which was still limited as long as only the economic slump of 2009 was bridged, will march on. Nevertheless, inflation, which can hardly be curbed in the emerging markets, is also on the doorstep in the EU; in the UK, it has already reached the 4.5 percent mark. Like the British administration, the ECB, the Sarkozy and the Merkel governments have apparently opted for inflation as the supposed lesser evil. This is leading to political and economic turmoil. In reality, it is a systemic issue, but no one wants to admit that.

Originally published in Neuen Deutschland on 09/19/2011

The End of The Raw Materials Boom

Robert Kurz

There are increasing signs that the economic downturn is turning into a new global recession. After the crash of the financial markets, the extremely indebted world economy is reaching its second barrier, that of public finances. As in the first half of 2009, a renewed slump would hit the export-heavy countries hardest, and all the harder the smaller the share of the domestic market in their national product. This does not bode well for Germany, whose elites are currently patting themselves on the back in view of their world market leadership in key sectors. But it would also hit the much-vaunted emerging countries hard, all of which have bought their recent rise with a one-sided export orientation.

However, there are different forms of dependence on the world market. While China acts as the world’s industrial workbench with still relatively little vertical integration of its own, most emerging countries are mainly dependent on the export of raw materials. They have thus not been able to improve their traditional weakness vis-à-vis the industrialized countries. Their position has even deteriorated structurally because industrialization processes have failed or at least declined. This has only been masked by the commodity boom of the global deficit economy, especially the commodity hunger of rapid Chinese growth. A new world recession, which can no longer be absorbed by public finances, would mercilessly bring to light the particular plight of the raw material countries.

Thus, the Brazilian upswing of the last few years has feet of clay. The export success is based primarily on industrial and agricultural raw materials such as iron ore, sugar, ethanol (biofuel from sugar cane), coffee and meat. Their upward price jumps spurred growth and foreign exchange reserves. In a global recession, this process can reverse within a very short time. Behind this is a dramatic shift in the structure of exports. While the share of manufactured goods has fallen by 16 percent over the last five years, the share of raw materials has also risen by 16 percent. Accordingly, the contribution of industry to the national product fell by almost half. An important factor in deindustrialization is foreign trade with China, which floods the Brazilian market with cheap industrial goods as a countertrade for raw materials. This only works well as long as raw material prices are high.

The situation is even worse with countries like Russia and Venezuela, which are extremely dependent on oil and gas exports. It is true that the depletion of natural reserves promises a demand surplus in the long term. But in the short and medium term, these countries would hardly survive a cyclical drop in the price of their “liquid gold.” The designation of Russia as an “emerging market” is sheer mockery and only an expression of the widespread deindustrialization after the collapse of state socialism. The consequences were concealed by the raw materials boom, but must appear all the more violently when it ends. The highly indebted economies of the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, with their bizarre construction activity, are also threatened with collapse if the oil price crashes. Such a development would not only cut off the air to the autocratic regimes of the oil-exporting states, but would also intensify the chain reaction of a global recession and financial crisis.

Originally published in Neuen Deutschland on 10/17/2011

Devaluation Race

Robert Kurz

A hard currency with a high external value is generally regarded as a sign of economic superiority. So-called soft currencies, on the other hand, belong to losing states and candidates for relegation on the world market. However, this rule seems to have lost its credibility. Everywhere, people are afraid that their own currency could become too strong. In Switzerland, the central bank is intervening to push down the rising franc against the ailing euro. Central banks in Japan and other countries are pursuing the same policy against the dollar. Emerging economies such as Brazil are also desperately fighting the appreciation of their money. Conversely, people in the U.S. and the EU are anything but sad about the downward trend of their own currency, no longer so proud. Since the supposed end of the crisis, one can practically speak of a devaluation race.

This can be explained by the changed economic structure of crisis capitalism. The world economy now runs only on surreally inflated credit and the associated external economic relations. Surplus countries like Japan, China or the FRG are dependent on one-sided exports, deficit countries on the equally one-sided inflow of transnational money capital. Both have reached their limits. Now they are all trying to rehabilitate themselves at the expense of the others. Some want to save their export surpluses by hook or by crook; others, conversely, want to gain a larger export share themselves. However, the weaker a country’s currency, the cheaper and more competitive its exports become, while imports become more expensive. The devaluation race shows that the domestic economy is being written off everywhere and that the focus is now only on increasing exports.

In the euro zone, we have the particularly paradoxical situation that the deficit countries cannot devalue against the surplus country FRG, because both sides have a common currency. Moreover, the relatively weaker euro, precisely because of the southern European debt crisis, is additionally boosting German exports to the rest of the world. But this success story is short-lived because it is destroying its own preconditions. It is the German export roller that is flattening the euro. Even every textbook of economics knows that such a thing cannot work. A dissolution into the old national currencies would, of course, increase the external debts of the deficit countries immeasurably and at the same time cause the returned deutschmark to appreciate so drastically that the export machine would grind to a halt. The construction of the euro was obviously a suicide mission.

For countries with large export surpluses, revaluation is unproblematic for some time only if they also have a strong domestic market and/or an industrial monopoly. This was the case for Great Britain in the 19th century and the USA in the mid-20th century. Therefore, the currencies of these world powers were able to take over the function of world money. After the descent of the heavily indebted USA, there is no successor candidate anywhere in sight, least of all China. The overdue drastic revaluation of the Chinese currency would ruin large parts of the export industries there, too, and at the same time devalue its huge dollar foreign exchange reserves. No one can get down from their position anymore, but objectively, permanently unilateral exports to indebted countries are impossible. The devaluation race leads beyond the euro crisis into a world currency crisis.

Originally published in Neuen Deutschland on 11/14/2011

Capitalism Does Not Repeat Itself

Robert Kurz

In terms of lifestyle, it’s called nostalgia: namely, the memory of supposedly better times, for example, of the economic miracle. In pop culture, it’s called “retro”: When producers can’t think of anything else, they rehash old stuff in a slightly different form. And when you watch “Tatort” on TV, you have to make sure you haven’t already seen it a few years ago. Nothing new under the sun, that seems to be the motto. Somehow, the belief has spread that if you want to find a recipe for the present, all you have to do is look to the past. Why else are politicians, the media and economists constantly looking for historical parallels in the crisis developments of recent years? Anyone who opens the newspaper often believes they have been transported to a history lesson.

Breakneck financial speculation, minor and major crises, a host of state bankruptcies, even the odd failed monetary union – the economic historians of modern times have just about everything on offer. And the moral of the story? It’s all been there before, which also means that everything is not so bad, everything can be overcome on the basis of the prevailing facts. Not only is wishful thinking the father of thought here, but also a certain image of capitalism as the eternal return of the same. Sometimes the economy is humming, sometimes it is crashing; there are up-and-comers and down-and-comers of the year or the century. But in principle, so the belief goes, it will always go on like this.

However, this is a mistake. We are not dealing with a static system, but with a dynamic one. Capitalism does not repeat itself, nor does it go round in circles, because it is itself an irreversible historical process. Capital valorization does not always start from scratch, but on a social scale it must exceed its last level if it is to continue. The degree of global economic integration cannot be turned back, and neither can the development of the productive forces. Universal competition ensures that this is the case.

But if globalization and productivity are developing ever higher, why should the character, depth and scope of crises always remain the same? The fondly told story of the tulip bulb speculation on the Amsterdam stock exchange in the 17th century teaches us nothing about the real estate bubble of 2008 and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. To understand that a sovereign bankruptcy in the early 19th century was something quite different from what it would be today, just look at the government’s share of the national product. The current history lesson of the experts and media tea-leaves readers is a witching hour.

Again and again, one hears the claim that politics and management have learned so much from the crises of the past that today there are sufficient instruments and tools available for coping with them. At most, the diagnosticians argue about whether the crisis is now one like 1872 or possibly one like 1929 or merely one like 1973. The learning success seems to be a minor one when governments and central banks prove to us every day that their economic and monetary policy concepts are about as helpful and competent as the toolbox of a steam locomotive for the emergency repair of an high-speed train. Anyone who talks as much about the future as the elites of the present should not rely too much on the system rescues of the past. In the memory of mankind, the old rescue packages and their consequences tend to go down as disasters anyway.

Originally published in Neuen Deutschland on 12/12/2011

The Climax of Capitalism

Brief Outline of The Historical Dynamics of Crisis

Robert Kurz

In the crisis is almost after the crisis. That has been the message of positive thinking since the Lehman bankruptcy. Why should the biggest financial crash since the 1930s provoke any crisis-theory thinking? Sometimes things just go up and sometimes they go down. Anyway, everything changes all the time; but just to keep things the way they are. The crises come and go, but capitalism remains eternal. Therefore, it is not the crisis as such that is of interest, but what comes next, when it is over again like all the boring crises before. Who are the up-and-comers and who are the down-and-comers of the new era? Is the economic miracle finally upon us in Africa, is the Pacific century coming with China as the new world power, or rather the rebirth of the United States from the spirit of dishwashing? Will we perhaps even see the rise of the reborn lira as the reserve currency? Anything goes. One is allowed to do a bit of courageous trend research when the financial markets, which have become overconfident for their part, emit ash clouds like Mount Etna in its best days.

Who cares about the inner historical context of capitalist development: Happy is he who forgets. The fact that in 1982, with Mexico’s first insolvency, a crisis cycle of a new quality could have begun that continues to this day, eating its way from the periphery into the centers, must not even be thought of. The postmodern structure of perception excludes any insight that would go beyond the horizon of a seasonal trend. What Marx described in the preface to the first volume of “Capital” as a prerequisite of social-theoretical insight, namely the “power of abstraction,” has long been regarded as disreputable essentialism. Like Margret Thatcher, discourse-dominant microeconomics no longer knows society, but only individuals. Where everything is business management, even the relationship to one’s own self, space and time shrink to the horizon of mouse clicks and shopping experiences. The negative whole is not to be spoken of, so that it remains in merciful invisibility. Many a hoodie wearer might ask: What Lehman bankruptcy? Was it before or after the First World War? If one only moves between incoherent event points in the media space without any awareness of the past or the future, one can think the crisis away as long as money is still coming out of the vending machine.

But gradually it smells so dicey that even the entertainment value of trend scouts as soothsayers has diminished. The crisis seems to want to grow old in the new century. One recession and one false all-clear follows the next, while the guardians of the global banking system count their skeletons in the closet and would prefer to throw away the key. Not even German export chauvinism is quite sure whether the FRG is really in a different league from the rest of the euro zone with itself alone. No one knows where the fire will flare up under the roof tomorrow or the day after. But everyone knows that the trouble spots lurk everywhere and seem to be mysteriously connected. The postmodern primordial confidence in capitalism is crumbling, even if its disgrace has not yet become the leading theme.

Even the Foucault left is beginning to realize that it knows about as much about the critique of political economy as Karl Marx knew about riding a motorcycle. That is why the crisis has at least been allowed to steer the discourse onto terrain that was previously condemned as “economistic” and avoided on principle. So what’s wrong with capitalism? Unfortunately, Marx did not leave behind a handy crisis theory in Merve volume format. Because the urge is strong to unite deconstructive loss of reality with the cheapest possible rediscovery of disdainful economics, it is best to look up the somewhat shallower versions of Marxist lore.

According to these, capital from time to time enters a phase of so-called over-accumulation. Too much capital has been accumulated which cannot be sufficiently further valorized because the surplus value produced can no longer be transformed or “realized” into its money form for lack of social purchasing power. The investments in machines and labor were too large for the capacity of the market, overcapacities of production have arisen, unsaleable goods lie around everywhere, money capital flees into the financial markets and drives bubbles there. The surplus capital in all its components (physical capital, labor, commodity capital, money capital) must now be devalued in a crisis. After that, everything can start all over again.

This version is the most palatable for the postmodern un-spirit. For the crisis appears here as an ahistorical event in the eternal return of the same. Such a purge now and then does capitalism good like a sweating cure. The crisis is part of its miraculous functioning, as the detached left has long known. Expansion and contraction alternate in endless succession, without any recognizable coherent and progressive process.

But Marx also has quite different considerations. According to him, the problem in the long run is not the periodically lacking realization of surplus value on the market, but much more fundamentally its lacking production itself. Capital is self-contradictory in that, on the one hand, it has as its sole purpose the incessant accumulation of value or “abstract wealth” (Marx), but on the other hand, competition forces it to make human labor power, as the exclusive source of this value, increasingly superfluous through the development of productive power and to replace it with a scientific-technical apparatus.

The development of productive power, however, is not an eternal return of the same, but an irreversible historical process. As Marx shows in the “Grundrisse”, this process drives towards a situation in which the products are commodities, but as commodities they cannot represent a sufficient amount of past human labor power. They become unsaleable because they no longer represent any abstract value. This is not an adjustment, but an “inner barrier” (Marx) of capital. This aspect of Marx’s theory was already unacceptable to traditional Marxism, which was concerned with the “planning of value” rather than its abolition. For a consciousness that neither knows history nor can formulate a concept of value, but that rushes from event to event and wants to persuade itself of the compulsion to self-valorization as boundless freedom, an objective barrier of this form of existence is all the less conceivable.

What matters to capital is not value per se, but the surplus value that labor power produces above its own cost. The same development of productive power, which makes labor power progressively superfluous, cheapens the costs of the labor power still in use. Thus the relative share of surplus value in the total labor time spent increases. But for the social mass of surplus value it is not only the relative share per labor power that matters, but also the number of applicable labor forces at a given standard of productivity.

Marx formulated this problem in the third volume of Capital as the theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. For each unit of money capital invested, the share of physical capital grows steadily, while the number of workers who can be mobilized with it declines just as steadily. Indirectly, this can be seen in the bourgeois statistics by the fact that the advance costs of a job historically rise inexorably, because an ever larger aggregate of machinery, infrastructure, etc. must be employed in order to be able to apply a labor force. Since only labor power produces new value, the average profit on a social scale per money capital advanced must decrease, even though the relative share of surplus value in the value production of a labor power increases.

In the social result, what matters is the magnitude ratio of the two opposing tendencies. Read together with the theory of a fundamental historical devaluation of value in the “Grundrisse,” however, the argumentation outlined is so inconvenient to the ahistorical understanding of eternally alternately expanding and contracting capital that the latest new Marx reading has taken the precaution of declaring the tendency of the rate of profit to fall to be a mere figment of Marx’s imagination.

