The Splendor and Misery of Anti-Authoritarianism

Highlights: On the History of Ideas and Effects of the “New Left”

Robert Kurz

1.

The student movement of 1968 understood itself as “anti-authoritarian,” which was essentially synonymous with “anti-institutional.” Rudi Dutschke’s famous catchphrase of the “long march through the institutions” did not contradict this self-understanding, but was meant, at least in its original meaning, only to express the necessity that the anti-institutional struggle was to be waged not only from the outside, but at the same time also from “within,” in the subversive penetration of the capitalist institutions themselves. Another catchphrase of the student movement – namely, that of “revolutionary professional practice” – pointed in a similar direction and reflects the ideas, hopes, and illusions of that time, as one might say today. The concept of “autonomy” – which is more common today and by which an entire current of radical young opposition currently defines its self-image – could be considered synonymous with the concept of “anti-authoritarianism.” This alone shows that we are dealing, in a transformed form, with unresolved, contemporary history – that 1968 is not merely history, even if it may seem as distant to some young people today as World War I.

The anti-authoritarian ideology could not have fallen from the sky; yet it seemed to appear suddenly, unquestioningly embraced by a rapidly spreading movement whose members, for the most part, were initially entirely unaccustomed to theoretical reflection. The decisive impetus was not the proliferation of ivory tower experiences, but rather social change – an objectivity unfolding behind the subjects’ backs. The movement’s external triggers and rallying points were political and moral; politically, the critique of emergency laws and the grand coalition – in itself a purely bourgeois, democratically immanent critique; morally, the outrage over the U.S. war in Vietnam – in itself a sentiment that had not yet departed from the framework of bourgeois thought. But why were the social institutions, which had been there all along, now suddenly perceived as authoritarian and intolerable (“Under the robes, the mustiness of a thousand years”)?

Undoubtedly, the objective social transformation that served as the backdrop to the 1968 movement was shaped by the Fordist socialization process of capital. The postwar era was not merely a “period of reconstruction” for capital, as the movement itself put it, but rather a process of capitalist socialization that went far beyond that, reaching a new level. This is indicated not only by the historically unprecedented growth rates of capital accumulation; above all, the social quality of this change itself was decisive beyond mere quantitative growth. It has already become a sociological commonplace that Fordist socialization produced the interventionist, Keynesian welfare state and largely disintegrated the family. Theoretical reflection (for example, by Critical Theory) had already partially anticipated these tendencies and derived them from the logic of war economies, fascism and the “New Deal.” But it was not until after the Second World War that the real Fordist socialization thrust began. Only now did the automobile and consumer and household electronics, aided in part by the technological innovations of the war, enter the phase of worldwide mass production; the creation of new mass needs on a world scale and their production as a profitable absorption of huge masses of living labor first constituted the self-sustaining boom. On an unprecedented scale, women were drawn into the capitalist-defined “labor force,” while at the same time the preconditions, consequences, and “unintended side effects” of this process increasingly demanded comprehensive state intervention – ranging from monetary control to the “permanent war economy” of the arms industry and the rapidly expanding institutions of professional training and scientification, all the way to social work, etc.

At the same time, however, social institutions and modes of transportation remained entrenched in traditional ways of thinking whose roots stretched far back into the estates-based, pre-capitalist society. While the bloody crucible of the two world wars in the first half of the 20th century had already destroyed, dissolved, and eroded traditional modes of interaction, ways of thinking, and behaviors in many respects, “peaceful” Fordist socialization now completed this work, penetrating even the finest pores of society. As a result, the only negative-social individual adequate to capitalism emerged, the abstract MONAD, liberated from all traditional ties and “values,” “liberated,” however, only for the empty end in itself of the valorization of value, of the total buying and selling of oneself. The realization of this tendency, immanent in the capital relation from the beginning, on a new level, the formation of this empty, self-sufficient individual, had to collide with the fossilized, “authoritarian,” in their essence still pre-capitalist traditional modes of thought and behavior. This clash had found mass cultural expression among young people long before the 1968 movement, not only in the revolt subculture of rockers or in the far-reaching fascination with existentialist heroic rebellion per se, for example through the stylization of James Dean, but above all in the massively popular music culture of rock or beat and its idols. The significance of this development cannot be overstated. For the first time in history, the phenomenon of WORLD CULTURE – which had already taken shape under capitalism in the 19th century – descended from the pedestal of “high culture,” the preserve of intellectual elites, into the everyday lives of the masses. This was made possible by the technological productive forces of Fordism and the associated emergence of a global network of direct communication. In this respect, no other form of mass culture has yet been able to even come close to pop music. And it was precisely at this level of the old and the new mass culture that the first violent clashes occurred, triggered by habitual secondary forms that were initially understood as protest (jeans, long hair, etc.). All this was not simply the eternally repeating generational conflict, but the incipient clash of two worlds, the traditional world, in which capitalist socialization was still merely sectoral or external varnish, and the Fordist world of total full capitalism, which subjugates social reproduction to its empty form-determination, right down to the last niches and pores.

From these contexts emerges an objectively grounded interpretation of the 1968 movement that stands in direct contrast to its own self-understanding at the time – namely, its portrayal as a mere function of the “modernization” of capitalism, or more precisely, of the imposition of a totalizing, historically self-identical full-scale capitalism. Tendencies toward such a reevaluation of the movement of that time are increasingly found in the literature, sometimes with negative, but more often with positive connotations under the ideological guise of the “democratization” narrative. The current banal democratic-capitalist self-image of most of the movement’s leaders at the time, extending even to the leading figures of “radical leftism” (Cohn-Bendit, for example), also points in this direction.

And yet such an interpretation would be just as one-dimensional as the super-revolutionary self-image of 1968. This movement, like the preceding revoltist and existentialist subcultures, was fundamentally ambivalent. It expressed not only the capitalist drive toward modernization in the articulation of abstract monads against “authoritarian” traditionalism, but simultaneously also the immense SUFFERING of this abstract individuality at its own hands, the outrage against the horrific emptiness of total self-exploitation. And the question remains whether this aspect of the revolt, whether this outrage, can be preserved as a “legacy” and transformed into a new revolutionary thinking at the height of our time: today, twenty years later. To be able to understand this, the traces of anti-authoritarianism’s ambivalence have to be identified within its own theoretical and ideological forms of expression and critically resolved.

2.

Then as now, the definition of “anti-authoritarianism” or “autonomy” remained rather vague. It is supposed to be about the autonomy of the individual vis-à-vis the social institutions experienced as repressive; the autonomous individual is supposed to defend himself against the authority of repressive sociality or its representatives and constitute a movement of many autonomous individuals, which finally abolishes the repressive-institutional sociality. This anti-authoritarian or autonomous ideology is naturally in a strong and contradictory tension with the socialist history of ideas. On the one hand, it largely shares the socialist intention of abolishing economic relations of exploitation as the basis of social repression; on the other hand, it sees in socialism as it was traditionally understood and practiced (2nd and 3rd Internationals) a new form of institutional repression of the individual, an assessment that was of course only reinforced by the real development of the Soviet Union. An essential impulse of the anti-authoritarian students and youth movement was therefore, in addition to the critique of repressive late capitalism, at the same time the critique of the real-socialist repressive-authoritarian forms of socialization. The fact that in 1968, at the height of the movement, the tanks of the machinery of oppression rolled in equal measure during the Paris May uprising and in Prague under the reformers seemed to confirm this view decisively in practice.

To critically understand anti-authoritarianism, it may be helpful to take a brief look at its intellectual history – a leap back 150 years. Literally “unthinkable” in traditional societies, anti-authoritarian ideology is, even in this early phase of “capitalism on its own terms,” a typical product of the bourgeois 19th century – as, incidentally, is Marxism – and certainly reflects an emancipatory impulse. From the very beginning, currents of anti-authoritarian thought have been close to anarchism or were originally part of it.

In its most radical intensification, even the earliest anti-authoritarianism is directed against any authority external to the individual ego, regardless of its nature. This basic idea of “solipsistic” egoism, which understands itself in emancipatory terms, is already summarized with almost brilliant banality by Max Stirner on the eve of the bourgeois revolution of 1848: “Away, then, with every cause that is not completely my affair. You think that at least the ‘good cause’ must be my affair? Which good, which bad? I am myself my own affair, and I am neither good nor bad. Neither makes any sense to me. The divine is God’s affair; the human cause is ‘humanity’s.’ My affair is neither the divine nor the human; it is not the good, the true, the just, the free, etc., but only my own, and it is not general, but is – unique, as I am unique. For me, there is nothing greater than me!” (Preface to “The Unique and Its Property,” 1842). Even in this earliest formulation by Stirner, the essence of anti-authoritarianism becomes crystal clear. In contrast to all the hypocritical altruism of Christian slave morality and bourgeois “welfare” organizations, there is undoubtedly something refreshing about this statement, just as there is in similar statements by Nietzsche, albeit in a different intellectual context. This problematic kinship is, of course, by no means coincidental. The question cannot be avoided: how does anti-authoritarianism actually intend to distinguish itself from the equally individualistic ideologies of radical liberalism (Manchester liberalism in the 19th century, monetarism, etc., today) or Nietzschean master-man ideology? The answer – that the freedom of each individual and “unique” self is contingent upon the freedom of all others – seems somewhat lame and helplessly abstract. This postulate could be denounced as an altruistic slip-up, as a moral appendage not inherent in the logic of radical autonomy that underlies consistent anti-authoritarianism. Nor does this abstract definition offer even the slightest hint as to how humane sociality is supposed to be practically possible under the presupposition of radical anti-institutionalism.

Quite obviously, anti-authoritarianism drags around with it the unsolved problem of the relationship between the individual and society, the classical problem of bourgeois thought in general, which never gets out of this dualism. The starting point is always the already formed modern individual, as if this individual had fallen from the sky. This individual is alien and external to his own sociality, sometimes even hostile to the extent that the state and bureaucratic institutions grow ever more threatening in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and seem to devour the I of individuality. It does not occur to bourgeois thinking that this individual is not an unquestionable presupposition, but rather a historical-social construct that only came into being with the generalization of commodity production through capitalism and thus the emergence of money as the total and universal form of exchange in society.

Stirner wants to do away with the false abstractions of Christian belief in God just as much as with the false abstraction of humanity in Feuerbach’s critique of religion, in order to arrive at what is supposedly truly concrete, corporeal, and tangible – namely, one’s own ego. He does not notice that it is precisely this that is the most extreme and most arid abstraction of all. This ego is so abstract that it is no longer aware of its own social constitution, but rather experiences it practically as the downright hostile coldness of the social institutions, which it fights against for its abstract, empty autonomy. The incessant dualism of bourgeois thought thus constantly oscillates between the abstraction of sociality and the abstraction of the individual’s privacy, unable to reconcile or mediate between the two, even though it concerns a mediated identity of the self that has disintegrated within itself and with itself. Depending on the context, either abstract sociality – or its institutions such as law, the state, the nation, and so on – is invoked as a necessary constraint on the freedom of the individual, or, conversely, war is declared on these institutions in the name of that very same individual freedom, even though they are merely expressions of the very same process that brought the individual into being in the first place. The unconquered and unconquerable pain obviously stems from the fact that it is precisely an abstract individual in the context of an abstract sociality. The unleashing of commodity production and thus the transformation of human labor power itself into a commodity has triggered an immense surge in socialization compared to the crude, traditional modes of production such as feudalism; people are increasingly less at the mercy of the immediate natural environment, and they are increasingly no longer reproducing their lives within a small domestic-village context based on an agrarian mode of production. Wage labor, the expansion of markets, the creation of the world market, and the associated industrialization have, to use a term now common in ecological discourse, established a global “networked” interconnection of human labor and reproduction. Within the capitalist framework, this is a historical process of socialization, albeit one that is, so to speak, only half-baked – namely, abstract. It is abstract because people do not collectively plan and regulate this growing interconnectedness of their social labor directly through their social institutions according to criteria of concrete utility; rather, social interconnection takes the form of developed, wage-labor-based commodity production, which is only indirectly linked to people’s social practice and DECOUPLED FROM CONCRETE NEEDS. The medium of this abstract socialization is an external thing, MONEY. As a “general commodity,” money is an abstract entity empty of all content that serves as an expression of social labor, completely severing it from its concrete content. Money, as is well known, does not stink; one cannot tell from its appearance whether it is the expression of a destructive or a useful expenditure of social labor. For the multiplication of the money advanced as the well-known end in itself of capitalist production, the aspect of concrete usefulness therefore plays no role in and of itself.

The modern individual, who emerged only after breaking free from the constraints of traditional modes of production, is therefore an abstract social individual – that is, a mere money-subject. In a well-known variation on Descartes’ famous statement, he had to say of himself: “I earn money, therefore I am.” Anti-authoritarianism may oppose the modern institutions driven by the abstract socialization of money; it may morally condemn the dance around the golden calf, not unlike Christian sanctimoniousness in this respect, but unfortunately it is not anti-authoritarian enough to avoid ultimately submitting to this incomprehensible, material authority of money, because it cannot escape its own incomprehensible sociality. Money, through the abstract, empty end in itself of fully unleashed commodity production, even appears to the abstract individual, for whom “nothing matters more than themselves,” as the unconsciously presupposed means by which he must bring his ego to bear. Antiauthoritarianism, or the ideology of the autonomous individual, is thus nothing but the unconscious reflex of bourgeois subject-development, the hopeless walkout of abstract money-subjectivity against itself. And yet in this revoltist reflex there lies, still unseparated, an emancipatory desire that does not know how to give itself adequate expression. In each new crisis epoch of bourgeois, money-mediated socialization, anti-authoritarian ideology therefore also emerges anew on a higher level, without ever being able to break out of the prison of commodity-logical categories, as long as no transformation into a concrete critique of the commodity form itself takes place. How was it historically possible that the idea of a liberation of the individual has nevertheless not progressed beyond anti-authoritarianism or abstract “autonomy” until today?

3.

Marx’s theory essentially contains at its core a radical critique of commodity production in general, that is, of the merely partial, abstract social nature of the individual. For Marx, the communist revolution is ultimately the abolition of wage-labor AS the abolition of the commodity-money-form itself, even if he was unable to articulate these consequences with the necessary clarity. This difficulty stems from the relative underdevelopment of the capitalist abstract socialization process in his time. For the same reason, the old workers’ movement could not grasp the truly radical consequences of Marx’s theory, even in its revolutionary wing. It wanted to abolish wage labor on the ground of commodity production and money, an undertaking doomed to failure. In the West, the result was social democracy integrated into capitalism; in the East, it was Soviet society, which took on a specific form as an expression of CATCH-UP industrialization and BOURGEOIS socialization. Starting from these premises, Marxist theory had to be drastically simplified and thus also had to offer a truncated and oversimplified critique of anti-authoritarianism. Traditional Marxism, itself caught in the categories of abstract commodity-money socialization, was not at all able to analyze anti-authoritarianism adequately. By using the merely accusatory label of “petty-bourgeois individualism,” it signaled its inability to recognize anti-authoritarian ideology as an expression of capitalist socialization at all. The flat sociological classification as the specific ideology of a certain class defined as “petty-bourgeois” obscured the fact that the problem of abstract individuality, with the advance of capitalist development, grips ALL classes, EVEN THE WORKINGCLASSas the bearer of the commodity labor-power and thus as the bourgeois money-subject. By merely countering the anti-authoritarians’ abstract individualism with the anti-individual, external organizational perspective of the old labor movement, traditional Marxism itself remained trapped in the dualism of bourgeois thought in its critique of anti-authoritarian ideology; it did not advocate the concrete individuality of communism – mediated through the struggle for social liberation – against the abstract individuality of money, but merely a new variant of abstract sociality in the form of “state socialism” against the abstract privacy of the liberals and their “inverted” anarchist variant.

The central theme of anti-authoritarianism therefore had to remain alive beyond classical anarchism, and not merely during the upheavals of capitalist crises. The emptied, abstract bourgeois money-subject, at odds with itself, is all the more the subject of the entire philosophy of the 20th century. Lebensphilosophie and existentialism took up the problem, without, of course, being able to resolve it philosophically. The critical theory of the Frankfurt School, like most of “Western Marxism” in general, also has to be situated in this context. In its critique of the “authoritarian state” and the “authoritarian personality,” it remained committed to the central motifs of early anti-authoritarianism not merely in form and name: however, it was shaped by contemporary philosophical debate and simultaneously drew upon Marx’s critique of political economy. Although the result remained rather eclectic in many respects, there was no sign of a critical resolution of the old contradiction. Critical theory itself still reproduced the old bourgeois dualism of individual and society as an external, unmediated, hostile opposition; In contrast to the traditional Marxism of the old workers’ movement, however, it did not simply assert the abstraction of the generality of society against the liberal individual in a “state-socialist” manner, but rather tried, precisely the other way around, to defend this individual, the “individual” (including the individual existing as a proletarian in his or her unrepeatable uniqueness) in its mediation through the bourgeois philosophical debate against the impositions of that power of abstract, negative sociality, which began to escalate to unbearable levels in the 20th century. Critical theory itself did not get beyond the individual as an abstraction; in this respect, Stirner’s central motif still remained unresolved in a modified and further developed form. But by daring to make the bold attempt to justify, against the grain of traditional interpretation, the very liberation of the individual from Marx’s theory, Critical Theory ultimately opened the door to a reformulation and further development of this theory beyond the limitations of traditional Marxism; a door, however, through which no one has yet passed.

This was the historical context of socially critical thought that the student movement still encountered in 1968 and could not escape. It was unable, so to speak, to leap directly into a complete reworking of theory, but had to establish a theoretical basis for its legitimacy in its opposition to the existing social structures. Given the ossification of social democracy as a bourgeois institution and the complete theoretical and political impotence of so-called “Marxism-Leninism” of the Eastern variety –  as a false “Marxist orthodoxy” – the adoption of anti-authoritarianism through the historical filter of Critical Theory represented an inevitable transitional phase in radical theory and practice; the uselessness and theoretical exhaustion of traditional Marxism, oriented toward the old labor movement, compelled a return to less discredited approaches to radical thought. If the re-emergence of anti-authoritarianism in the crises of the twentieth century had hitherto remained in the shadow of the old labor movement and its major parties, it re-emerged into the full limelight of history in 1968 as the central idea of the worldwide youth and student movements, precisely as the new claiming of an old, unfulfilled promise on which both liberalism and traditional Marxism had failed. The representatives of the old labor movement Marxism were as surprised as they were horrified, as the outcry of one of their propagandists shows: “Anarchism has risen again; it inspires student rebels, defuses the hand grenades of direct action, floods bookstalls, and enriches the vocabulary of police reports. The fact is undisputed, however surprising it may be. It had been considered dead, a museum piece; but it was only a false death. We must renew the discussion, enriched by the experience of a turbulent century” (Bruno Frei, Die anarchistische Utopie, Frankfurt 1978, I. Auflage 1971, p. 5). But in this renewed discussion the “traditionalists” had nothing new to say, as the same author shows with involuntary clarity when he objects as follows to the “petty-bourgeois individualism” of the new anti-authoritarian movement and its neo-anarchist concept of freedom: “The state, which guarantees social order (!), is not the antithesis of freedom (!). The question is rather: which state guarantees which social order, and whose freedom does it guarantee?  ‘Freedom,’ Marx teaches, ‘does not consist in negation(!)’, in individual refusal, nor in the isolation of the individual from society, but on the contrary in the ability to identify with the ‘laws of motion(!)’ and ‘lofty goals(!)’ of humanity” (ibid, p. 77).

A conservative could have said exactly the same thing. The traditionalist proponents of “real socialism” and left-wing social democracy thus exposed themselves all too clearly as ideologues of peace and order, who could once again offer nothing in response to the abstract individual’s call for freedom but abstract state-imposed bourgeoisification – the other side of the coin. While, according to authentic Marxist theory, the abolition of the state is identical to the abolition of wage labor and money, the ideologue of “socialist commodity production” and “social democratic” statehood must take refuge in the “laws of motion” and “lofty goals” of humanity. These “laws of motion,” which are nothing other than the immanent logic of commodity production and which Marx considered above all worthy of abolition, force precisely the disintegration of the individual into abstract privacy and abstract sociality, that unresolved dilemma which first brings forth nebulous constructs of external “ideals” and abstract “lofty goals of humanity,” to which the empirical individual is then morally condemned to “subordinate” himself. Quite rightly, this real-socialist/social-democratic civic Marxism earned nothing but scorn and derision on the part of the anti-authoritarians. Of course, this left the classic dilemma of the internally conflicted bourgeois individuality unresolved from the other side as well, for the new anti-authoritarian movement was just as unable to advance a concrete critique of commodity production itself – and thus of the abstract socialization mediated through money – as the traditional forms of state-citizen socialism. The movement of 1968 thus became a mere hot-water heater for all the socially critical ideas of emancipation from the past, which were all rushed through and discarded once again, including anti-authoritarianism itself.

4.

To do justice to the anti-authoritarian movement, it must nevertheless be emphasized that, just like Critical Theory itself, it by no means simply and uncritically repeated Stirner’s statements from 1842 or merely merged into traditional anarchist ideology. In fact, two distinct and ultimately contradictory lines of argumentation and interpretation can be identified within the new anti-authoritarianism, though at the time they did not truly play out their objective opposition. The first and actually more significant line of argumentation, which could still be of great importance, was developed by a group that has today been completely lost, at least in the consciousness of the German left: the “Situationist International.” As the somewhat strange-seeming name suggests, this current seemed to derive from French left-existentialism. The concept of “situation” is a central concept of the whole philosophy of existence, as Bollnow shows; this concept means “[…] that a situation is not something into which a person merely stumbles occasionally and only superficially, but that human existence is, by its very nature, a being-in-a-situation, and that a person caught up in a situation can never escape it. At every moment of his life, he finds himself placed in a situation that he did not choose, that takes no account of his wishes and needs, but which presses upon him as something alien and hostile” (O.F. Bollnow, Existenzphilosophie, Stuttgart/Berlin/ Koln/Mainz 1955, 9th edition 1984, p 59f.).

Translated into the language of left-wing actionism, this could only mean promoting a version of the old anarchist idea of “direct action” – that is, to rebel as a subject, in a “situational” manner, against the objectively established “situations” of capitalist socialization. The social-democratically regressed historians of the SDS, Fichter and Lonnendonker, do not have much more to report about this source of the international anti-authoritarian movement: “The resigned mood prevailing among the European intelligentsia at the time […] led the Situationists to a strange practice: through ‘experimental behaviors,’ a ‘uniform environment’ was to be brought about in collective organization as a ‘constructed moment of life’” (Fichter/Lonnendonker, Kleine Geschichte des SDS, Berlin 1977, p. 78f.).

This indeed strange idea of practice seems merely reminiscent of old anarchist and utopian “commune” experiments. In fact, in the FRG it was the later communard Dieter Kunzelmann who established himself as early as 1959 with the Schwabing artists’ group “Spur” as the German section of this “Situationist International.” This group around Kunzelmann was, however, excluded from the SI only one year later because of its putschist and neo-anarchist tendencies, which suggests a different real self-image of this French current. Under the name of “Subversive Action,” to which Rudi Dutschke also belonged for a time, the Kunzelmann group became part of the history of the SDS and, in the FRG, the forerunner of anti-authoritarian actionism.

Much more interesting, however, are the theoretical approaches of the Situationists themselves, which were hardly known in the FRG, but did play a role in the France of the May Revolt. In the summer of 1968, the German translation of a Situationist pamphlet appeared, which had already been distributed not only in France but also in England, Italy and the USA. The ideas expressed in this pamphlet were hardly discussed in the German movement, but seem all the more important today for a critical reappraisal. The anti-authoritarians of the SI did not merely repeat the basic ideas of the old anarchist anti-authoritarianism, but sought to mediate them with Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism, i.e. precisely that dimension of Marx’s critique of the capital relation which had been suppressed by traditional Marxism. Sartre had already taken up this problem as a problem to be mediated with existential philosophy in his late writings inspired by the confrontation with Marxian theory, without, however, going beyond a first attempt (see Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, New York 2004). Going beyond the “Marxist” Sartre, the Situationists wanted to directly attack and abolish the alienation of the individual from his social existence constituted by the commodity fetish; one of their public slogans was: “Down with the image world and commodity fetishism.” By “image world” they understood the existence of the commodity fetish in the culture of capitalist mass consumption of the Fordist epoch, an approach that went far beyond the anti-authoritarian slogan of “compulsion to consume” widespread in the FRG, even if today it may seem somewhat naïve to cast this keyword of an essential theoretical insight abruptly into slogan form. The Situationist pamphlet says: “The fetishism of facts masks the essential category, the mass of details obscures the totality. Everything is said about this society except what it really is: a society dominated by commodities and spectacles […]” (On The Poverty of Student Life).

From this position, the traditional left could be fundamentally criticized in a truly new sense: “Such pseudo-opposition, propagating the worst mystifications and invoking more or less rigid ideologies, ultimately helps consolidate the dominant order” (ibid, emphasis in original).

