“Social Natural Disasters” and The New Climate Protection Movement

Thomas Meyer

1.

The rapid spread of the climate protection movement throughout the world is indeed remarkable (cf. Haunss; Summer 2020). Also remarkable is the hatred that this movement sometimes experiences, especially that directed towards Greta Thunberg. The bourgeois subject in crisis simply does not want to admit that its capitalist way of life has become unsustainable. Even the smallest changes in the set screws send the ‘concerned citizen’ into a fit of rage. Thus, the climate movement is not perceived as an occasion or opportunity for reflection. Rather, this is nipped in the bud by “hysterical defensive reactions” (cf. Hartmann 2020, 118ff.). ‘Toxic masculinity’ discharges itself in countless hate comments and in absurd and completely reactionary counter-movements such as ‘Fridays for Hubraum’ (which currently has about 500,000 members).[1] Those who see their big car as an extension of their dick apparently feel symbolically castrated by a teenager.

Although climate change has become unmistakable, it is stubbornly denied by right-wing populists and radicals (such as Donald Trump and Beatrix von Storch). Even where they don’t outright deny it, they deny the human contribution to climate change or they say that nothing can be done anyway.[2] The apologists of a capitalism that has run amok apparently only have a ‘freedom to die’ to offer. Of course, they also reject all measures against climate change, no matter how shallow and insignificant. Or they strive for environmental protection instead of climate protection.[3] Environmental protection as form of ‘homeland security,’ of course. Homeland security, as a racist defense against everything that does not fit into the völkisch image, includes the defense against (climate) refugees as a ‘climate protection measure.’ From this would follow all the more an exclusionary imperialism (cf. Böttcher 2016) with even more wall building and orders to shoot. Although in recent years fascists have not been able to gain a foothold in the newer ecology movement (e.g. in the protests around the Hambach Forest, Ende Gelände), this does not mean that it will stay that way.[4] This is made clear by efforts to (re)formulate ‘environmental protection’ from the right, as shown not least by the founding of new right-wing ecology journals (see in detail: Jahrbuch Ökologie 2020; cf. also Hartmann 2020, 135ff.).[5]

2.

It seems a little strange that Fridays for Future, in addition to all the hate, receives a lot of support from many different sides. This initially suggests that Fridays for Future does not really cause any offense: As Gerhard Stapelfeldt put it “Resistance that does not cause resistance is not resistance” (cf. Stapelfeldt 2019, 3). According to him, recent climate protests are more of a conformist rebellion: “In each case, overcoming climate change is sought in socially and economically conformist ways. This conformism is the starting point of the current protests – that is why it is ‘low-threshold,’ that is why the invitations to participants of the protests from governments, parliaments and parties are never ending” (ibid., 4, emphasis in original).

As Stapelfeldt points out, the protesters are all people who grew up under neoliberalism, so it makes sense that the protests have an individualistic character and display a “social illiteracy”: There is talk of a climate crisis at Fridays for Future, but not of a crisis of capitalist society. Politicians find it appealing to finally give the findings of climate research the attention they deserve and to act accordingly. But it is not asked why, despite all of our knowledge and all of the promises and climate summits etc. nothing effective has happened for decades.[6]

It is true that Fridays for Future partly points out that a fixation on the individual and his or her consumption habits is insufficient, since the individual by no means has a free choice.[7] However, to reduce Fridays for Future to an ‘individualistic sustainability protestantism’ (as is clearly evident in post-growth economists such as Niko Paech, cf. Meyer 2021) misses their actual core concern.[8] Thus, I think it is correct to state that the reflections and the demands of Fridays for Future move within capitalist immanence. On this level, however, perspectives for society as a whole are considered necessary and developed (whereas the demand for a CO2 price, for example, has long since proven to be complete nonsense, cf. Hartmann 2020, 65ff.). Nevertheless, ‘what the individual can do’ or should do, e.g. renouncing air travel and meat, is mentioned, especially in the ‘public discourse.’[9] The social and especially the mode of production do not come into view through such appeals. This arises from blindness to the social form. It seems as if everything is just a matter of the ‘right technology’ and the ‘right consumption habits.’ Especially in the ranks of the Olive-Greens,[10] who “do not want to shake” capitalism, but “only want to regulate and green it” (Hartmann 2020, 42), such thinking is widespread. “The magic word is green growth” (ibid.).

In any case, the public interest in Fridays for Future remains for the most part inconsequential. The impending climate catastrophe has been the subject of discussion for decades,[11] but climate protection measures continue to be simulated or blocked. All measures, however inadequate they may be from the outset, are always defused so that they fizzle out as ineffective. The ‘location’ always takes precedence. “If you want to protect jobs, you can’t be too squeamish about ecological damage” (Hartmann 2020, 16). The fabulous ‘climate protection package’ of the German “Groko-Haram coalition” (Martin Sonneborn) in the fall of 2019 also showed that nothing serious is to be done. Everything is to essentially remain the same.[12]

As has already been formulated several times in the context of the critique of value-dissociation, immanent protests are important: for example, against social cuts, rent madness, the care crisis, etc. In individual cases, they have the potential to prevent something worse. But if they remain in immanence, do not question the funding proviso, etc., then they either come to nothing or run the risk of becoming part of crisis management (see, e.g., Kurz 2006, Böttcher 2018, and Meyer 2019). The situation is similar with climate protests. Thus, it remains right to put pressure on all the crisis management regimes, as the climate change movement is trying to do, in order to push for an ‘ecological transformation’ “no matter how inconvenient and unprofitable it may be” (Thunberg 2019, 47, emphasis TM).

Here Greta Thunberg makes clear that profitability should be rejected. The necessary goal is to preserve the world as a liveable place. So to let something be calculated for oneself is not an option. However, a critique of the capitalist mode of production, the valorization movement of capital, etc., sometimes do not play a significant role in the climate protection movement. Nevertheless, Fridays for Future is not a homogeneous movement (During 2019, it became more diverse. While it is essentially a middle-class movement, i.e., a movement of the rather better-off, it has long since ceased to be ‘only’ one of students, cf. Haunss; Summer 2020). There are indeed some groups (such as ‘Change for Future’) that claim or attempt a critique of capitalism (although a critique of capitalism does not amount to a radical critique of its fetish constitution). However, for the most part, positions critical of capitalism do not play a key role in the movement. It is said, for example, that the climate crisis cannot be solved in the current economic system. The ‘system question’ is thus posed. But at the same time, some Fridays for Future activists think they can make a difference by voting or being elected.[13][14][15] Whether Fridays for Future will succeed in breaking its capitalist immanence and not fall into affirmation or opportunism remains to be seen (cf. Konicz 2020).[16]

3.