In fact, the falling rate of profit can be compensated to some extent by a rising mass of profit, if the capitalist mode of production as such expands and thus additional money capital is productively employed. Externally, this expansion is exhausted by the “valorization” of the entire earthly space. However, there are various concepts of a qualitative internal expansion, all of which go back to the bourgeois economist Joseph A. Schumpeter. The latter described capitalist development as a periodic creation of new products and branches of production. According to this description, expansion is sustained by certain product cycles until they turn into stagnation and innovative entrepreneurs put an end to them with new products for new needs. In the “creative destruction” phase, contraction occurs. Only gradually does the new product cycle become sustainable and renewed expansion on the changed basis can begin.

Schumpeter’s theory has the small flaw that it is in no way related to the connection between the development of productive forces and substantial surplus value production. As in all of economics, the market surface is regarded as the sole object of economic science. Thus, the creation of new branches of production and needs automatically appears as the basis of a capitalist upswing, without the question of the concrete conditions of valorization of labor-substance under a changed standard of productivity being raised at all. This is precisely why the postmodernized left so readily seizes on Schumpeter’s idea and related theorems to add a bit of anti-substantialism to Marx. New branches of production, new opportunities for valorization, because the mass of expended labor energy could not possibly play such an important role, if soon money can be downloaded like everything else. One could then choose whether the central field for the coming boom is created by genetic monster production, friendship networks on the Internet, biofuel instead of bread for the world or saving the polar bears.

In the blanked-out strand of Marxian argumentation, the calculation looks different. No matter what content of production is concocted: For capital, the only thing that matters is the applicable quantity of value-creating labor power. This must increase absolutely if the presupposed end in itself of accumulation is to succeed. The creation of additional branches of production or the incorporation of former luxury products into mass production can, however, compensate for the scientific-technological rationalization of labor power only for a historically limited period of time. Capitalism reaches its climax when the internal expansion is caught up and overtaken by the development of productive power. Then the relative fall of the rate of profit turns into an absolute fall of the social mass of surplus value and thus of profit, and thus the supposedly eternal valorization of value turns into its historical devaluation.

There are some indications that capitalist development has entered this state with the third industrial revolution since the 1980s. The culmination of the internal contradiction is modified and filtered by the historical expansion of the credit system, which is a mirror image of the stagnation and decline of the value-productive labor mass. The permanent relative increase of physical capital drove up the dead up-front costs of production gradually to such an extent that they could be financed to an ever smaller extent from current profits. Credit transformed itself from an auxiliary driving force of surplus-value production into its substitute. Since then, accumulation has been fed less by past real labor substance and more and more by the anticipation of imaginary labor substance of the future. By means of an unprecedented global indebtedness and the financial bubbles that have arisen from it, investments and employment are financed without real foundations. This was also the social condition of possibility for the triumph of virtualist and deconstructionist ideologies. Despite temporary appearances, however, capital is not accumulated in the process, as was shown by the construction industry of many countries after the bursting of the real estate bubbles.

On the surface of the world market, the constantly advanced consumption of future profits and wages took the correspondingly absurd course of a functional division of surplus and deficit countries. The former buy goods with money from future revenues, the production of which was pre-financed by the latter by accessing future revenues. There is an expanding black hole between past real and fictitiously anticipated future value creation. This construct of a global deficit cycle has two focal points: a larger Pacific deficit cycle between China/East Asia and the U.S. and a smaller European deficit cycle between the FRG and the rest of the EU or the euro area. The employment mobilized for this, for example in China, is as unsustainable as the construction activity for the real estate hype. In the one case, Asia has accumulated dollar foreign exchange reserves on an astronomical scale; in the other, the international banking system has financed similarly high deficits within a common currency area. These notorious “imbalances” even make a mockery of the textbooks of economics, which nobody takes seriously anymore anyway.

After a dense chain of financial crises that had shaken individual countries and economic sectors and accompanied deficit booms over the past 30 years, the 2008 financial crash took on global proportions for the first time. The rupture of credit chains put the big devaluation push on the agenda. It was the already highly indebted countries that stopped the avalanche from going down with massive additional loans and the printing presses. They at least suspected that it was not a mere cleansing storm on the way, but that the lights of world capital were threatening to go out. So the bad loans were stashed away like nuclear waste with the help of state guarantees, the industrial overcapacities were maintained by horrendous subsidies, and the economy was artificially fed by state programs. Chinese state capitalism, in particular, forced its banking system, supported by the hoard of foreign currency, to finance investment ruins in the form of ghost cities, ghost airports, ghost factories, etc., pumping up the mother of all real estate bubbles.

All these adventurous measures did not solve anything, but only postponed the devaluation process and shifted the problem from the financial markets to the state. It was foreseeable that the government programs would quickly run out of steam. The euro zone started out as the weakest link, but all other government finances are also teetering and threaten to set off chain reactions. The Chinese dollar mountain, for example, will go up in smoke when the USA has to admit that it is broke. The unserviceable national debts add up to the bad loans of the financial markets; the meltdown of the credit system is approaching. The already spent capitalist future has become the present. Greece exemplifies that people will have to stop living for years to come in order to continue to meet capitalist criteria.

As soon as the central bank no longer merely delays the devaluation of debt securities but directly feeds the economy with insubstantial money, bypassing credit simulation, the money medium will devalue itself. Inflation also has a historical precedent. While it was almost unknown from industrialization until World War I, the war economies could only be financed with the printing press. After the world war epoch, however, the specter of inflation became a constant companion of capitalism, because the expanding credit system also became constitutive for ordinary commodity production. Today, the bailouts have already exceeded the dimensions of the war economy, and the direct money glut of central banks is proving to be the last resort. Even a radical monetary reform, dissolving all assets and credit balances, would not lead to a zero point and a new start. This is because the standard of productivity incorporated in the knowledge aggregate of society, which no longer permits sufficient surplus-value production, is inescapable. The devaluation would only repeat itself in ever shorter intervals.

May there come what will. Despite all this, the media consciousness of experience does not want to be bothered with uncool realities. The end of the world to be expected in 2012 according to the Mayan calendar promises more fun. The main thing is not to have one’s credit card confiscated. In the meantime, even the re-social-democratized postmodern left can imagine a capitalism without a world more easily than a world without capitalism. The ultimate self-deconstruction will certainly be a tingling affair. After all, one doesn’t treat oneself to anything else.

Originally published in Konkret 02/2012

Emergency Terror

How an Example Should Be Made in Greece

Robert Kurz

In the 21st century, as has become known, the powers of capital are no longer looking for territorial conquests. What should they do with zones of economically scorched earth and superfluous populations? This does not mean that imperialism has died out. But it is no longer about national empires and zones of influence, but about the controllability of globalization as a crisis. The limits of capital valorization are to be redefined into limits of viability for the losing masses, the collapse of national economies into a controlled coexistence of credit-financed boom towns and abandoned slum regions.

The production of security for the residual businesses under these conditions requires ideological legitimation. It is a good thing that the dismissed and disinherited children of capital are not better people, but rather like to attack their fellow citizens instead of their impossible conditions of existence. Not the external but the internal war along ethnic and religious divisions became the conflict paradigm of a disintegrating world of states. The world police operations on the part of the powers of order of the capitalist center against the barbarians of the periphery could be justified with democratic idealism.

This picture was, of course, only a snapshot in the process of the gradual dissolution of the global order. At the latest, the global economic crisis since 2008 has once again fundamentally changed the situation. Now the limits of creditworthiness are being reached even in the Western centers themselves. Everywhere, debt crises are emerging there of a kind that had previously only flared up in the peripheral zones of the global market. Thus, a qualitatively different crisis management is on the agenda for the metropolises, shifting the emphasis from external to internal distress. In addition to unaccountable populations in the squalid backyards of world capital, their own middle classes must increasingly be targeted. The content-empty democratic formalism, which the God-fascists of various stripes have long since recognized as the shaping principle of their madness, asserts the valorization compulsion of capital as its “natural basis” (Marx) all the more when its inner barriers are erected. The capitalist lifeblood of money must no longer be turned off step by step to solely a marginalized new poor, but to also the majority of the metropolitan “people’s sovereign.”

This, of course, also points to a state of legitimacy emergency. While NATO bombed the Sharia in Libya with reference to democratic values, for the Western core zones of globalization only the practical constraint of the teetering financial system can take over the role of the combat bombers for the time being. The execution of this economic imperative in the name of democracy against the elementary vital interests of a majority of the formal “sovereign” seems to take place first in the EU, because here the monetary construct of the euro has already taken the contradiction to extremes and there is a supranational instance of intervention.

Greece has become a precedent under global crisis conditions qua de facto state bankruptcy. An uncontrolled execution would blow up not only the European financial system and exceed the consequences of the Lehman bankruptcy. Controlled execution, however, would only be possible if almost the entire Greek population were pushed below the subsistence level. Mass unemployment in new dimensions, impoverishment deep into the middle classes, collapse of medical care and public infrastructures will become reality. The Greek elites can no longer justify such a collection of capital logic on their own account. What is needed is crisis-imperialist intervention from the outside, claimed by a troika of the EU Commission, the ECB and the IMF; now no longer against a poorhouse of the former Third World, but for the first time against a Western country.

The Merkel government has become a hardliner, speaking from the heart of the management, political and media class as well as the lowly master race in this country. With the assistance of the deputy sheriff Sarkozy, the systemic crisis is denied in order to appear as the self-appointed bailiff of the “automatic subject” (Marx). The Greeks, who have been dismissed as capitalistically untrustworthy, are not to be hooked up to Berlin Disneyland, but they are to be taken by the purse strings until they spit blood. There was even talk of a German savings commissioner for Greece, even though the EU majority spoke out against this with a residual sense of shame. The false gesture of superiority feeds on the FRG’s provisional position as a crisis winner, because German exports have profited from the expiring global government programs, from the devaluation of the euro precisely because of the debt crisis, and from the implementation of the homegrown low wage since Hartz IV. Suppressed is the fact that the Teutonic economic fairy tale has as its prerequisite not only its own debts but also those of others and must end with the evaporation of purchasing power in the European and global recession. Nevertheless, at least enough is known to make an example of Greece, which, if necessary, must also apply to Germany, in the hope of the historic social masochism of the German “sovereign,” which has always been unable to walk with civic goodness.

Greece also lends itself as an experimental field for the new democratic crisis management, because an isolated youth revolt with no prospects can serve as a sparring partner. It fits in well with the picture that the Greek state budget is being driven to zero socially, while the military budget almost doubled in 2012 compared to the previous year. The associated debts are also perceived favorably by the savings commissioners-to-be, because orders from Athens account for 15 percent of the sales of German arms manufacturers. Besides, in any case, the apparatus of the democratic state of emergency is also flexing its muscles militarily, which is only allowed to be as pseudo-self-reliant in this respect in Greece as it is to become in Afghanistan. If things really heat up, the state of emergency terror under German leadership could already show what it is capable of. The Assad regime may appear to be a wimp as soon as more than a slim Arab social product is at stake.

For the time being, the Greek political class will have to haggle a bit over its surrender terms and feign resistance in order to save its barely recognizable face. The electorate no longer knows what it should want anyway, and the entire party system is also wrapping itself up in exemplary fashion. The post-national crisis administrators approve of the nationalist upsurge, which can serve as an outlet all the more because it only processes the bankruptcy in a manner appropriate to the species, so to speak. The merely anti-German rage of the Greeks does not concern the German export chauvinists, because the pogrom that is due is really directed against Albanian and African refugees or other migrants, as has long been practically demonstrated, and not just in Greece. In this point, too, Germany, with its neo-Nazi serial killers spoiled by the democratic Stasi, certainly has pan-European leadership qualities to offer.

Originally published in Konkret 03/2012

Phony Auto Boom

Robert Kurz

The European and US debt crises are eagerly moving ahead, but this seems to have little impact on the global economy. The German export industry, in particular, believes it is springtime. The car companies are leading the way, reporting ever new record figures. This proves that auto production continues to be a key sector of capitalism. The branch gives an example of where the economic journey is headed. So are the optimistic forecasts that want to see a real economic upswing without end for the coming decade justified?

It is worth taking a closer look at the structure of the auto boom. Sales in Europe continue to decline. On the other hand, exports to the emerging markets, especially China, and the USA have virtually exploded. For this economy to be sustainable in the long term, consumption by the masses  would have to fueled with small and mid-range cars, while the expensive premium segment would be reserved for the small number at the top. But the opposite is the case. The driving force behind the supposed car miracle is the ostentatious luxury cars from Daimler, BMW or Audi and the sports cars from Porsche.

In China, as in the USA, the gap between rich and poor is widening. This is a social problem as well as an economic one: If mass car consumption is largely absent among lower incomes, it is a sign of the febrile nature of the luxury economy. It is an illusory boom based on pump-priming and financial bubbles.

The solvent new middle class in China, whose size is dazzling because of the sheer mass of its population, has no solid foundation. It is linked to the speculative run-up of largely vacant apartment and office buildings, sports stadiums and other investment ruins orchestrated by corrupt party cadres at the municipal and regional levels. Credit or irregular income finances their luxury consumption. The situation is very similar in the United States, where the permanent financial injections from the government and the central bank reach only a minority.

It doesn’t take the next financial crash to see that the premium global consumers have overreached themselves – even in the much-praised German wonderland: The big cars are hardly ever sold in cash anymore, instead, they are leased. They can be purchased for a comparatively modest monthly sum. Then the financing air becomes thin, because some people have already reached the limit of their income.

However, the high-horsepower prestige cars are so highly equipped that repairs quickly become necessary. What was still relatively cheap to repair in a pre-electronic small car starts in high-priced cars at 800-1000 euros. It is not only in Germany that leased gems accumulate in car dealerships and repair shops because their proud users cannot pay for the repair (or the next installment). A small hint that the premium-class car boom could be just as phony as the real estate boom.