This characterization, albeit a general one, captures the essence of the entire old workers’ movement and the Marxism that fused with it; admittedly, the tone of a quasi-“ontological” critique can be discerned, owing to an ahistorical perspective still rooted in existentialism, which amounts to merely denouncing the old workers’ movement as “false” in an abstract manner and without a conditional analysis of its real achievements. What is important, however, is that the Situationists do not criticize the immanence of traditional Marxism in the usual merely political-revolutionary way, but make much more far-reaching demands specifically directed against commodity-money socialization: “It is not enough to be for the power of workers councils in the abstract; it is necessary to demonstrate what it means concretely: the suppression of commodity production and therefore of the proletariat. Despite their superficial disparities, all existing societies are governed by the logic of the commodity; it is the basis of their totalitarian self-regulation […] In the world of commodity production, praxis is not pursued in accordance with autonomously determined aims, but in accordance with the directives of external forces. Economic laws take on the appearance of natural laws; but their power depends solely on the ‘unawareness of those who participate in them.’ The essence of commodity production is the loss of self in the chaotic and unconscious creation of a world totally beyond the control of its creators” (ibid, emphasis in original).

The significance of this solitary attempt at a radical critique of the commodity form cannot be overstated, especially when one considers that, in the twenty years since then, the most “radical” stance taken by the Left has never amounted to more than a mere being “for the power of workers’ councils” – a stance held by the new Left, which has itself grown old in the meantime, as well as today (at best!) among the Autonomists. Admittedly, these important statements by the Situationists remained abstract within their new approach at first and, apparently, could not be further developed – based on existentialist foundations – into a concrete application of Marx’s critique of political economy in the context of the times. Nor were the Situationists yet able to overcome the short-circuited false identity between theory and immediate practice, which is the very hallmark of the anti-authoritarians’ actionism. If anything from their entire approach has stuck in the forgetful consciousness of the Left, it is perhaps that oft-quoted phrase: “Proletarian revolutions will be festivals or nothing, for festivity is the very keynote of the life they announce.” However, the association of abstract, unmediated hedonism that emerges from this thought, taken out of context, does not do justice to the Situationists. Their radical critique of commodities and money goes far beyond ordinary anti-authoritarianism and remains even today that “Archimedean point” from which alone existing social orders can be unhinged.

But precisely because this approach so boldly anticipated a future of revolutionary movement – one that even today remains to be achieved – it could not truly be grasped or understood by the prevailing consciousness of the movement in 1968; the Situationists themselves had to lament that their ideas had been “thoroughly discussed and thoroughly misunderstood by the entire French left-wing press.” This is all the more true of the German movement, which even largely refrained from commenting. Instead, an interpretation of anti-authoritarianism prevailed that remained rather attached to Frankfurt Critical Theory with its resigned reformist implications and could not keep up with the radicalism of the French “existentialist” attempts to reform Marx’s theory. While Critical Theory certainly addressed the mystifications of what it termed the “exchange society,” its theoretical audacity – in invoking the unresolved abstract individual against its own social mystification – causes it to turn back at the very door it has opened, returning to the professional worlds of democratic fetishism. The concretion of critique did not grasp the commodity form as such and directly, but rather only the secondary forms of its historical development. With regard to the “central nerve” of bourgeois society, Critical Theory thus ultimately remained vague and inconsistent, on the one hand evaporating into the cultural spheres, on the other hand itself operating uncritically with the fetish categories of political economy (see the relevant works on the theory of economic planning by Friedrich Pollock, the “political economist” of Critical Theory). In fact, therefore, despite its theoretical merits, the Frankfurt School succeeded far less than at least some leftist existentialists in leaving behind the mere invocation of unresolved abstract money-individuality and thus bourgeois liberalism.

Drawing on Adorno’s theory, Rolf Wiggershaus has succinctly summarized the key premises and implications of Critical Theory. According to this view, Marx is supposedly concerned with the “non-bourgeois realization” of the bourgeois ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity – that is, with fulfilling the promises of the Enlightenment and liberalism. In a quasi-moral or rather metaphorical sense, this may well be true (cf. Marx’s idea of the “realm of freedom”).

Conceptually-theoretically, however, and in the sense of revolutionary social practice, such intentions were quite far from Marx’s mind; he was NOT concerned with the “realization,” but with the ABOLITION of liberalism and enlightenment. The mere idea of realization itself remains in the framework of commodity fetishism and thus of abstract money-subjectivity. The reformist implication of this approach is most clearly represented by Habermas, who, as an ordinary Enlightenment philosopher, still liked to tinker with this “realization” within the limits of legality and the laws of commodity production. In Adorno, too, the rather resigned reformism results from the connection between market economy and individuality in general, which remains liberal at its core; because the value form of the commodity, as the basic form of reification, remains entirely unresolved and shrouded in darkness, the critique of its cultural secondary forms fizzles out without effect, and it remains entirely unclear how a communist social individual is to be constituted through the abolition of commodity production. Instead, bypassing the central problem, Adorno, much like Horkheimer, directs his attention to the supposed forms of transformation of capitalism within the capitalist form of reproduction itself; in “organized capitalism” and the modern state bureaucracy he sees the destruction of the individuality and subjectivity constituted by commodity exchange, and his interest is directed primarily toward lamenting this and analyzing this process: “According to Adorno’s conviction, without a market economy and the patriarchal nuclear family, not only would there be no relatively independent entrepreneurs, but there would no longer be any reasonably autonomous individuals at all. […] Because of such judgments, Adorno did not even look for conditions other than liberal-capitalist ones for the emergence of counterforces. […] The collapse of the market, the collapse of the bourgeois family, and the collapse of the self were the key terms in Adorno’s view of the genealogy of the desubjectivized subjects of hierarchically organized capitalism” (R. Wiggershaus, Theodor W. Adorno, Munich 1987, p. 75).

Of course, Adorno was not a flat liberal in the sense of a capitalist market ideologue; on the contrary, according to his self-understanding, he was concerned with the abolition of capitalistically constituted social reproduction, but this intention is bent back in a peculiar way by his own theoretical approach. His crux lies above all in the fact that, due to a lack of concrete criticism of the commodity form itself, he is actually unable to name any individuality other than that constituted by this form in its abstractness; the idea of abolition therefore stalls, is no longer thought through, and ultimately exhausts itself in a falsely posed “condition” problem: the subjectivity constituted by (what is assumed to be transitory) “liberal capitalism” is supposed to be the indispensable condition for a radical rejection, which itself remains a black box and a theoretically empty mere intention. Paradoxically, this almost inevitably leads to the toothless slogan of SAVING “liberal capitalism” as the supposed presupposition for its abolition. Quite apart from the fact that this suggests a circular argument owing to the mere idea of “realization,” this view already implies a tendency to wage, in practice, only a defensive struggle for the mere “conditions” of emancipation, while leaving the goal itself – precisely in its decisive content –empty and open to a commodity-form-immanent interpretation. It is no coincidence that a surprising association flashes to mind in this context, namely the memory of the old revisionist Bernstein, for whom “the movement was everything and the goal nothing.” The compatibility of Critical Theory and social democracy, which has since become a practical reality, thus becomes understandable already from the theoretical approach. In the apparent radicalism of the anti-authoritarian movement associated with this line of argument, the seeds of a shift toward shallow reformism were therefore present from the very beginning.

The movement’s dilemma vis-à-vis its “theoretical fathers” lay in the fact that it was unable to critique their reformist-democratic reticence on the basis of the theory’s content itself, but only did so in a peculiar, formal way, as a mere critique of an alleged lack of “will to practice.” This one-dimensionality of the movement’s criticism of “professorial authorities” such as Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas – who raised their hands defensively in the face of these uninvited ghosts – contributed greatly to the mindless praxis fetishism that has repeatedly driven the revolutionary Left into demoralization. This dilemma can already be seen in the strategic approach of Rudi Dutschke, the central symbolic figure of that movement. The “long march through the institutions,” the “process of change,” can in fact be interpreted in two ways, and it is precisely here that an unconscious duplicity of the movement itself lies: either it is truly a process of raising consciousness for the revolution – but in that case, it would be a raising of consciousness against money, against commodity-based socialization itself, that is, in the sense of Marx and the Situationists of 1968 (even if the latter were unable to carry this intention further) – or it is a “democratic renewal” of commodity production itself, i.e., of capitalism. There cannot be a third option. To put it succinctly, Rudi Dutschke did indeed state clearly: “The problem of reform no longer even arises. Reforms, insofar as they can be implemented, are nothing more than improvements to prison cells; they reproduce the existing reality […]” (R. Dutschke, Mein langer Marsch, Reinbek 1980, p. 16). But the content remained unspecified, the direct attack on commodity production and thus money as a capitalist form of socialization (and only in this intensification would a revolutionary critique of “real socialism” also be conceivable) remained unspoken, leaving Dutschke open to interpretation as democratic and thus commodity-fetishistic. No matter how personally credible his emphasis on the liberation of the individual might have been, it was bound to remain bourgeois in this conceptual fog – if not in the situation at the time, then certainly historically. Dutschke himself eventually joined the Green Party’s citizens’ association, and his early death left this decision firmly in place. Even while he was still alive, at the height of the movement, Dutschke was occasionally called upon and questioned from a civic-integrationist perspective – a view he had vehemently rejected at the time: “The fact that this Rudi Dutschke exists, that he must be taken seriously, results from the current state of our parliamentary democracy and the parties that sustain it. If the Dutschkes – and I use this term here, not in a pejorative sense – initiate the necessary self-reflection within the state and the parties, leading to a re-democratization, then they will strengthen the very society they seek to overcome. An effect that is desirable not for Dutschke, but for the majority” (Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 5.12.1967, quoted from: Mein langer Marsch, op. cit. p. 55).

The late Rudi Dutschke is now interpreted by the majority of his former comrades-in-arms ONLY in this light: they declare the commodity-logical, democratically immanent aspect of the 1968 movement to be the “only true” one, thereby denying – almost doggedly – the other, more far-reaching aspect that transcends mere democratic immanence, as well as the very essence of the revolutionary. If these people still want anything at all today, it is, at best, an “improvement of prison cells” – attributed to “feasibility” – of the very kind that the Dutschke of 1968 so detested.

The social ambivalence of the anti-authoritarian movement and its ideology can be illustrated even better and more clearly than in Dutschke’s case by another spokesperson, Oskar Negt, who could never have been accused of revolutionary activities and who presumably always carried his SPD membership card with him. In his frequently reprinted speech “Politics and Protest” from October 1967, he does occasionally speak of “reified relations of domination,” but this hackneyed phrase no longer has any specifically identifiable meaning and is far removed from the Situationists’ direct conceptual sharpening of the issue. Instead, Negt argues primarily within a comparatively narrow and limited framework of German postwar history; rather than the historically totalizing commodity fetishism, the only structure perceived as negative – and thus in need of combating –

is a specific internal dynamic of the most recent stage of capitalist commodity production, understood in the sense of Horkheimer and Adorno’s concept of an “authoritarian state.” It is a matter of “[…] the stabilization of an authoritarian meritocracy that, in the interest of monopolistic and state decision-making powers, seeks to gradually eliminate the liberal sphere of political discussions, parliamentary controls, the protracted negotiation of compromises, and the temporary balancing of conflicting interests – all of which it regards as the epitome of unnecessary friction losses in the overall functioning of society” (O. Negt, Politik und Protest, in: Strategie und Organisationsdebatte, Hannover o.J., p. 3).

Quite bluntly, this suggests a fallback position that is by no means to be understood merely as a tactical maneuver; its own substantive aim is rather to invoke the “liberal sphere of parliamentary controls” and, ultimately, to identify the (“social partnership-based”) “reconciliation of conflicting interests” in the sense of the most run-of-the-mill trade union legalism as the only clearly formulable objective. Negt does, at the same time, concede that the protest movement presents itself with “a total claim to social change” (ibid.), but the peculiar lack of substance in this characterization already indicates that the totality of this claim could not have been that far-reaching. This becomes even clearer when he says of the anti-authoritarian groups that they “[…] develop forms of organizational self-activity through politically active reflection” and thereby not only realize “the constitutionally (!) inherent claims to democratic solidarity contained in the catalog of fundamental rights (!)” but simultaneously “[…] stabilize ‘autonomous zones of practical resistance’ ‘against an order that can respond to the demand for legitimation only with coercion and violence”(ibid., p. 13f.). If the vaguely defined “autonomous zones of resistance” could truly be portrayed as radically transforming society, then they were, of course, precisely a break with merely “constitutionally immanent” claims and could by no means be linked to such claims within the logic of “not only but also.” This duplicity on Negt’s part not only reveals the budding German professorial philistine peeking out from beneath the revolutionary cap – who, in his argumentative legitimization, was already covering his back long before the professional bans – but it also signals precisely that unconscious duplicity within the movement itself. Its real empirical starting point had, in fact, been merely the “defense of democracy” and the bourgeois constitution against emergency laws, the grand coalition, and “technocratic” tendencies toward consolidation. The movement’s own momentum had formally led it toward revolutionary positions, the substance of which, however, could not be more precisely defined or concretized. In fact, the supposed radicalism manifested itself more in the mere FORM of “breaking the rules” – such as violating academic regulations – than in any radical, society-transforming substance. In truth, the content ultimately remained rooted in the movement’s merely democratic – and therefore commodity-fetishistic, capitalistically immanent – point of departure, from which it had initially gained its relative mass base. This becomes clear, for example, at the end of Negt’s speech, when he says: “A practice constituted by the dialectic of anti-institutional and institutional elements, which creates the conditions (!) for a socialist overcoming of capitalist class society, will transform the sublime into the manifest violence of the system of domination to the extent that revolutionary-democratic (!) activity gains a genuine mass base. It was only through such an expansion, of course, that the political substance of the protest had become socially concrete; the manifest violence of the state would no longer be able to be directed exclusively against students and young people, but would be confronted with strategies of organized counter-violence that unite all democrats (!!) in this society in a united front of resistance” (ibid., p. 15f.).

Here, not only do the democratic dog-ears become visible in all their glory – tributes with which Negt is now, more than ever, lavishly blessed – but the reduction of the struggle to one concerning mere “conditions,” as already hinted at by Adorno, is already evident.

With regard to a real social movement, however, this definition becomes all the more questionable and nebulous. For “conditions” – in the sense, for example, of an impairment of the real social process of reproduction – cannot be “created” at all by the merely subjective efforts of a relatively limited youth and student movement; if, however, “conditions” of consciousness are meant in the “cultural-revolutionary” sense or in the sense of spreading theoretical insight, then this would indeed be the very proclamation, unfolding, and concretization of revolutionary content itself – and not a feeble assertion of bourgeois-immanent demands and slogans of merely democratic consciousness. To invoke the “common ground of the democrats” – or even “all democrats in this society” – merely in a supposedly “true,” alternative way – invoking the PRINCIPLE of bourgeois society against its empirical reality, rather than shattering this ideological principle as well with the revolutionary content of a radical critique of the commodity form – must from the outset remain a manifestation of bourgeois immanence and expose all seemingly radical rhetoric as a lie. Democratic drivel, which remains entirely within the confines of commodity-fetishistic abstractions, is, however, merely the necessary consequence of a truncated theoretical approach. Because, in truth, its own revolutionary content is lacking, the long-since decayed ideals of the 18th-century revolutionary bourgeoisie must be regurgitated ad nauseam, while their supposed radicalism can cling to nothing but FORM and, precisely for that reason, must make the purely formal “QUESTION OF VIOLENCE” the eternally repeated linchpin – in reality, devoid of content or filled with utterly non-militant bourgeois content – and thus fall into the stylized gesture of militancy known as “strategies of organized counter-violence.” Today, Negt no longer wants to acknowledge his own share of responsibility for the RAF’s destructive and suicidal path; it is precisely within the context outlined above that this can be presented to him. The RAF fighters were simply more morally consistent than the spineless university careerists of Negt’s ilk, who – despite their own aura – were in truth never radical in substance, not even back then. Nor should it be seen as an expression of theoretical decline when Oskar Negt today, after 20 years, unabashedly and openly documents his complete lack of understanding of the central categories of Marx’s critique of commodity production – as he did at the “Prima-Klima Congress” of former SDS members in November 1986: “Unfortunately, it’s the case that many […] have only read the chapters on the value-form in Capital – those are the most difficult, the most obscure, and probably the least significant. Yes, there might be some objections to that – I don’t want to commit myself on that point either… It’s just not really that essential for me, I mean, the value-forms… or not” (Prima-Klima Protokolle, Hamburg 1987, p. 165).

This conceptless babble really says it all. This is not a decline, because the theoretical level was never higher. It’s just that today, pseudo-radical rhetoric is no longer necessary; sated and ensconced in the bosom of the factual reality of capitalist socialization – whose normative power may finally be accepted without resistance – a Negt can now, with a slobbering mouth, spout democratic drivel among those who have turned out to be “realists.” The shame is simply over. The democratic interpretation of the anti-authoritarian movement – which had prevailed from the outset against all more radical options, especially those of the French Situationists – had to, by its own internal logic, capitulate to the consequences of the unresolved money-subjectivity in commodity-fetishist society and ultimately openly commit itself, in the spirit of “realpolitik,” to capitalist state bourgeoisie.

5.

It thus becomes apparent that the anti-authoritarianism of 1968, despite all the unsympathetic criticisms leveled by traditional Marxism, had its merits, at least for a historical moment, it brought to light a level of contradiction that has not been recognized to this day, and precisely in its social ambivalence it represented a necessary moment of development – though, just like that Marxism, it was incapable of breaking through the bourgeois shell of unresolved history of social emancipation. The extreme abstraction of the individual – who fails to grasp the basis of his social constitution and, as the monad that he is, rebels merely formally against his own institutional sociality, which is external to him – can only produce a semblance of radicalism that, so to speak, pantomimically enacts the extreme consequences of the bourgeois monetary subject, but does not overcome them, neither theoretically (which would be the presupposition) nor practically. The substantive emptiness of anti-authoritarianism therefore leads, with logical necessity, back into the bosom of that bourgeois world which it has set out to defeat – with Don Quixote-like emphasis and in a constant metamorphosis of its manifestations – at every stage of capitalist socialization, time and again.

The peaceful – albeit rather lackluster – return to the bourgeois fold, or, as Thomas Schmid, another former pseudo-radical, puts it somewhat more eloquently, the “return of the Left to its homeland,” proceeded quietly at first and, on the surface, even seemed to take on the opposite character. Anti-authoritarianism had helped the SDS blow up the inherited bourgeois organizational structure of a social-democratic kennel club; this, too, can only be counted as a merit. Admittedly, the merely negative “dissolution into the movement,” for lack of substance, could not resolve the organizational question of the radical Left; behind the supposed organizational question, bourgeois regression was in fact already lurking. In practice, this manifested itself in the rapid and short-lived withdrawal of the eerily Byzantine K-sects, which were oriented toward the traditional Bolshevik party model. Their mythologizing of an empirically defunct form of the proletariat and the class struggle of the 1920s – when the “revolutionary world was still in order” – did not in any way signal, as their members imagined, a chemically pure “class betrayal of the petty bourgeoisie” and “transition to the working class,” but could only be a stopover on the way back to the bourgeois home port. The fact that some people got stuck at every stage of the movement – and that we can still observe all their transitory manifestations empirically in pocket-sized form today – does not alter the general course as such. The historically costumed “proletarian” organizational fetishism actually served, above all, the function of stifling – with its rigid prohibitions on thought and the self-flagellation of the “intellectuals” (which every “revolutionary” first-semester German studies student was allowed – and required – to pay for) to stifle and extinguish any remaining impulse of the movement’s “excessive” moment, which touched upon the radical critique of commodity fetishism. It was not the long-sought antithesis to the bourgeois world – that traditional Marxism in its glorified “revolutionary” guise, which was now merely invoked dogmatically against its own pitiful forms of decay, denounced as “revisionist” – but rather the secretly kindred spirit that was already unconsciously sensed. The true substance of that ostensible organizational and class question was then revealed in the late 1970s in the accelerated metamorphosis into a green kennel club with all the attributes of bourgeois law and politics – a revival of old-style social democracy, painted green to the point of absurdity, under new conditions.

What remains are those “new conditions” themselves; and the anti-authoritarian movement can rightly claim that it helped “modernize” capitalism – not only in the FRG – in the sense of negative, abstract total socialization in the commodity form. If, however, the veterans today wish to pin this contribution to their chests as a medal in the name of a “democratization” of society, an “expansion of rights and freedoms” that even the “turnaround” could not fully reverse, etc., then they are distorting the true nature of this development beyond recognition. Critical Theory’s thesis of the “authoritarian state” already perceived this historical tendency in a very one-dimensional way, even if it was still aware of the ambiguity of the terms in the fetishistic commodity form. The expansion of state repression and state intervention on the one hand, and the expansion of formal “individual freedoms” on the other, are not mutually exclusive but rather mutually reinforcing. It is, after all, the unchecked dynamic of the abstract commodity form and the full-fledged emergence of the abstract human being that unites both as a single identity. Individuals are nationalized in the form of the abstract generality, yet through that very same process they are “liberated” as the contentless, increasingly dehumanized monads of money. It is a sign of boundless theoretical and political naivety to misunderstand the statist elements of this process as a “return of the authoritarian state” (a mistake even Adorno could not always avoid). The state’s apparatus of repression – an apparatus that has in fact been enormously expanded – beats down on individuals in both overt and subtle ways, insofar as the contradictions of the total commodity form place them in hopeless situations that threaten their very bodies and lives, driving them literally mad; but this repression no longer serves, in the slightest, the function of the semi-feudal traditional state apparatus, which was to forcibly maintain traditional hierarchies and structures of authority. Quite the contrary: individuals are expected to be able to adapt, without any further restrictions, to the free movement of the “automatic subject” (Marx), the finally total value form of social reproduction, and thus of money. To the extent that residual traditionalist structures and authoritarian forms of consciousness still stood in the way of the free floating of money monads, they had to be melted away; and it is precisely in this regard that the anti-authoritarian movement has achieved its lasting “successes.”

The “liberal” capitalism of the 19th century was not, as Critical Theory suggests, the “true” capitalism of the liberal individual – who still had a chance at “true,” socially universal emancipation; rather, it was in reality a still semi-feudal form of capitalism, existing merely as a subsector of society, and still far from complete and undeveloped; the liberal individual of that time was not the fully developed form, but only the embryonic precursor of abstract individuality. Fordist full or total capitalism is therefore not a transcendence of the capitalist relation on its own terms, as Horkheimer and Adorno believed, but, on the contrary, precisely that completion of capitalism, the blood of which they imagine to have been shed in the past. The secondary forms of the commodity fetish described by them are, in their perversity, not the result of a false sublation of the commodity, but, on the contrary, its very realization – the revelation of its true nature and logical consequence within itself. Every assertion of unresolved abstract subjectivity against the institutions of the abstract generality – as supposed bearers of authoritarian traditions – could thus only entangle itself all the more deeply in the fetishism of the commodity form, a fact that Adorno at least intuited. His refusal to bow to the anti-authoritarian demand for “praxis” thus appears in a more favorable light. For in fact: every partial realization of the anti-authoritarian emancipatory ideas in the forms of bourgeois society has, in practice, turned them into their opposite. The partial realization of “liberated sexuality” was bound to culminate in the pornographic industrialization of the sexual. For the “democratization” of sexuality is directly identical to its pornographic commercialization, because the commodity form and democracy are identical. Were it otherwise, the “democratization” interpretation of the anti-authoritarian movement would have had to lead directly to a confrontation with the commodity form rather than to its affirmation.