It certainly makes sense to criticize certain products and consumption habits and to stop their production. But it’s problematic if we stop there and think it’s enough to get rid of plastic bags and SUVs without taking a critical look at the mode of production itself. It is by no means only a problem of the ‘right’ technology. Above all, the “contradiction between matter and form” should come into view (cf. Ortlieb 2014). As in earlier debates about veganism or green capitalism, it is not realized that even a green or vegan capitalism must prevail in competition, so that ‘sustainable production’ can end up being not so sustainable after all, especially when solvent demand collapses and environmental regulations etc. prove to be dysfunctional and disruptive for further capital accumulation. The fact that high earners in the capitalist core states can stock up on all kinds of ‘eco-friendly products’ (and go shopping with their SUVs) should not obscure the fact that this is only possible because those social strata still belong to the world market winners.

So if it is claimed that less meat should be consumed so that less rainforest is destroyed for the production of soy as animal feed, why would a collapse in demand for soy then make soy production less destructive if soy is grown as human food? The rainforests would continue to be destroyed for the production of soy chips or biofuel. A green ‘critique’ that targets the individual and works concretely on individual consumer goods thus misses the destructiveness of the capitalist mode of production. Under capitalist conditions, a ‘Green New Deal’ is just another illusion of wanting to get rid of the destructiveness of capitalism without making it an issue and overcoming it. A Green New Deal would be the same thing in green (cf. Reckordt 2019). The destructiveness of capitalism would only be modernized. So if one complains about species extinction, industrial agriculture, and car mania, then the focus must be on how nature is being trimmed according to capitalist criteria of valorization and consequently destroyed by it. It is therefore necessary to make the domination and destruction of nature an issue and to question the reduction of nature to a mere raw material. In this context, reference should be made to the profoundly patriarchal character of the domination of nature by capital, as is evident, for example, in reproductive medicine (cf. Meyer 2018). However, this connection is not touched upon in the climate change debate, as Fridays for Future does not have a critical concept of the (natural) sciences (cf. Ortlieb 2019).

Robert Kurz emphasized that it is not possible for man, although a natural being, to exist ‘harmoniously’ with nature, because man is not ‘one’ with nature. The relationship to nature consists in entering into   a specific metabolism with nature, which also leads to nature being transformed and thus itself being changed (cf. Kurz 2002). Nature, then, is not something static. A conception of nature as something that is supposed to be something pristine and untouched is just the projective wishful thinking of the bourgeois subject that cannot or does not want to critically deal with its own relationship to nature and thus to itself. If there is talk about protecting nature, it has to be made clear which nature should be protected and why nature has to be protected at all: i.e. from whom or from what! It would have to be made clear why environmental destruction is the result of a certain mode of production and not the result of a certain technology or product alone, which the individual then consumes. Or in the words of Robert Kurz: “It would be too cheap to attribute the dynamics of the modern destruction of nature to technology alone. Certainly, there are technical means that intervene directly or indirectly in the interrelationships of humans and nature. But these means do not stand for themselves; they are the result of a certain form of social organization which determines both social relations and the ‘process of metabolism with nature’” (ibid.).

It therefore makes little sense to try to protect nature or the climate by merely banning certain products or practices. As we know, these bans are intended to reduce the emission of CO2.The alternative then is investing in products that promise lower CO2 emissions. However, the products are not considered as specific results of a mode of production, that is, as products in their sociality. In this context, the “form of social labor […] determines the specific purposes and driving forces of production and consumption and the type and extent of interventions in nature” (Böhme; Grebe 1985, 27). The ‘form of social labor’ (i.e., labor as a real abstraction) does not come into view in Fridays for Future. This form consists in abstraction from content and intrinsic qualities. Nature is only used as a substrate for the valorization of value, so that through labor, nature is also reduced accordingly, clearly noticeable, for example, in agriculture, where the industrialization of agriculture led to a massive loss of varieties (cf. Mooney; Fowler 1991). In addition, capitalism is not at all capable of using resources sparingly. If productivity increases, so that a single capital has to expend less labor to produce the same output of goods, this leads to the fact that due to the cheapening of products accompanying the increase in productivity, the single capital increases its market share, displaces competitors and increases its output of goods in total. If a productivity increase or product innovation leads to a (supposedly) more environmentally friendly version of the product winning out over competitors, then its environmentally friendly component is quickly overcompensated for when a single capital then floods the entire world with that product. The introduction of the catalytic converter in cars, for example, did not lead to more environmentally friendly mobility, but to even more personal transportation.[17] If the world market winners could possibly produce environmentally friendly and cheaply, the rest of the world would fall by the wayside and would then have to do without ‘environmental regulations’ all the more. Competition ensures that the cheaper product will always prevail. So if it is cheaper to destroy the environment, to ignore natural cycles and regeneration times, then competition will force us to do so even more in the crisis of capitalism. Due to the dynamics of capitalism, even a more environmentally friendly product leads to more environmental destruction, since resource consumption usually increases anyway. This is the so-called rebound effect, which was also noticed by bourgeois economists of the 19th century, but remained misunderstood.

Marx can be used to explain the rebound effect: If the total mass of value decreases with increasing productivity, because less labor has to be spent for the total amount of goods, then the number of products has to be increased in absolute terms in order to maintain the same mass of value. This is all the more true since it is not a matter of merely maintaining the mass of value, but rather that this mass itself must be constantly increased, i.e. production that does not yield       any surplus value is discontinued (cf. Ortlieb 2014, 91ff.).

So it is not ‘man’ or the use of nature that leads to the destruction of nature and to the climate catastrophe at all, but an irrational mode of production, which is about the production of abstract wealth, about the valorization of value. In this process, the ability to valorize is coming up against historical limits, which is evident in capitalism’s increased lack of restraint and destructiveness. However, hardly anyone wants to admit this. It is much easier to suppress the reality by pretending to be ‘green/sustainable’ or by putting the ‘blame’ on man ‘per se,’ i.e. when it is concluded that the existence of man himself is the real crime here! Verena Brunschweiger, for example, suggests in all seriousness that one should do without children for the sake of the climate (In her book: Kinderfrei statt kinderlos – Ein Manifest, for criticism: see Meyer 2020).[18] That way, one would save CO2. Here you can already see that the less the capitalist way of production and life is made an issue and radically criticized, the more denial of the problem and reality displacement take hold and lead to a situation in which human existence itself appears as a problem. Capitalism is assumed as an anthropological constant and seen as an inescapable fact of nature, so that it seems more realistic to make man himself disappear instead of facing the realization that the production of abstract wealth must be stopped. Without an understanding/critique of the social constitution of form, an ideological processing of the crisis, due to the erosion/feralization of value-dissociation socialization, will bring forth such barbarities.

References

Böhme, Gernot; Grebe, Joachim: Soziale Naturwissenschaft – Über die wissenschaftliche Bearbeitung der Stoffwechselbeziehung Natur-Mensch, in: Böhme, Gernot; Schramm, Engelbert (eds.): Soziale Naturwissenschaft – Wege zu einer Erweiterung der Ökologie, Frankfurt 1985.