Originally published in Neuen Deutschland on 06/04/2012

The Normalization of The Taliban

The Centers of The World System Discover Islamofascism As a Repressive Instrument of Crisis Management in The Periphery

Tomasz Konicz

Talk to the Taliban? Mrs. Merkel can’t do that quickly enough. While panicked people clinging to planes taking off plunge to their deaths at Kabul airport, while IS Islamists blow up dozens of fleeing people in suicide attacks, the chancellor declared Taliban rule in Afghanistan to be a new reality that was “bitter,” but one that had to be “dealt with.” This means, above all, holding talks with the stone-age Islamists “in order to be able to preserve something of what has benefited the people of Afghanistan over the past 20 years” (one can only hope that the Chancellor is not referring to the mass-murderous German air strikes, which, for example, provided one Colonel Klein with a career path to General).[1] According to Merkel, the German government is already providing 500 million euros for humanitarian purposes. Through this, the hope is to “continue to protect people” in Afghanistan after the evacuation, which will be completed in “a few days.”[2]

In plain language: Berlin wants to hold talks with the Taliban on how the Afghans can continue to be kept – pardon, “protected” – in Afghanistan despite the Islamist reign of terror. Because that was the central German concern during the collapse of the Afghan state dummy in recent weeks: The fear of new flight movements from the collapsed Afghanistan, which could give the New Right in the FRG additional impetus, manifested itself precisely in the slogan, “2015 must not be repeated.” And anyway: The New York Times knew to report after a first interview that the new Taliban could hardly be compared with the old stone-age Islamists.[3] At least that’s what the Taliban said. Their spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, even stressed that, “in the long term,” women under the Taliban could well “resume their routines.”

After all, it seems that the Taliban’s public relations have indeed been modernized, as Mr Mujahid seemed to know exactly what his Western interviewees wanted to hear. Despite the “tense situation” at the airport, the Taliban hoped to establish good relations with the “international community.” The Taliban spokesman named the fight against terror (Al Qaeda is now being replaced by the Islamic State), the eradication of opium production in Afghanistan, which is one of the Taliban’s most important sources of income, and the “reduction of refugees” who wanted to go to the West as potential areas of cooperation. The Taliban are thus in effect offering themselves to the West as a source of “law and order,” as jailers of a region of socio-economic collapse which, like the post-state region of Libya, is really only called Afghanistan out of habit. The Taliban spokesman was at pains to paint the picture of a rather “tolerant” Islamist movement that had broken with its past, according to the New York Times. For that to happen, the West would still have to tolerate the idiosyncrasies of Taliban extremism, such as the ban on music, which Mr. Mujahid explicitly acknowledged – and the reported burning alive of women by Taliban who didn’t like their food.[4]

The idea of allowing Islamic extremism to play a leading role in the defense against refugees, of allowing the corresponding dictatorships, militias and rackets to play the role of concentration camp wardens on economically scorched earth and turning them into open-air prisons, so to speak, is not entirely new. In Berlin this has been the maxim of policy towards Erdogan’s Turkey since the refugee crisis of 2015, which must not be repeated at all costs. Berlin keeps paying billions to the Erdogan regime so that calm prevails at the EU’s borders. Turkish Islamofascism – already under increased socio-economic pressure due to the crisis – expanded in the collapsing, war-torn areas of northern Syria, where Turkish-funded Islamist militias were able to establish a gang rule marked by permanent clashes. Syrian civil war refugees, who increasingly face pogroms in Turkey, are to be shipped there for some perspective (Al Qaeda in Turkish-controlled Idlib celebrated the Taliban’s victory with a motorcade).[5]

The war of Islamism, which in fact represents a postmodern crisis ideology,[6] is directed first and foremost against progressive counter-models. The aggressions of the Turkish-Islamist soldiery against Rojava, against the self-administration in northern Syria, not only served the ethnic cleansing of this region bordering on Turkey from Kurds; this also attempted to smash a competing, emancipatory counter-model to Turkish-sponsored Islamofascism in the region. Berlin has flanked these Turkish aggressions financially and politically – the repressive suppression of refugee movements with the help of Islamism seems to have become a raison d’état in Berlin, while an emancipatory alternative is being fought by the German state apparatus with passion.

Islamofascism now appears to be on the rise throughout the region. Coinciding with the fall of the Western-funded puppet government in the “failed state” of Afghanistan, Turkey has expanded its attacks on the Kurdish movement in Syria and Iraq. In the slipstream of the disaster in Afghanistan, the emancipatory awakening in Rojava is to be finally put to death.[7] The Islamists in Ankara, at least, are well aware that there is no alternative to their rise in the wake of the globally unfolding crisis process – as the civil war in Syria illustrates.

The collapse of Syria – similar to the even more dramatic situation in Afghanistan – had socio-economic and ecological causes. The civil war broke out due to the advanced impoverishment of a largely economically superfluous population, as well as a prolonged drought in the agrarian northeast of the country. In the course of the civil war, in which the Syrian state, which had degenerated into a self-service shop of the Assad clan, could only be saved from implosion by massive Russian intervention, not only the genocidal Islamic State emerged as a formative force, but also the self-government in northern Syria, which was largely supported by the Kurdish freedom movement.

The Rojava model, which attempts to realize an emancipatory claim, constitutes – as long as it exists – a threat to Islamism in the region, since it shows alternatives to the terror regime of these clerical-fascist crisis ideologies. The Islamism of the Islamic State, the Taliban and Al Qaeda represents, as it were, a fascist extremism of the center,[8] which uses religion, the central religious identity of the Islamic cultural sphere, as a sounding board in order to drive it to the ideological, sometimes genocidal extreme in interaction with crisis shocks – this crisis ideology thus has little to do with the pre-modern agrarian societies of Islam to which the Islamist ideologists refer.

The crisis of the capitalist world system produces economically scorched earth in its periphery, i.e. regions in which hardly any capital valorization takes place and thus economically superfluous population strata emerge, which leads to increasing political instability, which can ultimately lead to state collapse. This is the deeper cause of the rapid collapse of the state in Afghanistan,[9] as well as similar processes in Libya, and the civil wars in Iraq and Syria.

Syria, however, represents an anomaly, since here, with Rojava, there is indeed a progressive, emancipatory alternative to the crisis-induced drift into Islamist barbarism. In Syria, at the latest in the fight against the genocidal militia of the “Islamic State” supported by Turkey, the West had the option of supporting an alternative. It is significant that – after the official victory over the IS – both the US and Russia proceeded to sell off Rojava piecemeal to Erdogan’s Turkey, which managed to play both major powers off against each other. The Islamists in Ankara and Idlib were ultimately more important to Washington and Moscow than the emancipatory awakening in northern Syria, due to Turkey’s greater geopolitical weight.

Turkey’s current airstrikes and artillery strikes in northern Syria[10] and Iraq[11] would also not be possible without the USA’s clearance of the airspace, and without Moscow’s consent in its northern Syrian zone of influence. The West is currently capitulating to Islamofascism, which – historically and socio-economically speaking – it promoted in two ways. On the one hand, it was the many billions of Western and Saudi US dollars that flowed to the Taliban’s predecessors, the Afghan Mujahideen fighting Soviet troops, in the final phase of the Cold War that gave militant Islamism an enormous boost (Osama Bin Laden famously fought in Afghanistan). The Taliban specifically formed in refugee camps and madrasas that sprang up – funded by the Saudis – in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area during the war against the Soviets to indoctrinate children in the emerging Islamist ideology.

At the same time, the world crisis of capital choking on its productivity – which, precisely because of the increasing capital intensiveness of commodity production in the centers, first hit the capital-weak, peripheral regions of the world market in full – creates the socio-economic foundations for the rise of extremist movements in the collapsing periphery. Islamism thus represents – similar to the nationally and racially based European fascism – a terrorist crisis form of capitalist rule, which gains momentum wherever the course of the crisis has progressed far enough and the corresponding cultural foundations are in place.

The twenty-year struggle of U.S. troops and NATO against the Taliban thus resembled a senseless windmill fight in which the West fought against the ghosts of crisis that it itself directly and indirectly produced. The sophisticated late capitalist military machine fought – with barbaric methods – on economically scorched earth against the barbaric end products of the crisis of capital. The U.S. and its NATO allies wanted to finance and literally bomb the superstructure of a capitalist state with billions in subsidies, without realizing that there was no economic basis for it.

For the time being, Afghanistan will probably remain the last futile attempt at “nation building” by Western crisis imperialism. The new aspect of the current escalation in Afghanistan is that not only Berlin, but the West as a whole is coming to accept this religiously based crisis ideology, this Islamic fascism, as a factor of order in the periphery that is supposed to keep the superfluous masses of the global South in check, in order to prevent them from fleeing to the centers – all the more important in view of the full-blown climate crisis. The Taliban are also aware of this, as the interview with the New York Times makes clear. The repressive model of crisis management established by Berlin, in which Islamist regimes or rackets are literally paid to stop emigration, threatens to become a new, dystopian reality in the current crisis imperialism.

The transition from neoliberal, formally democratic capitalism, where rule unfolds without a subject, through the mediating levels of the market and the judicial apparatus, to openly authoritarian crisis management now seems to be taking place. Even the facade of Freedom and Democracy is being dropped, with Biden again merely continuing the policies of his right-wing populist predecessor in office. This authoritarian turn is first taking hold in the periphery – but, as illustrated by the militarization of the US police apparatus, it will soon rebound on the centers as well.


  1. https://www.deutschlandradio.de/oberst-klein-wird-general.331.de.html?dram:article_id=217621
  1. https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2021-08/angela-merkel-afghanistan-regierungserklaerung-evakuierung-bundeswehr-kritik-bundesregierung
  1. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/25/world/asia/taliban-spokesman-interview.html
  1. https://www.businessinsider.com/afghanistan-taliban-set-a-woman-on-fire-for-bad-cooking-2021-8?IR=T
  1. https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-africa-afghanistan-taliban-islamic-state-group-8b54562a8676906d497952c9e3f0cfda
  1. http://www.konicz.info/?p=4430
  1. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/569838-as-afghanistan-crumbles-turkeys-airstrikes-set-up-the-next-disaster
  1. http://www.konicz.info/?p=4430
  1. http://www.konicz.info/?p=4343
  1. https://anfdeutsch.com/rojava-syrien/kobane-kriegsversehrte-protestieren-gegen-turkische-angriffe-28065
  1. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210817-3-dead-as-turkey-raids-north-iraq-clinic-security-medics

Originally published on 09/10/2021

The Socio-Psychological Matrix of The Bourgeois Subject in Crisis

A Reading of Freudian Psychoanalysis from A Value-Dissociation-Critical Perspective

Leni Wissen

Introduction

This article draws its inspiration from two motivations. The first is determining the ‘socio-psychological matrix’ of the bourgeois subject based on a reading of Freudian psychoanalysis developed from a value-dissociation-critical perspective. The background of this endeavor is the insight that the objective dynamics of the value-dissociation form sustain capitalist society, but that this does not result in a determinism of social trajectories, due to the dialectical relationship between value and dissociation. This means that the thinking, acting and feeling of people cannot be derived directly from the form of value-dissociation – and yet the capitalist organization is sustained by people who reproduce the abstract categories of value-dissociation in their thinking, acting and feeling every day without being aware of it. So, the question arises as to how these abstract categories are internalized into people’s feelings, thoughts and actions, or, to put it another way, how the subject becomes a subject at all.

Because the form of capitalist socialization does not show itself abstractly, but is mediated with its empirical trajectories, the subject and its socio-psychological mediations are also subject to the dynamic nature of capitalist socialization. This is the second motivation of the text. For in the course of the postmodern crisis processes, a new socio-psychological formation of narcissism has spread. In the experimentation with differences and in the wake of deconstructivism, a narcissistic social type was able to develop. The constant tinkering with one’s own identity became a virtue – indeed, a proof of one’s own flexibility. The constant redesigning of one’s own life was thereby an expression of a narcissistic social type. In the meantime, it has become clear that the spread of the narcissistic social type is by no means as harmless as it might have seemed in the colorful (mascaraed) hustle and bustle of postmodernism since the 1980s/90s. The crisis surges since the late 2000s have shattered the illusion of a never-ending party, and the reality of the crisis is breaking out ever more drastically. This constellation encounters a narcissistic social character whose fragile ego makes him highly susceptible to being offended or threatened. The ability to immediately move from one position to another – especially when one sees themselves threatened – is inherent in the narcissistic social character. With this, however, the narcissistic social type, who is losing more and more opportunities to keep its fragile self alive, is very susceptible to banishing its narcissistic fears of powerlessness into ‘new’ unambiguities. This is precisely the gateway for anti-Semitism, anti-gypsyism, racism, anti-feminism, neo-fascism, etc… Not least for this reason, a critique of the narcissistic social character against the background of a radical critique of the subject is necessary.

Terminal Crisis and Its Displacement

A look at the enforcement and development of capitalist-patriarchal society reveals that the internal history of capitalism is riddled with crises. Capitalist socialization and crises cannot be thought of separately. Since the 1970s, however, a process of crisis has now become apparent that raises the question of an “absolute inner barrier of capital” (Kurz 2007, 280). Karl Marx had already pointed out the possibility of an ‘inner barrier of capital’; the crisis theory of the critique of value-dissociation sees this ‘absolute inner barrier of the socialization of value’ becoming historically topical with the emergence of the crisis processes in the context of the third industrial revolution. Because of the microelectronic revolution, more labor is made superfluous in society as a whole than can be compensated for by the expansion of markets and the like. The critique of value-dissociation has pointed these connections out many times.

The effects of the postmodern crisis tendency are no longer only observed in the so-called ‘periphery,’ but are becoming increasingly evident in the core. Symptoms of the worldwide crisis process in this country are unemployment (or the spread of precarious employment), the erosion of the welfare state, the ‘return of poverty’ associated with these processes (which in any case could only be imagined as overcome in a small part of capitalist history, among a small part of the world’s population), as well as the confrontation with refugee crises and violent rampages on our doorstep. Despite the crisis phenomena that are becoming more than evident worldwide and on various levels, the possibility of a ‘final crisis’ of capitalism seems to be categorically excluded – indeed, this possibility is denied and repressed. Thus, the absurd situation has arisen that, despite the catastrophes and narrowing scope of possibilities everywhere, radical criticism of capitalist society is marginal, at best, and is even exposed to the fiercest hostility.

With regard to the perception of crisis processes and how they are dealt with, there are frightening similarities between the spectrum on the left – from ‘left-wing’ parties to groups/alliances that see themselves as extremely radical, etc. – and ‘mainstream society,’ or even right-wing and neo-fascist voices. You can see how the desire for immediate action aggressively suppresses the question of an analysis of the crisis conditions or an understanding of what is really happening, and pushes any question of content into the background. In other words, there is no questioning of the issue at hand, not to mention an analysis of its connection with the totality of society. At the same time, the fact that immediate action, in combination with the elimination of all content, is not only limited to the perception and handling of the named crisis processes, but also shows itself in all pores of social life, is an expression of the society-wide repression of the realization of the “inner barrier of capital.” It seems to be almost irrelevant what the issue is. If a problem arises, it must be reacted to immediately, without a moment of pause and reflection that could potentially irritate such action. For complex problems, culprits or responsible parties must be identified immediately. Thus, a complex problem becomes manageable. It appears as if the problem can be eliminated by immediate action toward the guilty parties. Instead of the insight that there can be no solutions in the value-dissociation form, attempts are made to banish the resulting powerlessness in an action-fetishistic way. These are the reasons why Pegida, AFD, and other right-wing movements were able to spread so quickly: they offer simple explanations and solutions that also serve as an outlet for racist, anti-Muslim, anti-Semitic, etc. attitudes (see text by Daniel Späth in this issue).