The fact that the anti-authoritarian movement, in its development, not only contributed to the objective social affirmation and further historical liberation of the commodity form, but was also affected by it in its subjective consciousness, is also demonstrated by its degenerate form of social reform in the guise of the “alternatives,” whose diverse projects are still regarded today as a social pillar of the Green Party. From the very beginning, the alternative projects have represented a scaling back of social aspirations – a de facto abandonment of the political, society-wide framework that had degenerated into a moral ornament, within which alone the social nature of the individual and his or her claims could be addressed. “Communes” – reduced to “shared living arrangements” – printing shops, publishing houses, bars, bookstores, cultural projects, etc., were decoupled from the disintegrating political movement and, with varying degrees of friction, transformed into “social enterprises”; but in doing so, they also shifted from serving a logistical function for a higher social purpose to becoming an end in themselves – an abstract privacy that ideologically confined the transcendence originally conceived for society as a whole within its own interior: the politicization of the private gave way to the privatization of the political; the emphasis on revolutionary self-determination gave way to the faint echo of life-reformist “self-administration” within the mere confines of alternative projects. The feeble reflection of social aspirations in the expansion of what were initially merely logistical projects of a movement – into life-reformist pseudo-production (alternative bakeries and other artisanal workshops, agriculture on the “scorched earth” of abandoned peasant cultures, all the way to models of Keynesian state-subsidized “worker-owned enterprises”) and their state-interwoven “networking” signaled not merely a shift in the subjectivity of “revolt,” but long ago its abandonment in the unconditional renunciation of the revolutionizing of real social production after only a few years of short-lived attempts. It is a testament to theoretical stupidity when, in an ingratiating affirmation, the movement subject’s revealed bourgeois abstractness is still celebrated even in its forms of disintegration that take the direct shape of commodities: “Today, when reflexivity is itself threatened as a principle of life, social movements are also emerging, for example in the form of alternative movements, which directly (!) take up the struggle for technically threatened forms of life, finally the chances of SELF-BEING, however contradictorily” (Claus Daniel, Theories of Subjectivity, Frankfurt/New York 1981, p. 125, emphasis Kurz)

The adoption of the “alternative” agricultural dairy model evidently entailed a shift toward the theoretical as well. Yet, questions regarding the content – or the “contradictory nature” inherent in the social form of this proclaimed subjectivity – are no longer asked, just as the content itself is ignored. In socially totalized commodity production, however, the empty form itself is the content as an end in itself, from which no one can escape unless they fundamentally critique this form as such. It is easier to ride a tiger than to mobilize the money form – long since unleashed by society – as such for “good causes.” A false life cannot be truly lived; “being oneself” within the totalized commodity form can only ever mean the abstract subject’s unconditional surrender to the objective self-movement of this form. The alternative movement, as a metamorphosis of early anti-authoritarianism, has long since been overtaken on its own turf by the voracious appetite of the social value-form. This is evident not only in the ironic spectacle of founding a bank, but more broadly in the inevitable “professionalization” driven by market forces; here, the objective laws of the commodity form inevitably expose the illusion of “self-management” just as thoroughly as they did the long-bankrupt “workers’ self-management” of Yugoslavia’s capitalist commodity economy. And already a new, final metamorphosis of anti-authoritarianism is taking shape, one that – in conjunction with that “professionalization” – restores its connection to society as a whole, but now in the form of openly anti-socialist ideological militancy as the managerial perspective of “ecological capitalism.” The Green “market ecologists” constitute only a small segment of this trend, which focuses more on the development of “eco-social” perspectives within capitalist social technology. The post-Fordist shift in social work during the 1970s was, from the outset, closely intertwined – both in terms of personnel and ideology – with the anti-authoritarian movement and its transitional stages, including alternative projects. In the context of community social work, however, and its “theoretical” reflection, the push toward “professionalization” is evidently yielding unexpected results: “Highly developed industry itself demands social innovations for its own purposes. […] Everyone is their own manager. […] The new style of management is ‘a networking style of management’ […] in which everyone becomes a resource for everyone else (!). […] Companies nurture their human resources (!) by orienting toward the social and everyday needs of their employees. Company planning of working life and personal life planning, work style and lifestyle, adapt flexibly to each other (!). On the other hand, in many places alternative economic enterprises are founded for social reasons: Living differently, working differently […] The ‘new poverty’ should not blind us (!) to a process of increasing the value of human resources that runs diametrically opposed to the classic theory of impoverishment (!). The individual human being can make more of himself in the industrialized West (!) and achieve more with less effort than ever before. […] Human resources are the pound to be gained (!). The future role of social work will probably be determined less by its continuing obligation to assist the needy than by its effectiveness in tapping social resources (!). […]This tapping of resources takes place, on the one hand, through the direct link between social work and economic activity. […] After all, the alternative economy sector in the Federal Republic of Germany already employs 150,000 and more people. […] In the long run, profitability and welfare must coincide everywhere (!), economic and social yield must be brought into a balance. To ensure that this does not happen over people’s heads – and thus become “anti-social” again – an increasingly important task of social work is to encourage people, both inside and outside of companies, to shape their own lives productively and to participate socially and actively in economic processes. This is the essence of autogestion, under which term the French discuss the connection between self-determination, self-government and self-management (!!) […]” (Wolf Rainer Wendt, The Broad Field of Social Work: Historical Motivations and Ecological Perspectives, in Oppl/Tomaschek, Soziale Arbeit 2000, vol. 1, Soziale Probleme und Handlungsflexibilitat, Freiburg 1986, pp. 68ff.).

The brutal, perverse reification of this language and its terminology is self-defeating. Now it becomes clear what the phrase “reification” was worth in the mouths of those who failed to concretize it as a radical critique of the commodity form of social reproduction itself. And this is by no means an isolated voice; just think, for example, of the “paradigm shift” among formerly “leftist” industrial sociologists like Kem and Schumann, who today likewise rely on “enlightened management.” In its objective long-term consequences, as well as in the shift in the subjective consciousness of its proponents, the anti-authoritarian movement has become the last cry of capitalist corporate culture. From revolutionary “self-determination” through life-reformist “self-administration” to brutally defining oneself as a reified “human resource,” to “self-management” and “self-exploitation” – what a merciless logic of self-destruction of emancipatory will under the guiding star of unresolved abstract subjectivity! The inability of a merely formal conception of autonomy or anti-authoritarianism to distinguish itself from liberalism’s monetarist definition of the subject is thus cruelly demonstrated in practice. It suffices to quote another great anti-authoritarian, alternative thinker, and lover of abstract money-subjectivity: “The American Revolution was a philosophical one. For the first time in human history, we have unleashed the individual genius of the single man to rise as high and as far as his own strength and ability will carry him” (Ronald Reagan, 1980).

By defining “self-determination” and “self-administration” in terms of their outcome in this way, they subsequently lose, as such – as mere formal proclamations of emancipatory will – every last trace of revolutionary transcendence. The notion that, as a money subject, one must “make something of oneself” required no emancipatory idea, because the content of the money form consists in itself and in its emptiness, in which the total de-subjectification of the subject is grounded. The anti-authoritarian movement did not arrive at the bitter end of its path in Holderlin’s much-cited “Open,” but rather voluntarily and definitively cemented itself into that “prison cell” of abstract socialization, the name of which Dutschke and his followers had been unable to articulate in a radically critical manner. The “lead-heavy era” has only now truly begun – both for the victors of the process of “self-management,” who cannot be subjects, and for its losers, who are consigned to capitalist poverty and disaster management. In the event of their revolt, the Tumschuh-Noskes will stand ready, if necessary, as the enforcers of the depersonalized rule of the “automatic subject,” now that the Greens have already produced their own version of Tumschuh-Millerandism. The Situationists of 1968 knew what they were talking about: “The self-management of commodity alienation would only MAKE EVERYONE THE PROGRAMMERS OF THEIR OWN SURVIVAL – squaring the capitalist circle. The task of the workers’ councils will thus be not the self-management of the existing world, but its unceasing qualitative transformation: the concrete supersession of the commodity (that enormous detour in the history of human self-production)” (On the Poverty of Student Life, emphasis Kurz.).

The negative aspect of this statement reads today as a prognosis for the anti-authoritarian movement itself, even in its democratic, capitalist-immanent interpretation. With the verification of this prognosis, the left has in fact “come home to roost.” The Greens and their social milieu are the stinking corpse of the emancipatory will of 1968. This will, drowned in the logic of money and its self-perpetuating motion, will not – in the coming and, in part, already manifest crisis of money and the commodity economy – rise again from its former bearers like a phoenix from the ashes, but will instead transform them once and for all into frenzied, greedy, and ultimately murderous neo-petty bourgeois. The snatching and biting, the howling and gnashing of teeth over the dwindling “alternative funds” of the state and local governments must escalate to unbearable levels with the manifest crisis of public finances amid a looming global economic crisis, giving rise to political forms of expression that remain obscure today. At present, there are only faint glimmers of new hope for a social will to emancipate the human subject. For today’s young radical opposition of the Autonomists – who have given their concept of “autonomy” as little clear substance as the anti-authoritarian movement of 1968 did – the development of that movement and its social and subjective outcomes should serve as a warning sign. “It is not enough to cast an abstract vote for the power of the workers’ council.” The abstract slogan against wage labor and for autonomy, no matter how often repeated, remains empty and ineffective if it cannot be concretized in theoretical social discourse and in practical struggle at all levels of society as a fundamental critique of the commodity and money forms themselves. The Autonomists, like other future movements, will be radical as radical critics of commodity-fetishist society and of money itself – or they will not be radicals at all.

Originally published in Marxistische Kritik no. 5 in 12/1988

The Fear of the Roma Among Ordinary People

Antiziganism and Feeling Superfluous

Roswitha Scholz

In today’s left-wing circles, class struggle and traditional Marxism are all the rage. They pander to the average Joe willing to work and imagine a working class that has long since ceased to exist. In this predicament, they present themselves as representatives of “the 99%.” And all this at a time when AI is on the verge of swallowing up more and more jobs. Yet “unproductive” people are viewed with suspicion by this left. One group in particular rubs the average Joe – whom they populistically fawn over – the wrong way: Sinti and Roma – the largest minority in Europe.

Anti-Gypsy attacks and intensifying anti-Gypsy propaganda in the media have been observed in this country since the early 1990s. In 1992, pogroms took place in Rostock-Lichtenhagen, where the hatred was initially directed against Roma seeking asylum. Since then, reports have focused on crime, begging, and hygiene issues; in recent years, there has been an increased emphasis on organized welfare fraud and similar topics. Today, people prefer to speak of “Romanians and Bulgarians” because the term “Gypsy” is considered politically incorrect. However, this does not prevent anyone from drawing on the same stock of common anti-Roma stereotypes under this new label. Structural issues surrounding poverty and the housing crisis are ignored in the process. The right-wing shift over the past decade has only exacerbated this. Yet anti-Gypsy discrimination and persecution have a long tradition.

Modernity and Antiziganism

Sinti and Roma first appeared in Central Europe at the beginning of the 15th century. At the end of the 15th century, they were declared outlaws for the first time, a fate that would befall them repeatedly thereafter. The early modern period brought about profound changes. Feudalism entered a crisis, nation-states gradually took shape, and the Protestant work ethic came to the fore. From then on, nomadic groups were regarded as difficult to control and economically unproductive. For this reason, they were oppressed and persecuted, by no means only in Germany.

Until the Enlightenment, the image of the “Gypsy” fluctuated with that of the beggar, the vagabond, and “vulgar” traveling people in general. In the 18th century, a clear “racialization” of the stereotype took place. As is well known, the view prevailed during the Enlightenment that only the “white race” was capable of civilization. “Gypsies” were now declared a “primitive race.” As a result, social and racial discrimination became significantly intertwined in the Gypsy stereotype, which also encompassed romantic elements. “Gypsies” stood, in a diffuse way, for uninhibited freedom. This romantic dimension was fueled not least through music and dance (keyword: “Carmen”). As for the gendered connotations of antiziganism, the “Gypsy woman” was constructed as the antithesis of the chaste housewife, wife, and mother, who was conceived as complementary to the ideal of the disciplined wage laborer in the realm of reproduction. The “Gypsy woman” was primarily imagined as sexually seductive and witch-like.

Anti-Gypsy Measures in Germany

In the 19th century, “Gypsies” were considered “persons of inferior rights.” As early as the mid-19th century, files on “Gypsies” were systematically created. From the beginning of the 20th century, the aim was to register as many Sinti and Roma as possible, with photographs taken and fingerprints recorded. Under National Socialism, based on racist assumptions, it was assumed that “Gypsies” were no longer “racially pure.” Arising from the intermarriage of Gypsies with “racially inferior” Germans, “Gypsy half-breeds” in particular were deemed predominantly asocial. Sinti and Roma were forcibly sterilized and declared “socially mentally deficient.” The Nuremberg Race Laws, which initially applied only to Jews, were extended to them. In 1935, Sinti and Roma began to be interned in so-called “Gypsy camps.”

In 1938, Himmler ordered the “final solution to the Gypsy question […] based on the nature of the race.” In December 1941, it was decreed that “Gypsies” should be treated the same as Jews. Decisions regarding the manner of their extermination were left to the commanders of the Security Police and the Security Service, with the result that many Sinti and Roma were shot on the spot. In July 1944, the last gassing took place in Auschwitz, to which Sinti and Roma had been deported from numerous countries since early 1943.

In the postwar period, Sinti and Roma were frequently housed in dilapidated emergency shelters or settled on the outskirts of towns. So-called “Gypsy experts” were hired by government offices; likewise, records from the Nazi era were used – the special registration of Sinti and Roma continued. In various cities, policy documents were issued to prevent the presence of “Gypsies” (now called “Landfahrer”) at all costs.

The assessors of Sinti and Roma restitution claims were former employees of the Reich Health Office. In the 1980s, new guidelines were issued and modest reparations were granted. At the same time, some Sinti and Roma were no longer granted German citizenship. A precondition for these reparations was protest actions by the Sinti and Roma themselves, which also led to their recognition as an ethnic minority in Germany.

Anti-Semitism, Antiziganism, and Other Forms of Racism

In modern times, “Gypsies” are associated with a lack of ties and a refusal to work. But what, then, is the difference between antiziganism and antisemitism, which stands for similar things? In capitalism, Jews are primarily associated with power, domination, and a destructive civilization; “Gypsies,” on the other hand, are viewed as inferior and rooted in nature because they remind us of a possible life beyond the accursed labor society. Holger Schatz and Andrea Woeldike, commenting on this, write: “What they have in common, however, is the mechanism whereby the exclusion and physical persecution of the ‘non-identical’ supposedly provides psychological relief while simultaneously allowing repressed desires to be projected outward. What one cannot have oneself, no one else should possess either. The ‘idea of happiness’ must be driven out.”

We should emphasize here that, unlike antisemitism, antiziganism is a form of “romantic racism” (Wulf D. Hund). One might even consider to what extent “the Gypsy” corresponded far more to the (repressed) notions of happiness held by the masses – at least under Fordism – than “the Jew” did. Much of what is associated with the Gypsy stereotype – the soulful folk song, the fairground, the circus, the “coming and going” – was certainly closer to the feelings of happiness of “ordinary people” in the Fordist phase than the stereotypes regarding Jews, who were imagined as rich and powerful and also stood for a foreign, bourgeois culture, even if the common denominator can be found in the accusation of being “work-shy parasites.” In contrast to other “savages” (Native Americans, South Sea islanders, and so on), who are likewise equated with nature, the “Gypsy,” however, has long been an integral part of the culture and society in which one lives. For this reason, and because – unlike the “Black” person – they cannot be enslaved, they are persecuted; this is linked to the ever-present fear of one’s own descent into “asociality,” a fear of which the “Gypsy” is also a constant reminder.

Homo Sacer and the Gypsies

Giorgio Agamben’s legal-theoretical reflections can be fruitfully applied to the analysis of antiziganism. He is concerned with the relationship between rule and exception: “It is not the exception that eludes the rule; it is the rule that, by suspending itself, gives way to the exception; and the rule establishes itself as a rule by remaining in relation to the exception. The particular ‘force of the law’ derives from this ability to remain in contact with an outside.” Here, the individual is reduced to a mere body, to “naked life,” while it is the sovereign who rules over the state of exception. A decisive role in Agamben’s work is played by the “Homo sacer,” a concept derived from Roman law that gave his book its title. The Homo sacer is an outlaw who falls outside the law (but is precisely for that reason enclosed within it) and can be killed with impunity.

Something similar was expressed in the structures of persecution and internment of modernity, taken to an extreme in Nazism. Agamben sees the state of exception emerging once again today in the disintegration of state organizations, the establishment of camps, and “illegitimate assaults” (such as mass rapes). In such phenomena, which according to Agamben are precisely a fundamental precondition for the law, he sees an omen for the entire world. In these crisis-ridden processes of decay, all are thus potentially homines sacri.

Robert Kurz takes up Agamben’s reflection on the relationship between legal form and exclusion and links it to considerations regarding the “constitution of politics and the economy, of abstract labor and the state apparatus” in modernity. The space of “excluding enclosure, of reduction to naked life” was still called the “house” in early modernity: “The poorhouse, workhouse, prison, asylum, slave house – the ‘houses of horror’ in which, as an example for society as a whole, the training in externally determined abstract labor took place, a process intensified in the camps of the later modernizing and crisis dictatorships. This original state of exception has become the modern normal state that underlies all rule of law.”

The global crisis of the third industrial revolution today differs from earlier crises in that sovereignty itself is beginning to “dissolve, because the space of enclosing exclusion is also dissolving. […] Sovereignty, to the extent that it still exists, reacts reflexively with its customary crisis measures, even though these come to nothing.” Forced labor, low wages, the camp, the management of people, and so on are now being reactivated for the superfluous in the crisis of the working society at a new level of decay. Yet the general threat is expressed in differences in the exclusionary measures and ideologies. Even today, “enclosing exclusion […] takes place in the polarized pattern of racism and anti-Semitism” (Robert Kurz).

These discussions, however, fail to address the specific anti-Gypsy syndrome. Alongside the Jews, it was precisely the “Gypsies” who were not only regarded as foreign in race, but who, over the course of centuries, were repeatedly declared outlaws in the very sense Agamben describes. In modern times, a permanent state of emergency was effectively imposed on Sinti and Roma, insofar as they were constructed as the absolute antithesis to the modern disciplinary process and to “Protestant ethics” within one’s own society. Although the “Gypsies” are “Homines sacri” par excellence, as their history of persecution proves, they are generally forgotten even in critical accounts of racism; and it is precisely in this act of forgetting that the fact is expressed that the “Gypsy” represents, so to speak, the Homo sacer of the Homo sacer. Constructed as the embodiment of “asociality” and “foreignness,” regarded as the “scum of humanity” (as the Enlightenment “Gypsy expert” Heinrich Moritz Gottlieb Grellmann put it in the 18th century), and thus representing the quintessential cautionary example for the “normal” person: He shows them where they will end up if they do not conform and comply, but instead behave “like the Gypsies.” Even integrated Sinti and Roma are buried under a mountain of stereotypes in everyday life if they “admit” to belonging to this group.

Structural Antiziganism

Quite a few Roma work in the low-wage sector under precarious conditions and/or are dependent on basic social assistance, including the prospect of “forced labor,” as this now increasingly threatens “ordinary” people as well. In the context of the new mass migration, refugees who need “welfare” are already in the classic “Gypsy position.” The problem of “undocumented status” is also already anticipated in anti-Gypsyist policies.

Here, general and specifically anti-Gypsy measures of crisis management intertwine with a mass anti-Gypsy ideology. The more the middle classes face the danger of social decline, the more they recognize themselves in the prototype of the superfluous and outcast in European societies: the “Gypsy.” Just as one can speak of a structural anti-Semitism that manifests itself not least in attacks on the financial markets and in the imagination of a global conspiracy, even when Jews are not mentioned at all, so too can one speak of a structural anti-Gypsyism when, in the fear of one’s own downfall, decline in status, and a slide into antisocial behavior and criminality, the antiziganist stereotype implicitly comes into play, even when “Gypsies” are not mentioned at all. The oscillation between social discrimination and racist exclusion makes the Gypsy stereotype particularly suitable for this purpose.

Structural antiziganism, however, is harder to recognize than structural antisemitism because it is rarely addressed or, at best, treated only marginally. After all, the modern subject would have to recognize itself in the mirror with its Homo Sacer fear. That is why it looks away from the start. On the other hand, it has always known that the “Gypsy” is the “very last,” as surveys show.

Contemporary antiziganism is also a reaction to the massive crises of capitalist collapse. The impending decline of the middle classes is now compounded by galloping inflation, a housing shortage, and so on. Linked to this is the spread of racist ideologies from both “above” and “below” – that is, an “alliance of mob and elite” (Hannah Arendt).

Today’s regressive mainstream left, with its traditional focus on the respectable and decent wage laborer, implicitly targets the so-called lumpenproletariat as the “dregs” of society – and thus also the “Gypsies,” who, in the racist narrative, rank even lower than the “native” lumpenproletariat.

Originally published in Konkret No. 3 in 2026.

Betrayal on Principle

A look back and ahead at the crisis-imperialist constellations within which the self-administration in northern Syria’s Rojava region must assert itself.

Tomasz Konicz

To understand the current catastrophe facing the Kurdish freedom movement in Rojava, it helps to look back at its geopolitical context during the height of the Syrian civil war. The United States, in the midst of its hegemonic decline, was the central factor here. There were two interventionist approaches toward Syria, which was sinking into civil war, that competed with one another within U.S. foreign policy. During the Obama administration, this conflict was also played out relatively openly.[1] While the CIA sought to instrumentalize “moderate” Sunni Islamist militias, the Pentagon relied on the Syrian Kurds in the emerging Rojava to break the advance of the Islamic State (IS).[2]

As is well known, the Pentagon prevailed. And this happened for one simple reason: The Kurdish self-defense forces were highly effective in the fight against the genocidal Islamofascism of the IS, as they were fighting for an emancipatory society.[3] Neither of these qualities could truly be said of the CIA’s Islamist-influenced militias, which mostly viewed IS as mere competition. The intense, militarily successful phase of cooperation between the Pentagon and Rojava spanned from the defense of Kobane in September 2014 to the liberation of Raqqa in October 2017.[4] This took place amid constant tensions with Ankara, as Turkey acted as one of IS’s most important supporters and was determined to destroy Kurdish autonomy in Syria.

Yet Washington’s support for the Kurds of Syria had always been fragile, rendering their geopolitical situation precarious. Even during the Obama administration, the decline of American hegemony was already underway, a process that Trump is now carrying through to its bitter imperial end. The deployment of American forces against the Islamic State took place during a phase in which Washington, as part of its pivot to Asia intended to focus more intensely on the struggle for hegemony against China and the containment of the People’s Republic in Southeast Asia.[5] Washington thus only reluctantly assumed its role as “world policeman” in response to the regional collapse in Syria’s “war of state decomposition” (Robert Kurz).

Washington’s reluctance had its reasons: The disastrous U.S. invasion of Iraq, perpetrated by the neocons as part of their intended democratization of the Middle East, constituted the most significant tipping point, which immensely accelerated the gradual process of erosion of American hegemony. The rapid military victory over Saddam Hussein’s poison gas regime was followed by state collapse and a murderous civil war between Sunnis and Shiites. The neocons’ idea of cementing American hegemony in the oil-rich region through democratization backfired – accelerating the decline of American hegemony.

The crisis-driven surge of state decomposition in the region, in which Libya and Syria also collapsed in the wake of the Arab Spring, was thus effectively initiated by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Western hegemonic nation-building, which was forced through as part of the “wars for world order” (Robert Kurz) of globalization, failed across the board, as the global crisis of capital had long since stripped the ailing ruins of modernization in the periphery of their economic foundation: from Somalia, through Afghanistan and Libya, to Iraq. However, the chaos of state collapse also opened up spaces for the only significant emancipatory impulse that was able to hold its ground in the general process of disintegration in Northern Syria. What the neocons failed to achieve in Iraq suddenly seemed to be working in Rojava.

The remnants and ideological vestiges of this democratization approach within the U.S. state apparatus consequently supported Kurdish self-administration for tactical reasons, but these forces very quickly lost all relevance due to the disaster in Iraq. Rojava was only significant to the U.S. in the context of containing the Islamic State. Especially since the neocons’ democratization strategy was a democratic means to a hegemonic, imperial end aimed at the region’s fossil fuel resources: Democratization – which would effectively have been financed by oil exports – was intended to go hand in hand with the region’s integration into the United States’ hegemonic system, which meant Washington’s indirect, mediated control. This was intended to cement the dominance of the petrodollar. Rojava, with its marginal local oil reserves, could not serve this purpose; all that remained was the ideology of democratization, without the economic foundation of the neocons’ hegemonic calculus still being in place.

An Early Farewell to Human Rights Imperialism

In other words: The geopolitical value of the Syrian Kurds was rapidly declining following their victory over the Islamic State, especially as the old hegemonic mindset within the U.S. ruling elites gave way to a new, openly imperialist calculus personified by Donald Trump. As early as May 2017, Trump had his then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson deliver a keynote speech on foreign policy in which human rights were rejected as an ideological factor in American foreign policy, so that American interests could henceforth be pursued openly without the “ballast of human rights.”[6] Much of what Trump is currently practicing in terms of naked imperialist policy was already announced in 2017.[7] The betrayal of former geopolitical “partners” is thus the new principle of American power politics, whose open imperialism no longer needs to take into account the institutional and democratic façade of the old U.S. hegemony (under Obama, Washington still made an effort to appear as a “reliable” power factor in foreign policy in order to find willing proxies in the future as well).   

About six months after this speech by the U.S. Secretary of State, which effectively initiated the U.S. transition from hegemonic policy to naked crisis imperialism – a transition completed by early 2026,[8] Turkey, with NATO backing attacked the Syrian Kurds in Afrin,[9] which was then under Russian influence. Shortly thereafter, a second Turkish invasion followed in the American sphere of influence in Rojava. The self-governing regions in northern Syria were practically sold off in an imperialist haggle: in early 2018, Vladimir Putin gave the green light for the invasion of the canton of Afrin, which was within Russia’s sphere of influence.[10] In October 2019, Donald Trump gave free rein to Turkey’s expansionist ambitions in northeastern Syria, allowing Ankara to establish another occupation zone in Rojava.[11]

These two military campaigns by Turkish Islamofascism in northern Syria, which were accompanied by ethnic cleansing, illustrate Erdogan’s imperialist expansion strategy, in which he played a high-stakes game, oscillating between Russia and the West to extract concessions from both sides for further land grabs.[12] Erdogan’s imperial leverage, as the controller of a strategically important country, is far greater than that of the Syrian Kurds, who were needed only to contain the Islamic State and serve as a counterweight to the Assad regime. Putin sold out the Kurdish region of Afrin for a nuclear and pipeline deal; with Trump, it was likely just an affinity for authoritarian figures and an effort to keep Ankara within the Western alliance.