Böttcher, Herbert: “Wir schaffen das” – Mit Ausgrenzungsimperialismus und Ausnahmezustand gegen Flüchtlinge, 2016, online: https://exit-online.org/textanz1.php?tabelle=autoren&index=17&posnr=554&backtext1=text1.php.

Böttcher, Herbert: We Have To Do Something! Action Fetishism in an Unreflective Society, 2018, online: https://exitinenglish.com/2022/02/07/we-have-to-do-something-action-fetishism-in-an-unreflective-society/

Cunha, Daniel: The Anthropocene as Fetishism, in: exit! – Krise und Kritik der Warengesellschaft No.13, Berlin 2016, 25-45. With revised epilogue (2021) also on exit-online.org.

Hartmann, Kathrin: Grüner wird’s nicht – Warum wir mit der ökologischen Krisen völlig falsch umgehen, Munich 2020.

Haunss, Sebastian; Sommer, Moritz (eds.): Fridays for Future – Die Jugend gegen den Klimawandel – Konturen einer weltweiten Bewegung, Bielefeld 2020.

Jahrbuch Ökologie: Ökologie und Heimat – Gutes Leben für alle oder die Rückkehr der braunen Naturschützer? , Stuttgart 2020.

Konicz, Tomasz: Klima für Extremismus, Telepolis on 05.08.2018.

Konicz, Tomasz: “Wir brauchen ein neues System!” – In Teilen der Klimabewegung reift die Erkenntnis heran, dass nur ein Systemwechsel den Klimakollaps verhindern kann. Doch was muss eigentlich überwunden werden?, in: Ökumenisches Netz Rhein-Mosel-Saar (Hg.): Bruch mit der Form: Die Überwindung des Kapitalismus in Theorie und Praxis, Koblenz 2020, 246–257.

Kurz, Robert: Gesellschaftliche Naturkatastrophen – Die synchronen Überschwemmungen und Dürren in der ganzen Welt kündigen eine neue Qualität der ökologischen Krise an, 2002, online: https://exit-online.org/textanz1.php?tabelle=autoren&index=31&posnr=74&backtext1=text1.php

Kurz, Robert: Unrentable Menschen, 2006, online: https://exit-online.org/textanz1.php?tabelle=autoren&index=31&posnr=237&backtext1=text1.php.

Meyer, Thomas: Zwischen Ektogenese und Mutterglück – Zur Reproduktion der menschlichen Gattung im krisenhaften warenproduzierenden Patriarchat, 2018, online: https://exit-online.org/textanz1.php?tabelle=autoren&index=35&posnr=583&backtext1=text1.php.

Meyer, Thomas: “Neue Klassenpolitik?” – Kritische Anmerkungen zu aktuellen Diskursen, 2019, online: https://exit-online.org/textanz1.php?tabelle=autoren&index=35&posnr=590&backtext1=text1.php.

Meyer, Thomas: Kinderfrei statt CO2 – Gebärstreik als Maßnahme für den Klimaschutz, 2020, online: https://exit-online.org/textanz1.php?tabelle=autoren&index=36&posnr=614&backtext1=text1.php.

Meyer, Thomas: Alternativen zum Kapitalismus – Im Check: Postwachstumsbewegung und Commons und die Frage nach der ‘gesellschaftlichen Synthesis,’ in: exit! – Krise und Kritik der Warengesellschaft Nr.18, Springe 2021. In publication.

Mooney, Pat; Fowler, Cary: Die Saat des Hungers – Wie wir die Grundlagen unserer Ernährung vernichten, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1991.

Ortlieb, Claus Peter: Zur Kritik des modernen Fetischismus – Die Grenzen bürgerlichen Denkens – Gesammelte Texte von Claus Peter Ortlieb 1997-2015, Stuttgart 2019.

Ortlieb, Claus Peter: A Contradiction Between Matter and Form: On the Significance of the Production of Relative Surplus Value in the Dynamic of Terminal Crisis, in Marxism and the Critique of Value, Chicago 2014.

Stapelfeldt, Gerhard: Klimawandel. Heiße Sommer, Trockenheit: Fridays for Future und Die Grünen als neue Volkspartei, 2019, https://www.kritiknetz.de/images/stories/texte/Stapelfeldt_globaler_Protest_gegen_Klimapolitik.pdf .

Reckordt, Michael: Dasselbe in Grün, in: oekom e.V. – Verein für ökologische Kommunikation (ed.): Green New Deal – Fassadenbegründung oder neuer Gesellschaftsvertrag? , Munich 2019, 46-52.

Thunberg, Greta: I want you to panic! – My speeches on climate protection, Frankfurt 2019.


[1] Cf. https://www.akweb.de/politik/gegenwind-fuer-die-klimabewegung/. Cf. also the lecture by Ricarda Lang of 21.3.2019: Feindbild Klimaschützerin: http://emafrie.de/audio-feindbild-klimaschuetzerin/?hilite=%27Ricarda%27%2C%27Lang%27. 

[2] Thus Gauland in the 2018 ZDF summer interview: “I don’t think there is anything we humans can do against climate change.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HWUvTqlbsjg. From 2:31 min.

[3] Cf. Gauland Lecture: Sustainability is a Conservative Principle, youtube.com, Aug. 22, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TyxCIhhCVM0.

[4] Cf. https://www.freitag.de/autoren/elsa-koester/die-allzuvielen as well as Konicz 2018.

[5] Cf. https://die-kehre.de/.

[6] Cf. Stapelfeldt’s presentation: Climate and Protest, youtube.com, Aug. 25, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zS4h34A9jHc.

[7] For example, Fridays for Future activist Clara Mayer: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D9Eqf7UlNWo.

[8] Cf. https://fridaysforfuture.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Forderungen-min.pdf.

[9] This is what is repeatedly referred to in interviews: Luisa Neubauer from “Fridays for Future” as a guest in the post-report from Berlin: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YFUb6wMIHxU. From 17:20 min.

[10] Bzw. Polizei-Grünen: Cf. e.g. Jörg Tauss: Brandmelder gelöscht: Grün, Olivgrün, Polizeigrün, Telepolis vom 20.7.2020, https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Brandmelder-geloescht-Gruen-Olivgruen-Polizeigruen-4847325.html.

[11] For example, the Spiegel of 11.08.1986 states “The world climate is coming apart at the seams“ https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13519133.html.

[12] See, for example, https://www.spektrum.de/kolumne/klimaschutzpaket-der-bundesregierung-springt-zu-kurz/1675002 and https://www.freitag.de/autoren/der-freitag/das-ist-unglaublich-fahrlaessig. Cf. also: Wolfgang Pomrehn: Groko verhöhnt die Jugend, https://www.heise.de/tp/news/Kohlevertrag-Groko-verhoehnt-die-Jugend-5024350.html.