This aggressive suppression of questions of content always occurs in combination with an equally aggressive ‘niceness terrorism’ – a term by Daniel Späth. There seems to be an addiction to harmony that threatens to level all ambivalences and contradictions. The general cult of concern seems to further fuel this tendency. Contents can only be perceived and processed with direct reference to one’s own self: if they fit into one’s own ‘self’-conception, immediate identifications occur, if they do not fit, they are destroyed, and, if they are not understood, either blame is put on the mediator (because one’s own gigantic self immediately understands everything, after all), or the content is experienced as an imposition, an insult or even a slight, which all the more throws a correspondingly negative light on the mediator. And since everyone ought to be ‘nice’ to each other, it is not considered ‘nice’ at all to express such a complex thought in the first place, and it is possibly even judged as a personal ‘assault.’ In this process, all questions of content thus become personal matters.

It must now be explained why immediate action, the cult of concern, the addiction to harmony, etc. have become so widespread as a way of reacting to and dealing with living conditions that are becoming ever more complex and hopeless. This question sheds light on why radical social critique that reflects on the inner barrier of value-dissociation socialization has such a hard time; because, as the outlined phenomena have already indicated, there is a ‘limit of mediation’ that lies, so to speak, in the subjects themselves.

The postmodern subject is above all a subject in crisis, undergoing a process in which the foundations of bourgeois subjectivity are constantly being eroded. To put it simply, it is about the working subject who is running out of work. This must be processed. The nature of this processing, despite all individual differences, cannot simply be freely chosen, insofar as this process is decisively structured by the socio-psychological matrix of the capitalist subject.

Postmodern Crisis Processes and the Emergence of a Narcissistic Social Type

Before I take a closer look at the socio-psychological matrix of the bourgeois subject, however, I would first like to outline in key terms the phenomena that are connected with a change, on the level of social character, toward the narcissistic type, or that have helped to drive this change.

  • Even though the term postmodernism already appears toward the end of the 19th century, this term indicates an epochal rupture within the internal history of capitalism, which has come to a social breakthrough as a result of the neoliberal reforms. Robert Kurz sees postmodernism as the “ensemble of a crisis capitalism that misunderstands itself as postindustrial” (Kurz 1999, 7).
  • In barely two decades, the Third Industrial Revolution has conjured up the greatest world crisis since 1929: In the capitalist core countries, mass unemployment has returned, and in the periphery, “along with ‘abstract labor,’ the money economy in many countries has already collapsed” – as Robert Kurz wrote back in 1999 (Kurz 2005, first: 1999, 739). This, then, merely describes the beginning of the incipient postmodern crisis developments. The collapse of the monetary economy combined with the collapse of statehood has long since reached European states as well. The trouble spots all over the world can hardly be counted…
  • The flight of financial capital into the ‘realm of speculation’ – a development that was already a clear sign of crisis at the beginning of the 20th century – is an indication of how unprofitable real investments have become. Capital accumulation is shifting from real to speculative spaces, becoming a simulation. The fragility of this simulated capital accumulation becomes clear again and again when the bubbles begin to pop and very real catastrophes suddenly burst out of the financial sky.
  • Even the processes of globalization could not compensate for the contradictory dynamics of the capitalist mode of production. Nevertheless, globalization has had an impact on social life: new technologies and, above all, the Internet have created new networking possibilities that are less tied to regional contexts.
  • In view of the massive increase in unemployment in the 1970s, a process of social cuts began which, among other things, led to the spread of precarious employment and finally culminated in the so-called “Hartz reforms” in Germany.
  • Parallel to these developments, a social process began in the 1980s that has entered the sociological literature under the term individualization. This process must be seen in the context of changing working conditions and demands. With the spread of unemployment or precarious employment, the basis of the bourgeois ‘normal biography’ collapsed: an education no longer guarantees a permanent employment relationship. The new ‘freedoms’ that have repeatedly been associated with the concept of individualization, e.g., being less dependent on one’s family of origin and fixed biographies, have come at the price of a loss of security and orientation. Individuals are expected to take more and more responsibility for the success of their biographies. This in turn means that it is up to individuals to keep themselves ready, fit and healthy for the labor market. Not being able to keep up is an expression of a poor work-life balance and not a problem of objective constraints. The shift of responsibility to the individual forces an ‘ego-centeredness’ – after all, this is a prerequisite for being able to keep up at all under conditions that are becoming increasingly individualized and flexible.
  • The bourgeois nuclear family could not remain unaffected by the processes just outlined (insecure, precarious employment, individualization, flexibilization). It is exposed to enormous dissolution processes. High divorce rates, the widespread phenomenon of ‘single mothers’ and so-called ‘patch-work families’ are expressions of these processes. The family has become less important in terms of the socialization of children and young people, but it has not disappeared as an authority. Peer groups, the omnipresence of media, and technical devices such as smartphones and the like, which shape the new form of relating to the environment, have pushed back the role of the nuclear family.
  • In addition, family structures are also dissolving from within: Entering into fixed relationships and the obligations and responsibilities that go with them seems to be perceived as a threat on a broad level. Thus, people speak of ‘life-interval companions’ to make clear in advance that the connection is only entered into for a limited period. Having children has become a question of complementing one’s own biography: if a child fits into the concept of life, it is brought into the world at a precisely planned time. If children do not meet one’s own narcissistic expectations, the clamor is great, and the child is dragged from the doctor to the therapist to the psychiatrist, to be diagnosed with ‘social behavior disorder’ and/or ‘ADHD’ and sedated with medication.
  • The almost general inability to enter into obligatory contact with others already points to narcissistic character structures. It can be observed at every turn how people can only perceive and process the world in relation to their own self. This indicates that no clear distinction can be made between inside and outside. Thus, any object (another person or even content, among other things) can become an immediate threat to one’s own easily offended ‘narcissistic self.’
  • It is not coincidental that the term ‘self’ has been mentioned many times. There is a history to this term: It was the ego and self psychology which made an idealistically constructed self out of Freud’s confrontationally conceived ego, which is then simply positivistically regarded as set. There is no ‘I that develops (confrontationally)’ in ego and self psychology. Rather, the ego or self is always already there, and it is merely a matter of calling up the self-development potentials inherent in the heaven-fallen self from birth. Thus, those who cannot keep up in the working society have simply not yet found a way to activate their powers of self-development.
  • The postmodern demands to constantly ‘work on oneself’ and to ‘optimize oneself’ hardly leave out any area of life: the postmodern subject is supposed to always be flexible, willing to perform and fit – both on a physical and on a psychological level. As Ulrich Bröckling pointed out in his book ‘The Entrepreneurial Self,’ self-optimization is an incomplete process that has little chance of success (cf. Bröckling 2016).
  • The expression of this is the ‘career of depression.’ Alain Ehrenberg writes: “Depression began its ascent when the disciplinary model for behaviors, the rules of authority and observance of taboos that gave social classes as well as both sexes a specific destiny, broke against norms that invited us to undertake personal initiative by enjoining us to be ourselves” (Ehrenberg 2010, 4). Depression is thus a “illness of responsibility in which the dominant feeling is that of failure” (ibid. Emphasis in the original).
  • With the rise of depression, markers have already been set that indicate the direction for a change at the level of social character in the face of postmodern crisis processes. On the pathological level, the shift toward the narcissistic social type is expressed in a shift from neurotic to depressive illness. Thus, Ehrenberg writes: “Depression teaches us about our current experience as an individual because it is the pathology of a society whose norm is no longer based on guilt and discipline but on responsibility and initiative. […] The depressed individual is a person out of gas” (ibid., 9).
  • The excessive demands that accompanied behavioral norms based on guilt and discipline broke out in neurosis as an expression of an underlying conflict between desire and repression. Depression, on the other hand, is not characterized by a conflict, but is an expression of the narcissistic inability to make contact with the world of objects – psychoanalytically speaking, depression is an expression of an inability to occupy objects libidinously. However, an object can only be libidinously occupied if it can be perceived as an object outside the narcissistic universe.
  • For Freud, melancholia, which in its symptomatology bears some resemblance to depression, was in a sense a clinical (i.e., pathological) form of mourning. The distinction between mourning and melancholia becomes clear in Freud’s answer to the question of what the ‘work of mourning’ consists in: “Reality-testing has shown that the loved object no longer exists, and it proceeds to demand that all libido shall be withdrawn from its attachments to that object” (Freud 1976b, 3042). This process is conscious. Melancholia, however, is about an ‘unknown loss.’ Freud writes: “In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself” (ibid., 3043).
  • What Freud wrote in 1917 with regard to melancholy is certainly true with regard to depression. Depression is the expression of an emptiness, which is the flip side of the permanent overload of always having to work on and optimize oneself.
  • The constant manifestations of concern are an expression of the inability to name that which ‘concerns’ – to be able to do so would require not perceiving the world exclusively from one’s own narcissistic universe and recognizing the world of objects as existing outside one’s own ego. With the inability to recognize the world of objects as existing outside of one’s own narcissistic universe, the possibilities of reflection also break away: problems, burdens, confusing experiences etc. can no longer be named, no longer be brought up. Everything remains diffuse, somehow you just don’t feel well, everything is too much, you just don’t feel like doing anything anymore.
  • Another type of narcissistic processing in its extreme form is running amok. Here a narcissistic megalomania acts out, which carries out its self-constitution via its self-destruction and the destruction of others.

Out of all these processes the narcissistic social character has sprung as a child of postmodernity. The postmodern conditions are above all an expression of the objective crisis dynamics of the value-dissociation socialization. And only by taking this crisis dynamic into account it is possible to understand the triumph of narcissism. For the spread of the narcissistic social type is an expression of the disintegrating bourgeois-capitalist subject, which is incessantly digging its own grave. Narcissism has thus become the last resort for the decomposing subject of the value-dissociation society.

The Critique of Value-Dissociation and Psychoanalysis

The critique of value-dissociation focuses on the analysis and critique of the capitalistically constituted totality. In doing so, it does not serve a universalistic concept of totality. Value-dissociation critique starts from an ‘in itself broken totality’ (cf. Roswitha Scholz, 2009) and thus takes the driving dialectic of value and dissociation into account. Accordingly, different levels of the ‘in itself broken totality’ must be kept apart in the critique, without therefore losing the reference to the level of form.

This understanding of totality results from the insight that the capitalist-patriarchal organization works into all social spheres – and thus also into the drive structure, which is carried, driven and reproduced by a ‘social unconscious.’ In order to clarify the question of why people reproduce the capitalist principles of form in their everyday actions, feelings and thoughts, it is thus necessary to clarify different levels: the level of form, the level of the subject as the agent of the commodity-producing patriarchy, the ideological, the cultural-symbolic and socio-psychological level. All these levels must be interrogated again and again in relation to current phenomena and developments – that is, in relation to the ‘concrete totality,’ which tries to accommodate the individual without losing its relation to the totality.

Psychoanalysis is indispensable for the clarification of the socio-psychological level (and with restrictions, also for the cultural-symbolic level). This is because it focuses on the processes of mediation between society and the individual and poses the question of subject genesis. However, it is not a contradiction-free subject – neither in relation to Freudian psychoanalysis itself nor in relation to its historical reception. It should be noted here that, on the whole, a taming of psychoanalytic thinking has taken place, which can be seen in the displacement of the concept of drive from the inner-psychoanalytic debate: Freud’s conflictual ‘I’ became, in the environment of a corresponding ego or self psychology, a contradiction-free ‘I,’ which no longer knows any drive conflict. The ‘de-libidinization’ of psychoanalysis corresponds to the social developments of a general psychologization and individualization of social contexts and a centering on a conflict-free imagined ‘self’ or ‘I.’

From a value-critical point of view, however, it is precisely the banished libido theory that could be made fruitful. With the help of Freud’s metapsychology, which itself is not free of contradictions and admittedly must also be subjected to critical examination, it is possible to describe the socio-psychological matrix of the subject. According to this reading, ego, id, and superego are the central instances that shape the psychological form of the subject. At the same time, they are expressions of underlying drive dynamics and conflicts.

The Freudian Libido Theory from a Value-Critical Perspective

First of all, the historical situation in which Freud developed psychoanalysis must be clarified. Here it quickly becomes clear that Freud was referring to the bourgeois subject, which had only just established itself and, after a brief period of flourishing, was already in crisis (cf. ‘Civilization and Its Discontents,’ Freud). Now, the bourgeois subject did not simply fall from the sky, but was the result of the brutal history of the enforcement of capitalist-patriarchal society, which extended over centuries, was pushed forward on many different levels, and was finally connected with a restructuring of all areas of life. Here are just a few key points that may have played a role in this history of enforcement:

  • The emergence of manufacturing because of the absolutist hunger for money due to the costs of warfare, with the development of firearms likely being partially responsible for the spiraling costs.
  • Inculcating the work ethic in workhouses as a prerequisite for factory work.
  • The newly emerging mode of production was associated with the dissociation of the spheres of production and reproduction, with women assigned to the area of reproduction. This assignment forms the basis for the emergence of the bourgeois nuclear family.
  • These developments were accompanied by a ‘domestication of women as natural beings’ (witch hunts), which in turn refers not least to the fact that a completely new relationship to nature emerged (androcentric domination of nature).
  • The internalization of the ‘work ethic’ and the emergence of corresponding ideologues, which ultimately culminated in Enlightenment philosophy.