With the collapse of the Assad regime in late 2024, the regional balance of power shifted further to Rojava’s disadvantage. The Islamist alliance – backed by Turkey, the U.S., and, to a limited extent, Israel – which swept away the shell of the Syrian state apparatus within days, achieved a strategic objective of the West and Israel in the region. The Shiite corridor, through which the Iranian mullah regime had been able to project its military power to the border of Israel, was severed; Hezbollah’s logistics were severely disrupted, and following its defeat by Israel, it was thus no longer capable of intervening in Syria.


In effect, this is where the CIA’s intervention strategy – mentioned at the outset – prevailed, as the agency ultimately struck a deal with the ideological and/or organizational successors to al-Qaeda in order to achieve a geopolitical objective. With the remnants of the Syrian state, the Islamists merely destroyed what was already in the process of disintegrating due to the crisis. And they were also so successful because they did not have to fight against their own kind, against the Islamic State, which had previously been defeated by the military forces of Rojava at great cost.

The al-Qaeda State

About a quarter of a century after the attacks on the World Trade Center, organized by an al-Qaeda leader named Osama bin Laden who had been nurtured by the CIA in Afghanistan, the United States brought the political heirs of this Islamofascist terrorist group to power in Damascus. For the U.S., this is part of its struggle for dominance against China. Washington views al-Qaeda’s Sunni extremism as a bulwark against Shiite Iran, which is part of the Eurasian alliance system centered on Beijing. Russia has indeed been pushed out of the region, and Iran has been weakened.

The biggest beneficiary of this al-Qaeda state – which will be just as unstable as the Assad regime – is Turkey, which has been able to massively expand its power base in the region as a result. The Europeans (especially Berlin), in turn, hope to soon be able to deport refugees back to Syria. That is why Berlin remains just as adamantly silent about the massacres and ethnic cleansing currently taking place in Rojava as it did previously regarding the jihadist mass murders on the Alevi coast or in the Druze region in the south. The country would thus become an open-air prison guarded by Islamists for the region’s economically superfluous population.[13]

There is no longer any talk of democratization or free elections in Syria; the human rights imperialism of the neoliberal era has also receded into the background in Europe. Brussels, Berlin, and Paris are following Washington with a time lag. The only goal now is to ascribe some sort of legitimacy and stability to the emerging al-Qaeda in Syria in order to be able to deport people there. In effect, this constitutes collaboration with fascism in its Islamic-clerical form; it is an effort to somehow pacify the crisis-ridden region through the murderous terror of the jihadists, to bring about a deathly silence. And – this prediction can already be made – of course, this European hope for Islamist graveyard silence will be shattered by Islamist terror (one might even ask whether Washington does not in fact intend this destabilizing factor as part of its now relatively open struggle against the EU).

After December 2024, there was effectively only one regional power left with an interest in Rojava’s existence: Israel. Tel Aviv appeared to support the overthrow of the Assad regime, at least tactically, yet at the same time, Israel immediately sought to limit the power of the Islamists in Syria. Sunni extremism was to be largely neutralized by autonomous regions controlled by minorities: the Druze in the southwest, the Alevis on the coast – and the Kurds in the north and northeast. Support for the Kurds thus stemmed primarily not from political or ideological sympathies, but from geopolitical calculation. Moreover, Israel finds itself in confrontation with Erdogan’s Turkey over supremacy in the region, where Ankara seeks to expand in the tradition of the Ottoman Empire. By the end of 2025, for instance, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel had formed an alliance clearly directed against Ankara, intended to neutralize Turkey’s quest for dominance in the eastern Mediterranean.[14]

So what has happened? Why is Tel Aviv now silent as an unstable, Islamist state closely intertwined with Ankara forms on its northeastern flank? For one thing, Washington has simply prevailed – it is U.S. soldiers who are stationed in Rojava. And Trump already sided with Erdogan and against the Kurds during his first presidency. The fascists in the White House feel closer to Erdogan, with his authoritarian hybrid ideology of nationalism and Islamism, than to the Kurdish self-administration focused on emancipation. Especially since Turkey, as mentioned above, represents an important – albeit increasingly problematic – link for the US and the EU in the region. Just how quickly the Kurds are being sold out to secure other concessions was made clear, for example, by French President Macron’s email to Donald Trump, which the latter simply made public. Macron, who had often spoken out publicly in support of the Syrian Kurds, suddenly found himself on the same page as Trump regarding Syria and Iran – only to then contradict him during the Greenland conflict.[15]

Iran as the new Syria?

Iran is the key word here. Today’s Iran exhibits a structure similar to that of Syria during the Arab Spring: an authoritarian, internally hollowed-out state in ruins, effectively in the throes of economic and ecological collapse (which is why it was easy for Israeli intelligence agencies to comprehensively infiltrate this eroding state apparatus). The last major wave of uprisings and protests, which could only be crushed through state-sponsored mass murder, claiming the lives of likely tens of thousands of demonstrators, was supported by broad segments of the population.[16] In addition to the usual suspects – the liberal bourgeoisie, which has long hated the moral terror – impoverished wage earners and small business owners, who are suffering from the currency collapse and inflation, also participated in the protests.[17] In parts of the country, the water supply is collapsing simply due to the manifest climate crisis.[18]

Washington – and Israel in particular – therefore want to seize the moment and overthrow the mullah regime. Although “overthrow” might be the wrong word, given the U.S. approach toward Venezuela.[19] There is no talk of democratization or elections in the case of Iran either; instead, the archaic institution of the Shah of Persia (of all things) is to be revived – that is, precisely the repressive, murderous regime that swept away the 1979 revolution, which failed due to fundamentalist mass terror.[20] The U.S. effectively wants to replace a hostile Islamic-fascist regime with one subservient to the U.S. After Venezuela, Iran would thus neutralize another of China’s supply hubs. For Israel, however, a central security policy objective is at stake. The regime that has elevated the annihilation of the Jewish state to a state doctrine, that publicly cheered and militarily supported the Hamas pogroms and massacres of October 7, could be overthrown.

And this regime reshaping, this regime design – as was made clear in the case of Venezuela – is far more cost-effective than the resource-draining efforts of the neocons to establish democratization and U.S. hegemony in the region through regime change. The goal is simply to eliminate the fundamentalist forces within the Iranian regime, while at the same time making appropriate offers to factions and cliques willing to cooperate in order to retain power.[21] The mass murderers within the Iranian repressive apparatus, on whose orders thousands of demonstrators were recently shot down, could thus retain their positions of power even after the intended “overthrow of the government,” provided they show themselves to be cooperative.

The crisis-induced erosion of state structures makes this approach toward individual cliques within the apparatus conceivable, after all – Venezuela serves as the blueprint for this new form of U.S. crisis imperialism, which has long since forgotten its isolationist campaign promises. Yet this by no means implies that this approach, which has been successful in Venezuela (at least in the short term), will also work against a regional power like Iran – at least not without war.

This “regime design” intended by the U.S. – the reshaping of the Iranian regime to align with U.S. interests – would most likely not proceed without prolonged military conflict. A brief Delta Force operation, like the one in Caracas, will not suffice. And this is precisely what Washington appears to be working toward. Shortly after the Syrian state Islamists launched their attacks against Rojava, representatives of the Kurdish self-administration reported that they had been urged by U.S. officials to fight against the Shiite militias in Iran, which would be mobilized in the event of a conflict. A mobilization of Iranian-Kurdish forces is already underway for a potential conflict in Iran, forces that would have to navigate between their geopolitical instrumentalization and the Kurdish struggle for liberation.

And this is precisely what brings Turkey into the picture, as it acts as one of the most important regional opponents of an overthrow of the mullah regime, since Iran – like Syria – has a large Kurdish minority, whose autonomy or self-governance, modeled after Rojava, Ankara seeks to prevent. It thus appears that Trump’s repeated betrayal of the Syrian Kurds is a geopolitical price paid to soften Ankara’s resistance to the intended overthrow of the regime in Iran. Furthermore, it can be assumed that Turkey has also been promised a buffer zone on Iranian territory, similar to its occupation zone in northern Iraq.[22] Once again, the Kurds are paying the price for imperialist deals between great and regional powers.

The crisis of the capitalist world system unfolds as a historical process in waves; following the wave of state decomposition triggered by the Arab Spring, Iran now stands on the brink. The Trump administration’s new crisis imperialism could be understood as a form of crisis adaptation by late-capitalist functional elites, in which economic upheavals in the semi-periphery are exploited to justify military intervention by the core.[23] Driven by unbearable socio-ecological contradictions, a new violent upheaval is looming in the region, though its outcome remains fundamentally open – just as it was in Syria and will continue to be, provided the Rojava project can somehow be kept alive. Those opposition forces in Iran that managed to survive the recent wave of massacres could thus soon find themselves in a situation where they are confronted not only with the eroding mullah regime, but also with crisis-imperialist efforts to establish a new dictatorial Shah regime amid the chaos.

The disintegration of the late-capitalist world system, the systemic transformation, and the resulting struggle for transformation are, however, inevitable. For what remains of the Left –  despite all regression, repression, and opportunism – there is consequently no alternative to the struggle for an emancipatory course of this transformation process. In Rojava as in Iran. And in the core whose neo-imperialism is fueled by the same crisis process that is ravaging the semi-periphery.

I finance my journalistic work largely through donations. If you appreciate my writing, you are welcome to contribute – either via Patreon or Substack.


[1] https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-cia-pentagon-isis-20160327-story.html

[2] https://www.kritiknetz.de/images/stories/texte/Islamischer_Staat.pdf

[3] https://www.telepolis.de/article/Allianzen-Almosen-Massaker-3366580.html

[4] https://archiv.telepolis.de/features/Kobane-in-Truemmern-Tuerkei-in-Flammen-3367844.html

[5] https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/obama-tried-to-pivot-to-asia-in-2011-we-must-succeed-this-time

[6] https://www.telepolis.de/article/Abschied-vom-Menschenrechtsimperialismus-3713257.html https://www.konicz.info/2017/12/11/abschied-vom-menschenrechtsimperialismus/

[7] https://medium.com/@ascentreact/everything-must-burn-862b983914a6

[8] https://exitinenglish.com/2026/03/19/what-is-crisis-imperialism/

[9] https://ednews.net/en/news/politics/240234-turkey-has-right-to-act-in-self-defense-in-afrin-nato-chief-stoltenberg-says

[10] https://www.konicz.info/2018/01/21/afrin-erdogans-werk-und-putins-beitrag/

[11] https://www.konicz.info/2019/10/26/der-krieg-der-neuen-rechten/

[12] https://www.konicz.info/2022/12/29/das-vergessene-morden/

[13] https://www.telepolis.de/article/Outsourcing-der-Barbarei-3336631.html

[14] https://www.dw.com/en/greece-cyprus-israel-military-cooperation-explained-turkey-reaction/a-75394974

[15] https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-decoded-text-message-donald-trump/

[16] https://www.t-online.de/nachrichten/ausland/krisen/id_101098128/massenproteste-im-iran-neue-opfer-zahlen-offenbaren-dramatisches-ausmass.html

[17] https://news.sky.com/story/why-are-people-protesting-in-iran-everything-you-need-to-know-13490639

[18] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/15/how-day-zero-water-shortages-in-iran-are-fuelling-protests

[19] https://www.konicz.info/2026/01/11/die-herrschaft-der-terror-clowns/

[20] https://therealnews.com/how-irans-theocrats-allied-with-and-then-crushed-the-left

[21] https://www.msn.com/en-us/politics/international-relations/as-us-forces-build-up-trump-weighs-limited-strikes-to-shake-iran-s-regime/ar-AA1V1Ksq

[22] https://www.konicz.info/2022/12/29/das-vergessene-morden/

[23] https://exitinenglish.com/2026/03/19/what-is-crisis-imperialism/

Originally posted on konicz.info on 01/28/26

Nationalist Shadow Boxing

Tomasz Konicz

About a year after taking office, the results of Donald Trump’s tariff policy are mixed and contradictory. The number of industrial jobs in the U.S. has actually declined slightly, as rationalization in the production process continues to advance, driven in part by AI programs.

In and out of tariffs – this is the only constant in U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariff policy. Last week, new U.S. tariffs of 10 percent on nearly all imports went into effect. They replace the tariffs that the Supreme Court had ruled invalid on February 20. In his initial angry reactions to the ruling, Trump had even announced a 15 percent tariff. The government is still considering further increases of this magnitude.

The only certainty is that the protectionist policy will continue, even though its legal basis has changed. The Supreme Court ruled that imposing the previous tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977 was unlawful. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent immediately announced that the government would simply rely on other trade laws instead. Currently, Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 applies. It allows the government to impose tariffs for 150 days; after that, Congress must approve them.

Politically, too, Trump’s tariff policy remains controversial, even within the Republican Party. Just under a year ago, Trump began raising the U.S. average tariff rate, which stood at 2.4 percent at the time; at the end of last year, it was around 17 percent. Protectionism is intended to “make America great again” – specifically, to reverse the crisis-driven deindustrialization and loss of manufacturing jobs. But the results have been mixed.

Although Trump keeps touting ever-larger, astronomical figures purported to demonstrate a massive surge in foreign investment – in October 2025 he spoke of $17 trillion, and in his address to the nation on February 24, the figure had already risen to $18 trillion, which he claimed had been pledged to him through bilateral trade agreements, among other channels –these figures have little basis in reality. Instead, the administration adds together forecasts of actual high corporate investment in the context of the AI boom, non-binding letters of intent from governments interested in appeasing Trump, vague agreements on potential economic cooperation, and binding agreements—and thus arrives at an absurdly high investment volume that would amount to four times the annual investment activity of the U.S. private sector, which ranges from about $4 to 5 trillion. Foreign investment in the U.S. amounted to only about $151 billion in 2024.

But has the U.S. government actually succeeded in extorting substantial investment commitments through the threat of tariffs? Japan has committed to $550 billion in industrial investments by 2029; South Korea has pledged $350 billion; Apple plans to pour $600 billion into U.S. manufacturing facilities and actually manufacture a Mac Mini in the U.S. There are also binding commitments worth billions from TSMC, Nvidia, Honda, Hyundai, Johnson & Johnson, IBM, Merck, and Roche. The list could go on, but it remains to be seen whether all these commitments will be fulfilled – and whether corporations are simply passing off investments they had planned anyway as a return to “Made in America” in order to gain political capital with Trump.

Huge U.S. Trade Deficit

The massive U.S. trade deficit has not shrunk – at least not yet. Trump said in late February that these investments would not yield economic results for “a year.” The annual trade deficit remained virtually unchanged at $901 billion in 2025. Looking solely at goods trade, excluding services, the deficit actually rose by 2% to a new record of $1.24 trillion, as the AI boom has been accompanied by rising imports, particularly of microchips from Taiwan.

However, the composition of trade flows has changed. Imports from China plummeted by 25% to just $242 billion, Japan’s exports to the U.S. fell by 12%, and those from Germany dropped by 9.4%. Canada also exported less to the U.S. in 2025: goods worth $291 billion instead of the previous $308 billion. Mexico recorded the largest growth last year, and with an export volume of $399 billion, it is now by far the leading exporter to the U.S. Moreover, the slump in imports from China was offset by nearly 50% increases in imports from Taiwan and Vietnam. At least part of these changes can be attributed to the fact that goods produced in China are simply being rerouted through countries such as Mexico or Vietnam to circumvent the particularly high U.S. tariffs imposed on China.

The picture is similarly ambiguous when it comes to production in the United States. Industrial production has indeed risen by more than 1% since Trump took office a year ago, yet the number of industrial jobs has declined slightly over the same period – by a good 108,000. This reveals the inherent limitation of capital – the market-driven tendency of capitalist commodity production to minimize wage labor in the production process through rationalization. Trump is shadowboxing, for the crisis process is by no means rooted in trade practices supposedly disadvantageous to the U.S., but will only be intensified by the current AI boom and advances in robotics.

No Boom in the Labor Market

Furthermore, while protectionism may benefit certain industries, it often does so at the expense of other sectors that rely on the smooth import of materials and parts as part of the internationally organized division of labor. U.S. steel tariffs, for example, have led to an increase in employment at steel mills, but this came at the expense of those sectors that had sourced inexpensive steel products from abroad and have now cut tens of thousands of jobs, as the New York Times calculates. Consequently, there can be no talk of an overall boom in the labor market. Despite economic growth of 2.2% last year, the number of jobs rose only minimally – even though the expected waves of rationalization associated with AI programs are still to come.

For consumers, tariffs drive up inflation because they are passed on in the form of higher prices. The New York Times cites a study indicating that the inflation rate last year was more than half a percentage point higher due to the tariffs. It stood at 2.7% in 2025, and 3.1% for food. The Trump administration implicitly acknowledged this by promising every U.S. citizen a one-time “tariff dividend” of $2,000 as compensation. Whether this will still happen following the Supreme Court’s ruling is questionable.

Above all, however, the tariff revenues were intended to finance government spending. Following the tariff ruling, Trump also imposed substitute tariffs because the revenues had already been budgeted. Last July, the Trump administration sharply reduced taxes – especially for the super-rich – with the so-called “Big Beautiful Bill,” causing the national debt to rise even more than it already had. In part, the customs revenue was intended to cushion that impact – in other words, a de facto consumption tax was meant to finance the tax breaks for capital and top earners.

The U.S. Dollar’s Status as the World’s Reserve Currency is at Risk

As of November 2025, revenue from the tariffs imposed by Trump totaled $236 billion, of which approximately $175 billion was collected under the IEEPA regulations that have now been declared illegal. These funds will now be the subject of protracted legal disputes; they are not available to the Treasury, as companies such as FedEx have already filed lawsuits to secure the refund of these paid customs duties.

Ultimately, Trump’s protectionism threatens the status of the U.S. dollar – which has been steadily losing value – as the world’s reserve currency. U.S. trade deficits provided an incentive for countries and economic regions with large trade surpluses, such as China, Japan, and Europe (which is economically dominated by Germany), to accept the dollar’s dominance. Now, the special status of the U.S. – which has been able to incur virtually risk-free debt in the world’s reserve currency – is in danger of becoming a thing of the past. This became clear, for example, during the disputes over Greenland, when U.S. bond prices plummeted on January 20 after several Scandinavian funds announced they would liquidate their positions.

The U.S. national debt now stands at more than 120% of gross domestic product, while yields on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds – which averaged less than 2 percent during Trump’s first term – are now above 4%. At $1.1 trillion annually, debt service is now one of the largest items in the federal budget; it has doubled over the past five years and even exceeds military spending. Should, for example, the impending AI disruption once again necessitate trillions of dollars in government crisis measures, the U.S. would have little capacity to do so, unlike during the financial crisis beginning in 2007.

Originally published in jungle.world 10 in 03/2026

War as a Catalyst for Crisis

If the Iran conflict escalates, the region faces the threat of another wave of statelessness.

Tomasz Konicz

Trump went way back, all the way to the 1979 embassy takeover and the 1983 Beirut bombing against U.S. troops, to justify the U.S. and Israeli attack on Iran in an initial statement.[1] Even though the U.S. president’s public statements have an increasingly short half-life, and Trump could claim the opposite as early as tomorrow, he did ultimately name two military objectives of the current bombing campaign: the extensive disarmament of the Iranian regime, particularly regarding its nuclear program, and – optionally – its overthrow, should opportunities arise. Washington and Tel Aviv appear to be planning a multi-day intensive bombing campaign against key officials, the state apparatus, and its infrastructure, which would significantly weaken the regime, in the hope that this would spark an uprising that – supported by the CIA, Mossad, and special forces – would bring an end to the mullahs’ rule. On the evening of February 28, Trump also kept all options open in a brief phone interview with Axios: from short-term bombing to hinder the Iranian nuclear program to regime change.[2]

The talk of regime change is strikingly reminiscent of the murderous disaster the neocons under George W. Bush wrought during the invasion of Iraq—but this time, appearances are indeed deceptive. This is not only due to the simple fact that no significant ground forces are ready for an invasion. The neocons did indeed have the democratization of Iraq in mind, with the aim of subsequently integrating the country into the U.S. hegemonic system; they made no compromises with the remnants of the swiftly defeated Saddam regime in order to rebuild state structures from the ground up. The bloody consequences are well known: anomie, state collapse, a bloody civil war, and its “freezing” into a sham state fractured along ethnic and religious lines. The U.S. easily won the Iraq War against the crumbling Iraqi regime, but it lost the peace after the anomic centrifugal forces in Iraq were unleashed.

No “Democratization”

Trump’s imperialism, on the other hand, has a completely different thrust; Washington has long since shed the ideological veil of human rights imperialism as practiced by Western centers during the neoliberal decades.[3] The Islamofascist mullah regime, which had thousands of demonstrators massacred just a few weeks ago, is to be replaced by a regime subservient to the U.S. This approach is easier to carry out, as large parts of the state and repressive apparatus can simply be taken over. The precedent here is the case of Venezuela, whose head of state was effectively handed over to the U.S., while the power structures characterized by racketeering otherwise remained untouched . The offer of “total immunity” that Trump made in his speech to the officials of the Iranian regime clearly points in this direction.

The authoritarian alternative to the mullahs, the Shah’s son Reza Pahlavi, seems to have been dug straight out of the CIA’s dustbin of history.[4] His father’s genocidal regime was swept away in the wake of the 1979 revolution. His supporters are currently attempting to gain dominance within the Iranian opposition through nationalism, intimidation, and threats, while specifically targeting leftist and feminist movements. A miniature dictatorship is already taking shape. Meanwhile, tensions are also coming to light between the Pahlavi camp and Kurdish opposition groups, which have been accused by the monarchists of separatist aspirations.[5] Even U.S. officials have told media representatives that the Pahlavi monarchists are causing them “fear.”[6] The would-be Shah has already held official talks with members of the Trump administration, such as Steve Witkoff.

Crisis and War

Venezuela, the Al-Qaeda state of Syria,[7] and now, prospectively, Iran – crisis imperialism is merely returning to its roots in its twilight years by once again relying on authoritarian regimes.[8] The human rights imperialism of the neoliberal era thus represents only a brief historical episode. The novel aspect, however, is the crisis process of capital, which, in its economic and ecological dimensions, shapes geopolitical developments as well as concrete imperialist aggression. Without the crisis, there would be no American attempt at regime change.

This is not an abstraction; the global crisis of capital is manifesting itself in very concrete ways. Iran is already on the brink of ecological collapse. In parts of the country, the water supply has collapsed; even in the capital, Tehran, with its ten million inhabitants, the water is occasionally cut off. According to the British newspaper The Guardian, an evacuation of the Iranian capital is now even being considered should no substantial rainfall occur by the end of the year, as its population can barely be supplied with water.[9] The increasing extreme weather events, the lack of rain, and the ever more frequent heat waves are all leading to slumps in crop yields in Iran, which already has to import food.[10]

Iran has been subject to various forms of sanctions for decades; the regime has experience in circumventing or mitigating this economic pressure. However, the decisive tipping point was the current ecological and economic escalation of the crisis dynamics. The sanctions imposed on Iran have exacerbated the escalation, but did not trigger it. The protests were triggered by a massive devaluation and a surge in inflation caused by the suspension of subsidies for basic foodstuffs. At its core, the uprising against the mullahs – which was brutally suppressed – was economically motivated, as even basic foodstuffs became unaffordable for an increasing number of Iranians. The rising demand for imports (and foreign currency) is met with dwindling revenues: China is the Iranian oil industry’s most important customer, yet Beijing purchased the energy resource at a steep discount due to sanctions, further exacerbating Iran’s economic situation.

Reasons for War

The timing of the attack is likely indeed linked to the mass murderous suppression of the protests. It is a window of opportunity that the U.S. and Israel wish to exploit, during which the regime is weakened and has lost its legitimacy among large segments of the population. The time lag between the Iranian uprising and the Israeli-American attack is due to the logistics of war: The U.S. had to assemble its forces in the region, secure their supply lines, etc., which takes weeks. The mullahs’ rule does indeed appear rotten, porous, and highly corrupt, as evidenced by the extensive penetration of the Iranian state by Israeli and Western intelligence agencies. The Israelis were not only able to eliminate part of the Iranian leadership during the 2025 bombing campaign; they have now managed once again to take out Supreme Leader Khamenei on the first day. Netanyahu is said to have been shown images of the body shortly after it was recovered.[11]

In Israel’s case, the reasons for war are obvious: Tel Aviv wants the end of the mullah regime out of pure self-preservation. Israel wants the government overthrown, since the “Islamic Republic” of Iran has elevated the destruction of Israel to a state doctrine. Since October 7, 2023 – the mass-murderous terrorist attack by Hamas on Israel, which was cheered by Iran and militarily supported by Hezbollah attacks – regime change appears to have become the guiding principle of Israeli policy toward Iran. Israel wants to prevent, at all costs, a repeat of an attack such as the one carried out by the Iran-backed Hamas. The current right-wing government in Jerusalem would likely favor a reactionary, U.S.-aligned regime under Reza Pahlavi, yet regime change appears to be the top priority – regardless of the succession debate. Israel’s minimum objective, intended to secure the survival of the Jewish state in a hostile region, consists of permanently preventing Iran’s nuclear program.