[13] See the interview with Change for Future: https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Ein-Wirtschaftssystem-das-auf-Wachstum-und-Profit-ausgelegt-ist-kann-nicht-nachhaltig-sein-4401440.html.

[14] Cf. https://www.rnd.de/politik/klimaaktivistinnen-greta-thunberg-und-luisa-neubauer-an-eu-die-uhr-tickt-5HPDTQ4QWLEM2CXMAHFPNMXW2E.html.

[15] Cf. https://taz.de/Aktivisten-treten-zur-Wahl-an/!5704234/. Cf. also: https://www.klimaliste.de/.

[16] See also discussion between representatives of Fridays-for-Future, Gerhard Stapelfeldt and Dorothea Schoppek, youtube.com, 9/28/2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N5ytkTQQtvA.

[17] Cf. https://www.freitag.de/autoren/der-freitag/monster-unter-artenschutz

[18] Which, however, has nothing to do with Fridays for Future.

Originally published in Telepolis on 02/18/2020, updated and revised for publication on the Exit! homepage

The Monetary Sin

Robert Kurz

Just as every doctrine of salvation produces its orthodox dogmatists, neoliberal economic theology does not lack this type. Principles over facts is the motto. With Bundesbank President Weber, yet another conservative apostle of respectability has thrown in the towel. Weber, recently considered Chancellor Merkel’s preferred candidate for the post of outgoing ECB chief Trichet, left his patroness in the monetary policy dispute. As a member of the same economic church, Merkel is more inclined to pragmatic muddling through. Weber presents himself as a strict guardian of money against the ECB’s easing policy and a “transfer union” that is to be used to plug the rampant debt. His steadfastness has only the flaw that he confuses cause and effect. It was not a lax monetary policy that brought about the crisis but, conversely, the crisis forced a lax monetary policy. The fall from grace of neoliberalism already took place under former Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan in response to the dotcom crisis in 2001. Since 2008, the ECB, too, has gone against the wisdom of its own bible and turned to money glutting. The crisis respite bought with it threatens to turn into uncontrollable inflation in textbook fashion. If Weber, who is faithful to the Bible, had prevailed, however, the euro would have blown up long ago. Merkel wants to sit out the debt crisis through political horse-trading. The euro bailout fund is to be drastically expanded, contrary to earlier declarations of intent. In return, a vaguely conceived “competitiveness pact” is planned. The problem behind this is that the deficits, which have reached their limits, are nothing more than the flip side of Germany’s export surpluses. Regular debt relief would cause these one-sided exports to collapse and, at the same time, put the major German and French banks in trouble, which are sitting on mountains of junk bonds issued by the deficit countries. Thus, inflationary policy appears to be the lesser evil. The dogmatists of economic theology are right against the pragmatists and vice versa. That is why they must fail together.

Originally published in Freitag on 02/17/2011

The Political Economy of Education

Robert Kurz

The capitalist mode of production is rich in internal self-contradictions. The field of education and training is no exception. Knowledge in itself does not produce surplus value, but it is a factual necessity for capital under the dictates of productive force development. Since in this society every expense must appear in the form of money, the education system is a “dead cost” in the capitalist sense, i.e., a deduction from social surplus value. Therefore, the need for educational investment is invoked everywhere in the name of location competition, but at the same time the production and distribution of knowledge is put under enormous cost pressure.

This contradiction has intensified historically. The same development of productive power that forces that expansion of knowledge and education has, on the other hand, thinned out the real value-added producing sector (especially the industrial base) by making labor superfluous there to an increasing extent. While the famous “productive” working class relatively declined and today forms a social minority, the largely “unproductive” new middle classes of the education and knowledge sector grew in mirror image. In capitalist terms, this development could only be represented as increasing credit financing of the corresponding “dead costs,” an aspect of the general financing crisis that has hardly been addressed.

According to the laws of the labor market, the massification of higher education (in the FRG today, about half of a cohort graduates from high school) and thus of the supply leads to a devaluation of the qualified labor force. In conjunction with the cost pressure on the entire capitalistically “unproductive” education system, this has led to even the academically educated strata progressively being made to live in precariousness. The old educated middle class is doomed. Added to this is the discrepancy between qualification and cyclical requirements. Since the social context is not subject to joint planning but to blind dynamics, some qualifications suddenly become superfluous or oversupplied, while others are lacking. Training, however, is only possible in the long term, while the requirement profiles in global competition change by leaps and bounds.

In the meantime, we are dealing with the same problem worldwide. There are similar names in all countries for the condition that is called “Generation Internship” in this country and illustrates the true social imbalance of “Generation Facebook.” Precisely because the educational gap between the capitalist centers and the periphery has been partially leveled, the lack of prospects for the educated young generation in the poorer countries is particularly drastic. This (along with the explosion of food prices) is one of the backgrounds for the current revolts in the Arab world. But also in China or India, mass qualification and employment are diverging. It is not a matter of so-called democratic deficits, but of a capitalistically insoluble structural contradiction in the relationship between education and economy.  The question is whether the globally masculinized “academic proletariat” translates its precariousness into the idea of a new social emancipation for all, or whether it merely wants to assert itself in capitalism and ideologically processes the necessary disenchantment. In the second case, the worst is to be expected.

Originally published in Neuen Deutschland on 03/07/2011

A Hero of The Postmodern World

A Small Follow-Up to an Exemplary Affair

Robert Kurz

Baron Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg has attracted attention by his contemporary behavior. The surprise may be called all the more a pleasant one, as it had been said of him from ill-wishing sides that he suffers from anachronistic and pathological mental states such as intellectual honesty, independent thinking or reliable diligence. Some cultural conservatives are even said to have imputed originality to him. All of these slanders have proven to be groundless. As a jogging and surfing media literate under forty, the noble scion is flesh from the flesh of the Facebook generation. Copy and paste is not considered shamelessness to him (what is that?), but cleverness; nothing postmodern is alien to him. Why should one still think anything oneself, when one has always been a patented queer and self-thinker anyway? So this sympathetic bearer of the zeitgeist succeeded in an exemplary way in expressing the ideas he didn’t have, not even in his own words. No one can take that away from him.

All those who copied the postmodern theorem of the “death of the author” from whomever knew how to put their name over it with grandeur. This subtle irony was also immediately understood by the Baron. In times of individualization, the author and the authoress do not disappear to make way for an anonymous collective of intellectual factory production. Only the names change like the doorplates in a prefabricated building. What dies is the myth of origin, that someone once actually thought and invented, researched, developed and formulated something that had to be quoted. Texts are simply there like the universe. Or like the apples on the tree that you only have to pick. To put it better and less naturalistically: The world is in any case one big text in the form of a virtual self-service supermarket, into which one may log in if one happens to be in the mood for reputation.