In the context of these processes of upheaval, the bourgeois subject has asserted itself with a corresponding socio-psychological matrix. The bourgeois subject and its socio-psychological matrix are centrally based on the dissociation of the feminine, the phantasm of the mastery of nature and the imagination of self-constitution. They are also essentially linked to the internalization of the work ethic. Corresponding to this is a drive dynamic in which, when drives surge, the libido skyrockets in joyful anticipation of the ‘reward for this failure.’ This ‘trick’ of the libido to deal with drive refusals also lays the track for drive sublimation processes. The necessity for drive sublimation arises with the enforcement of the capitalist mode of production and the expenditure of abstract labor demanded by it. Thus, it becomes clear that the capitalist social formation could not remain external to the drive structure. From this it can be concluded: Only with the capitalist patriarchy does a drive structure emerge in which ego, id, and superego interact as separate instances that conflict with each other and thus mediate the psychological dynamics. This form of psychological mediation has thus only emerged in the wake of the historical assertion of capitalism. Freud, of course, did not write it this way; this is part of the interpretation of Freud made here, which is based on reading Freud in the context of the historical situation in which he developed his theory.

Moreover, this reading of Freud’s psychoanalysis is only possible against the background of a radical critique of the Enlightenment and the subject – this also means that Freud’s concept of the subject must be criticized in its affirmation of the Enlightenment. For the Enlightenment must be understood as an “‘enforcement ideology’ of the commodity-producing system” (Kurz 2004, 18). The Enlightenment produced the modern subject and at the same time equated all people living under capitalism with this subject (cf. ibid.). The subject as the “modern actor of abstract labor and its derivative functions” is nothing other than the “social form of individuals’ own activity: form of perception, of thought, of relation, of activity” (Kurz 2016, 184f). The subject is thus not identical with the socially sensible individual, but rather “the conscious (individual as well as institutional) bearer of the subjectless movement of valorization” (Kurz 2004, 57).

For the critique of the socio-psychological form of the subject, this means that here, too, a distinction must be made between subject and individual. For the social-sensual individual is confronted with the socio-psychological matrix of the bourgeois subject, but does not merge into it. The socio-psychological matrix provides, so to speak, the psychological form in which psychological mediation takes place.

However, the socio-psychological level cannot be derived from the subject concept. On the one hand, this is forbidden against the background of a critique of deductive logic. On the other hand, the psychological form is in a certain way also prior to the subject, insofar as it is the precondition for becoming a subject. In view are the processes of subject genesis or reproduction of the subject as ‘agent’ of the capitalist-patriarchal organization. And this is true both at the ‘individual level’ (i.e., in relation to the question of why people repeatedly form the subject position and reproduce it in their thinking, acting, and feeling) and at the level of the emergence of the psychological form itself. The latter, as already indicated above, emerged in the context of the enforcement of modern patriarchy. The socio-psychological matrix of the subject is supported or reproduced not least by a ‘social unconscious,’ which is also the result of the real demanded drive suppression (see above) and reproduces itself in every process of ‘becoming a subject.’

Gender-Differentiated Trajectories of Psychosocial Development.

The constitution of the (male) subject is accompanied by the dissociation of the feminine. In other words, the dissociation of the feminine is the mute precondition of the male-bourgeois subject. This relationship of the (male) subject to the dissociation extends into an ‘androcentric unconscious’ and reproduces itself in the form of the Oedipus complex in individual life histories. This interpretation is based not least on the fact that Freud himself conceptualized the Oedipus complex both at the level of phylogenesis (i.e., the genesis of the subject) – in ‘Totem and Taboo’ patricide is described as a founding act that is passed on from generation to generation as an (unconscious) inheritance or repeated in the Oedipus complex (cf. Freud 1976) – and at the level of ontogenesis (the development of the single individual). However, it is precisely Freud’s concept of phylogenesis that must be critically examined in terms of its ontological moments. In this respect, Freud’s concepts cannot simply be taken up hastily.

Freud, of course, conceived his Oedipus complex in this context without consideration of the value-dissociation structure. Nevertheless, Freud has an eye for the gender-differentiated psychosexual development. Thus, along the Oedipus complex, he describes ‘male’ and ‘female’ libido fates.

Before I discuss the gender-differentiated progression of psychological development, I would like to note that when I speak of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ in the following, it is by no means a matter of ontologizing these terms, but rather of taking into account the socio-psychological matrix of the subject, which is profoundly two-gendered or based on the dissociation of the feminine. Within the socio-psychological matrix, femininity and masculinity are markers that psychosexual development cannot bypass, and thus they must be conceptualized. With the modern two-gender model, women as well as men have been/are forced to form gender identities in the progressive forms of ‘male’ and ‘female,’ with femininity devalued from the outset. Femininity is the absence of the phallus, deficiency par excellence. This ‘void’ that femininity then leaves is well suited to accommodate male projections. The fact that ‘femininity’ has to serve as a projection surface – in the familiar projection directions of mother/wife and whore – is an expression of the value-dissociation structure. These masculine projections are, first of all, an expression of the fact that the dissociation of the feminine precedes the constitution of the (male) subject. However, they also show that the dissociation of the feminine is not an act that is accomplished once, but rather is one that pushes for constant repetition. In this respect, ‘femininity’ is not a ‘dark continent’ by chance, and should/must remain so.

This has consequences for female psychosexual development and its analysis. Thus, ‘femininity’ must correspond to the requirements of the male side and must not be anything ‘on its own’ outside the ‘male’ catchment area. In this sense, it is almost absurd to speak of a ‘female psychological form’ at all, since this form consists mainly in having to be ‘formless.’ This is also reflected in the ‘female’ libido fate as described by Freud: in the male course, the male child, under the threat of castration emanating from the father, gives up the desire it directs toward the mother to bow to the paternal law through identification. In the most favorable case, this development leads to the ‘demise of the Oedipus complex’ (cf. Freud, Oedipus). In contrast, the female child, who does not have to fear castration – because it has already been accomplished – runs into the Oedipus complex ‘as into a haven of refuge’ (Freud 1976e, 4731). The background of this movement is the discovery of the difference between the sexes. The disappointment about ‘one’s own deficiency’ is blamed on the mother, and this makes it possible to turn to the father. From the father, the girl hopes for a (male) child to compensate for penis envy and to restitute herself narcissistically. Thus, the absence of the phallus or this discovery is decisive for the female libido fate. The background of this development is a ‘phallocentric-androcentric unconscious,’ which reproduces itself again and again in the gender-differentiated pathways. Thus, phallocentrism structures the ‘formless’ female psychological form.

Christa Rhode-Dachser rightly criticizes the ‘patriarchal foundation’ of psychoanalysis. She also calls “Freud’s theory of female development” “a theory of non-individuation [] which […] served the adaptation of women to the gender role intended for them at that time” (Rhode-Dachser 2003, 5. Emphasis in original). This statement can be agreed with in part; for, of course, female psychosexual development is attuned to the role intended for women. And it is also true that Freud describes the female libido fate in an affirmative way. Nevertheless, it is not Freud’s theory that is responsible for the female libido fate, but the social conditions of the value-dissociation form. In this respect, it would also be a mistake to simply throw Freud in the garbage can since his theory is androcentric in nature. Rather, it is important to subject Freud to a feminist critique and, against this background, to ask why Freud described the female libido fate as he did.

In addition, Rhode-Dachser’s hypostasis of the feminine is apparent. But it cannot be a matter of searching for a ‘femininity’ beyond phallocentrism. In ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ the value-dissociation structure shows itself. Thus, it would be completely wrong to look for a somehow ‘better,’ even ‘non-identical,’ in ‘femininity’ – Roswitha Scholz has pointed this out again and again. For a critique of capitalist gender relations, this means that ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ must be seen as two poles within the value-dissociation socialization and must be criticized as such – of course, the hierarchical status of the ‘masculine’ and the discrimination of the ‘feminine’ connected to it must not be underestimated. With regard to ‘femininity’ this means that first of all an idea of what is hidden in the ‘dark continent’ would have to be developed. In this sense, the question of a psychoanalytic theory of femininity would have to be posed anew.

Christa Rhode-Dachser is not alone in her attempt to develop a feminist reading of psychoanalysis. Other authors have also dealt with this question. However, the fact that these authors repeatedly hypostatize the “feminine” is certainly not accidental. Here, the fact that feminist-psychoanalytically oriented theory has dealt too little with a critique of the subject takes its revenge. Instead of radically questioning the subject form itself, it tries to develop a theory of femininity beyond phallocentrism that enables women to be ‘subject.’

Crisis Processes and a Narcissistic Social Character

By now it should be clear that the ‘socio-psychological matrix’ of the subject could not withstand the postmodern crisis processes. Gainful employment and family as supporting agencies of socialization break down more and more in the context of general processes of flexibilization and individualization, and thus pillars that were indispensable for the socio-psychological development of the bourgeois subject fall away. But again: the form of psychological processing does not simply dissolve, it still indicates the paths of socio-psychological development – but under postmodern auspices, this path can only lead to narcissism. As I will show, narcissism is already inherent in the constitution of the subject, but it seems to implode, so to speak, under postmodern crisis conditions. The postmodern social character is a profoundly narcissistic one – and this is likely to be true, albeit in different trajectories, for both ‘female’ and ‘male’ characters. What they have in common, so to speak, is the high degree of ‘self’-reference as an expression of their narcissism.

What has changed with regard to the socio-psychological form of the subject in the face of postmodern crisis processes can be illustrated by a quotation from the book ‘The World as Will and Design’ [Die Welt als Wille und Design] (Robert Kurz). Robert Kurz writes:

“The absence of social relationships means nothing other than being a commodity on two legs; ‘expressive individualism’ must also shift to the outfit, because behind the clothes there is only the specter of an individual. Adorno was never more topical than in the postmodern times of the Love Parade, whose followers really do commit a gross impertinence when they say ‘I’” (Kurz 1999, 49).

This quotation can be interpreted against the background of Freud’s concept of the ego. Freud writes in the text ‘On the Introduction of Narcissism’ (1914): “We are bound to suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from the start; the ego has to be developed. (Freud 1976a, 2934). Freud names ‘primary narcissism’ as the decisive driving force of the constitution of the ego. For this – writes Lili Gast as an interpretation of Freud’s train of thought – “initiates a dynamic self-reference in objective self-perception, which ultimately results in the constitution of subjectivity” (Gast 1992, 52). The initial constitution of the ego is a narcissistic one. In Freud’s concept of ego, narcissism is firmly inscribed as the driving engine. However, Freud saw the overcoming of primary narcissism as the central step in ego development. With regard to the socio-psychological matrix of the postmodern subject, we can now assume a dominance of a ‘narcissistic ego’ as the carrier of psychological mediation – an ‘ego,’ in other words, that actually cannot call itself ‘I’ in the sense described above.

Against the background of narcissism, it then also becomes clear why such a delusion of immediacy, as I have described it above, can spread in such a way. Because this goes along with a psychological structure which also pushes for immediacy. Freud describes the ‘subject-object unity’ of primary narcissism as a developmentally specific ‘recognition of reality’ or ‘reinterpretation of reality’ (cf. ibid. 52ff or Freud 1976a, 2931ff). This means that the world of objects can only be directly incorporated by the narcissistic ‘subject-object-unit,’ or must be repelled and destroyed (psychologically) if it threatens the narcissistic integrity.

With regard to the background of origin and the immanent transformations of the socio-psychological matrix of the subject, it can be assumed that different manifestations overlap and coexist. Thus, the ‘authoritarian personality’ did not exist in pure form, and so today the ‘postmodern social character’ does not exist in pure form. Socio-psychological trajectories cannot be thought in a straight line, neither on the level of the description of a social character nor on the individual level. At this point, once again, consideration of the underlying drive dynamics is central: for these are linked to a specific temporal logic in which what is past is not simply past and ‘unconscious’ is not simply ‘unconscious.’ The drive dynamic pushes for the past and unconscious to be flushed up when the present demands or permits it. This means, banally speaking, that ‘old,’ ‘resolved’ conflicts can become virulent again under the impression of a changed reality and now take new paths of processing or repression. Thus, it can be assumed that the narcissistic social character is not only to be observed in the younger generations, but also in older generations, who are not spared from the narcissistic pull. The fact that it is precisely the ‘narcissistic trajectories’ that are taken has to do with a reality that also pushes towards narcissistic positions because of its complexity and hopelessness.

The postmodern narcissistic type in particular cannot be thought of as a rigid figure in view of the general processes of flexibilization and individualization, insofar as the postmodern subject is flexible to the point of self-destruction. This also means that the narcissistic type can pass from one extreme to the next completely abruptly. The ‘narcissistic ego’ and the corresponding mediation of drive processes are extremely ‘flexible’ and adaptable in their immediacy, which may be due not least to the lack of formation of the object libido. This in turn is an expression of an immediate (narcissistic) access to the ‘world of objects.’

Therefore, it is not at all surprising that ego-, self-, and object-relational psychology could prevail against drive theory. The far-reaching purge of psychoanalytic theory from the drive concept corresponds to the real developments of a focus on the narcissistic self. These developments have been affirmatively taken up – or anticipated – by ego-, self-, and object-relational theories, and thus these theories can be interpreted as theories of adaptation to postmodern impositions. This can also be seen, for example, in the fact that these theories – whether intentionally or not – have found their way into the ‘new management literature’ and are thus also part of the intellectual-historical background of the ‘entrepreneurial self’ (cf. Bröckling 2016).

The purification of psychoanalytic theory from the concept of libido in the context of ego-, self-, and object-relational psychology does not mean that with the elimination of the concept the thing itself has disappeared. The ‘drive’ or the dynamic it sets in motion does not disappear; rather, the conditions for a ‘successful’ sublimation in the bourgeois sense break away. This means that the drive dynamic itself had to change qualitatively and the processes of a (in the bourgeois sense) ‘successful’ ‘ego’ development, in which the ego is a stable mediating agency between id (the drive-like moments) and superego (the ‘paternal’ – patriarchal – law) (whereby it should be clear that, in view of the immanent history of crisis, a ‘stable ego’ can never actually be assumed), are blocked. The narcissistic withdrawal or self-reference is an expression of this reality.

Crisis Gender

Against the background of the critique of value dissociation, it is now necessary to question the spread of the narcissistic social character in terms of its gender-specific implications. Here, it must first be stated that in the wake of the postmodern developments described above – also favored by gender and queer theory – there has indeed been an equalization of the ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ gender codes. Women as well as men seem to be less fixed to their traditional social roles. This equalization of the ‘codes’ is not least an expression of the fact that, due to the real processes of crisis, the gender roles shaped by the two sexes are increasingly losing their possibilities of realization and are visibly coming into conflict with the demands of the postmodern ‘compulsory flexible individual’ (Roswitha Scholz). The question is how the narcissistic social character mediates this equalization of gender-differentiated codes. Psychoanalytically, the primary narcissistic stage does not yet know gender difference. Thus, the narcissistic social character also does not simply develop along the rigid lines of ‘male’ and ‘female.’