In the case of the U.S., domestic political reasons are usually emphasized: Trump wants to divert attention from the pedophilia scandal involving members of the U.S. ruling elite. Meanwhile, there is growing evidence that the president himself may have molested girls and children. The attack on Venezuela was already interpreted as an attempt by Trump to divert attention, similar to Reagan’s invasion of Grenada in 1983, which was intended to divert attention from the Iran-Contra affair. The military triumph in Caracas also simply led to the fascists in the White House – here, above all, Trump’s close confidant Steven Miller – taking a liking to the use of military force without consequences. They have simply gotten a taste for blood.

Yet at the same time, it is evident that the Trump administration is targeting China’s second “gas station” in Iran. Beijing is (and has been) the most important customer in both Caracas and Tehran. The deployment of the colossal U.S. military machine – following Trump’s dismantling of the remnants of American hegemony – effectively constitutes the last significant lever with which Washington can maintain its global dominance.[12] Precisely because the crisis is also breathing down the Trump administration’s neck, as the dollar increasingly loses its role as the world’s reserve currency and Washington faces mounting budgetary problems. The attacks on oil-producing countries that have broken away from the U.S. orbit also appear intended to consolidate the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency, as the “petro-currency.”

Moreover – and this must not be overlooked in the era of oligarchic brutalization in the U.S.—Trump was encouraged to attack Iran by the Gulf despotisms, which showered his clan with “gifts” and deals worth billions. Saudi Arabia, in particular, pressed Washington in secret talks to carry out the bombing, while officially maintaining a neutral stance.[13] Iran’s attacks against the Gulf states are a direct consequence of this tactical acquiescence and support for the U.S. attack, which would also neutralize a key Shiite rival of the Saudis for the time being. Riyadh hopes to rise to become the leading regional power in the wake of the war.

Outlook and Prospects

Without substantial deployment of ground forces, the bombing campaign against Iran is likely to peter out after a few weeks without bringing about regime change. The regime is ailing; it is corrupt; and it can apparently be easily penetrated by intelligence agencies that can simply buy information. But it still has hundreds of thousands of supporters and fighters under arms, particularly in the militias, who will remain loyal without substantial military pressure for one simple reason: the regime provides them with material support. Their children are not malnourished; they can make ends meet for their families in the midst of a socio-ecological crisis in which this is no longer possible for ever-larger segments of the population.

Consequently, the organizational structures are likely to remain intact despite the barrage of bombs, the chains of command continue to function, and unreliable elements within the repressive apparatus were neutralized anyway during the brutal counterinsurgency at the beginning of the year. The machine guns stand ready in case spontaneous protests flare up again, which could easily be drowned in blood once more. The backbone of the regime is too strong to be broken by airstrikes and demonstrations alone.

There are hardly any significant, powerful opposition groups that could challenge the regime militarily. The People’s Mujahideen, a left-wing Islamist splinter group of Iranian state Shi’ism, resembles a sect with some 3,000 followers that sporadically organizes attacks in Iran.[14] The Shah’s son, Pahlavi, has no significant battle-tested forces at his disposal. What remains are the minorities: the Kurds, through the Iranian successor organization to the dissolved PKK, have significant combat units; separatist aspirations – which could potentially be encouraged by Turkey – exist among the Azeris in northwestern Iran, as well as in Iranian Baluchistan in the southeast of the country.

However, these groups would likely strengthen Iran’s centrifugal forces, fueling instability and state collapse – while the U.S. would prefer to install a stable, U.S.-aligned regime in Iran. Turkey’s initial opposition to an attack on Iran stems precisely from Ankara’s fears that Iranian Kurds might fight for independence or autonomy (Washington’s betrayal of Rojava, in which the Kurds were sacrificed, which was overcome by Ankara’s resistance).[15] This scenario of a renewed wave of state decomposition in the region also seems most likely in the event of an escalation. The country, with a population of 90 million, could disintegrate into a gigantic, second Syria. In this case, however, it would not only be Iran where conflicts could erupt along ethnic or religious lines.

Iraq would also be affected; following the freeze in the Sunni-Shia civil war, it is little more than a hollow shell of a state, where militias effectively hold sway depending on the region. And Shias constitute the majority of Iraq’s population. Shia militias, most of which are backed by Iran, have already threatened attacks against U.S. military bases and other facilities. A resurgence of the civil war seems quite likely in the event of an escalation.[16] The Syrian Islamist regime, which emerged from the Sunni terrorist network Al-Qaeda, is already massing troops along the border with Iraq.[17] Turkish interventions are also conceivable, aimed at occupying the Azerbaijani regions of Iran or attacking the Kurds as part of Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman imperialism.

And finally, the conflict could very quickly trigger global economic upheaval if Iran blocks the Strait of Hormuz, which could happen simply through the threat of drone or missile strikes – a navy is not necessary for this. This would shut down one of the most important shipping routes for fossil fuels. As is so often the case with Western wars over the world order (Robert Kurz), the war would thus simply become a catalyst for crisis, accelerating the crisis process of capital in fits and starts—both in the region and globally.

I finance my journalistic work largely through donations. If you appreciate my writing, you are welcome to contribute—either via Patreon or Substack.


[1] https://x.com/WhiteHouse/status/2027654336138924410

[2] https://www.axios.com/2026/02/28/trump-iran-war-israel-off-ramps

[3] https://www.konicz.info/2026/01/28/verrat-aus-prinzip/

[4] https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2026/02/24/reza-pahlavi-iran-trump-00793877

[5] https://apnews.com/article/iran-iraq-kurds-pahlavi-6beae57e9fdc3546a61ec8f1432eef4b

[6] https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2026/02/24/reza-pahlavi-iran-trump-00793877

[7] https://www.konicz.info/2026/01/28/verrat-aus-prinzip/

[8] https://exitinenglish.com/2026/03/19/what-is-crisis-imperialism/

[9] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/15/how-day-zero-water-shortages-in-iran-are-fuelling-protests

[10] https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/507241/Climate-change-significantly-impacts-food-security-in-Iran-expert

[11] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/natenyahu-said-shown-picture-of-khameneis-body-retrieved-from-compound/

[12] https://medium.com/@ascentreact/everything-must-burn-862b983914a6

[13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/02/28/trump-iran-decision-saudi-arabia-israel/

[14] https://esut.de/2025/04/fachbeitraege/58620/der-geist-der-volksmudschahedin/

[15] https://www.konicz.info/2026/01/28/verrat-aus-prinzip/

[16] https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/02/28/iran-backed-militias-in-iraq-say-us-israel-attack-kills-at-least-two-fighters/

[17] https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/2027754904991781276

Originally published on 03/01/2025

What is Crisis Imperialism?

And how does it differ from the classical imperialism of earlier eras?

Tomasz Konicz

Crisis imperialism is the state’s quest for dominance – carried out through economic, political, or military means – during an era of contraction in the valorization process of capital. The state apparatuses of the core of the world system strive for dominance in a systemic crisis fueled by constant advances in productivity, that, on the one hand, create regions of economic and ecological scorched earth – primarily in the periphery – and, on the other hand, make the emergence of a new regime of accumulation, in which wage labor would be valorized on a massive scale in commodity production, impossible. This crisis process is accompanied by a rise in debt that outpaces global economic output and leads to the emergence of an economically superfluous humanity, as illustrated, for example, by the refugee crises of recent years.

This also highlights the fundamental difference between crisis imperialism and the imperialism of earlier eras, since the latter took place during a historical phase of capital expansion – originating in Europe in the 16th century – that was driven precisely by the genocidal exploitation of labor. The plunder of resources – such as the gold and silver of Latin America – and the development of new markets in the Global South – sugarcane, spices, etc. – could only be realized through the mass valorization of “hands,” which in most cases could only be achieved through forced labor. The trail of blood left by this imperialist expansion of the capitalist world system – which integrated ever-new peripheral regions into the world market, often through military force – stretches from the genocide of the indigenous peoples of Latin and Central America, through the Atlantic triangular trade in African slaves and the British Empire’s exploitation of India, to the atrocities of Belgian imperialism in the Congo of the late 19th century, the effects of which are still felt today, when the failure to meet rubber quotas by forced laborers resulted in severe mutilations – such as the chopping off of hands.

The ultimately military drive for expansion by imperialist states is a consequence of capital’s valorization compulsion, whereby imperialist tendencies can gain momentum precisely in response to the internal contradictions of the valorization process: Overaccumulation of capital seeking investment, increasing social tensions intended to be mitigated through colonization, or capital’s demand for raw materials and energy sources that cannot be produced domestically often lead those states possessing sufficient means of power to pursue corresponding forms of imperialist expansion.

Following the 20th century, during which, due to the “Cold War,” practices of informal imperialism were more commonly employed – involving the installation of dependent, formally sovereign regimes in the periphery through economic pressure or intelligence-led coups – forms of direct imperialist aggression are once again gaining the upper hand in the 21st century, in conjunction with the imperial decline of the United States and the increasing tendencies toward state and social disintegration in the periphery. This also carries with it the danger of major wars waged between imperialist great powers.

During its historical phase of expansion, the capitalist world system was characterized by cycles of hegemony in which an imperialist great power was able to attain a hegemonic position that was, at least temporarily, tolerated by competing powers. The 19th century was marked by a British hegemonic cycle, and the 20th century by a U.S. hegemonic cycle of industrial rise and decline. The increasing number military conflicts today are an expression of the U.S.’s hegemonic decline, and the socio-ecological crisis of capital prevents the emergence of a new hegemonic power.

China, which is engaged in a global struggle for hegemony with Washington, is unable to succeed the U.S. as the “world policeman” due to the crisis-induced increase in internal turmoil (debt and real estate crises). The current phase of escalating military conflicts thus represents a bloody real-life satire of the talk of a “multipolar world order” demanded by all imperial rivals of the declining United States. The systemic crisis prevents the emergence of a hegemon, though many state apparatuses continue to strive – ultimately in vain – to become as powerful as the U.S., and the erosion of U.S. hegemony provides them with the necessary leeway for their own military adventures. Moreover, growing internal contradictions are once again fueling the drive for imperial expansion (e.g., Russia, Turkey).

A central concrete difference between today and the imperial quest for dominance in earlier centuries thus lies in the fact that the hunt for markets and “hands” that could be exploited through violent integration into the world market now plays hardly any role at all in the globalized world system due to the aforementioned systemic crisis of overproduction. In the late-capitalist crisis imperialism of the 21st century, the imperialist drive for expansion manifests itself in efforts to seal off the economically superfluous masses of the periphery – both in “Fortress Europe” and in the U.S. In this respect, expansion thus turns into the sealing off of the core from the periphery, which also plays hardly any role as a market.

The collapsed periphery, with its “failed states,” now plays a role only within the framework of extractionism as a supplier of raw materials, building upon the forms of decay of 20th-century “informal imperialism” by – as in the case of cobalt mining in the Congo – organizing raw material extraction independently through local post-state power structures (militias, gangs, sects, etc.) who do this on their own initiative, only to then channel them to the world market through shadowy channels and middlemen. Militarily, the core countries interact with the “scorched earth” regions only within the framework of “world order wars” (Robert Kurz), in which the periphery is either to be stabilized through state-building processes (“nation building”) or at least militarily neutralized as a disruptive factor. The global drone campaign of the former “world policeman,” the U.S., in the “war on terror,” or the – consistently failed – Western interventions in Afghanistan and Somalia fall into this category of the imperial core’s futile struggle against the social consequences of the systemic crisis – originating from the core – in the periphery.

Thus, the current era of crisis imperialism is characterized by the interplay between the state’s quest for dominance and the crisis process of capital, which exhibits a market-mediated, fetishistic momentum fueled by the internal contradictions of capital (which, in market competition, tends to divest itself of its own substance, value-creating labor). The functional elites of the state apparatuses find themselves confronted with the consequences of the crisis, which unfolds, mediated by the market, “behind the producers’ backs” (Marx), as if exposed to an external, natural force, even though the increasing contradictions and distortions (debt, social erosion, economic and environmental crises, etc.) are the unconscious product of market actors in their pursuit of the highest possible capital valorization. Capital has thus brought forth a social formation that lacks control over this blindly unfolding dynamic and is ultimately driven by it into social and ecological collapse.

The state-level competition arising from this systemic crisis of overproduction consequently leads to the formation of an economically grounded imperialism that strives for the highest possible trade surpluses. Through the trade surplus, the crisis of overproduction – as well as the accompanying compulsion to incur debt – is exported to countries that are running ever-larger deficits. In this regard, the Federal Republic of Germany was particularly successful following the introduction of the euro. The political dominance of the FRG in the eurozone stems precisely from the extreme German trade surpluses between the introduction of the euro and the euro crisis, which led to the southern European debt crisis and to deindustrialization in the indebted states, while the industrial base of the German export industry remained intact. After the outbreak of the euro crisis, German Finance Minister Schäuble was able to unilaterally impose the consequences of the burst European debt bubbles – which were accompanied by German trade surpluses – on the crisis-stricken states in the form of strict austerity policies, amidst fierce political disputes. This widened the economic gap between Berlin and “its” eurozone – and cemented Germany’s claim to leadership, while states driven to the brink of bankruptcy, such as Greece, had to accept extensive losses of sovereignty. The protectionism that has been on the rise in recent years, and which has become openly apparent since the Trump administration, represents precisely a reaction to this crisis-driven urge to achieve the highest possible trade surpluses. Before the open trade wars that Trump ignited due to the extensive deindustrialization of the U.S., many countries attempted to improve their trade balances through currency devaluation races.

The objective crisis process of capital thus unfolds through corresponding crisis-imperialist conflicts between state actors – this, the execution of the crisis dynamic through economic, geopolitical, intelligence, or military power struggles, constitutes the objective core of crisis-imperialist practice. This applies not only to the eroding core countries (such as in Southern Europe), but also to the periphery of the world system, where the crisis process has advanced further and widespread social disintegration is giving way to state collapse. The imperialist interventions in Syria and Libya following the “Arab Spring” – where failed modernization regimes, having degenerated into kleptocracies, found themselves threatened by desperate uprisings – make it clear how crisis-induced upheavals first open up opportunities for imperial interventions. Social tensions in the post-Soviet space, where Russia’s hegemony rapidly eroded until the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, gave rise to a similar dynamic of protest, uprising, and external intervention. Putin’s Russia chose to wage a war of aggression against Ukraine precisely in the wake of the uprisings in Belarus and Kazakhstan.

At times, states with imperial ambitions also exploit the consequences of crises directly –Erdogan’s Islamofascist Turkey, for instance, used the refugee flows into the EU as a lever of power to extort concessions and money from Brussels and Berlin. And Ankara also justifies its imperialist expansion in northern Syria and northern Iraq by claiming it intends to concentrate refugees in these regions in the future. Imperialism must therefore be viewed not only historically as an ideological and practical precursor to fascist excesses – the same process is also unfolding in the current systemic crisis.

Imperialist striving for dominance also interacts with the ecological crisis of capital, which, due to its compulsion to grow, is incapable of establishing a resource- and climate-friendly reproduction of humanity. This includes, for example, the tensions in the far north, in the Arctic, where the rapidly melting ice cap is opening up new shipping routes and making new deposits of fossil fuels accessible – and over whose extraction the neighboring countries of Russia, the U.S., Canada, and the EU are in dispute. The conflict between Russia and the West over Ukraine, which began in 2013 as a struggle between competing economic blocs (the EU and the US versus Putin’s envisioned “Eurasian Union”), now also has a climate policy dimension. Ukraine possesses highly fertile black soil, which is rapidly gaining value as a geopolitical lever of power in light of looming, climate-induced food shortages and impending hunger crises – food could become the oil of the 21st century.

The crisis is thus driving the late-capitalist state behemoths into confrontation in both its economic and ecological dimensions. Crisis imperialism thus resembles – to stay with the image of the climate crisis – a cutthroat competition on a melting iceberg, or a struggle on the sinking Titanic. Since the socio-ecological systemic crisis cannot be resolved within the framework of the capitalist world system, crisis imperialism finds its vanishing point in a major war, which would have catastrophic consequences due to the destructive potential accumulated under late capitalism. Without an emancipatory systemic transformation, the collapse of civilization threatens to descend into climate catastrophe and nuclear war.

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Originally published on konicz.info on 06/23/22

Crisis, Riots and What Next?

Thomas Meyer

The bourgeois discourse on violence is dominated by the attitude of condemning violence from the left. This can be seen very clearly in the condemnation of the climate protests of Last Generation, where the call for the heavy hand of state violence cannot be extreme enough (Konicz 2022). In contrast, violence legitimized by the state is not an object of critique. This applies all the more to structural violence (such as against refugees and Hartz IV recipients) or social catastrophes imposed by the IMF’s structural adjustment measures. Right-wing violence is trivialized, reduced to so-called individual cases or equated with left-wing violence, i.e. no significant distinction is made between violence against people (which often ends fatally) and violence against things or against the bourgeois property order (blockades & occupations). Naturally, such an attitude is suitable for preventing practical social critique and limiting “freedom” & “self-determination” to the approval of the existing. Right-wing violence appears to be less of a threat to the bourgeois order, especially as neo-Nazis often “improperly” do what the state does anyway through official channels – for example in the case of refugee deterrence (“properly” picking up and deporting “foreigners,” burning them in prison,[1] shooting them,[2] etc., instead of chasing them through the park and murdering them). In bourgeois discourse, the violence that appears to pose a threat to the bourgeois order is criticized, while the violent structures of bourgeois society are “taken for granted.” The violence legitimized by the rule of law does not even appear linguistically as such, or it is claimed to be “proportionate” or “necessary.” If violence is then exaggerated, it is once again only “regrettable individual cases.” The police powers acts passed in recent years are increasingly transforming the bourgeois constitutional state into a police state. Preventative detention was used against climate protests on the basis of these laws, i.e. the imprisonment of people who could presumably commit a “criminal offense” or participate (!) in climate protests (which are not even punishable in and of themselves). It should only be a matter of time before climate activism is equated with terrorism![3]

Riots cause particular outrage in the bourgeois discourse on violence, i.e. the usually “relatively spontaneous” uprisings (triggered by certain individual events, such as police violence, price increases for essentials such as bread, but also for petrol, tickets, etc.), which often appear pointless and aimless and are characterized by looting and excesses of destruction of other people’s property. Riots are therefore of a different quality than strikes, in the sense of orderly and formalized struggles for interests (as can be wonderfully observed in collective bargaining disputes). Their social causes are therefore often not understood or they are only interpreted as irrational excesses of violence, which are to be “dealt with” by even more police batons and early warning systems.

This irrationality is an expression of the irrationality of social rationality. “Rioting” people, often young people, are people who live within this society but cannot participate in it. They may be formally equal in legal terms, but they are treated differently (for example, if you come from a “problem neighborhood” or have a “foreign” name, you are more likely not to be invited to a job interview, despite having the same qualifications). They usually share the ideals and goals of society (work, consumption, family), but are excluded from their realization. That the promises of equality and happiness of bourgeois society can be fulfilled or that opportunities for advancement can be realized is increasingly becoming an illusion.  The social catastrophes in so-called problem neighborhoods (“ghettos” or suburban settlements) are not understood as the result of the social upheavals of crisis capitalism and its neoliberal crisis regime since the 1970s, but are racialized: There is agitation and claims that they are a “cultural problem” of black people, the result of “lack of integration,” represent a “foreigner and migrant problem” and/or a problem of “Islam.” Instead of understanding the social causes of the riots and the specific historical constellation in which they take place, they are externalized as a “problem.” A problem that is allegedly being brought into bourgeois society from “outside.” This unwillingness to understand is obviously far more irrational than torching cars or looting supermarkets. Robert Castel, for example, explains against the backdrop of the youth riots in the banlieues in France in 2005: “The problem with these young people is not that they are outside society. This is neither the case in terms of the space they inhabit (the suburban settlement is not a ghetto) nor in terms of their status (many are French citizens and not foreigners). But they are not within society either, because they do not occupy a recognized position in it and many of them are obviously not in a position to obtain such a position. If there has been a revolt of despair, it is in the conviction of having no future, of being deprived of the means necessary to be considered full members of society” (Castel 2009, 36, emphasis added).

In his book Riot Strike Riot, Joshua Clover examines this phenomenon and attempts to contextualize it theoretically and historically. He makes it clear that the bourgeois concept of violence that comes into play in the condemnation of riots is highly problematic: “That property damage equals violence is not a truth but the adoption of a particular set of ideas about property, one of relatively recent vintage, involving specific identifications of humans with abstract wealth of the sort that culminate in, for example, the legal holdings that corporations are people.” (Clover 2016, 11.). The violence to which those who are marginalized and made superfluous are exposed is ignored: “However, this insistence on the violence of the riot effectively obscures the daily, systematic, and ambient violence that stalks daily life for much of the world. The vision of a generally pacific sociality that only in exception breaks forth into violence is an imaginary accessible only to some. For others – most – social violence is the norm. The rhetoric of the violent riot becomes a device of exclusion, aimed not so much against ‘violence’ but against specific social groups.” (ibid., 12).

Clover distinguishes riot from riot prime. The former refers to riots before the labor movement, before the implementation of industrial capitalism (moral economy, resistance of the Luddites, etc., see also Kurz 1999, 125ff.). The historical background is, among other things, the destruction of the commons accompanying “original accumulation” (Marx) and the simultaneously increasing dependence on the market. While the strike sought to enforce the highest possible price for labor power in the factory as well as better and more tolerable working conditions, a rise in the price of goods on the market (bread riots) was a more frequent cause of a riot. Riots did not set the price of labor, but the market price of consumer goods (or they prevented exports so that bread would be sold here and now at a “fair” price and not at a higher price elsewhere). They did not interrupt production, but circulation; the riots were, in a sense, circulation struggles (Clover 2016, 15f.). They did not take place in industry, but in public space, in markets. This is to be distinguished from “riots” (hereafter “riot” again), i.e. those riots that have become more and more important since the 1970s, which is related to the never-ending crisis of capital since the 1970s. They are therefore qualitatively different from the riots in the early days of capitalism. What riot and “riot” have in common is the looting of goods, the spontaneity and disorderliness of their actions. The difference is that today the production of goods is fragmented across the globe, whereas in early capitalism everything necessary for life was still produced in close proximity. This change makes it impossible for a riot to “appropriate and take over” production. If riots are playing a greater role again today, in contrast to the declining importance of strikes, this does not mean that there is a return to older forms of protest. Clover emphasizes that the historical dynamics of the valorization of value are of decisive importance in the theoretical assessment of riots. Even if riots interrupt circulation today, this is not the same as the circulation of the 18th century. With Clover, we can establish the fact that concepts themselves have a history (as, of course, does the thing to which they are supposed to refer), that similar phenomena that occur in the history of capitalism are not a recurrence of the same thing. This must be taken into account in the analysis.

Clover’s explanations have been criticized (Armstrong 2021) that his historical “tripartite division” (“riot-strike-riot prime”) is too schematic, that he does not, for example, address the militant struggles of slaves (which did not take place in the sphere of circulation) and that his distinction between riot and strike is not tenable, look at past mass strikes or wildcat strikes where there was an overlap between struggles in circulation and production (sabotaging trains, disrupting “supply chains” to support striking factory workers).

He was also criticized for focusing on Western countries. If one looks at the world as a whole, then there can be no question of the significance and number of strikes decreasing. Two of Clover’s critics therefore seem to conclude that Clover was apparently mistaken when he said that the crisis of capital has been insoluble since the 1970s, because “the global industrial proletariat has never been as large as it is today, and there have probably never been as many strikes as there are today” (Arps & García Doell 2021). For the two authors, this essentially puts an end to the discussion on crisis theory (see Kurz 2005 & 2012 and, specifically on China, Ming 2023 and the article by Tomasz Konicz in this exit!)

The historical-concrete context that Clover is elaborating is equally applicable to strikes. Fortunately, an increase in strikes has been observed in recent years (see for example Scholz 2022 and Autorenkollektiv 2023). The authors of Analyse & Kritik are undoubtedly right with this observation. However, it should be borne in mind that they are taking place against the backdrop of a tightening space for shaping the value-dissociation form and therefore have a completely different range of possibilities than strikes of previous generations (even if they are also more necessary than ever). It is therefore a little cheap to think that by counting strikes we have refuted Clover’s comments on the crisis.

Clover points out that workers” struggles are tied to the precondition of successful capital valorization and that they become obsolete when the valorization of value enters a systemic crisis (i.e. not a mere cyclical crisis). These are therefore struggles within the capitalist formal context, which as such is not called into question. In the crisis, such struggles then become more and more irrelevant, which makes their defensive and affirmative character clear. As Clover writes: “Labor’s historical power has rested on a growing productive sector and its ability to seize a share of expanding surplus. Since the turn of the seventies, labor has been reduced to defensive negotiations, compelled to preserve the firms able to supply wages, affirming the domination of capital in return for its own preservation. The worker appearing as worker in the period of crisis confronts a situation in which ‘the very fact of acting as a class appears as an external constraint.’ […] We might find a decisive moment by returning […] to Detroit and to 1973, where ‘for the first time in the history of the UAW, the union mobilized to keep a plant open.’ This will swiftly become the paradigm for labor organizing, wanted or not. […] Capital and labor find themselves now in collaboration to preserve capital’s self-reproduction, to preserve the labor relation along with the firm’s viability. […] We might call it ‘the affirmation trap,’ in which labor is locked into the position of affirming its own exploitation under the guise of survival” (Clover 2016, 30, 146f.).