Every thought has already been there and stored in postmodern nirvana. All you have to do is gain technical access. That is why the habitual reduplication will not stop in the remote text regions of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung or the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, but will hack into the central treasure troves of the West, the East, and all intelligent worlds in general. The Baron belongs to the forerunners of a far higher second-hand thinking than he himself could display. Let’s take as a simple example the theorem of the so-called Pythagoras. This origin myth is cracked, when the so far still unrecognized 23-year-old Emil Backe states the theorem in a term paper for the University of Cologne and puts his name above it. Of course, Backe’s theorem cannot have a long stock of originality either, but that is not the point. The postmodern time horizon is getting shorter and shorter anyway. This is also true when Backe, who is now already 25 years old, presents the “Faust” that he has painstakingly downloaded. For a quarter of an hour, it is discussed in the community as his most mature work to date, and you really can’t ask for more than that.

Perhaps some eternalist now claims that in this way nothing new would come about and at some point the human copy machines would have to run out of material. Anyone who thinks this way doesn’t know the remix process. It is by no means just about the repetitive and serial appropriation of individual works, but even more about the combination of as many different text modules as possible. Therein lies the actual creativity of the original forgery. And the Baron’s dissertation also provides an example of this, although it cannot yet be called quite classical in this sense. Conceivable, for example, would be a remix of Shakespeare’s “As You Like It,” essays by Kurt Gödel, and the autobiography of Oliver Kahn; reconfigured as a retirement work by Emil Backe, which he blogs at the age of 29. The variety of remix possibilities is almost unlimited. Thus, at last, everyone becomes a celebrity and, beyond the copy work, the subject of his own electronic Yellow Press, tweeting every day with patience interesting messages about the composition of his dinner.

Basically, the copied state of mind could be completely automated. Why should one still download and remix oneself when the computer can do it much better on demand? The difference is a quantitative one, not a qualitative one. It is only about the speed with which the ars combinatoria is to be accomplished. Nowhere is anyone at home in the thinking room, neither with the intelligent robots nor with their masters. Who still needs an ego today, when everyone has long since been individualized? Admittedly, one single basic qualification remains indispensable: the subject being copied should still be able to write his or her name. Entering three crosses would not be individual enough. So much literacy is necessary, even in the postmodern copy store. The Baron, for example, could clearly spell his name, otherwise it would not be on the title page of the dissertation. He could have gone into business with it. Or into nuclear physics. The fact that he preferred jurisprudence, however, indicates a certain narrow-mindedness. The future will bring the individual universal copier, before which the universal geniuses of the Renaissance would have to pale.

So the artificial excitement of worn-out cultural seniors, who want to recognize in all this a decadence of the de-skilled intellectual business, is quite superfluous. The dynamic avant-gardists at the base are of a different opinion: “We should be careful with such judgments and deep indignation…because copying, copying, decorating with false feathers on a small scale is our daily business.” Who copied this down from the universe of texts? No one other than the head of the “Names & Careers” department in the “Handelsblatt” newspaper, who can also write her name for professional reasons. She knows where the bartel gets the cider; and that’s why she adorns herself not with other people’s feathers, but with false ones. There are no real ones left. This is the way it is with the work of art in the age of its mechanical reproducibility, as Emil Backe once expressed it in his imitative way, when he had just had a particularly good copying day on a somewhat larger scale.

The fact that the Baron, despite his enormous and sacrificially cultivated copying skills, can no longer perform the job of defense minister, which was tailored to his body like any other scientifically demanding job, makes him a hero and a martyr of the postmodern idealistic overall state of mind. As the deconstructivist left marches at the forefront of digital progress, it should recognize the kindred copy-soul in the Upper Franconian minor nobility. It seems all the more strange when some representatives of the free software and free culture movement try to distance themselves. They would not have meant it that way. It is only surprising that there was never such an objection, when in the alternative leaf forest of their own milieu the “lustful copying” was declared to be an emancipatory act. At least the “Gegenstandpunkt” appreciates that the Baron has behaved in a pleasingly non-proprietary manner. This statement cannot have been copied from a Marxian text. But perhaps diversity has finally arrived even among the oldest new leftists.

In general, the left-wing postmodern scene can study the secret of the state it has always longed for but never achieved: namely, to be popular and to be loved by the people. The Baron was considered by the people of the country to be swell; not because, but in spite of the fact that he presented himself as a conceptual thinking being. The heroes of the everyday mind, however, have a keen sense of when there is a good core hidden behind a deviant shell. Thus, the supposed unmasking only washed away one last blemish by proving what was always to be suspected: He is not an intellectual at all! He has merely copied all the outlandish stuff without thinking much about it. Since then, he has been doubly and triply loved for this very reason, no matter what else he may publish, be it the “Grundrisse” or “Finnegans Wake.” The postmodern regulars may say to themselves: nevertheless, he is one of us. The fact that he can write his name is not in itself a matter of honor. After all, we as normal people can do that, too, if we make a little effort. The Post-Left should appoint the Baron as its honorary member not only for factual reasons, but also for propaganda reasons; perhaps then a little of his charisma will fall on them.

Originally published on the exit! website in 2011.

Business Management as a Gamble

Robert Kurz

For the common man, the most evil villain in the country is not the slanderer, but the speculator. The “gambling casino” of financial capitalism has long been held responsible for all economic and social crisis phenomena. Thus, the banker has become the prototype of the irresponsible gambler and is considered the number one enemy of all well-behaved philistines. The same consciousness, however, can find a lot of good in the industrial capitalist, who does not hang around in the airy financial superstructure but has material things produced and needs jobs in the process. One does not criticize capitalism at all, but would like to distinguish between dubious financial gambling and down-to-earth real economy.

But is real economic capital with its material basis really so far removed from speculative thinking? Even industrial profit is not fixed from the outset, but must first be won in competition. Because there is no collective planning of social production, no enterprise knows whether it can sell its goods at all. Therefore, material production is also a gamble on the field of universal competition and the real business manager is just as much a gambler as the investment banker. Only the stakes are different: not paper financial securities, but machines, raw materials and people.

For a long time, economic science did not want to associate risk competition with the concept of gambling. Corresponding attempts to apply mathematical game theory to economic behavior came only from outsiders. It was not until 1994 that John F. Nash (Princeton), John C. Harsanyi (Berkeley) and Reinhard Selten (Bonn) received the Nobel Prize as representatives of economic game theory. This change in perception has not only something to do with the postmodern mentality that wants to turn everything and anything into a “game.” Nor is it merely an ideological reflex of the financial bubble economics since the 1980s. Rather, the use of risk in the real industrial economy has also changed dramatically.