However, it would be fatal to think of the narcissistic social character as gender-neutral or as independent of the two-gender matrix because of the loosening of gender boundaries described above. Even if the boundaries between the ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ trajectories are blurred, this does not mean that the differential gender forms and the hierarchy associated with them have simply disappeared. The narcissistic social character is, after all, characterized by the fact that it can pass abruptly from one extreme to the other, since its object ties – to put it euphemistically – are quite loose. Even if the primary narcissistic stage does not know the difference between genders, it knows the ‘phallus’ very well. Both girls and boys in the primary narcissistic stage assume that they possess a ‘phallus.’ This means that phallocentrism has not been overcome even when there has been some equalization of binary codes. And under the domination of the ‘phallus,’ in the context of the value-dissociation society, even the binary codes cannot simply disappear. Rather, the ‘feralization of patriarchy’ (Roswitha Scholz) is also evident here: the codes ‘male’ – ‘female’ do not simply disappear, but go wild – and this happens not least against the background of the codes having lost their ‘meaning’ in real terms, since they no longer coincide with reality. So, it is hardly surprising that the postmodern softie-man can still celebrate the play with the genders at a ‘queer party’ today, and write a ‘Manifesto for the Man’ tomorrow, in which he laments the crisis of masculinity and advocates a flat anti-feminism. The supposed equalization of the different gender codes happens through the different gender forms, so that the apparent equalization can also turn back into gender essentialism at any time. This hard-as-nails changeover from colorful gender hustle and bustle into gender essentialism is an expression of narcissistically shaped crisis gender. With the subject, its gender is also at an end.

The incursion of gender and queer theory has not only encouraged the spread of the narcissistic social character, but has also brought feminism – although it has suddenly become prominent – into a situation in which it must once again fight for survival. Mediated via gender theory, the postmodern repression of all content and of a claim to truth was carried into feminism and here wreaked its havoc. Now it is precisely gender theory that cannot explain why, despite the equalization of the binary gender codes, the hierarchical gender relationship has not disappeared, or why it even seems to have been revived. In retrospect, it turns out that gender and queer theory were a vehicle or expression for the spreading crisis gender under narcissistic auspices and now cannot understand the result of their drifting, since their conceptual tools do not reach beyond the cultural-symbolic level. Thus, gender and queer theory must also escape the ‘feralization of patriarchy’ (Roswitha Scholz), or else it cannot explain the individual phenomena that make clear the hierarchical gender relations that still exist.

In view of the worsening gender relations, it would be important for feminist thinking to face up to the “feralization of patriarchy” and to perceive how it acts out. A look at the worldwide crisis shows that, despite the (still) colorful gender hustle and bustle (in this country), a crisis masculinity has long since spread, which finds its expression above all in a brutalization of gender relations. Addiction and violence are everyday phenomena of masculine crisis subjectivity – a combination that may also have played a role in the New Year’s Eve sexual assaults in Cologne, Germany. It is evident that sublimation possibilities and thus inhibition thresholds for the direct acting out of affects are breaking down. This is an expression of the narcissistic, as I have tried to show. The connection between crisis masculinity and narcissism becomes particularly clear in the case of amok: the last act of the masculine narcissistic self-constitution is the extended suicide, in which ultimately the destruction of the world is imagined.

On the female side, crisis gendering shows itself in the form of the ‘double socialization’ that Roswitha Scholz has repeatedly pointed out in her interpretation of Regina Becker-Schmidt (cf. Scholz 2011, 67ff). In the course of the postmodern crisis processes, women are once again forced into the role of crisis administrators and made equally responsible for family and income, but this under the auspices of a collapsing capitalism, in which it is ultimately a matter of mere survival. (‘Rubble Women’ [Trümmerfrauen] were also crisis administrators, but they were still able to build something). Moreover, women are still exposed to male projections which, under narcissistic auspices, become so immediate that they can be discharged in (even violent) affect at any time. Thus, in addition to the responsibility that women have for family and income, there is the threat of becoming victims of male violence, hostility, and the like. This permanent overload, which is directed at the role of the woman, may not be named – it would not fit the image of an emancipated woman, who actually manages her job and children quite easily. It is in this context that research findings indicating that women in Germany suffer from depression twice as often as men should be explained. Depression is an expression of the narcissistic way of dealing with the aforementioned contradictory, permanent, and excessive demands. Depression is a ‘female’ variant of narcissism, even though depression also increasingly affects men. As far as a ‘female narcissism’ is concerned, some things would still have to be clarified. For example, we should also ask about the female ways of narcissistically acting out aggression. There seems to be a certain ‘feminine’ tendency to be able to get rid of aggressions quite directly, but in a way in which the aggressions are not acted out openly. It is rather something like a ‘narcissistic-passive aggressiveness,’ which from the outset, because it is not open, evades any reaction and confrontation and thus shows itself to be incapable of conflict.

Even if there is much need for clarification on the socio-psychological level with regard to the latest obfuscations of gender relations, it should be more than clear: The spread of narcissistic social character is an expression of crisis gendering, which is visible on both the female and male side, albeit in different ways. All this indicates that people cannot simply step out of the socio-psychological matrix of the subject, even though this matrix is decomposing from within – and it is also being stripped of its substance. The result of this contradictoriness is narcissism as the last hold of the crisis subject: only through it can the disintegrating subject still pretend to be capable of acting, thinking and feeling.

References

Bröckling, Ulrich. 2016. The Entrepreneurial Self: Fabricating a New Type of Subject. Translated by Steve Black. London: SAGE.

Ehrenberg, Alain. 2010. The Weariness of the Self: Diagnosing the History of Depression in the Contemporary Age. Translated by Enrico Caouette, Jacob Homel, David Homel, and Don Winkler. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.

Freud, Sigmund. 1976. “Totem and Taboo (1913).” In The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIII, edited by James Strachey, 2646-2799. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Freud, Sigmund. 1976a. “On Narcissism: An Introduction (1914).” In The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV, edited by James Strachey, 2929-2954. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Freud, Sigmund. 1976b. “Mourning and Melancholia (1915).” In The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV, edited by James Strachey, 3039-3053. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Freud, Sigmund. 1976c. “The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex (1924).” In The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIX, edited by James Strachey, 4083-4091. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Freud, Sigmund. 1976d. “Civilization and Its Discontents (1930).” In The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXI, edited by James Strachey, 4462-4532. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Freud, Sigmund. 1976e. “Lecture XXXIII: Femininity.” In The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXII, edited by James Strachey, 4715-4737. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Gast, Lilli. 1992. Libido und Narzissmus: Vom Verlust des Sexuellen im psychoanalytischen Diskurs. Eine Spurensicherung. Tübingen: Gerd Kimmerle.

Kurz, Robert. 1999. Die Welt als Wille und Design: Postmodernism, Postmoderne, Lifestyle-Linke und die Ästhetisierung der Krise. Berlin: Edition TIAMAT.

Kurz, Robert. 2004. Blutige Vernunft: Essays zur emanzipatorischen Kritik der kapitalistischen Moderne und ihrer westlichen Werte. Bad Honnef: Horlemann Verlag.

Kurz, Robert. 2016. The Substance of Capital. London: Chronos Publications.

Kurz, Robert. 2005. Schwarzbuch Kapitalismus: Ein Abgesang auf die Marktwirtschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn.

Kurz, Robert. 2007. Marx Lesen! Die wichtigsten Texte von Karl Marx für das 21. Jahrhundert: Herausgegeben und kommentiert von Robert Kurz. Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn.

Rhode-Dachser, Christa. 2011. Expedition in den dunklen Kontinen: Weiblichkeit im Diskurs der Psychoanalyse. Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag.

Scholz, Roswitha. 2009. “Gesellschaftliche Form und konkrete Totalität: Zur Dringlichkeit eines dialektischen Realismus heute” in exit! Krise und Kritik der Warengesellschaft, no. 6: 55-100.

Scholz, Roswitha. 2011. Das Geschlecht des Kapitalismus: Feministische Theorie und die postmoderne Metamorphose des Patriarchats. Bad Honnef: Horlemann Verlag.

Originally published in Exit! no. 14 on 06/01/2017

We Have To Do Something!

Action Fetishism in an Unreflective Society

Herbert Böttcher

1. Action and Transformation

“On the struggle for an immigration and post-growth society in Europe” was the motto of the medico Foundation Symposium in 2016.[1] The Austrian journalist and author Robert Misik opposed the fear discourse of both the right and the left. While resentment and the willingness to use violence are promoted by the right, powerlessness is advanced by the left.[2] So what can help against fear and powerlessness?

“The power to act is regained by those who make use of the first virtue of critical thinking: to look for the other world not ‘by looking away from existing evil,’ but by looking in the middle of the ‘real movement,’ ‘which cancels the present state,’” is the answer given at medico, in reference to Karl Marx.[3] And the “real movement” in the 21st century is quickly found. In addition to “explicitly political innovations,” it is the “everyday changes in interpersonal relationships and the ethical and moral attitudes that support them.”[4] Some examples are mentioned: practical solidarity with refugees, self-organized solidarity clinics, and neighborhood networks.[5]

All of this may well make sense. It would only have to be made clear from the self-formulated claim why these activities are not just sensible emergency measures, but would actually abolish “the present state of affairs.” But this state can only be lifted if it is recognized, i.e. if it is clear what is to be lifted. “Real movements,” then, can only be those which are aimed at recognizing the “present state” in order to be able to “abolish” it or – to put it more precisely and less Hegelianly – to overcome it.

Social movements – from the traditional workers’ movements to the new social movements – move a lot ‘in the dark.’ The range extends from the flight into the concrete to the flight into the general – depending on the need. Sometimes it is concrete projects or concrete actors to whom demands are addressed, sometimes it is general ethical-moral appeals or abstract visions that promise an orientation for action. At all costs, however, the question as to what the individual phenomena, from people fleeing their homelands to the permanent deterioration of working and social conditions, which we encounter “in the existing evil,” have to do with the totality of the social conditions to be overcome, is to be avoided. Because this question must not be asked, for fear of paralyzing political impotence, salvation is to be sought in action that jumps back and forth between projects, ‘intercessions’ to economic and political actors, and ethical-moral sermons, between ‘concrete’ and ‘general.’ Such action must remain indeterminate in view of the “condition to be abolished” – as Medico puts it. Its indeterminacy finds expression in empty actionist formulas like: We have to do something. In other words, the main thing is to do something, whatever that may be. Or it leads into moralizing appeals such as: We have to change. Change is everything. It must “become DNA” – as the new NRW Economics Minister Andreas Pinkwart of the FDP inculcates in us.[6]

Two problematic social contexts become clear here: On the one hand, both in labor movement Marxism and in social-liberal reforms, as well as in everyday life, the value-dissociation socialization – that is, the “commodity-producing patriarchy” (Roswitha Scholz)[7] – as a social fetish form has always been presupposed without reflection. Second, with the intensifying crisis of capitalism, a new situation is emerging. The margins of action become narrower because they come up against the limits set by the social form. They cannot be overcome by an effort of the will – according to the motto ‘whoever wants to, can.’ These two problematic social contexts need to be reflected upon.

2. Action as a Struggle for Equality and Political Influence in the Capitalist Form.

Theologian Ton Veerkamp laments how Fukuyama’s talk of the history ending with the free market and democracy leads to a lack of alternatives:

“The new gospel of Fukuyama was also the end of the great narratives of the occidental bourgeoisie, the narrative of true liberté, freedom, true égalité, equality, true solidarity, as we call fraternité today. It was perpetuated in the Great Narrative of the labor movement, the narrative of those who took seriously the narrative of the bourgeoisie, true liberty, true equality, true solidarity, not only in the church, but also in the factory.”[8]

The history of the workers’ movement becomes here the continuation or the completion of bourgeois history. It is completed by extending its promises of freedom, equality and solidarity to all. The promised equality is to become a reality for all those who were excluded from the blessings of bourgeois society, especially the workers. Equality is to apply not only politically but also economically, not only in politics but also in the factory. Equality in bourgeois society was the aim not only of the largest part of the workers’ movement, but also of the largest parts of the slavery abolition and women’s movements.

In the workers’ movement in particular, the struggles were seen in the social context of the contradiction between capital and labor. Capital represented the point of view of domination, and labor, that of liberation. Social power relations were represented by the power of capital over labor and the means of production, and thus over the means that are indispensable for human life.

It should not be denied that these liberation struggles, as struggles for participation and equality, have made people’s lives easier. However, at the latest in view of the failure of socialism, it would have been necessary to reflect self-critically that all attempts at emancipation fall short if they move within the fetishistic social context constituted by capital and labor and at the same time within the framework of the dissociated area of reproduction. In it, value and dissociation are always already presupposed, value insofar as capitalist society is oriented toward the irrational and abstract end in itself of the multiplication of money through the production of commodities, i.e., through the production of value and surplus value, dissociation insofar as reproduction, with its feminine connotations, represents the mute precondition for commodity production.

It is not recognized that, just like capital and labor, politics and the state also constitute the fetishistic social context of the capitalist form of society. They are dependent on the process of valorization and can only shape and steer within the margins made possible by the creation of value. It is within this framework that the state performs its task as an “ideal total capitalist” (Friedrich Engels). In view of the incoherently competing individual enterprises, it is its task to create an overall social framework for production and reproduction. It can do this only as long as the process of value creation provides it with the necessary means to do so.

Embedded in the fetishistic capitalist social context is also the subject who believes himself to be autonomous and free. His autonomous cognition seems to be unconditional, his actions essentially controlled by his will. At the same time, his thinking and acting is always already subjected to the unreflectively presupposed factual constraints of the structuring social context of valorization and the reproductive foundations dissociated from it. What appears to him as free thinking and acting has always already affirmed the fetishistic capitalist social context as a self-evident and unreflected given.

On this basis, the subject becomes the agent of abstract labor. Whereas in pre-modern societies activities characterized by toil were due to the necessity of a ‘metabolism with nature’ at a low level of productivity, in modern capitalist societies with a more highly developed productive power, labor is subjected to the compulsion to serve the abstract and irrational capitalist end-in-itself of producing abstract wealth, which is expressed quantitatively in money and is indifferent to its material content. The concrete is to be had only as a carrier of something abstract, the use-value of the commodity only as a carrier of the exchange-value, the material-content wealth only as a carrier of abstract wealth.