A strike is dependent on economic growth. If certain factories or entire production sectors are no longer profitable, (surplus) value shrinks, there is also less surplus value to distribute that the workers could appropriate. In such a situation, trade unions – since they only represent people in their function as variable capital – advocate that the jobs are retained, usually under worse conditions, so that the factory remains profitable for the time being (possibly in contrast to a competing “location”), provided the workers accept all the necessary conditions. The scope for action within the value form narrows, the room for maneuver becomes narrower. As long as one does not question the wage system as such, but only ever stands up for higher wages (or for lower wages so that the store is not closed down), one participates in the organization of one’s own social decline (or that of other workers). Clover points out that since the 1970s, utilized labor in the production sector has increasingly declined and accumulation has shifted to the financial sphere. The result is the production of a “surplus population” (ibid., 26), which forms the social substance of the riots. People are released into superfluousness, yet they remain forced to reproduce themselves capitalistically: “Capital may not need these workers, but they still need to work. They are thus forced to offer themselves up for the most abject forms of wage slavery in the form of petty production and services – identified with informal and often illegal markets of direct exchange arising alongside failures of capitalist production” (ibid..).

If “normal” working conditions become the exception, the order that “well-behaved citizens” understand as “orderly” disintegrates. The surplus population becomes a “security problem.” In contrast to the 18th and early 19th century, this population is at the mercy of a highly armed police force “as a standing army within.” The state is waging a “war against drugs and terror” (ibid., 36). No wonder that riots are often sparked by police killings.

The shift of value realization to the financial sector and at the same time the intensification of transport and logistics (which shorten the turnover period of capital) could not stop the “stagnation and decline of global profitability” (ibid., 31). Clover sees no contradiction in the fact that individual companies are able to make a profit for themselves, prevail in competition, are extremely successful according to capitalist criteria and do not appear to be in crisis. Clover distinguishes the system as a whole and its crisis from the level of individual capital. He therefore does not make the serious mistake often made by many of today’s remaining Marxists (or followers of the New Marx Lekture) of inferring the state of the system as a whole from the characteristics of individual capitals (cf. Kurz 2012). The conclusion is then drawn: Yes, work is indeed being done, things are being produced, and exploitation is taking place! Where is the systemic crisis? On the contrary: “For Marx’s value analysis, the movements of profits are surface phenomena corresponding to an underlying shift in the balance of constant to variable capital: means of production to waged labor, or dead to living labor. Despite countervailing forces, this so-called organic composition of capital tends to rise over time as competition compels increasing productivity, iteratively replacing labor with more efficient machines and labor processes […]. Over time, however, the rise in the ratio of dead to living labor undermines the capacity for value production […]. The same dynamic that originally drives accumulation […] also undermines it, until manufacturing capacity and labor capacity can no longer be brought together, and instead empty factories and unemployed populations pile up side by side. […] Crisis and decline come not from extrinsic shocks but from capital’s internal limits” (Clover 2016, 133f.).

The inner barrier of capital has made emancipation within the barriers of capital (which is dubious anyway) more and more irrelevant. As a result, strikes are thinning out, almost disappearing from the scene, or are just spreading hot air, as what is being struck is becoming increasingly unprofitable (apart from the fact that strikes, which are not aimed at abolition, do not address the destructive nature of the capitalist mode of production and its catastrophic effects on the climate). When more and more people are put out of work, factories stand empty, suburbs and workers’ housing estates turn into “problem neighborhoods,” there is simply nothing left for many people to strike about. In order to “make their voices heard,” the circulation of goods is interrupted (looting, sabotage, blockade of highways, etc.), their own hated neighborhoods or police stations are torched.

A riot triggered by a singular event can spread within weeks to become a “conflagration” that expresses a fundamental rejection of the “ancien régime” and possibly seeks (and implements) its overthrow. As Clover emphasizes, a riot, just like a strike, does not have to be emancipatory as such (ibid., 191). This point is particularly important to emphasize following Clover, as it is now perfectly clear that the “practice of the riot” (or that which seems similar to it) is also one of right-wing radicals and conspiracy ideologues, as can be seen in the storming of the Capitol in the United States (01/06/2021) and the Parliament in Brazil (01/08/2023) (although this did not exactly happen spontaneously).

Since the Arab spring and Occupy Wall Street in the early 2010s,[4] riots have repeatedly involved the occupation of public spaces (although there is no necessary link) or the occupation of infrastructure (which is central to the circulation of goods), such as the occupation of the Port of Oakland (Occupy Oakland). In their dynamics, the riots obviously point to something that goes beyond looting and torching. The occasion may seem singular and the course of a riot chaotic and spontaneous. The question is what becomes or could become a “conflagration.”

A social struggle that seeks to improve the position of people or workers will come to nothing if more and more people can no longer really participate in the valorization process, but on the contrary exist more and more in an informal economy with no prospect of their lot in life ever improving. This by no means only affects people from the former factory proletariat, but also knowledge workers from universities (the internship generation, ongoing fixed-term contracts, etc.), i.e. also qualified workers. A riot that sets itself the goal of redefining prices is anachronistic today, given the global crisis of capital: “The public whose modality is riot must eventually encounter the need to pursue reproduction not just beyond the wage but beyond the marketplace” (ibid., 173). This necessity is all the more pressing because “attempts at appeasement” of all kinds are no longer effective today. While the riots of the 1960s in the USA could still be “pacified,” admittedly also by police batons and lead bullets, but also by integrative measures such as social programs etc., which could certainly improve the social situation, this effect has failed to materialize today. Social programs cannot erase the superfluousness of those who “benefit” from them. This is all the more tragic when a regime is actually successfully overthrown, but nothing changes in the social and material situation of the people, those who are “rioting” remain a surplus population and one gang is just replaced by another. As Clover writes, these attempts at appeasement were possible because in the era of Keynesianism, i.e. the expansion of the mass of value, social programs were initiated and could take effect. This has now definitely come to an end: “One could perhaps imagine demands in the present that would, if met, alter in substance the circumstances of the excluded. But the swelling ranks of the excluded is the same fact as the inability to meet such demands—the two faces of crisis. Just as the U.S. can no longer deliver accumulation at a global level, and thus must order the world-system by coercion rather than consent, the state can no longer provide the kinds of concessions won by the Civil Rights movement, can no longer purchase the social peace. It is all sticks and no carrots. […] The prolongation of the riots and of their fury is doubtless a measure of social pressures building around racialized policing and around the immanent violence applied to the management of surplus populations in general. It is also a measure of the fading appeal of moderation and optimistic compliance. This approach still retains some charisma […]. At the same time, the argument that the bottomless violence and subordination is structural, and cannot be resolved either practically or theoretically through redistributive participation, grows ever harder to refute” (ibid., 186).

So if the compulsion remains that the surplus population must of necessity reproduce itself capitalistically, the crucial question is how to initiate material reproduction beyond wage labor and beyond “just” prices. It would be important to create a different kind of “public sphere” that interrupts the “normal course” and addresses precisely this. Public space and infrastructure occupations could be a means to this end (the latter are becoming increasingly important in the course of climate protests: from road blockades to the sabotage of pipelines a la Malm 2021). The aim would therefore be to break open the formal shell of the economy and politics, i.e. to transcend both the riot and the strike in order to develop the reproduction of society beyond wage labor and the market. Clover uses the “Commune” as an institutional metaphor for this (ibid., 187ff., on the Paris Commune see also Kurz 1999, 237ff.). However, the problem, as became clear during the Arab Spring and elsewhere, is that the addressee may remain the state due to a lack of alternatives, thus reproducing a problematic orientation towards the state. The tragedy of this is that at best a regime change is achieved, i.e. a replacement of the functional elites or gangs, without this changing the social situation of the surplus population in any way (not to mention the meaning and content of production and consumption).

The material side of all this shit, i.e. the fragmentation of the production of all the necessities of life across half the world, makes “appropriation” impossible. Even an alternative public sphere or a general interruption of normality will not be able to change this (at least not immediately or in the short term), although they could at least address the problem “on a large scale.”[5] Unfortunately, Clover does not elaborate on the “material” side in his book (which is undoubtedly very difficult and because no one really has definitive answers). In theoretical terms, and in practical terms too obviously, there is still much to be done. In any case, Joshua Clover’s book on riots (the next ones are sure to come) makes an important contribution to understanding this phenomenon and placing it in its historical context.

Literature

Armstrong, Amanda: Die vergessenen Massenstreiks – Zu “Riot.Strike.Riot” von Joshua Clover – eine Kritik, in: Analysis and Critique No. 670, 20.4.2021, https://www.akweb.de/bewegung/joshua-clover-kritik-riot-streik-strike/

Arps, Jan Ole; García Doell, David Ernesto: Riots für Kommunist*innen – Joshua Clover bietet eine Theorie des Aufstands – hilft das für die politische Praxis in Deutschland?, in: Analysis & Critique No. 669, 16.3.2021, https://www.akweb.de/bewegung/joshua-clover-theorie-aufstand-praxis-fuer-deutschland/

Collective of authors: “The situation is serious – time to strike,” in: Wildcat No. 111 (Spring 2023), 42-49.

Castel, Robert: Negative Discrimination: Youth Revolts in the Paris Banlieues, Hamburg 2009.

Clover, Joshua: Riot. Strike. Riot: The New Era of Uprisings, London 2016.

Konicz, Tomasz: No weather for climate protests, 2022, on exit-online.org.

Kurz, Robert: Das Weltkapital – Globalisierung und innere Schranken des modernen warenproduzierenden Systems, Berlin 2005.

Kurz, Robert: Geld ohne Wert – Grundrisse zur einer Transformation der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie, Berlin 2012.

Kurz, Robert: Schwarzbuch Kapitalismus – Ein Abgesang auf die Marktwirtschaft, Frankfurt 1999.

Kurz, Robert: Weltordnungskrieg – Das Ende der Souveränität und die Wandlungen des Imperialismus im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, 2nd edition, Springe 2021.

Malm, Andreas: How to Blow Up a Pipeline, London 2021.

Ming, Shi: Fierce storms, terrible waves – The CP leadership prepares for social upheaval, in: Le Monde Diplomatique 4/2023.

Scholz, Nina: Die wunden Punkte von Google, Amazon, Deutsche Wohnen & Co – Was tun gegen die Macht der Konzerne?, Berlin 2022.


[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Oury_Jalloh

[2] Aydemir, Fatma: Police violence in Germany, taz.de from 12.8.2022.

[3] This text was written at the beginning of 2023.

[4] See also: Feuerherdt, Alex: Das Volk gegen ein Prozent – Der Antisemitismus der “Occupy” -Bewegung, jungle.world from 1.12.2011.

[5] By this I do not mean the “state of exception,” which is merely a continuation of normality by other means, with the aim of establishing a capitalist normality at a higher level by force or keeping the surplus population in check (see Kurz 2021, 320ff.).

Populism for the Poor

A Polemic on the Post-Leftist Desire for self-deception in the midst of a manifest socio-ecological systemic crisis.

Tomasz Konicz

They are anything but modest when it comes to their ostentatiously displayed modesty. The leaders of the so-called “Left Party” (Partei dei Linke – hereinafter PDL), Ines Schwerdtner and Jan van Aken, gave up part of their salary in the fall of 2024 in order to receive the statistical German average wage from then on. They wanted to “change the world,” and an “average salary” was perfectly sufficient for this, whereas “exorbitant salaries would lead to exorbitant politics,” the party leaders explained with all due modesty to any media representatives who wanted to hear it.[1] The money saved would be donated, and special consultation hours would be set up at the party headquarters to help people in need. No concern was too small, party leader Schwerdtner asserted. Populism for the poor and disenfranchised of this late capitalist world, so to speak.

Of course, this populist idea of becoming the advocate of the “little man” did not grow on the dung heap at Karl Liebknecht House (to stay with the populist jargon). The original left-wing populist can be found in Austria and goes by the name of KPÖ. The website of the Communist Party of Austria in Graz states that – surprise, surprise – “exorbitant politicians’ salaries… lead to exorbitant politics.”[2] The KPÖ in Graz uses the money it collects in this way to help people in need – meticulous records are kept of this, and the relevant data is publicly available. The crucial difference to the PDL, however, is that the Austrian communists oblige all elected representatives to limit their salaries to the average wage of a skilled worker in order to be able to use these funds for social policy.

The KPÖ’s strategy should therefore be taken seriously. It is a form of left-wing populism that genuinely strives to help people in the midst of a manifest systemic crisis, while at the same time taking the wind out of the sails of opportunism within its own ranks. Because, let’s not kid ourselves, the salary cuts are primarily intended to deter careerists and their cliques, who have already taken over many left-wing projects as soon as they became successful – starting with the Fischer gang and the Greens. The PDL, on the other hand, is staging a populist charade that is only concerned with external impact and showmanship in order to achieve electoral success and lead as many of its old boy networks and Rackes as possible to well-paid feeding troughs (always stay populist!).

The difference between populism and melodrama lies precisely in the salary cap that would have to apply to the entire party, its apparatus, and above all to the foundation that misuses the name of Rosa Luxemburg in order to be taken seriously. This would actually add up to a considerable sum of money that could be used to help many people who have fallen on hard times during the crisis. In Graz alone, several million euros have already been raised in this way. If the Left Party were to introduce a similar salary cap for all office holders and employees, similar sums would be raised every month, which could actually be used to provide concrete help to a great many people in need – be it soup kitchens or food banks, which are now barely able to meet the growing demand.

The critique of German post-left populism, which has now become almost hegemonic, is thus a critique of this charade performed by actors hungry for power and position. After only a few months, the PDL’s electoral success is thus turning out to be a disaster for all that remains of the left in Germany.[3]

But even as a consistent, sincerely meant strategy, such as that pursued by the KPÖ, populism must be subjected to radical, fundamental critique, as its basic assumption is false. The voice of the people, the vox populi, which populism seeks to capture and transform into politics in order to assert the interests of the people, is preformed by late capitalist crisis ideology and how subjects are socialized in capitalist society. The internal interests articulated by populism are therefore an expression of adherence to a practice of false immediacy in the midst of the capitalist systemic crisis – that is, the doomed post-leftist effort to realize the political goals that impose themselves as “immediate” surface phenomena (welfare state, work, climate protection, democratization, etc.).[4]

Populism can therefore only operate within the framework of internal capitalist interests, which are subject to a crisis-induced process of erosion – and it merely parrots society’s brutalizing ideological self-image. The guiding principle of populist politics is thus not the harsh, uncomfortable reality of the crisis, but the false ideological illusion that the crisis produces through cultural-industrial mediation by means of the vox populi preformed by late capitalism. This is particularly devastating because of the rapidly unfolding systemic crisis, which has now also engulfed the core of the world system, and which makes a radical, transformative critique of late capitalist society, with its contradictions and prevailing crisis ideology, essential for survival—and not parroting it, as is characteristic of populism.[5]

This subjugation to the imperatives and “practical constraints” of the permanent crisis inherent in populism has now driven the imposition of a party foundation that has hijacked the name of Rosa Luxemburg (RLS) to the point of real satire. In its strategy paper entitled Linke Triggerpunkte (Left Trigger Points), the RLS simply argued that all issues that contradict the right-wing, pre-fascist hegemony in the FRG and would thus “trigger” right-wing reactions should be avoided. Don’t rock the boat, is the motto of the – well – Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. In particular, the issues of refugees and the climate crisis should be avoided so as not to alienate potential voters (and, by the way, this says it all about the crazy, old-left fixation on wage earners and “proletarians” as the “revolutionary subject,” who in fact, in their function as variable capital, act more as its last resort, as the RLS implicitly admits in its right-wing “strategy paper.”[6]

Ultimately, the aim is to avoid addressing the systemic crisis that is currently destroying the social and ecological foundations of civilization in order to remain compatible with late capitalist politics. And the PDL is sticking to this line. It is in fact an ideological declaration of surrender, with which the PDL simply enters into populist competition with the AfD, without even being able to conceive of a counter-principle to fascism in the manifest crisis. Other bogeymen are constructed (bigwigs, the rich), alternative historical periods are romanticized as a “golden age” (the “social market economy” of the second half of the 20th century) – and at the same time, any hint of radical, categorical criticism of the disintegrating foundations of late capitalism evaporates. Phrases and posturing take the place of critique. Women and men strike a Che Guevara pose when they demand higher tax rates for “fat cats.”

Wagenknecht’s Heirs

So what does the new German left-wing populism in the form of the PDL want? It wants to return to the past, back to the social market economy, to the Rhineland prosperity capitalism of the post-war period. The social question is at the center of populist propaganda. The Left Party strikes a pose as the advocate of the little people, demanding an expansion of the welfare state, higher taxes for the rich, and a greater role for the state in the economy—just as was the case in the economic miracle of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Not only strategically, but also in terms of content, the new left-wing populism thus turns out to be a mere copy of the policies of Sahra Wagenknecht and the National Socialist forces that formed the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW).[7] Ms. Wagenknecht explicitly formulated the crazy idea of being able to return to the second half of the 20th century by means of populist politics in her book Die Selbstgerechten (The Self-Righteous) shortly before the split.[8] The Left Party is the populist heir to Wagenknecht’s Querfront populism, pursuing left-wing conservative policies, to use Wagenknecht’s apt oxymoron, although the PDL at least refrains from parroting the crisis-induced rise in resentment, xenophobia, and racism that characterizes the BSW.

And the whole thing is obviously – to return to populist jargon once again – a single lie and a deception, a kind of popular deception committed by pseudo-populists, which the PDL performs with all its false immediacy. There is no going back to the social market economy; the clocks cannot be turned back. The crisis process stands in the way of this populist anachronism. The crisis as a fetishistic process, eating its way in fits and starts from the periphery to the centers, driven by the internal contradictions of capital, is now evident. Everything is obvious—and it is almost impressive to see the mental contortions the German post-left still manages to perform in order to ignore this evidence.

It is obvious: the trade wars that Trump started are the political consequence of deindustrialization in large parts of the United States, where the internal barrier of capital manifests itself.[9] The fetishistic self-movement of capital on a societal level, generated by competition between market subjects, becomes evident in the climate crisis.[10] There is no capitalist interest behind the fact that the compulsion to valorize will soon render entire regions of the world uninhabitable. The self-destructive irrationality of the capitalist system, which uses instrumental rationality to turn the whole world into material for its boundless valorization process, is self-explanatory when one takes a cursory look at global CO2 emissions.

No one wants a revolution; there is no revolutionary subject. That, too, is obvious. And yet – even though almost all sections of the population cling fiercely to its forms of socialization – the system is collapsing. It is the capitalist compulsion to valorize in its agony that calls the system into question by breaking down under its own contradictions – while left-wing populism wants to make everything a question of distribution and clings to a society in dissolution in a reactionary manner. The right wing is, in a sense, acting in a forward-looking manner; it wants barbarism, it wants collapse, in order to approach fascist madness in a cleansing steel storm – the populist left is acting conservatively, clinging to the ideologically distorted ideal images of economic miracle capitalism.

But there can be no welfare state in late capitalism, because the whole of society depends on the pot of the valorization process, quite prosaically in the form of taxes and wages. The PDL’s moronic drivel about the welfare state is a lie. When the valorization process stagnates or simply collapses, when the economy no longer “runs,” then everything else is also up for grabs. Redistribution does not help when the mass of valorized labor in commodity production melts away, when the valorization process destroys its ecological foundations.

There will also be no peace in collapsing late capitalism, as the increasing internal contradictions and ecological upheavals almost inevitably drive the state monsters into external expansion and military adventures. The arms build-up in the West is not only a reaction to Russian imperialism, which launched a war of aggression against Ukraine from a position of internal instability and geopolitical weakness.[11] Increasing resource bottlenecks and raw material shortages will make ordinary wars of plunder necessary again wherever the process of capital valorization, with its boundless hunger for resources, is to be maintained. Food supplies are at risk in the medium term, which is already reflected in corresponding inflation. A catastrophic major war is only a matter of time. In the dark present of the 21st century, there is only war.

Late capitalist democracy is also a thing of the past. In times of crisis, fascist tendencies inevitably gain the upper hand, together with an oligarchic brutalization of the increasingly authoritarian state apparatus. This is not a prediction for the future; it is already happening: in the US, in parts of Eastern Europe, and to some extent also in Germany. What’s more, fascism is the subjective agent of the objectively already unfolding systemic transformation into post-capitalist barbarism. The optimization of the valorization process, realized through democratic discourse, which constitutes the Orwellian essence of capitalist democracy, is turning into an objective tendency toward self-destruction in the manifest crisis of the system, whose subjective political actor is fascism.[12]

The Stepping Stones for the Stepping Stones

Almost everyone knows, really everyone suspects, that the system is coming to an end. And yet the populism of the Left Party, with its obvious fairy tales, is quite successful. The PDL’s deceivers of the people (always stay populist!), who pretend that the systemic crisis does not exist in order to throw social democratic sand in people’s eyes, are simply pursuing their own intra-capitalist interests. The populist question of cui bono, of “who benefits,” which inevitably turns into ideology when considering the irrational, fetishistic crisis process, is entirely appropriate in the autopsy of populism.

Redefining the systemic question as a question of distribution simply opens up career paths in politics. There is a concrete need for this. The ideological taboo of saying what is, of clearly naming the self-destruction of the system, must be maintained even in its agony. However, the basis of capitalist ideology production, the naturalization of capitalism, can hardly be maintained due to increasing upheavals. The false narratives of left-wing populism, according to which the excessive greed and lust for power of a class of sinister puppet masters and bigwigs are responsible for this, create ideological outlets that alleviate the pressure for legitimacy. There is nothing that a few new tax rates and economic shifts toward Keynesianism cannot fix, according to the implicit lie of left-wing populism. The seemingly radical pose and hollow rhetoric conceal the gulf between the reality of the crisis and the anachronistic postulates of the PDL.

The Greens have twisted the urgent insight into the capitalist climate crisis[13] into a commitment to “green capitalism,” while the Left Party is doing something similar with regard to the internal barriers of capital and their social consequences.[14] The PDL thus offers itself to the capitalist functional elites as crisis managers. And this is not done metaphorically, but quite concretely –visible to anyone who wants to see it. Any pseudo-radical rhetoric from prominent figures in the PDL melts away immediately as soon as there is even the slightest chance of participating in politics.

The TikTok product Heidi Reichinnek, for example, jumped on the anti-fascist wave of outrage in early 2025 that was triggered by the taboo-breaking of the then CDU top candidate Friedrich Merz in the heated election campaign phase when the CDU used the votes of the AfD to push through tightening of immigration laws.[15] At the time, the chairwoman of the Left Party group in the Bundestag said that Merz had left the democratic center and had the AfD in tow.[16]  Just a few months later, the same Heidi Reichinnek and her parliamentary group enabled the election of the same Friedrich Merz as chancellor, who committed the greatest fascist “taboo breach” in German postwar history.[17] This was accompanied by the most pitiful phrases: “End the chaos,” “always ready,” “for the good of the country and its people,” always “cooperation possible.” Reichinnek can simply rely on the fact that the memory of her TikTok fan swarm has to be measured in seconds.

Why did the PDL enable the early election of Merz as a stepping stone? Why did the PDL members of the Bundestag effectively act as stepping stones for the stepping stones? To demonstrate their reliability in the political arena, to prove that they can be a reliable partner in “cooperation” in capitalist crisis management. And this decision by the PDL not to stand in the way of German pre-fascism was recognized and appreciated, within narrow limits. The CDU’s decision on its incompatibility with the PDL has been made, and the FAZ, as a kind of late-capitalist Izvestia, basically the central organ of the Federal Republic’s functional elite, ran a headline after the chancellor election that said the “Left Party” was no longer “suitable as an bogeyman.”[18] The path to normalization, to ordinary participation, has been paved since the chancellor election – the PDL’s anti-fascist campaign slogans were the opportunistic sacrifice that the party, which hatched Wagenknecht, was only too willing to make.

The leading PDL cliques are, to stay with populist jargon, an abyss of cheap phrases and ass-kissing towards the functional elites wherever possible. And this post-leftist imposition wants to do nothing other than the political business that is oriented towards ordinary, worn-out crisis strategies. The reactionary state fetish that characterizes a large part of the German old left forms the perfect ideological springboard for career planning in crisis management, since the state moves into a central economic position in manifest crisis phases in order to support the stuttering valorization machine.