As is well known, the trump card in the competitive game is business cost reduction. In the real economy, this also involves risk-taking in a highly material sense. This applies not least to safety standards in the handling of hazardous natural substances and processes. The competitive pressure that has intensified in crisis capitalism has long since taken hold of this sensitive area. The flip side of the same development is the use of ever larger aggregates of production and ever less mature and controlled techniques. For example, according to the official investigation report, the huge oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 was due to a rigid business strategy of saving time and money at the corporate conglomerate involved. The same policy has come to light in the Japanese nuclear disaster; not to mention that nuclear energy in itself carries unmanageable risk burdens.

The financial speculators at least play with paper, the big industrial gamblers with nature, with the life and health of people. Who is more irresponsible? The chain of industrial catastrophes caused by business management has become just as dense as the chain of financial catastrophes in the last 30 years. And the next one is sure to come. The game must go on.

Originally published in Neuen Deutschland on 04/04/2011

Starvation Inflation

Robert Kurz

It was common knowledge that the huge government rescue packages and economic stimulus programs since the crisis collapse in 2009 contain inflationary potential that must be unloaded after a transition period. In fact, inflation is on the rise worldwide – especially in the global growth drivers China, India and Brazil, but to some extent already in the euro zone.

However, there are differences between the production sectors. Everywhere, food prices are outstripping all others. The official inflation rate in China is currently 5 percent; in the food sector it is 10 percent, and in real terms it is estimated at 19 percent. The price explosion for basic foodstuffs is even worse in India and other parts of Asia, in Africa and Latin America. Food price increases in the U.S. and the EU have also far exceeded the general inflation rate in recent months. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), rice, corn, wheat, meat, vegetables and luxury foods have become more than 30 percent more expensive on average globally since the beginning of the year.

Why are food prices in particular exploding? Obviously, several causes of capitalist economic logic are intertwined here. Government programs and a flood of money from central banks lead to the actual devaluation of money, which affects all sectors. In the case of food, however, special factors are added. The increasing production of biofuel has a particularly serious effect: Oilseeds are being burned for fuel and acreage is being lost for this purpose. At the same time, however, the price of fossil energy has risen and with it the cost of diesel and fertilizer in agricultural production. This development is escalating because high oil prices make the conversion of agricultural products into fuel all the more attractive. Finally, such a situation in agricultural commodities attracts speculative mobile money capital, which bets on further rising prices and makes this process a self-reinforcing one.

The social impact of record food prices depends entirely on the proportion of income that has to be spent on food and drink. The majority of people in Asia, Africa and Latin America spend between 60 and 90 percent of their income on food. In China, the figure is still 30 to 40 percent, despite growth successes. In Europe, the figure is 5 to 10 percent. But these figures are deteriorating dramatically in all parts of the world. In the wake of the global economic crisis, which has by no means been overcome, global poverty has spread like wildfire, albeit unevenly. In many regions of the world, the incomes of large masses of the population have fallen to rock bottom. Now the price of, of all things, basic foodstuffs is surging. As early as 2010, the World Bank warned of new hunger revolts. The unbearable rise in food costs is playing a major role in the uprisings in the Arab region. And Spain shows that something similar is brewing in the crisis countries of the euro zone. Although no one here has to starve yet, in view of the rampant youth unemployment, the patience of the generations that are able to fight may be wearing thin if many can no longer afford even the cultural goods and technologies that have become a matter of course because food alone is becoming more and more expensive as budgets shrink.

Originally published in Neuen Deutschland on 05/30/2011

Postnational Chain Reaction

Robert Kurz

In capitalism, it is not people who are socialized, but dead things: money and commodities. Therefore, the perception of the world is reduced to a point; to the single individual, the single company, the single state. The consciousness of time is just as atomized. What counts is always only topicality. Everything else is yesterday’s snow or the Flood that follows. We don’t think in terms of epochs, but in terms of the time horizon of the “daily news.” It is true that we somehow know that there are complex global connections, especially economic ones. But the more there is talk of “networking,” the more isolated the facts appear. Globalization is all well and good, but isn’t it a topic of the day before yesterday?

Ever since the states put together their rescue packages, people everywhere want to put on their national glasses again. The fact that the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (was there something?) triggered a chain reaction that for a moment revealed the worldwide network of bad loans is seen as an excess of some paternalistic financial markets. Under the protective umbrella of the government and within the four walls at home, people like to believe that they are in a world of loud patriotic economies. In reality, the same transnational flows of goods and money, the same global imbalances and deficit cycles as before are now subsidized by government loans instead of commercial financial bubbles. And the state money itself is anything but national.

Because capitalism is considered indestructible anyway, and the new quality of globalization tends to be suppressed, the only question that seems to arise is that of up-and-comers among corporations and national winners and losers. Will China replace the U.S. as the economic and political world power? This “grand narrative” of the media is completely blind to reality, because we no longer live in a century of independent national empires. The Chinese export surpluses vis-à-vis the U.S., which are increasing again from month to month, are financed by the money glut of the U.S. Federal Reserve. Conversely, the Chinese feed their state-enforced domestic growth from astronomical foreign exchange reserves, primarily in dollars. The interdependence is so great that any stumble by one brings down the other. Neither individually nor jointly do they control their contradictory interdependence.

In Europe, people pretend that the debt crises of Greece and the other wobblers are homegrown problems that can be dealt with by national austerity efforts. In fact, the deficits in the EU are the flip side of Germany’s export surpluses. If the German economy had to focus on the national domestic market, it would collapse immediately. So far, the draconian austerity measures in Southern and Eastern Europe, and for that matter in Great Britain, have largely only been proclaimed. If they are fully realized, we can expect a European recession with global repercussions. And if Greece goes bankrupt, just when it is saving itself to death, people will wonder where Greek government securities are stashed everywhere. It’s not much different than the Lehman certificates, and it applies to bad government debt everywhere. Capital in all its forms is international.

Originally published in Neuen Deutschland on 06/27/2011

Savings Terror and Revolt

Robert Kurz

German export chauvinism believes itself to be on the island of the blessed, where no crisis exists anymore. It is true that mass poverty and slum conditions have continued to rise in this country as well. But that is not an issue when the economy is booming all the same. China and the USA are not the only ones buying big in Germany thanks to government aid. Together with cars and machine tools, the crisis was mainly exported to the less blessed parts of the EU for the time being. The euro makes it possible because it favors the high-tech export roller. And that’s why it has to be saved. The regulars get artificially excited about alleged gifts of billions for the “lazy Greeks.” But the gifts are not gifts at all, but additional loans that are to be serviced by hook or by crook. This is only possible if Greece saves itself to death and literally cuts the costs of the euro bailout out of its citizens, including the middle class. It is no longer just militant young people who are taking to the streets against this, but also conservative housewives, doctors and teachers, grandpas and grannies.