Labor subjected to the capitalist end in itself of the multiplication of abstract wealth belongs to the constitution of an abstract and unconscious domination, independent of the thought and action of the actors. Marx described it with the paradoxical concept of the “automatic subject.”[9] The subject is in the service of an automatism in which money is used as capital to produce value and surplus-value through the expenditure of abstract labor, which is expressed in surplus-money after the exchange of commodities. Automatism needs subjects to set it in motion and keep it going. In this respect, the subject is “the agent of a blind social system that sets the ‘automatic subject’ in motion through its own pre-structured pattern of activity.”[10]

Then, however, the subject is precisely not autonomous, but integrated into “the self-movement of the capitalist real categories.” These were “unconsciously created” by people. They have now “become independent … precisely because the individuals live their lives within these categories not wanting to imagine anything differently and seek their happiness by hook or by crook, and through their satisfying the demands brought forth by this matrix.”[11] Their thinking and acting is determined by this unconsciously created, independent and unreflected fetishistic social context. Therefore, political action is also fetishistic. It moves within the polarities of market and state or economy and politics, praxis and theory, which are set by the fetish form. Thus, depending on the constellation, the welfare state can be invoked against the market, the market can be made neoliberal against the state, praxis can be played off against theory, or theory can be put at the service of praxis.

In social movements, political action becomes above all a question of political will or of the interests that are to be asserted against political-economic power. With a shift of the balance of power within the capitalist form and the polarities set with it, i.e. between capital and labor, market and state, theory and praxis, however, the ‘present state’ cannot be ‘abolished’ or overcome. Capital and labor are always presupposed as a fetishistic social context and are not put up for disposition, just as little as the dissociation of reproduction and the patriarchal gender relations. People as social beings remain subordinated to the movements of the commodities they produce and the social relations of a ‘commodity-producing patriarchy’ constituted by them. Their thought, will, and action are broken by the abstract domination constituted by value and dissociation.

As an agent of abstract labor, bound into the fetishistic structuring social context of labor and capital, the subject cannot be a ‘revolutionary subject.’ Through its integration into the fetishistic social context, its supposedly autonomous thought and action is reduced to the framework set by the social form. In this, the subject turns out to be “a category of capital itself, or a function of the ‘automatic subject’ of abstract labor and value.”[12] Then the category of praxis, or the primacy of praxis over theory, also becomes problematic. The praxis of subjects, before there is any thinking, is always already integrated into the dominant fetish forms that seem plausible to the acting subject:

“Working, earning money, gender relations, etc. are in a certain way similar to the way the wild sow digs for acorns or the way the spider weaves its web. Therefore, the absurdity that individuals do not consciously act socially, but according to blind mechanisms, appears as self-evident and is always already presupposed. The consciousness of individuals, precisely because they are separated from these mechanisms, and the fetish forms and their mechanisms, does not refer to the social character of their actions, but to the given immanent calculation according to the given criteria in these immanent forms.”[13]

Just like the praxis of the subjects, the theory produced under the primacy of such praxis remains integrated into the fetishistic social context presupposed without reflection. Such theory becomes either – e.g. in the form of business administration/economics or systems theory – the justification of the relations presupposed in praxis or the justification of a praxis of modernization of relations, which seeks change within the framework of the presupposed social forms by shifting the power relations within the fetishistic social context of capital and labor, market and state, etc. Such theory enters into the service of practical work on contradiction. It moves in the tracks laid by the struggle for recognition in the forms of law and state and for self-assertion in the forms of abstract labor, value, and dissociation.[14]

3. Action in an “Unreflective Society”

3.1 Limits of Action in the Crisis of Capitalism

As the crisis of capitalism progresses, the scope for acting in the presupposed fetish forms becomes narrower. Accordingly, the actors of individual and political action come up against the limits of their action and experience their individual and political impotence. The crisis of capitalism affects the ability of subjects to act insofar as its basis is the expenditure of labor, the ‘substance of capital.’ Because of the ‘moving contradiction’ (Karl Marx) associated with capital, capital producing in competition is forced to replace labor with technology. With the microelectronic revolution, this logical contradiction also comes up against historical limits that can no longer be compensated for, since now more labor substance has to be disposed of than could be compensated for by expanding and cheapening the products. In this way, however, capitalism undermines not only its own foundations, but also the ability of subjects to act as agents of abstract labor.

The illusion of agency is nevertheless maintained insofar as money, too, is detached from its objective social context and declared to be a sign, true to postmodern logic in which the world consists of a multiplicity of signs. Its validity is detached from the objective social context of commodity production, in which it represents abstract labor and thus value and surplus value. It is now recognized as valid on the basis of social convention. Accordingly, the money supply can be increased according to economic necessities. New possibilities for action seem to be opening up via the control of the money supply even to the point of alternative dreams of being able to both secure stability and free up money for social investment via a transaction tax. Negative reality seems to be able to be leapfrogged and to dissolve into an all-determining intentionality. Against such illusions, Robert Kurz has pointed out that “the meaning of an objective validity (in the sense of the fetish relation being independent and reified)” should not be understood in terms of “‘validity’ as subjective kind of ‘validity’ (in the sense of the bourgeois notions of contract and decree).”[15] The ‘objective validity’ of money results from the fact that it represents the expenditure of ‘abstract labor’ and thus value. Fictitious money can only prolong the crisis as long as the connection with the expenditure of abstract labor and the associated production of value and surplus value does not break.      

The extent to which this thread is being put to the test is shown by the increasingly rapid interplay between the capitalist polarities of market and state, economy and politics, in the course of the crisis. In the face of intensifying state financing and economic valorization crises, neoliberalism focused on strengthening the market and the economy through privatization, deregulation and social cuts. Against the supposed omnipotence of the economy and the growing social problems, trade unions and social movements called on the state and its regulatory power. A way out seemed to be found in the miraculous multiplication of capital without going through real commodity production via the buying and selling of financial securities. A simulated accumulation was created which resulted in “money without value” (Robert Kurz), on whose drip the real economy became dependent via global deficit cycles. The ‘natural’ limits of a simulated economy supported by money without value were shown again and again in the bursting of bubbles. The bursting of the real estate bubble in particular called the state back onto the scene to rescue the “systemically important banks” (Angela Merkel). It is becoming clear that not only the state-driven modernization processes in countries of the two-thirds world are coming to an end with the collapse of states that can no longer be financed, but also the ping-pong between market and state or economy and politics in the countries of the global North.

3.2 False Immediacy in an “Unreflective Society”

In view of all the social experiences of crisis and catastrophe, it would seem obvious to critically reflect on the limits of capitalist socialization. Instead, theoretical thinking that seeks to reflect on individual phenomena in the context of social relations is denounced. At the beginning of the new millennium, Robert Kurz had already predicted the path to a “unreflective society”:

“The real social contradiction, which is no longer manageable using the previously employed methods, is simply to be banished from thinking. The dark end of modern development is absurdly celebrated as a transition to an ‘illusionless pragmatism.’ Along with social criticism, reflective thinking ceases altogether.”[16]

The contradiction connected with the inner logical barrier of needing labor for the multiplication of capital, but at the same time having to replace it with technology because of competition, which forces efficiency and cheapening, could be dealt with in capitalist immanence as long as there were sufficient possibilities to compensate for the disappearance of labor. Because this logical barrier now also encounters its historical barriers and thus becomes topical, the perspective would suggest itself to reflect on these barriers and with them on the end of capitalist socialization. Insofar as thinking moves within the unreflected, presupposed social forms, it also encounters the limits of its possible reflection with the logical and historical barriers of capital valorization. Reflection also feels the powerlessness that is established by the objectivity of the relations. There is immanently no more praxis towards which one could think in the interest of change. But instead of making these immanent limits of action and of reflection itself the object of critical reflection, reflection stops its operation.

And yet action is being taken. After all, the crisis ‘must’ be ‘managed’ – among other things, by cutting social benefits and activating companies as well as individuals. The further the crisis progresses, however, the more clearly the limits of its manageability become apparent. Thus it becomes clear: the game is up – both the game of increasing money without value in the casino and the associated illusions of ‘anything goes’ as well as the ping-pong game between market and state that tries to stretch out the crisis. With labor disappearing, both – market and state – are losing their foundation. The latter is most evident in the phenomena of disintegrating states and the looting economies spreading in the voids.[17] But here, too, a ‘need for action’ arises: military intervention is needed to protect the remaining spaces of accumulation from the violence threatening the collapsing regions, as well as from the refugees. The chairman of the German Commission Justitia et Pax and Bishop of Trier, Stefan Ackermann, also does not want to refuse his blessing to such an ‘urgent need for action.’ “Strengthening European cooperation – militarily where expedient – is a prerequisite for the demanded long-term capacity to act.” Against the background of the fight against terrorism, the military participation of the Federal Republic is completely understandable, the episcopal press office of Trier let the bishop announce.[18]

The “illusionless pragmatism” that prides itself on being able to dispense with the burdensome ballast of reflection in the form of theoretical thought and at the same time denounces critical thought as superfluous and detached elitist theory that misses the point of people’s concrete problems amounts to crisis management that is enforced in an increasingly authoritarian manner as the crisis intensifies. In the horizon of easy thoughts and easy language, an easier path is obvious for many: instead of the critical examination of the conditions, which seems too theoretical, the guilty are concretized in “false immediacy” (Theodor W. Adorno) – in ‘the’ foreigners, ‘the’ refugees, ‘the’ politicians, ‘the’ bankers, etc: The unreflective rage of concerned citizens is given an object on which it can act out.

The turn to a relieving false immediacy, which manifests itself in concretisms, did not just fall from the sky with the increased ‘turn to the right,’ as was evident in the 2017 federal election. The indicators of false immediacy and concretism were already visible before the 2008 financial crisis:

  • In 2005, Franz Müntefering wanted to revitalize the ossified SPD with a concrete critique of capitalism. He focused attention on the “plague of locusts.” The problem is identified as ‘rapacious finance capital.’ If it were stopped, the problems would be solved. The fact that the distinction between good, creative and evil, ‘rapacious capital’ connoted with Jews serves structural or even direct anti-Semitism is not a problem for such an alleged critique of capitalism, but an advantage: it can be used to reach those who, in view of the crisis of abstract labor, have to circulate on the market as precarious wage workers between changing wage employment situations, pseudo-self-employment and state benefits – i.e., in situations in which they are not able to work. In other words, in conditions in which everyone becomes a “petty bourgeoisie of himself”[19] who, as individualized human capital, is responsive to concretizing right-wing populist slogans.
  • This corresponds to the individualization of the social crisis, in which everyone is supposed to become an entrepreneur of his or her human capital and is obligated to keep themselves competitive in processes of permanent self-optimization, and is supposed to present themselves in such a way that he or she stands out through eye-catching design. In the process, self-optimization and self-presentation remain empty of content. Self-optimization is about optimizing formal competencies and self-staging is about being eye-catching by doing whatever.
  • The individual is not only “Me, Inc.,” [Ich-AG] but is also supposed to be “Germany,” as the campaign carried out in 2005 propagated. “While the Germany Inc. is being wound up in real economic terms, in the midst of the hurricane of globalized crisis capitalism, the German people’s community is to rise as an ideological community of need and compulsion.”[20] The “state of patriotic optimism,” as Jürgen Klinsmann put it in view of the summer fairy tale of the World Cup, “in one’s own country,” with German flags everywhere, came just in time.[21]

Behind the false immediacy that is already apparent in the above-mentioned examples is the need to concretize problematic situations and to banish them in a fetishistic way. It is no coincidence that Pegida, AfD, etc. can grow and flourish in this conglomerate of crisis repression, which marginalizes content and reflective thought. They articulate society’s need to concretize guilty parties for complex problems in a false immediacy. They are offered in the form of ‘the’ foreigners, ‘the’ refugees, ‘the’ bankers, ‘the’ politicians. What shows up at the supposed margins of society is not a ‘marginal phenomenon,’ however, but an expression of processes in the ‘center’ of society, which also show up on the so-called ‘left’ : in the structural or direct anti-Semitic concretization of the crisis of capitalism to casino capitalism, in the polarization of German and foreign poor in the party ‘Die Linke.’ Such immediate concretizations open up possibilities for immediate action. When culprits and responsible parties are identified, complex problems seem manageable. They can seemingly be “sorted out by immediate action. Instead of the realization that there can be no solutions in the value-dissociation form, there is an attempt to banish the resulting powerlessness in an action-fetishistic way.”[22]

In the processes that aggressively deny and repress the crisis, in which the false immediacy of action is combined with the elimination of reflection on content, a narcissistic social character finds expression. It arises in the structuring social context of the crisis of capitalism, which has to be dealt with by individuals who are pressed into the subject form. With work and family, the foundations of bourgeois subjectivity collapse. The labor subject runs out of work and the family as a place of reproduction loses its foundation. Thus, the possibilities of sublimation of bourgeois subjectivity associated with work and its promise of success and prosperity break down. In the face of empty promises, drive stimulation makes as little sense as binding commitment to an object. Needs cry out for immediate satisfaction through an ever new mother’s breast, problems for an immediate solution through the concretization of guilty parties and correspondingly immediate strategies of action. The relation to the external world of objects is fundamentally disturbed. Thus the narcissistic social character is under the compulsion to assimilate objects, repel them as threatening or destroy them.[23] In this matrix, questions of content are only significant if they can be “perceived and processed in direct relation to the self”[24] or, as personal questions, trigger consternation and can be handled. Otherwise, they are denied as an offensive, excessive demand or a threat, or are aggressively warded off.

This helps to understand why people react so allergically, either ignoring or aggressively defending themselves, to strenuous, complex analyses that are perceived as disempowering and, moreover, block a way out of the false immediacy of concretism and fetishism of action. They can withstand neither reflective distance nor the lack of an immediate action strategy.

As the crisis progresses, people who become devoid of reflection seem to merge with the world as it is in an authoritarian and aggressive anti-intellectualism. Individuals who are reduced to subjects threaten to become one with their valorization or with their exclusion in the state of their devaluation.

Reflection as the ability to step beside oneself in order to look at oneself and the conditions one occupies ‘from the outside,’ as it were, seems to become more difficult. The realization that, as a supposedly self-aware subject, one is only an appendage or material of a process of valorization and its accompanying moments of dissociation is painful because it is disappointing and disillusioning. Moreover, no alternative that could be immediately realized offers itself up. Theoretical reflection, which remains within the immanence of capitalist socialization, reaches a limit, because it can no longer hope for a new stage within a process of development. It gained its dynamism in the critique of an achieved state as a stage of passage to a better future, a next step on the ladder of development within the framework of a perpetual movement of progress. Such progress, however, was bound to the metaphysics of money, which multiplies endlessly in a supposedly infinite process of the self-valorization of capital.