Dysfunctional Hyper-Opportunism

However, as mentioned above, there are strict limits to the PDL’s participation. In return for its parliamentary function as a stepping stone for Merz, the PDL faction expected not only the “normalization” of relations with the CDU, but also a seat on the secret service committee. Our Heidi Reichinnek, who made it possible to quickly elect a chancellor who had the “AfD in tow” in order to “avoid chaos” in Germany, wanted to be on this committee for one reason only: to prove her reliability, “for the good of the country,” etc., etc. Well, that was too much of a stepping stone for the CDU and SPD. The already pitiful calculation of getting into the intelligence committee by means of the chancellor election did not work out, as Reichinnek failed to obtain the necessary majority in June.[19]

But that does not deter the opportunistic participation mania of the power-hungry middle-class snobs with proletarian tendencies who make up the majority of the PDL’s old boy networks – on the contrary. Opportunism escalates into hyper-opportunism, it overturns itself, becomes dysfunctional, stands in its own way, negates itself, so to speak. It is opportunism without an opportunistic chance, without opportunity, which virtually takes control of the bullying machines at the top of the PDL: No one demanded it of her, there were no government posts in sight, and yet Ines Schwerdtner, the imposition at the top of the “Left Party,” demanded an increase in the retirement age in August 2025, while expressing the usual “concerns.”[20]

This was a populist cardinal sin committed here without cause, with Ms. Schwerdtner simply telling the truth: not regarding the retirement age, but with regard to the character of the PDL’s “left-wing populism,” which simply lies to people. As I said, they do not believe in the social demagoguery they spew in the systemic crisis. The populists of the PDL lie; it is not ignorance. Ms. Schwerdtner just wanted to be part of the reactionary debate on crisis management strategies in order to signal her “ability to govern.” And that contradicts not only the PDL’s anachronistic social welfare rhetoric, but also the populist credo and tactics of social demagoguery, which is based on sweet-talking people until you are in power – only to then forget your promises and betray your voters. Schwerdtner overshot the mark and had to be called back, although the PDL can probably rely on the short attention span of its Reddit and TikTok brigades.[21]

And that’s nothing new, really. The PDL already stumbled over its dysfunctional hyper-opportunism during the 2021 election campaign. The man who reverently knelt before Wolfgang Schäuble, Dietmar Bartsch, then the party’s top candidate, declared much of the painstakingly negotiated election program obsolete during the heated campaign phase because the competition criticized it.[22] Following criticism from the SPD and the Greens on a number of program points, Bartsch threw a good part of his party’s program overboard in order to demonstrate the party’s ability to govern in the middle of the election campaign – instead of doing so, as is customary with every other party, only in the event of possible coalitions after the election.[23] Despite the change in leadership, much of the old left has remained opportunistic. Hyper-opportunism can thus be defined as a thirst for power and career advancement that stands in its own way.

The proletarian streak of the “Left Party,” its ostentatious display of love for the working class, for wage earners, is a quirk of the middle-class snobs who make up the majority of the PDL leadership.[24]  The internal capitalist interests of wage earners, which this pseudo-populism purports to represent, will be betrayed at the earliest opportunity. No question about it. Ms. Schwerdtner’s love of work goes so far that she would like to see the working life extended – as long as Ms. Schwerdtner herself does not have to work, of course. After all, why shouldn’t we apply the same populist categories to Ms. Schwerdtner as she does to her political rivals?[25] To evaluate Schwerdtner on the basis of her own work ideology: here, a middle-class snob who has never really worked is calling for the extension of working life so that she can provide her political clique with jobs and money as quickly as possible.

And it is no coincidence that the traditional German work ethic, which Ms. Schwerdtner aggressively propagates, is at the heart of this populist taboo-breaking, which only provides a glimpse of this ragtag group’s possible participation in government. The state fetish of the German old left in and around the PDL – which is reinforced by objective state-capitalist crisis tendencies – is complemented by the German work ethic. It is a product of the old left’s belief in the proletariat as a “revolutionary subject,” as well as a central ideologeme of late capitalist crisis ideology, to which the PDL is attached.

Labor, however – leaving the populist rubbish behind – is the substance of capital. The outright hysteria surrounding work, the relentless agitation against everything that does not contribute to the process of capital valorization, are expressions of the crisis of this very process of valorization, which is driving it toward self-destruction. That is why, in times of crisis, the potentially murderous work ethic manifests itself again and again, to the point of forced labor and starvation – even in the 21st century.[26] Everything must become work because work itself is breaking down.[27] The PDL, with its populist hatred of “profiteers” and “parasites,” which stifled any radical critique, is only one post-leftist current of this crisis ideology.

The Regressive Desire for Self-Deception

The PDL can thus already be understood as a post-left formation; they are opportunistic barbarians who dwell in the ruins of past emancipatory attempts. The actual intra-capitalist interest that drives these populist cliques thus materializes in figures such as Schwerdtner or Reichinnek: It is the panicky urge to find a place in late capitalist crisis management in order to become its subject. This also explains the dysfunctional tendency toward hyper-opportunism –time is running out, and the systemic crisis, which these opportunists are dishonestly framing as a redistribution crisis, is progressing inexorably. And they sense that time is running out for them to still “find a place.” As a result, there are hardly any taboos, even without gratification: stepping stones are paved to the chancellorship, promises of a welfare state are turned on their head, etc. The ridiculousness of demanding marginal improvements to a system in open dissolution in the midst of a manifest socio-ecological systemic crisis is blatantly obvious.

But this does not explain the evident popularity of the PDL’s pseudo-populism, which has in fact long since become hegemonic in the German post-left. Its hypocrisy is evident: Germany’s post-left populists polemicize against fascist stooges in order to pave their way into the chancellery a few months later; they engage in social demagoguery, which they refute without any opportunistic motive by demanding an increase in the working life. These populist lies, which can be easily exposed, nevertheless find open ears and receptive minds. Many old leftists and broad sections of the population simply want to be deceived. There is a widespread desire for self-deception that cannot be explained simply by demagoguery or the hope of followers for a warm place in crisis management. This pseudo-populist filth is so successful because it appeals to a widespread, irrational need that is rampant in the manifest crisis of the system.

This irrational, dark need, which takes hold of the masses in the wake of the fully revealed irrationalism of capital, is best illuminated by the concept of regression. The fear-induced relapse into earlier stages of development, often used to ward off traumatic experiences, corresponds to a variety of reflexes of ideological defense against the crisis in the disintegrating political sphere. In this magical thinking, the global crisis of capital is to be banished by making perceiving, reflecting upon, or discussing it taboo. Concretely, this manifests itself in the struggle of the post- and old left against radical crisis theory. It is a kind of taboo that is being established, a compulsive unwillingness to know – which, in view of the manifest crisis and the openly apparent fetishism of capital[28] increasingly often turns into ridicule: for example, when young PDL members demand “justice in the climate collapse,”[29] or when left-leaning German comedians issue ultimatums to billionaires[30] to put an end to the crisis, while the latter have long since had their bunkers built.[31]

The post-left regression that drives the populism of the PDL and the disintegrating BSW is related to the explicitly reactionary aspirations of the right, which has also been expressed concretely in the querfront efforts of recent years.[32] However, this preconscious and unconscious crisis reflex goes beyond a merely political dimension. The crisis of capital also affects the subjects whose own constitution and socialization are shaped by late capitalism. What capital does to wage earners, their constitution as subjects, as citizens and market subjects, is on the verge of dissolution. And regression wants to cling to this, to late capitalist identity, which – by the way – also explains the rampant identity mania that is merely an expression of dissolving identities. When everything is in flux, when things are in motion, subjects cling to what they still have left – to the identity they acquired through their socialization, even if this is also eroding.

Radical crisis theory and the resulting transformative practice, the escape from the capitalist prison of thought, thus amounts to a necessary, painful break with identity. And it is precisely this break with capital that the old left refuses, as crisis theorist Robert Kurz already explained in his examination of anti-German ideology at the beginning of the 21st century:

The impending categorical break would be such a painful break with identity that the death throes of the old paradigm of critique consist primarily in devising avoidance strategies in this regard.”[33]

The post-left pseudo-populism of the PDL is thus not only an opportunistic career project in an era of open crisis management, it also builds on this unconscious crisis tendency toward regression, on the subjects’ fear of impending “loss of self,” so to speak. It is also a populism of the intellectually poor, to put it populistically. In this context, Robert Kurz spoke explicitly of a “reactionary longing for a return to the old familiar patterns of interpretation” in “large parts of the left.” The anachronistic talk of the welfare state, the zombie-like return of anti-imperialism in the form of post-colonialism, the praise of hard work in the face of the impending AI rationalization pushes, the ridiculous polemic about parasites and fat cats in the face of the manifest climate crisis – all these appeal to this regressive need among all the old leftists who have not yet openly defected to the right.[34]

The populist desire to march back into the idealized social market economy is merely a post-left expression of this general tendency toward regression, as exemplified by Wagenknecht.[35] It is literally an “avoidance strategy,” as Kurz put it. Or, to put it another way: the identitarian delusion – whether based on national or religious grounds – is an expression of clinging to late capitalist society, which shaped these identities through socialization.

And yet this regressive flight into identitarian delusion and class struggle stupidity will not stop the fetishistic march toward crisis. Every day, open crisis fetishism strikes a blow to the numb wannabe class warriors who can only smell sinister capitalist interests everywhere. It is obvious that the looming climate catastrophe, for example, also threatens to put an end to capital’s profiteering. The crisis will continue to unfold in its ecological and economic dimensions, even if populism and old-left dullness obscure or marginalize radical crisis theory. The fetishistic reality of the crisis cannot be mobbed away.

The categorical break that Robert Kurz predicted in his book Die antideutsche Ideologie [The Anti-German Ideology] is now very much on the agenda. Not because the fearful market subjects blinded by identity want it, but because it will inevitably take place in the course of the upcoming transformation of the system:

“On the historical agenda is the categorical break with the basic forms of the modern commodity-producing system as such, as announced by the concept of value criticism: the capital relation must be fundamentally criticized as value socialization. If, after the collapse of state socialism, the labor movement, and traditional Marxism, there is to be a renewed theoretical and practical critique of the ruling world system, its economic terror, its social impositions, and its processes of destruction, then this critique must become more radical; that is, unlike previous left-wing paradigms, it must go deeper, to the roots and to the categorical basis of commodity-producing modernity. This includes a critique of the fetishistic form of subject and interest, of ‘abstract labor,’ and of the democratic legal form: all of which are foreign concepts to the dying consciousness of the categorically immanent labor movement Marxism. Since one was oneself an integral part of the history of capitalist modernization, one cannot and does not want to break away from commodity-producing modernity.”[36]

Despite the ever-advancing dynamics of the crisis, nothing has changed in this regard over the past two decades. This old left is in fact the main disruptive factor in the establishment of a radical awareness of the crisis, which could only develop on the political left. Nowhere is this clearer than in the decaying products of “state socialism, the labor movement, and traditional Marxism,” which have taken on a populist form in the PDL – they are flesh from the ideological flesh of capital, its last resort in the disintegrating left, so to speak, which attempts to suppress any emancipatory impulse. Opportunistic calculation, old-left dullness, and general regression go hand in hand here.

Especially against the backdrop of the inevitable systemic crisis, which will necessarily lead to an open-ended systemic transformation, this post-left “identity populism” has a disastrous effect. Emancipation in crisis can only be the result of a consciously waged struggle for transformation.[37] On this point, Robert Kurz writes in The Anti-German Ideology:

“But that is precisely why the crisis leads to nothing but crisis, the failure of capital to function, and not to the self-evident demise of capital as a social relationship, as has become a false assumption in people’s minds. The crisis therefore never replaces emancipation, the emancipatory social movement, precisely because it is purely objective. Of course, there is no automatic, objective emancipation; that would be a contradiction in terms. And it is therefore completely open how people will react to crisis and collapse. In its objectivity, the absolute internal barrier of capital can become an external condition for emancipation as well as for social decay into barbarism, which capitalism has always carried within itself as a potentiality and as a manifestation.”[38]

The opportunistically motivated, regressive dullness propagated by the PDL within the dwindling German remnants of the left thus objectively blocks the necessary “categorical break with the basic forms of the modern commodity-producing system,” as Kurz put it.[39] This categorical break, however, would be a prerequisite for anemancipatory social movement” that would consciously wage social struggles as part of the objectively imminent struggle for transformation.[40]

Telling it like it is – clearly and publicly articulating the crisis and the necessity of overcoming capitalism in order to survive – seems hardly conceivable anymore in the populist morass that has spread throughout the remnants of the left in the wake of the PDL’s catastrophic election victory.[41] Instead of radical critique of the frothing identity and work mania, which are only expressions of the crisis of labor and the market subject, instead of a conscious, forward-looking search for emancipatory paths to transformation, the PDL is staging a backward-looking farce that is blatantly obvious in its regressive hypocrisy. Incidentally, the PDL’s ideological-identitarian blockade extends not only to the left-wing media landscape, which has been largely brought into line, but also to left-wing discussion forums and social networks, most of which are moderated by people who do not have to work because they are paid by the PDL – as parliamentary assistants, party employees, volunteers, interns, etc. The fundamental radical discourse, the understanding of emancipatory ways out of the impending catastrophe, is being cut off at its root.

Emancipation requires a radical, categorical break with value-based society, both ideologically and identitarily, as a precondition for emancipatory transformative practice – precisely because value-based society is breaking down due to its contradictions. Regression, the comfortable opportunistic path of the PDL, on the other hand, acts as one of the breeding grounds for fascism. Fascism is an extremism of the center, which drives precisely what it finds in the center in terms of ideology and identity to extremes in response to crises.

This regressive openness to the right, which drove Wagenknecht to leave the National Socialist Party, can currently be best demonstrated by the largest populist hollow body in the PDL, party leader Jan van Aken.[42] Van Aken has developed the habit of having posters made for himself[43] in order to sell himself as a tribune of the people in populist fashion.[44] Here, the right-wing degeneration of a simplified critique of capitalism becomes visible as if under a magnifying glass: praise for the hard work that “keeps the country running” goes hand in hand with the personification of the crisis in a “clique of millionaires.” Mr. van Aken, similar to his co-chair, is someone croaking the praises of work even though he has never had to “really work” in the populist sense.

As mentioned, labor is the substance of capital – the rampant work hysteria that is once again giving rise to forced labor in the FRG is an expression of the crisis of capital, which, with the impending AI rationalization push, threatens to finally rid itself of its own substance.[45] Emancipatory practice would consist in fighting for the end of compulsory labor and the realization of automation in a post-capitalist society emancipated from fetishism. The German work mania, which escalated during the last severe systemic crisis in the context of National Socialist extremism from the center to the Auschwitz motto “Arbeit macht Frei” [Work makes you free], is currently flaring up in response to the crisis in almost all political camps. Van Aken reproduces this work fetish in a post-leftist variant by contrasting the proletarian masses with a clique of parasites.

The discourse hegemony of fascism in the FRG becomes particularly visible when van Aken expresses anti-fascist views and unwittingly lapses into fascistoid critique of fascism, imagining fascism as a sinister elite conspiracy (“bigwigs”) directed against national labor, against – surprise – the “hard-working people.”[46] Workaholism, personification of the causes of crisis, conspiracy thinking – all on one poster whose simplified critique of capitalism could also be found on a Nazi poster, if only “bigwigs” were replaced with “Jews.” This has nothing to do with a critique of the actual dynamics of the crisis, which are actually causing the distribution struggles to escalate on the surface. This is not an expression of a counter-principle to fascism, but merely its populist rival.

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[1] https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/deutschland/linken-vorsitzende-schwerdtner-van-aken-gehalt-spende-100.html

[2] https://www.kpoe-graz.at/tag-der-offenen-konten-2023.phtml

[3] https://www.konicz.info/2025/03/23/alle-werden-wagenknecht/

[4] https://www.untergrund-blättle.ch/politik/theorie/emanzipation-in-der-krise-7306.html

[5] https://jungle.world/artikel/2025/14/autoland-ist-abgebrannt

[6] https://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/Studien/Studien_3-24_Linke_Triggerpunkte_web.pdf

[7] https://www.konicz.info/2025/03/23/alle-werden-wagenknecht/

[8] https://www.konicz.info/2021/06/29/schreiben-wie-ein-internettroll/

[9] https://exitinenglish.com/2025/06/06/trump-at-the-inner-barrier-of-capital/

[10] https://www.konicz.info/2022/01/14/die-klimakrise-und-die-aeusseren-grenzen-des-kapitals/

[11] https://www.akweb.de/politik/russland-ukraine-konflikt-kampf-auf-der-titanic/

[12] https://www.konicz.info/2024/01/13/e-book-faschismus-im-21-jahrhundert/

[13] https://www.konicz.info/2024/05/29/aktualisierte-neuausgabe-klimakiller-kapital/

[14] https://www.konicz.info/2025/11/01/understanding-jd-vance/

[15] https://www.konicz.info/2025/01/28/schwarz-brauner-durchbruch-in-der-heissen-wahlkampfphase/

[16] https://www.zdfheute.de/video/zdfheute-live/reichinnek-bundestag-redebeitrag-debatte-migrationsgesetz-video-100.html

[17] https://x.com/antonnft6/status/1919821830660976804

[18] https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/kommentar-zum-unvereinbarkeitsbeschluss-die-cdu-sollte-ihr-verhaeltnis-zur-linken-aendern-110466519.html

[19] https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/geheimdienst-gremium-reichinnek-afd-100.html

[20] https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Linken-Chefin-haelt-Erhoehung-des-Renteneintrittsalters-fuer-moeglich-article25948019.html

[21] https://www.zdfheute.de/politik/deutschland/rentenalter-linke-schwerdtner-aussage-korrektur-100.html

[22] https://www.wsws.org/de/articles/2024/01/04/link-j04.html

[23] https://www.konicz.info/2021/09/24/linkspartei-wagenknecht-statt-kampf-um-emanzipation/

[24] Workers are so underrepresented that the party had to introduce a quota in 2025. https://www.freitag.de/autoren/sebastian-baehr/die-linkspartei-will-eine-arbeiterquote-einfuehren-kann-das-klappen

[25] https://x.com/fr_dr_kniffel/status/1992268626490269713

[26] https://www.konicz.info/2013/03/15/happy-birthday-schweinesystem/

[27] https://exitinenglish.com/2025/06/06/trump-at-the-inner-barrier-of-capital/

[28] https://exitinenglish.com/2023/01/23/the-subjectless-rule-of-capital/

[29] https://x.com/tkonicz/status/1992636311359172882

[30] https://x.com/tkonicz/status/1928306598717403243

[31] https://konicz.substack.com/p/the-exodus-of-the-money-people

[32] https://www.konicz.info/2024/06/06/linkspartei-querfrontschrecken-ohne-ende/

[33] Robert Kurz, Die antideutsche Ideologie, Vom Antifaschismus zum Krisenimperialismus: Kritik des neuesten linksdeutschen Sektenwesens in seinen theoretischen Propheten, Münster, 2003, p. 14.

[34] https://exitinenglish.com/2024/08/03/ai-the-final-boost-to-automation/

[35] https://exitinenglish.com/2024/08/10/the-great-regression/

[36] Robert Kurz, Die antideutsche Ideologie, Vom Antifaschismus zum Krisenimperialismus: Kritik des neuesten linksdeutschen Sektenwesens in seinen theoretischen Propheten, Münster, 2003, p. 14f.

[37] https://exitinenglish.com/2023/02/22/emancipation-in-crisis/

[38] Robert Kurz, Die antideutsche Ideologie, Vom Antifaschismus zum Krisenimperialismus: Kritik des neuesten linksdeutschen Sektenwesens in seinen theoretischen Propheten, Münster, 2003, p. 227.

[39] In the US, the Democratic Socialists of America and the regressive rag Jacobin fulfill a similar crisis-ideological function.

[40] https://www.untergrund-blättle.ch/politik/theorie/den-transformationskampf-aufnehmen-fuer-ein-kaempferisches-krisenbewusstsein-009092.html

[41] https://www.konicz.info/2025/03/23/alle-werden-wagenknecht/

[42] https://x.com/tkonicz/status/1995044050798612824

[43] https://x.com/tkonicz/status/1995108620632002741

[44] https://x.com/tkonicz/status/1995110373213536561

[45] https://exitinenglish.com/2024/08/03/ai-the-final-boost-to-automation/

[46] https://x.com/tkonicz/status/1995107787139936504/photo/1

Originally published on konicz.info on 11/30/2025

The Aesthetics of Modernization

From Detachment to the Negative Integration of Art

Robert Kurz

The separation of life and art is an old theme of modernity. All artists who want to express a truth and who consume themselves existentially in their creations have always suffered from this separation. Whether art shows well-proportioned beauty or, conversely, the aesthetics of ugliness in its various representations, whether it criticizes society or seeks to rediscover the wealth of forms in nature, whether it is realistically or fantastically oriented: it always remains separated from everyday life and thus from social reality as if by a glass but impenetrable wall. Artistic creations are either ignored or they are world-famous as museum objects, dead before they are even born. The artist thus resembles a figure from the tragedies of antiquity: just as water and fruit forever recede before the thirsty Tantalus, so life recedes before him; just as King Midas had to starve to death because all objects turned to gold under his touch, so the artist as a social being must starve to death because all objects turn into pure exhibits under his touch; and like Sisyphus, he always rolls his stone in vain – his work remains disconnected from the world.

All attempts by art to break out of its glass ghetto have failed. Sculptures set up in factories and paintings on the walls of offices remained foreign bodies; literary readings in churches or schools never got beyond the character of compulsory events. When the Dadaists resorted to provocation out of desperation and dragged toilet bowls or rusty iron pipes into the sacred halls of art to mock the bourgeoisie, this offer was accepted with animal seriousness as an art object and cataloged like Michelangelo’s sculptures or Picasso’s paintings. The tautological definition is: art is everything that society perceives a priori in a separate space, in a reservation called “art,” and which, therefore, in its impregnated artistic objecthood, can be collected independently of any content, like stamps or insects. It doesn’t matter what the art wants and how it presents this, its effects are always defused and trivialized. For the capitalist elites, the artist is not even a court jester, but at best a special supplier like the wine merchant or the confectioner. You wouldn’t buy a used car from him, and you wouldn’t want him to be your son-in-law. At least that is his status in classical modernity.

Modern society has always seen its own mode of existence and its categories as supra-historical and universally human. If there is something rotten and actually unbearable about this system, then it is never supposed to be a historical problem that can be overcome through critique, but always an irrevocable condition of existence per se, which humanity unfortunately has to live with. Modernism also perceives the dilemma of the separateness of art and life through this lens of false ontologization. People pretend that in ancient Greece the artist was just as much a seller of his possibilities as he is today and that even the ancient Egyptians exhibited their images of the gods in galleries and museums or put price tags on them at auctions.

But in ancient civilizations there was no separate social department called “art” or “culture” in the sense that we understand them today. The modern structure of separate and mutually independent spheres, which also determines our language and our thinking, was completely alien to all earlier societies. Whatever human deficits, problems and social power relations they had, they did not divide their existence into separate functional areas. Such a division of social life only developed when the so-called economy was detached from the rest of life in the modern era; an elementary change that cannot be emphasized enough. Recent systems theory regards this as “progress” and the previous state of humanity as a lack of “differentiation,” axiomatically assuming a measure of primitiveness: The more integrated a society is through an overarching cultural context, the more primitive it is from this perspective; and conversely, the more “differentiated” a society is, the more it has split into separate spheres (based on the independence of the capitalist economy), the more “developed” it appears and the more “opportunities” it supposedly offers. This way of thinking has become so self-evident that it no longer seems absurd to see the highest achievement of social evolution in the fact that the functionally reduced human being only represents an intersection of systemic structures.

In reality, however, pre-modern civilizations were not primitive, but highly differentiated; only this kind of differentiation does not correspond to the concept of it accepted today. The old, predominantly agrarian societies did not have a culture, in the way that one “has” an external and random object, but they were a culture. This is even expressed in our scientific language, albeit most of the time unconsciously: we readily speak of the “culture” of ancient Egypt, antiquity, the Middle Ages, etc. and, as a rule, we indicate in this way both the special artifacts and artistic representations of sculpture, painting or literature and, on the other hand, the respective civilization, accompanied by its social structure and its relationship to the world in general. On the other hand, when we talk about “modern culture,” we only mean that particular aspect of artistic forms of expression that have been relegated to a separate sphere and never the social context as a whole. So we unconsciously “know” that culture used to be the whole and not a functionally separate sphere for the edification of the money-earning individual on his Sunday trips to the museum.

In fact, the Latin word “cultus,” from which our concept of culture derives, means both “planting” and “agriculture” as well as “worship,” “way of life,” “sociality,” “education” and even “clothing” (for certain occasions). This multi-layered terminology points to the culturally integrated character of ancient agrarian civilizations. The differentiated contents and forms of both their “metabolism with nature” (Marx) and their social relations and aesthetics did not fall apart as “subsystems,” each with its “own logic,” but were always only different aspects of a single and coherent cultural mode of existence. In modern terms, the description of this culturally integrated existence must sound confusing: production was aesthetic, aesthetics was religious, religion was political, politics was cultural and culture was social. In other words, the social aspects that are distinct for us were intertwined, and each area of life was to a certain extent contained in every other.

One might perhaps be tempted to speak of these agrarian cultures as religiously constituted, because religion was apparently the strongest integrative element of such a “society as culture.” It is well known that not only all kinds of artistic crafts, but also the theater and sporting competitions emerged from cultic acts; more precisely: they were cultic acts of a special kind. But even the quite ordinary activities of everyday life had a fundamentally cultic character; even humor and irony were cultically integrated. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to single out “religion” as the systemically defining moment of such societies, because in doing so we are already thinking of our functional concept of separate spheres. But religion was not a religion in the modern sense either, not a mere “belief,” not a limited opportunity for transcendental thoughts, and certainly not a “private matter.”