As is well known, the social pain threshold is not only being exceeded in Greece. For similar reasons, the austerity terror is also raging in Spain, Portugal, Ireland and elsewhere; even in Great Britain, which, although not part of the euro zone, had to save its own banks and is now making its own population pay for it. Everywhere, a revolt is brewing against the selling off of the last public resources, which, although so far aimless in sociopolitical terms, will soon be containable only by force. Suddenly, “Arab conditions” are looming in the middle of the EU. Whereas the uprisings there have so far been perceived by the media as crucifixive “democratization movements,” the social misery is now emerging as the true motivation on the ground of the European democracies themselves. At the center, here as well as there, is the dramatic mass unemployment of the academic youth, which, by the way, has long been noticeable in China and the other Asian boom countries.

It was the central banks’ flood of money and the global government bailout programs that led to new financial bubbles, rampant inflation or, as in the euro zone, to the brink of currency collapse. The extremist austerity policy is the about-face to escape these consequences. However, this is the only way to manifest the crisis in its full extent. Greece, currently the weakest link in the chain, shows after Arabia the future of the capitalist economy and its world of states. If, after the young, the older generation also suffers the consequences of the crisis as a result of state intervention, the legitimacy of the political system will collapse. This is not only a social and political problem, but also affects capital itself. After all, the mania for austerity against the consequences of the bailout mania is also stifling the global economy again in the end. It is absurd to imagine that the FRG can bask in the glow of its successful crisis exports while the world around it is on fire. It will be interesting to see how the supposed winners of the crisis react socially and politically when the misery finally reaches them.

Originally published in Freitag on 07/07/2011

Toxic Waste Dumps of Credit

Robert Kurz

Anyone who still has a vestige of memory might wonder what happened to the huge masses of bad loans for which the search was on after the financial crash of 2008 to find as inconspicuous a resting place as possible. Nothing has been paid off; on the contrary, the imaginary liabilities have continued to swell. The game of apparently servicing old loans with new ones, and servicing them again with new ones, has long been exhausted in the private sector. On the other hand, the notorious “toxic papers” were not allowed to be written off in full because of their sheer mass, apart from a few cosmetic operations by the banks. According to the financial gurus themselves, this would have meant the famous “meltdown” of the global financial system. In balance sheet terms, the banks were allowed to offload their toxic waste. But even the “bad banks,” which were supposed to temporarily cushion the collapse of the shadow banking system after the bursting of the real estate bubble with the help of government guarantees, have gone quiet.

Officially, hopes and expectations were raised that the government guarantees could soon create enough new “confidence” to bring the long worthless securities back to a halfway decent price. The prerequisite for this would have been that the U.S. real estate sector, from which the shock wave had emanated, recovered strongly. There is no evidence of such a recovery. But the government guarantees did not come due either. This was simply not allowed to happen, because otherwise the “meltdown” would have taken place via the detour of the state budgets. So where has the highly toxic waste of the financial system gone? A final repository has indeed been found, namely the central banks. As is well known, they are currently flooding the world with dollars, euros, etc., in order to breathe life into what is actually a clinically dead global economy. Officially, they are not yet dropping the money from the helicopter, but are giving it to the commercial banks as a loan; albeit at low or even zero interest rates. As with any loan, the banks have to deposit “collateral” for it. And what does this collateral consist of? In the masses of toxic waste paper that the central banks take in their stride as if they were the crown jewels.

Less than three years have passed since the crash of the financial markets, and already the public finances of more and more countries are running out of steam because they were overstretched in the course of the anti-crisis policy. Basically, the same development is repeating itself with government securities as with private financial securities. A growing part of the barely serviceable debt has been transferred to shadow budgets. More and more government bonds are turning into toxic waste like real estate mortgages before them. And central banks are also becoming grateful customers for this. The Asians are buying less and less U.S. bonds? No problem, the U.S. Federal Reserve itself is asking for them like grain during a famine. The European sovereign debt crisis would also have worsened, despite all the rescue packages, if the European Central Bank had not long since started buying up worthless bonds of the crisis states en masse. Of all things, the central banks, the supposed guardians of the Grail of financial stability, have become toxic waste dumps of the global financial system. This is the final disposal site because there is no longer any authority behind it that could, in turn, relieve the central banks of their burden. The façade of normality that has been put up since 2008 consists of the adventurous policy of money creation based on the “safety net” of bad loans.

Originally published in Neuen Deutschland in 07/25/2011

Attack on Ukraine: Struggle for World Order

The Rupture in German-Russian Relations and The Return of War as A Continuation of Imperialist Geopolitics in Europe

Tomasz Konicz

Shock and awe – that’s the denominator of the massive Russian attack on Ukraine, in which dozens of targets have been shelled in a very short time to paralyze Ukrainian forces and prevent coordinated resistance to the Russian army’s advance in the east of the country (so far, Russian ground forces have been active only east of the Dnieper River). The large-scale nationwide attack, which targeted and partially destroyed Ukraine’s command structures, depots, and air force, is similar to the U.S. approach in the last Iraq war, when the U.S. Air Force also relied on an overwhelming assault against the ailing Iraqi regime’s military infrastructure.

The start of the war over Ukraine should teach the U.S. and the EU a lesson. By emulating the American attack on Iraq, the Kremlin wants to prove that Russia is militarily on the same imperialist level as the West, a fact that Washington, Berlin, and Brussels want to deny Moscow geopolitically. The imperial Russian sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, which the economically declining Moscow was no longer willing to concede – is now literally being bombed back into existence by the nuclear power Russia, while the West has to watch impotently if it does not want to risk a nuclear doomsday. The Kremlin thus makes it clear that it will defend to the utmost its imperial position as a great power that wants to dispose of its “spheres of influence” just like the USA and Germany.

Germany and Russia: Close Economic Relations

The political and economic fallout from the war will be massive, especially for Berlin, as the Federal Republic continues to maintain close economic ties with Russia – even though these peaked after the pro-Western overthrow in Kiev in 2014 and the subsequent Ukrainian civil war. The German-Russian trade balance peaked at a volume of 80 billion euros in 2012, only to fall to 48 billion euros in 2016 in the wake of the sanctions. Last year saw a slight recovery to just under 60 billion. Germany mainly exports high-tech products such as machinery and cars, while Russia exports raw materials and in particular fossil fuels with a slight trade surplus. Around 55 percent of the natural gas imported into Germany comes from Russian deposits. Germany is still Russia’s most important European trading partner – globally, the FRG was overtaken by China as a trading partner only a few years ago.

A major setback for Berlin’s energy policy ambitions is the cancellation of the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the commissioning of which would have made Germany a central European energy hub. Instead, Germany’s consumers and industry must prepare for rapidly rising energy prices. According to former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, they are likely to reach $2,000 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas soon. This economic fallout, which is now imminent, may have been the most important reason for Berlin’s hesitant attitude toward Moscow. In Washington, in the U.S. press, Berlin’s refusal to supply weapons to Ukraine or to abandon the pipeline project in the North Sea was sharply criticized for weeks.