It seems increasingly difficult to think beyond the immediacy of individual phenomena or experiences. In the face of growing burdens, on an individual level – not least due to the irreducible constraints of self-optimization and the omnipresent danger of failure despite all efforts – immediate, i.e., without any thought, relief is sought and offered. This implies the activation of racist, sexist, anti-Semitic and anti-gypsy attitudes at any time in service of a crisis administration that is under pressure to act but remains bound up in the social form. The crisis administration is also becoming more and more incapable of action – and nothing at all can be done when it comes to the claim of coping with the problems in an emancipatory way. Thus, the inability of crisis administrations to act, which is advancing with the crisis, threatens to turn into authoritarian tendencies and, where the military and police security apparatuses are also deprived of their economic foundations, into the savagery of a struggle for existence, which is fought out in a ‘war of all against all.’    

The options for action of social movements, which are linked to capitalist immanence, are also blocked. Instead of critically reflecting on their own powerlessness in the formal social context of capitalist immanence and advancing to a radical critique of capitalism, i.e. one that reaches to the roots, their highest goal seems to be to participate in crisis management or to want to create alternatives without having gone through the purgatory of a radical critique of capitalist society.[25] Thus, individual facets are broken out of the whole of the conditions in the illusion of being able to create an alternative through a niche. Thus it remains with Regiogeld, with exchange rings and free stores, with basic income on the level of misery, with solidarity and common good economy, which do not touch the form of capitalist socialization. In the ecclesiastical field, Caritas and pastoral work take refuge in ‘lifeworld’ orientations, which find their expression in the concept of a so-called ‘socio-spatial approach.’ At least in the ‘small details’ of the immediate life worlds, successes are sought in a praxis that unspokenly admits that it can no longer reach the level of social macrostructures. Praxis becomes the shaping of small life worlds in the immediacy of one’s own social space and is reduced to the framework that the crisis conditions still allow. Playgrounds can then be designed, dilapidated facilities repaired, green spaces tended, and so on. The activated people are given the impression of having influence and of being practically effective. The possibilities of being able to do ‘something’ remain limited to the local area and the framework that the crisis situation allows. Ultimately, behind the often euphorically proclaimed socio-spatial approach is the admission that pastoral praxis and Caritas cannot shape more than the small world of local areas. Thus, it is an expression of adaptation to conditions that are immunized from any critical reflection. Such reflection could, after all, recoil against one’s own praxis and make it recognizable for what it is: as a flight into ‘pseudo-activism’ or into the concretism of false immediacy and as an evasion of the challenge of critical reflection and the necessary overcoming of destructive conditions. The insistence on praxis becomes here – far from being a “forum for appeals against self-satisfied speculation” – a “pretext used by executive authorities to choke, as vain, whatever critical thoughts the practical change would require.”[26] At the same time, the humanitarian significance of solidarity-based crisis management should by no means be underestimated, nor should the improvement of the quality of immediate living conditions against barbarizing savagery in the struggle of all against all. However, without reflection on the structuring context of the social whole, no overall social alternatives to the barbarization inherent in capitalist socialization can emerge from these movements.

4. Religion in a Unreflective Society

Analogous to an unreflective society, an unreflective religion is also developing. As early as the 1990s, Johann Baptist Metz summed up a newly awakened religious enthusiasm with the formula “Religion, yes – God, no.”[27] With this, he described a trend in which religion is very much in demand as a spiritual exaltation and relief from the stress of everyday life, but talk of God is falling into crisis or evaporating. Today René Buchholz speaks of a “false return of religion.”[28] What is false about it is the fundamentalism that is attached to this new interest in religion.

In original religious texts such as the Bible or the Koran, certainties are sought that cannot be shaken by critical reflection on the historical social contexts of the texts. The sacred original texts are just as withdrawn from historical-critical reflection as they are from the question of whether and how their statements can be substantiated. They are valid without time and without justification – then as now.

While religious movements after the 1960s had understood themselves in the horizon of socially critical ‘political theology’ or the ‘liberation theology’ that emerged in Latin America, “today a worldwide religious regression has become the driving force of barbarization. This applies to all religions without exception, from the Catholic fundamentalism of ‘Opus Dei’ to the Protestant sects, Islamism, the messianic-theocratic Jewish ultras, the ultra-right Hindu movement and the racist Buddhists in Sri Lanka, etc.”[29]In the transfiguring retrospection of an ideal situation of origin, they gain their aura and “appear as a way out of the precarious situation and at the same time as a threatened part of one’s own identity, which is regarded as unchangeable.”[30]

In addition, a softer but no less fundamentalist variant of religion is emerging. It is offered as spirituality on esoteric markets, but also by churches that want to remain competitive as entrepreneurial churches in the face of dwindling demand for God. The programs seek success by directly addressing the sensitivities of individuals: the search for an expansion of happiness through intensive and spiritual experiences, for relief for the stressed through wellness, for meaning and closeness for those who have failed in competition or are plagued by fear of social decline. In the immediacy with which individual needs are addressed, the structuring social context is not abolished, but made invisible. The impositions that people have to put up with, as well as the nonsense of a society that has subjected itself to the irrational compulsion of the multiplication of money, is omnipresent, but it should not and will not be grasped.

If spiritual offerings are to be successful on the market, this structuring social context and with it reality must be faded out. They must be experience-intensive and at the same time content-empty and reflection-free. Their fundamentalism lies in the fact that the world as it is, and the merging of individuals with it, is always already presupposed to be without justification, authoritarian, and hostile to reflection. They reflect what Theodor W. Adorno described in his studies on the authoritarian personality as follows: “The superiority of the existing … over the individual and his intentions” is to be “acknowledged” as realism and implies “classifying oneself as an appendage of the social machinery.”[31] With the authoritarian presupposition of the world as it is, any idea that the world could be otherwise remains excluded. It is confined in a closed immanence that is exalted by a contentless spirituality that renounces any thinking that could transcend its object to a level that supersedes it.

5. What To Do?

If the processes of crisis are not to drive further into barbarization, it cannot be a matter of anything less than “abolishing the present condition.” The ‘power to act’ cannot be gained without recognizing and negating what constitutes this condition as a structuring social context of form, namely value and dissociation and the levels of ideology production that are mediated by them, but also connected with a momentum of their own, as well as the cultural-symbolic and the socio-psychological level. In view of this social context, the proclamation of a primacy of praxis is also misleading, since praxis, like the subject as its bearer, always presupposes the ‘condition to be abolished.’

In view of the constraints of immediacy, a reflection is necessary that can gain distance from the condition of a society closed in the form of capitalist socialization. This presupposes an epistemological break with the form and its characteristic thinking in the polarities of capital and labor, market and state, as well as those of subject and object, and theory and praxis. Instead of instrumentalizing theoretical knowledge one-dimensionally from and to praxis, it would be important to understand theoretical reflection as an independent moment of social emancipation. As a mere instrument of praxis, it must remain within the limits set by the form of capitalist relations. In this prison it becomes – just as in the Middle Ages philosophy was once understood as ancilla theologiae (handmaiden of theology) – “the Cinderella of unscientific and pre-scientific premises and forms of life, to which it has to serve as a handmaiden of legitimation.”[32]

“The recovery of theory’s independence lies in the interest of praxis itself,” Adorno says in his “Negative Dialectics.”[33] The background of this statement is the insight that in the demanded unity of theory and praxis, theory succumbed and became “a piece of the politics it was supposed to lead out of; it became the prey of power.”[34] A different praxis is only possible if theoretical reflection can step out of its functional subjection to a praxis already determined by the circumstances and gain its own weight. But then, against the attempts to reconcile the tension between theory and praxis by including critical reflection as ‘theoretical praxis’ under the concept of praxis, the tension between theory and praxis must be endured. It is necessary “to refuse any ‘fusion’ of critical reflection with the given ‘counter-praxis’ of immanent contradiction processing or even an everyday metaphysics.” “In order to be able to shatter this fetishist constitution, both ‘theoretical praxis’ as well as immanent ‘counterpraxis’ must undergo, each in its own respective domain, a process of transformation, until both go beyond themselves and can only merge in the result. Thus, the celebrated ‘unity between theory and praxis’ can no longer be a presupposition, but only an immanent telos of categorical critique; it coincides with real transcendence, or else it will not exist.”[35] Such transcendence is in the interest of social emancipation. It opens up possibilities for recognizing and negating the limits imposed on praxis by capitalist socialization. Without such recognition, “there would be no changing the praxis that constantly calls for change.”[36]

Nor can a royal road to overcoming capitalism be derived from a theory as an independent element of emancipatory praxis and implemented as a model. Theory cannot replace emancipatory praxis. Only in a social movement that negatively reaches beyond the limits set by the capitalist form do paths to overcoming capitalism seem possible. In this sense, it would be important to insist on and fight for demands that cannot be met under capitalism. This includes the struggle for the satisfaction of basic needs as well as the struggle against low wages and precarious working conditions and for ‘public services,’ in short for everything that is possible in view of material wealth and the state of the productive forces, but fails because of the constraint that material wealth in capitalism can only be represented and have meaning as abstract wealth. In this sense a ‘different world would be possible,’ but only in the break with the capitalist form of abstract wealth. This would be the precondition for an orientation towards the life needs of people and the production of the goods that are necessary for this. Corresponding demands would therefore have to know and make clear that they are by no means raised from a situation beyond the form of value and dissociation, but that they lay claim to its overcoming. However, this claim would already be denied if, in the interest of mediation and mobilization, the limits of the capitalist form of society that are to be overcome were no longer allowed to be thematized: For “no theory may play dumb for the sake of agitational simplicity against the objectively achieved state of knowledge. It must reflect it and push it further. The unity of theory and praxis was not meant as a concession to the weakness of thought, which is the spawn of repressive society.”[37]


[1] Cf. Thomas Seibert, Stiftungssymposium: Vom Kampf um eine Einwanderungs- und Postwachstumsgesellschaft, in: meidico international, rundschreiben 2/16, 41-43.

[2] Cf. ibid., 41.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Cf. ibid.

[6] Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 10.11.2017.

[7] Cf. Roswitha Scholz, Das Geschlecht des Kapitalismus. Feministische Theorien und postmoderne Metamorphosen des Kapitals, Bad Honnef 2nd ed. 2011.

[8] Ton Veerkamp, Die Welt anders. Politische Geschichte der Großen Erzählung, Berlin 2012, 423.

[9] Cf. Karl Marx, Capital Vol I, Penguin Publishing Group 1992, 255.

[10] Robert Kurz, The Substance of Capital, Chronos Publications 2016, 184.

[11] Ibid, 183f.

[12] Robert Kurz, Marxsche Theorie, Krise und Überwindung des Kapitalismus. Fragen und Antworten zur historischen Situation radikaler Gesellschaftskritik, in: ders., Der Tod des Kapitalismus. Marxsche Theorie, Krise und Überwindung des Kapitalismus, 19-34, 26.

[13] Robert Kurz, Die antideutsche Ideologie. Vom Antifaschismus zum Krisenimperialismus: Kritik des neuesten linksdeutschen Sektenwesens in seinen theoretischen Propheten, Münster 2003, 233.

[14] Cf. Robert Kurz, Grey is the Golden Tree of Life, Green is Theory, online here: https://libcom.org/library/grey-golden-tree-life-green-theory-robert-kurz.

[15] Robert Kurz, Geld ohne Wert. Grundrisse zu einer Transformation der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Berlin 2012, 231.

[16] Robert Kurz, Das Ende der Theorie. Auf dem Weg zur reflexionslosen Gesellschaft, in: ders., Weltkrise und Ignoranz, a.a.O., 60-67. 66.

[17] See, among others, the text by Tomasz Konicz in this publication, see: https://www.oekumenisches-netz.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Festschrift-Die-Frage-nach-dem-Ganzen-25-Jahre-Netz-Webversion-full.pdf.

[18] Diocese of Trier – Press Service Koblenz from 11.12.2015.

[19] Cf. Robert Kurz, Die Heuschreckenplage, in: Neues Deutschland, 20.5.2005.

[20] Robert Kurz, Du bist billig, Deutschland, in: Neues Deutschland, 30.9. 2005.

[21] Cf. Robert Kurz, Wirtschafts- und Fussballpatriotismus, in: Neues Deutschland, June 30, 2006.

[22] Leni Wissen, The Socio-Psychological Matrix of the Bourgeois Subject in Crisis, 2017, online here: https://exitinenglish.wordpress.com/2022/02/07/the-socio-psychological-matrix-of-the-bourgeois-subject-in-crisis/

[23] Cf. ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Cf. Dominic Kloos’ text on the common good economy: https://exit-online.org/textanz1.php?tabelle=autoren&index=8&posnr=591.

[26] Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, Routledge 2004, 3.

[27] Johann Baptist Metz, Religion, ja – Gott, nein, in: ders, Tiemo Rainer Peters, Gottespassion. Zur Ordensexistenz heute, Freiburg 1991; ders, Gotteskrise. Versuche zur geistigen Situation der Zeit, in: Diagnosen zur Zeit, Düsseldorf 1994, 76-92.

[28] René Buchholz, Falsche Wiederkehr der Religion. Zur Konjunktur des Fundamentalismus, Würzburg 2017.

[29] Robert Kurz, Weltordnungskrieg. Das Ende des Imperialismus im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, Bad Honnef 2003, 435.

[30] René Buchholz, op. cit., 148.

[31] Theodor W. Adorno, quoted in Buchholz, op. cit. 141.

[32] Claus Peter Ortlieb, A Preface to the Memory of Robert Kurz (1943-2012), located here: https://libcom.org/library/memory-robert-kurz-1943-2012-claus-peter-ortlieb

[33] Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, Routledge 2004, 143.

[34] Ibid, 143.

[35] Robert Kurz, Grey is the Golden Tree of Life, Green is Theory.

[36] Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, op. cit. 143.

[37] Ibid, 206.


Originally published in: Ökumenisches Netz Rhein-Mosel-Saar (ed.): Die Frage nach dem Ganzen – Zum gesellschaftskritischen Weg des Ökumenischen Netzes anlässlich seines 25 jährigen Bestehens, Koblenz 2018, 357-380. Slightly shortened and with minor changes for the Exit homepage.