We must therefore not simply imagine the religious character of ancient cultures as a restrictive, irrationally coercive relation. The religious was at the same time the public, the so-called politics, the form of debate. It is not for nothing that the Latin word “privatus” has a rather negative, derogatory meaning, which becomes even clearer for us when we look at the corresponding ancient Greek term: there, the “privatus,” who does not participate in public life on a daily basis and as a matter of course, is the idiot. The fact that the religious aspect is both the form of public life and encompasses the whole of everyday life is not, however, an index of the limitations of this society, as the ideology of modern self-legitimization claims. Conversely, it could just as well be said that such a civilization had much more publicity and debate than the modern system, in which most of society’s affairs are settled automatically and without debate through the mechanics of the “detached” economy. Whichever way we look at it, our modern self-image does not allow us to come to terms with the existence of a culturally integrated society. We have no concepts for it.

This modern blindness to the character of pre-modern conditions has created yet another major misunderstanding. At the center of what we call “religion” is basically, in all cultures, the problem of human mortality and death as a process, event and “goal of life.” Along with religion, modernity has also relegated death to a special functional sphere, thus separating it from life just like it has done to art. In this way, the modern secularization of society did not lead to a different and possibly more reflective approach to death, but rather to its being repressed and ignored. What religion had meant in the old societies was not overcome and positively abolished, but merely functionally reduced to an irrational remnant for the private sensibilities of the abstract individual. With regard to bodily mortality, modernity went even further: just as old people who have become “useless” for capitalist reproduction appear even to their own children as mere “waste” and are locked away in institutions separated from normal life, the dead are also “disposed of” like garbage and industrial scrap.

Once modernity had repressed death, it could only understand the earlier integration of life and death as a frightening “fixation on death.” The fact that the ancient Egyptians attached so much importance to their tombs and to embalming the dead is usually interpreted as a sinister death cult, as if they had been preoccupied with nothing else. Modern man is even more disgusted by the widespread Neolithic custom of burying the bones of the dead in the middle of the house under the fireplace. In reality, all these people must have been extremely fun-loving, as ancient studies can now prove in many respects. The natural integration of death into everyday life only seems strange to us because the problem of our own mortality has been “outsourced” to a place that is invisible in ordinary life. Various cultural critics have repeatedly made this separation of life and death, as well as the separation of art and life, an agonizing topic in the history of modernization, without, however, ever radically criticizing the underlying social structure.

 In a “society as culture,” which was even capable of integrating death, “art” was necessarily always part of everyday life and was therefore completely unthinkable as an exhibit of a sterilized and dead sphere “behind glass.” But that is precisely why it was not art as art, but a specific moment in an integrated social context. The “artist” could therefore only be an artist and be recognized in the sense of a technical ability, but not as a social representative of “the” art. The problem of functional divisions, which so preoccupies modernity, arose with it in the first place and could not even have been formulated before. The question therefore arises as to where this systemic “differentiation” actually comes from.

The process of modernization has by no means divided up society evenly and equally. Rather, a certain aspect of human reproduction, namely the so-called economy, was split off from all other aspects and from life in general. It is therefore no more possible to speak of an economy in our sense of the word for the ancient agrarian civilizations than it is to speak of an art or religion, even though the term originates from antiquity. However, while in ancient Greece, as in all pre-modern civilizations, “oikonomia” was a household economy in an integrated cultural context, a factual prerequisite and a means for cultic and thus social or aesthetic purposes, in the modern age it developed into an absurd end in itself and the central content of society. Money, as capital, was coupled back onto itself and thus became a blind “automatic subject” (Karl Marx) that is eerily presupposed for all human and cultural purposes.

As this “valorization of value” (Karl Marx) or abstract economic profit maximization split off from life as a dynamic end in itself, a separate, independent “functional sphere” emerged for the first time, like a foreign body in society, which began to rise to dominance and become the center. And it was only the existence of this detached and simultaneously dominant sector that made all other aspects of social reproduction left over from the capitalist economy appear as separate “subsystems,” that are, however, without exception of merely secondary importance and subordinate to the assumed economic end in itself.

Under the dictates of the independent economy, productive activity has mutated into abstract “labor” in an alienated functional space separate from life, which is only regulated secondarily and under the compulsion of its own uncontrollable “system legality” by the equally separate special sphere of politics. Such a “politics” split off from the culturally integrated society must therefore have been just as unknown to pre-modern civilizations as the “disembedded economy” (Karl Polanyi) of the capitalist self-purpose and the corresponding positive concept of abstract “labor” outside an integrated context of life. Modern politics and the associated institutions of the state and law cannot be equated with the apparently corresponding pre-modern institutions, which, just like “religion,” did not have the character of separate functional sectors. Only in the process of modern social disintegration through the “disembedded economy” did politics, the state and law emerge as complementary “subsystems” of the second order and thus as the first servants (ministers!) of the mute a priori of the capitalist economy.

When the central content and purpose of society has become a split off end in itself, then life must necessarily sink to a mere remnant. Expressions of life beyond the systemic divisions and complementary functional spheres of market and state, economy and politics, competition and law have been degraded to the residual waste of “leisure”; and somewhere in relation to this diffuse remnant, not only religion but also art and culture are located in a special sphere. All things that were once crucially important to people, all existential questions, all associated aesthetic purposes and forms of expression have become this meaningless “remnant” and their representatives have to scramble for the crumbs that fall from the table of monstrous self-purpose.

The situation of art and aesthetics in general is particularly absurd. Although every manifestation of life in itself always has an aesthetic moment for humans, capitalism has negated this elementary fact and separated aesthetics into a separate space, just like all other moments. “Work” is not aesthetic, the economy is not aesthetic, politics is not aesthetic; only aesthetics is aesthetic. It is as if the aesthetics of things lead an abstracted, ghostly existence of their own alongside things; just as the social nature of products leads an abstracted, separate existence alongside the products in the abstract form of money, which has become an end in itself, and abstract formal logic, as the “money of the mind” (Marx), becomes independent and stands alongside the concrete logic of real relationships.

The modern artist’s glass prison consists precisely in this structural separation of the aesthetic. Art flounders helplessly back and forth in this prison; it is no longer the artistic form of a social content, but a dissociated “formality” – either form without content or content as mere form. Art must therefore ape the end in itself of capital, which, as an abstract form (money) that feeds back on itself, would prefer to emancipate itself from any material content, without ever being able to realize this absurdity. “Art for art’s sake” is only the culmination of art as an involuntary caricature of capital, without being able to solve the dilemma at the heart of the capitalist system.

But if, through its own distress, it has become a delusional, self-obsessed end in itself, art, in its unreconciled separateness, can give rise to social hubris: Instead of understanding itself as the product of a system of divisions and mobilizing the radical critique of this destructive self-serving structure, art begins to “aestheticize” the division itself and its functionalist manifestations. Not only its own dilemma becomes an aesthetic subject, but also the glaring capitalist schizophrenia as a whole. However, if the capitalist structure is not criticized but aestheticized, then bodies torn apart by grenades, raped women, starving children and the obscenity of power can also appear as merely aesthetic objects. The detached aesthetic does not return to the social content, but only illuminates it in cynical reflection. An “aestheticization of politics” within the unresolved capitalist system thus leads not to emancipation, but directly to barbarism. Aesthetically staged politics was the secret of fascism’s success and Hitler was the prototype of the artist as politician, who did not reintegrate the separate spheres but stylized their disintegration into a bloody Gesamtkunstwerk.

The precarious situation of art in the capitalist structure of divisions also has a gendered aspect. In order for the “disembedded economy” of capitalist self-purpose to establish itself at all and produce the modern separation of spheres, an elementary precondition was necessary: Everything that was not absorbed into this system of divisions had to be primarily dissociated in its turn. And these were those aspects of life that were once culturally integrated but were then shifted onto modern women: family, “housework,” childcare, caregiving, “love,” etc., along with their associated characteristics. This also included a supposed special receptivity to aesthetics: women, as “natural beauties,” adorn themselves and the homes of their loved ones. This social space, which could not be completely absorbed by capitalist structures but nevertheless remained necessary for human reproduction, emerged as a separate kind of privacy in contrast to the entire social structure of capital and the internal divisions it contained. A paradoxical “separation from the overall system of divisions” (Roswitha Scholz) thus emerged, which forms its “dark reverse side” and is connoted as “female,” while, conversely, the official system as a whole is occupied and dominated by “masculine” elements.

This realization of the elementary and primary gendered dissociation, which emerged from feminist critique, points to a peculiar gendered relationship between the private and public spheres, which also affects the detached aesthetic sphere of art and culture. In the culturally integrated pre-modern societies, there were indeed strong patriarchal moments, but not in the “differentiated” and exaggerated modern form. The culturally integrated differentiation, for which we no longer have terms, did not separate “privacy” and “publicity” in the way we understand them today. In modern terms, much of what is considered private today was public, and vice versa; insofar as the public sphere was “male,” it remained limited, or there were “male” and “female” public spheres simultaneously and in parallel in the cultural context.

The paradoxical forms of disintegration based on the “disembedded economy,” however, have gendered the public and private spheres in a twofold way. On the one hand, there is the intimate space of privacy, in which “the woman” is the so-called fairer sex and at the same time responsible for the warmth of the nest, the comfort of the master, loving care, etc. – and for this very reason is considered inferior and “weak of spirit.” In contrast to this inferior private sphere, the entire system of capitalism with the “disembedded economy” at the top appears as the “masculine” sphere of bourgeois public life and as society proper. On the other hand, there is also a second internal split between the private and public spheres within this official “male” structure: absurdly, the activity for the subjectless end in itself of the system appears here as the “male” private sphere of the capitalist subject with specific interests, the “homo economicus” and money earner, while the complementary sphere of politics, which is also “male,” is defined as the public sphere. And the dissociated sphere of aesthetics or art and culture is merely an extension of this internal public sphere within the “male” capitalist pseudo-universe.

Therefore, “the artist” is in principle a male being within the capitalist public sphere, albeit in a particularly precarious place. There are also female artists, just as there are female politicians, entrepreneurs, scientists, etc. – but firstly, they are merely exceptions that prove the sociological rule; and secondly, they always have to adapt to the “male” rules of the game, which only proves that these are not biological conditions, but socio-historical attributions. The structurally “male” artist in his glass cage of dissociated aesthetics becomes a particularly schizophrenic being: On the one hand, he is a thoroughly capitalist “man” and moneymaker who rests on bourgeois privacy of the first order and needs “the woman” as an inferior caregiver in the background like any ordinary car salesman. On the other hand, within the “male” bourgeois public sphere, he represents a dissociated “female” element in the form of aesthetics itself, which is not absorbed into the functionalist system but is nevertheless part of the capitalist public sphere.

Only in the form of detached, sterile, museum-like art objecthoods can the “feminine” appear within the male pseudo-universe. The artist is thus the capitalist man who is the only one allowed to show his female side and even be homosexual if necessary – but only as the social aberration of the narcissistically self-centered aesthetic, who also robs “the woman” of her ascribed attributes and is thus the superman precisely because he even incorporates the “feminine” in a masculine way and degrades “the woman” as a model, object, or muse to a mere object of beauty. At the same time, however, bourgeois society chalks up his representation of the feminine in the masculine as a shortcoming and the “feminine inferiority” rubs off on him, so that he is regarded by his fellow car salesmen as a social exotic and is not really taken seriously.

However, this structure of divisions, which is the essence of modernity, is already perceived as a historical past. The capitalist dynamic has blown up its own social form and yet continues to proceed unabated. Mass culture and new media seem to level out the systemic “differentiation”: What critics denounced half a century ago as the “culture industry” (Adorno) is now celebrated by postmodernists as the reintegration of art and life. Mediatization is seen per se as emancipation from the constraints of capitalist reality; the world is declared to be a digital game. Everywhere is teeming with “opportunities” that can be seized in the spirit of media “democratization.” And in the amusing habitual masquerade of the sexes, the brave new postmodern world believes it has also overcome gender inequality. The transvestite is almost being proclaimed the new revolutionary subject.

The rhetoric of opportunity in postmodern cultural professional optimism, even if it sometimes presents itself as radical left-wing, is suspiciously reminiscent of the Orwellian language of neoliberal economists. In fact, it is not art that is returning to society as “democratic mass culture” but, conversely, the market is overstepping its boundaries and renewing its claim to totality harder than ever. Once the capitalist economy had detached from the cultural context of life and transformed its remnants into separate subsystems, its dynamics could not remain in this state of disintegration. While the sectors of art and culture, sport, religion, “leisure” etc. initially seemed to be able to assert a certain logic of their own against the dominant system of the “disembedded economy,” they are now being successively “economized” themselves.

These areas were dependent and secondary from the outset: if the structuring social context of society is determined by the end in itself of money, then priests, athletes, and artists must also “earn money,” whether directly as sellers in the market or indirectly through the state’s siphoning of money from market processes. But for a long time, this dependence was only external. As long as art was not subject to the economic laws of the market in its own production, it could not yet be a completely capitalist commodity, but only became so retrospectively in circulation. But the capitalist end in itself is as voracious as it is insatiable, and so it ultimately had to devour the already mutilated remnants of life: the detached art and culture as well as the meager “leisure time” and limited family intimacy.

Art only returns to life to the extent that life has already dissolved into the economy. Now art no longer has an existence of its own, not even as a sphere of a separate aesthetic, but has itself become a direct economic object and therefore its production is already taking place with a view towards how it can be marketed. In the boundless capitalism of the late 20th century, all objects in the world and in life no longer have any intrinsic qualitative value, but only the economic value conferred on them by their marketability.

What postmodernism would like to see as an emancipatory opportunity for art in capitalist mass culture is in reality its destruction. If the “cheerful positivists” (Michel Foucault) of postmodernism today want to place this prophetic insight of Adorno in the vicinity of conservative cultural pessimism, then they are only proving that they themselves have capitulated unconditionally to the economic imperative and are no less affirmative than the conservative pseudo-critics. If conservative cultural pessimism criticizes the destruction of art by the capitalist culture industry only from the point of view of its own past, when it was still a self-purposeful aesthetic in classical modernism, postmodernism twists the final push of the dissolution of art into economics into its re-appropriation by society. And while conservative cultural criticism mourns the bourgeois family and the elitist subjects of the old educated bourgeoisie, postmodernism misjudges the lonely media misery of the atomized “decentered subject” as an emancipatory spring. Some cling to the capitalist past, others to the capitalist present, both deny a new perspective for the anti-capitalist future.

Men and women, artists and car salesmen have become identical today only insofar as they have
all assumed the same empty identity of “homo economicus” and are no longer themselves as will-less agents of the “automatic subject.” The “differentiation” of sectorally split subjectivities is crushed by the market economy until everyone is a kind of car salesman, no matter what they do. The naïve belief in the cultural-industrial postmodern consumer democracy is disgraced under the dictatorship of capitalist supply. The culture industry is therefore not to be criticized because it is mass culture, but because it is absorbed in the alienated form of the “disembedded economy.” Its aesthetics are not the aesthetics of man, but the aesthetics of the commodity.

In the democracy of commodities, people as human beings no longer have anything to say. The aesthetics of commodities does not integrate the disintegrated individuals, but the commodities as ghostly pseudo-subjects. It is not the aesthetic form of a content, but the “design” of economic abstraction. This final stage of modern aesthetics can be described on several levels:

  • Firstly, it is an aesthetics of particularism. Contexts and connections are not taken into account. It ignores the fact that the whole is more and something qualitatively different than the sum of its parts. The design is the glittering aesthetics of the abstract single commodity for the consumption of the abstract single individual, while the whole of the landscape, the cities and the social space is transformed into a stinking garbage dump.
  • Secondly, this design corresponds to an aesthetic of arbitrariness. Form and content no longer have any relationship to each other, because the content itself is redefined as form. Capital is indifferent as to whether it valorizes itself through the production of pig carcasses, anti-personnel mines or laxatives. Art, which has been economized into design, must be just as indifferent to what it produces – if only it presents itself as marketable and capable of being staged in the media. This eliminates any yardstick. While conscious cultural integration must always develop standards, even if it is aware of their relativity and can change them, commodity aesthetics is a priori without standards – in keeping with the postmodern “decentered subject,” who literally “doesn’t care about anything.” A world without standards, which makes everything indifferent, can only produce one thing: endless boredom.
  • Thirdly, art and culture degraded to the design of the commodity world proves to be the aesthetics of simulation. The crazy postmodern idea of a media-induced de-realization of reality (Jean Baudrillard et al.) is only too eager to believe in the appearance of design because it produces it itself. Media simulation attempts to build a parallel virtual and dematerialized world in which capitalism no longer faces any natural or social barriers and the growth of the “disembedded economy” can continue indefinitely. In economic terms, the virtual illusory worlds of the media correspond to the casino capitalism of the last 15 years: the decoupled financial markets simulate an accumulation of capital that has long had no real economic ground under its feet. Capitalism continues to run on air, so to speak, after it has crossed the edge of the abyss. In this economic milieu of “fictitious capital” (Karl Marx) of stock market booms, debt, gambling, and “risk” sociology (Ulrich Beck), a zeitgeist has developed that wants to cover up the intolerability of capitalist impositions by “pretending.” In the simulative pose of media self-aestheticization, individuals act “as if” they were competent, successful, beautiful and reflective, while their real social relationships collapse.

Particularism, arbitrariness, and simulation reveal that destroyed art, through its mutation into commodity aesthetics, is only negatively integrated into a social life that is no longer life at all. The old problem of the separation of art and life has not been solved, but has become irrelevant because social man himself has become irrelevant. But even this irrelevance proves to be mere appearance, in which the “automatic subject” creates illusions about itself in people’s minds, so to speak. Capitalist reality must be de-realized because it has reached the absolute end of its development without any way out, while systemically conditioned people refuse to acknowledge this historical crisis. But behind the smooth design of commodity aesthetics, its true negative existence is relentlessly revealed. They cannot escape their real suffering, even if they try to de-realize themselves through the media.

The “disembedded economy” can only ever integrate itself tautologically into itself, but its claim to smooth totalization must fail, because although it can make real, sensual life negative it cannot incorporate it into its surreal world of independent abstractions – just as it is incapable of de-realizing death. The repressed does not return; it is always already there. Only on the surface of the design does the system of divisions appear to be dissolved into the economization of the world. Behind this appearance, however, the disintegrated real world becomes unbearable. Just as gender dissociation does not disappear in travesty, but rather the postmodern “feralization of patriarchy” (Roswitha Scholz) continues to shift the burdens of the social crisis primarily onto women even after the decomposition of the bourgeois family, the aesthetic misery of the functionalist world does not disappear in commodity-aesthetic design, but emerges all the more starkly in the desolation of economized public spaces.

When the real crisis can no longer be suppressed, media de-realization proceeds to “aestheticize” the unconquered and painfully perceived misery, even if this aestheticization of the crisis no longer takes on the political forms of the 1930s, but even appears “economized” in politics itself. But the motifs of fascism grin out of the commercial, commodity-aesthetic mediatization of poverty, violence and the degeneration of gender relations. The aesthetics of media de-realization and boundless arbitrariness is the aesthetics of civil war and barbarism, because they ultimately eliminate civilizational inhibitions.

There can be no return to classical modernism, just as there can be no return to the old agrarian forms of culturally integrated society. But continuing to live in capitalist disintegration is just as impossible. Art, too, can only positively transcend itself by consciously becoming the moment of a new social movement that goes beyond the old workers’ movement Marxism and exposes the root that has produced the system of divisions and functional separations. Cultural integration of society on a new, higher level of development will only be possible if the self-purpose of the economy is broken and the basic gender dissociation is abolished. The prerequisite for a new emancipatory debate today is self-defense against the capitalist economization of the world.

Originally published on exit-online.org on 01/11/2002

The State of Feminist Theory

“Sexism is once again being declared a secondary contradiction”

Konkret: Your new book is called Back to the Roots.

Roswitha Scholz: As the subtitle suggests, the title refers to the regression in Marxist-feminist theory formation, or rather in left-wing theory formation as a whole, since this often forms the basis for feminist theories. And here we can observe a return to the old Marxism of the labor movement with class struggle and labor ontology, and to the hard-working and willing average citizen. There is an attempt to explain sexism, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Gypsyism, homophobia, and transphobia simply in terms of class conflict. That, in a nutshell, is my criticism of current left-wing theory.

How did this regression come about?

This is taking place against the backdrop of general regression in global society—the shift to the right, the turn to nationalism, the nationalization of capital through tariffs, and so on, which are responses to the failure of globalization, even though it is clear that this will not work and will only exacerbate the crisis. The left’s return to class struggle Marxism and the ontology of labor must also be seen against this backdrop. It is a reflex response to these crisis-ridden social conditions and the left-wing counterpart to right-wing regression.

So what is the problem with the concept of class?

The problem with the concept of class is that it no longer applies today. The concept of class as found in Marx’s work can no longer accurately describe current conditions, because society has evolved from an industrial society to a service society with a broad middle class. The central cause of the regression lies here: in the middle classes’ fear of social decline. In this context, Marx speaks of a dynamic contradiction: as productive forces develop, more and more jobs are being rationalized away, while production output is increased. The key point here is that abstract labor is not something ontological, but rather a historical product of capitalism and patriarchy that must be questioned. Therefore, workers can no longer be the ones to whom one simply appeals.

Were they ever?

That’s precisely the joke. As we know, the proletariat also veered toward fascism, as early as the 1930s. Marx’s entire concept of class in and of itself has been thoroughly discredited. And it continues to be discredited today. One could refer back to the Frankfurt School, where Dialectic of Enlightenment states that in the course of self-preservation, humans become amphibians. In other words, they become stimulus-response beings who no longer question their existence and instead just conform to their circumstances.

And what is the problem with Marxist-feminist analysis?

Take, for example, Lise Vogel’s Social Reproduction Theory. The book was published back in 1983, but is currently the subject of heated debate. Vogel takes Marx as he is – that is, the class struggle Marx, not my fetish Marx – and then simply paints the sphere of reproduction in feminist colors. What she does not do is to conceive of women as the other, as active participants in an undervalued sphere of reproduction. For me, this other encompasses the socio-psychological aspect: that is, the split within the male subject, which designates female characteristics as inferior, and the fact that this can also be demonstrated in scientific, theological, and philosophical discourses. Furthermore, value-dissociation is a process. In the past, there was a polarization of gender characteristics: men were rational with a strong superego, and women were emotional and sensual, and so on. But that has not remained the case. Since the 1970s, more and more women have been entering the workforce and the level of education has risen. Today, more women than men graduate from high school. They are no longer considered just housewives, but, as Regina Becker-Schmidt says, are doubly socialized. Nevertheless, women still have a lower status than men.

In your book, you write that social regression has been evident in mainstream society for decades, but has accelerated in recent years. When was that? With the crisis of globalization in 2007 and 2008?

Wilhelm Heitmeyer described this regression back in the 1980s, when the Republicans were winning elections. And the “individualization” described by Ulrich Beck, which began during this period, led to great uncertainty and the conservative shift of the Kohl years. After “reunification,” there were the events in Rostock, Mölln, and Solingen. But it really took off in 2007 and 2008 with the financial crash. This was followed by the euro crisis, the Greek crisis, and, in the mid-2010s, the refugee movements. The result is figures like Trump and the rise of right-wing parties throughout Europe. To my knowledge, only two people on the left foresaw the financial crash: the American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, based on his world-systems analysis, and Robert Kurz with his crisis theory. Before that, he was ridiculed for it. They called him collapse Kurz.

Why is left-wing theory formation regressing in the crisis of capitalism? Shouldn’t the opposite actually be the case?

Over the past 30 years, especially after 2008, many Marx reading circles formed. There was a new philosophical reading of Marx, and anthology after anthology was published. But that was a relatively short-lived trend, and with the rise of the right, the left has reverted to this class struggle Marxism and, to a not inconsiderable extent, to vulgar Marxism, because what applies to society as a whole also applies to the left, namely that in times of crisis, people orient themselves toward old certainties or stupidities.

Does left-wing regression also mean believing that one no longer needs to be concerned about sexism, racism, etc.?

The juxtaposition of class and identity politics resonates with anti-woke sentiment. This is embodied, for example, by the BSW. Another example is the attempt by “Z,” the magazine for Marxist renewal, to explain and solve the problem of intersectionality through class struggle. This isn’t necessarily crude sexism on display, but racism, sexism, and so on are once again declared to be secondary contradictions. The sexism isn’t direct, but it is already an inherently sexist line of argumentation. Of course, it must also be said that identity politics is also open to criticism. It is not entirely innocent, but has itself become authoritarian. I wrote a decidedly anti-antiziganist text in which the word “gypsy” appeared frequently. And then, at an event, someone actually counted how often I used this term. Like an old grammar school teacher who constantly marks spelling mistakes in the margins. Totally formalistic. In a text about anti-Gypsyism, the negative connotation commonly used in the dominant society must also appear. Critiques of language only makes sense if they take context and intention into account.

Roswitha Scholz: Back to the Roots. Zur Regression marxistisch-feministischer Theoriebildung heute. Texte aus 30 Jahren. Zu-Klampen-Verlag, Springe 2025, 334 pages, 32 euros.

Originally published in Konkret No. 11 (2025)