Now that even the Tagesschau considers the course of German Russia policy, characterized by “dialogue,” to have “failed,” a fundamental reorientation of Berlin is likely to take place. Thus, for the time being, Berlin’s strategy of a mainly economic penetration of the post-Soviet space has failed because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, ultimately because of Moscow’s military means. German think tanks like to substantiate this German path to geopolitical power development with the term geoeconomics as a complex strategy in which “trade, technology, finance or energy policy are instrumentalized as means to achieve strategic goals.” Greece had to experience how such a geoeconomic conflict is played out in the course of the debt crisis in the summer of 2015, when the country, mistreated by the then German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, was driven to the brink of economic collapse.

German Geopolitics and Inner-Western Differences

But in reality there is no uniform German policy toward Russia; it has always been an expression of the shifting power constellation between Western-oriented forces within the German functional elites (often derided as Atlanticists) and the forces teased as “Putin whisperers,” who advocated a Eurasian orientation toward Russia, China, and so on.

There is no complete overlap between the political spectrum and the respective geopolitical preference, as Eurasians and Atlantists are found in varying proportions in almost all Bundestag parties – even if the SPD, Die Linke and, above all, the AfD have a particularly high proportion of “Putin whisperers.” Atlantists, on the other hand, are mainly to be found among the Greens. It is simply a question of the geopolitical orientation of the FRG as the dominant European superpower, within the framework of which its own global ambitions are to be realized: for example, the expansion of the German sphere of influence in eastern and southeastern Europe, which in the course of EU enlargement has long since been transformed into the extended workbench of the German export industry.

Against the background of this loose and changing faction formation within German functional elites, a double strategy emerged vis-à-vis Russia, which the German geostrategist Wolfgang Ischinger described as “congagement,” a portmanteau created from the words containment and engagement. Economic cooperation, in which Russia in fact assumes the peripheral position of a supplier of energy and raw materials, was accompanied, with varying emphases, by German efforts to minimize Russia’s geopolitical influence in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space. The phase of tumultuous economic and political expansion in the 1990s – when Berlin supported the breakup of Czechoslovakia, the breakup of Yugoslavia, and the eastward expansion of the EU and NATO – was followed by the phase of cooperation with Putin’s rise to power, which ended only in 2014 with the crisis in Ukraine.

In the wake of the pro-Western upheaval in Kiev, however, it also became clear that Berlin operates as an independent geopolitical actor and does not allow Washington to dictate its policy. In 2013, there was still agreement on the effort to remove Ukraine from the planned Russian economic union. At the time, Germany, through the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, built up the Klitschko party UDAR, which was aiming for a change of power through new elections and quickly came into conflict with more radical, U.S.-sponsored forces during the fighting around the Maidan. U.S. diplomat Victoria Nuland’s famous “Fuck the EU,” published as a recording of a telephone conversation at the height of the crisis, reflects precisely these intra-Western differences, which also explain Germany’s current reticence.

Oceania vs. Eurasia

Washington has since sought to drive a wedge between Berlin and Moscow through additional escalation in order to prevent the formation of a grand Eurasian alliance, while Berlin has rather wanted to embrace Moscow to death and turn it into a periphery as part of a strategy of change through economic rapprochement. The declining empire in Washington sees China, together with a Eurasian alliance (keyword: New Silk Road), as the central threat to its eroding hegemony. The U.S. intervention in Kiev is therefore aimed at consolidating its own “oceanic” alliance, which extends as far as possible across the Atlantic and the Pacific and is ultimately directed against China.

Oceania vs. Eurasia – this is the denominator of the current global hegemonic struggle, with the imperialist camps striving to expand the boundaries of their spheres of influence. The U.S., for example, is trying to re-establish the German-dominated EU, which since the Trump era has increasingly wanted to act as an independent actor, firmly in its sphere of influence.

The increasing autonomy of action of the late capitalist states also comes to bear in the Eastern European countries, which, although economically dependent on the Federal Republic, at the same time tended to pact with the USA (above all Poland and the Baltic countries) when it came to torpedoing further rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow. The old Central Eastern European fear of a renewed division of the region between Berlin and Moscow, revived by the Nord Stream pipeline, provided the U.S. with a good lever of power in the economic “backyard” of the FRG to push this agenda.

Ultimately, the increasing military conflicts in the semi-periphery of the world system, including Turkey’s imperial ambitions, are due precisely to the imperial decline of the USA. Washington can no longer maintain the claim it made in the 1990s to be the “world’s policeman,” largely monopolizing the use of military means globally in bloody world-order wars. Regional powers are pushing into the emerging power vacuum to enforce their imperialist ambitions by military means if necessary.

Shaky World Order and The Crisis of Capital

This is, in a nutshell, the much-invoked “multipolar world order” in the socio-ecological crisis of capital. The decline of the USA has in fact resulted in the emergence of a number of small “baby USAs” that want to project the increasing social (and, in the long term, ecological) distortions caused by the crisis outward by military means: from the Turkish war adventures in Syria, the South Caucasus and Libya, to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, to the possible showdown between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan.

Similar to the 1930s, the economic crisis is breathing down the necks of the shattered state apparatuses. The need to pass on the consequences of the crisis to others is growing steadily. In the course of its economic expansion, the Federal Republic literally managed to export the consequences of the crisis, such as debt or unemployment, by means of high trade surpluses – at the expense of the deficits of the importing countries of the German export offensives. The eurozone sovereign debt crisis of the last decade is a case in point.

In this context, it is not least the mercilessly over-indebted United States that is de facto forced to fight for the hegemonic position, since it must hold the dollar as the world currency. Without the greenback as the measure of value of all commodity things, which Washington until recently could print at will to finance the extreme U.S. budget deficit, the U.S. would degenerate into a gigantic, nuclear-armed debt state. Because of the social disruption at home, the U.S. elites have therefore long since developed a paranoia of Russian influence, similar to that which prevails in the Kremlin with regard to Western-financed “color revolutions.”

But in the end it is precisely the socio-ecological world crisis of capital, concretely in the form of increasing inflation, which prevents Washington itself from using “deficit spending” to whitewash the internal contradictions.

Danger of a Major War

War as a means of politics will thus gain in attractiveness for the late capitalist functional elites. It forms a catalyst of the economic and, in perspective, ecological crisis process: The resulting social distortions find in it a violent medium of external discharge, which ultimately executes the self-destructive tendency of capital – up to the threat of large-scale nuclear war. In the case of Ukraine, one can still hope that the nuclear power plants in the country constitute the only nuclear danger: NATO intervention seems unlikely so far, after U.S. President Biden ruled out direct military intervention even in the run-up to the war.

Nevertheless, a further escalation of the war cannot be ruled out. The powerless left currently has only the option of peace struggle and educational work: the emphasis on the survival necessity of a post-capitalist system transformation in order to prevent the barbaric collapse by means of a repeated large-scale war.

Originally published in analyse & kritik on 02/24/2022