The Subjectless Rule of Capital

Who is to blame for the increasing contradictions and distortions of late capitalist societies – and what can be done about it?

Tomasz Konicz

Who are the rulers in capitalism? Preliminary observations seem to confirm what is, for the most part, the core principle of leftist ideology or theory: it is the capitalist class, the owners of the means of production, who seem to hold the reins of power – and they are therefore the ones responsible for the current state of the capitalist world system.

This conclusion seems justified at first sight, given the absurd level of inequality between rich and poor, between the mass of wage earners and the “happy few” of the billionaire caste, which has only been exacerbated by the neoliberal economic and financial policies of recent decades.

The data on the ever-widening gap between rich and poor seems downright bizarre: the 26 richest billionaires now own assets with a face value equal to that of the poorer half of the world’s population – that’s about 3.8 billion people. In the US, it is the wealthiest 20 people whose assets are equivalent to that of the impoverished half of the population.

In the Federal Republic, on the other hand, this ratio between billionaires and the destitute is 45 to 41 million. 45 mega-rich capitalists own just as much as the lower half of the population, and the income divide in the Federal Republic is now even more pronounced than in the United States.

The inequality of late capitalist societies, together with the emergence of a largely segregated caste of billionaires, goes hand in hand with an intensified, increasingly open assertion of the interests of the capitalist class. The ability of this class to successfully lobby has been reflected not least in the financial and tax policies of recent decades, which have almost exclusively favored the super-rich and large corporations.

US billionaires like the notorious Koch brothers finance a veritable political machine that puts their reactionary interests into law in Washington. As a result, there is a debate about whether the US has degenerated into an oligarchy dominated by a few billionaires.

In the Federal Republic, on the other hand, BMW billionaires from the notorious Quandt clan make donations to the CDU before the federal government once again undermines CO2 emissions limits, which directly benefits the German car industry. In addition – with the rise of the New Right – there is the direct financing of right-wing extremists and populists by billionaires, as in the case of US President Trump and the German AfD.

The same applies to political inaction in the face of the escalating climate crisis. For decades, both in the US and in Germany, the lobbying groups of the fossil fuel-driven capitalist economy have spent millions of dollars to torpedo any serious measures to combat climate change, and have largely been successful.

Capitalists, Class Struggle and Crisis

In the face of this informal power of the capitalist class, which can effortlessly put its economic interests into legal form through its lobbying machines, the causes of the current crisis seem clear, especially to the left: it is the increasing socio-economic division of society caused precisely by the seemingly behind-the-scenes ruling class of billionaires, the capitalists. The boundless greed or insatiable hunger for power of the capitalist class has led capitalism into crisis.

It seems to be similar with the ecological crisis: the greed of the corporate bosses of the oil and automobile industries, and their influence on politics, seems to be responsible for the fact that climate change, despite all the soapbox speeches, continues raging on, fueled by constantly rising CO2 emissions.

Economic stagnation and the decades-long social decline of large sections of the population in the centers of the capitalist world system, appear as a consequence of the policies of the super-rich class, which is waging a real class war against the working population, as for example the billionaire and speculator Warren Buffet once said: “There’s class warfare, all right, … but it’s my class, the rich class, that’s making war, and we’re winning.”

The beginning of this “class war” is usually traced to the neoliberal turn of the 1980s, which, after the bloody prelude in 1973 in Chile, was first implemented in the US and Great Britain by Ronald Reagan and Margaret (“There is no such thing as society”) Thatcher.

Meanwhile, the bouts of destitution that followed the housing crash in 2008, which devastated the US middle class, for example, have also contributed to the formation of a strong, class-struggle oriented left. In response to the increased animosity towards minorities which the New Right pushed after the crisis surge in 2008, the left in the USA and Great Britain have been calling for a class struggle, in which the class war waged by the super-rich would now be answered consciously by way of the political mobilization of the “bottom,” the wage-earners. This left is also calling for a massive Keynesian investment program, the Green New Deal, to overcome the climate crisis.

A False Approach and A False Premise

Politicians like Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez thus argue for a redistribution from the top to the bottom, for a strict taxation of large fortunes and for a curtailment of the informal political power of the super-rich, in order to lead out of its ecological and economic crisis through large investment programs. In the face of this renaissance of leftist class struggle, which has now also taken hold of the German left, a progressive counterweight to the reactionary wave of the New Right seems to be forming.

And yet this approach to explaining the crisis, which remains stuck in the dichotomy of proletariat and bourgeoisie, is a distorted consciousness that is ultimately not radical enough to adequately grasp the crisis process. The crisis is more than the result of escalating class struggle. The inherent premise of old, leftist, class struggle thinking, according to which there is a group of people who consciously control social reproduction, is false.

The reality of the unfolding capitalist crisis is far more frightening than any specter of an all-powerful rule of super-rich villains operating behind the scenes of the political establishment – however repulsive and reprehensible the individual egomaniacal actors in these exclusive circles may be.

Fetishism: The Autonomous Movement of Capital

Despite all the conspiracies that actually exist, there is no one behind the curtain who is ultimately pulling the strings, who is somehow “controlling” the course of events of the capitalist system. Humanity under capital is the object of an independent, contradictory dynamic, which it unconsciously produces by way of market mediation. This process of capital’s autonomous movement, called fetishism, is constituted “behind the backs of the producers,” as Karl Marx famously remarked.

Generally speaking, capitalism as a fetishistic social formation is thus characterized by the fact that in capitalism, “the process of production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite,” as Karl Marx wrote in his main work Capital. The fetishistic forms of the valorization of capital, which are independent of the subjects, “appear to the political economists’ bourgeois consciousness” as a “self-evident and nature-imposed necessity.”

This fetishism pervades all the aggregate states that capital passes through in its autonomous movement, its cycle of valorization, in which more money is created from money through the production of commodities and the exploitation of wage labor (M-C-M’): commodity, money, labor.

In the labor process, for example, the wage-dependent market participant (“proletarian”) becomes “variable capital,” the only commodity acquired by capital on the labor market, which through its capacity to work can create more value than it is itself worth. Labor is “external” to the worker, he therefore “only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself,” as Marx put it in the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts.

This being at the mercy of an external labor process over whose goal and course the worker has no control, in which his divestment is a moment of the fetishistic valorization movement of capital, leads to the formation of the well-known, omnipresent sense of alienation in capitalism. This “forced” labor under capital no longer serves the direct “satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it,” Marx continues. Its strangeness emerges “clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labor is shunned like the plague. External labor, labor in which man alienates himself, is a labor of self-sacrifice, of mortification.”

The market subjects, isolated from one another by the compulsion of competition, who enter into commodity exchange only through the mediation of the market, appear similarly powerless in the face of commodity fetishism. The social character of their own labor is reflected to the commodity producers in the representational character of the products of their labor, Marx explained in the famous fetish chapter of Capital.

The social property of a commodity as a bearer of value (the quantum of socially necessary labor-time expended in its production process), produced within the framework of the valorization process, appears as a natural property of these things. The individual commodity seems to be endowed with the property of being a bearer of value in the same way as it is endowed with its other physical properties. Since the commodity, as a socially constituted “object of value,” appears only in the exchange of commodities on the market, it appears to the isolated producers as if it were a matter of a “social relation between objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers.”

Things thus become “independent” in a market-mediated way from the market subjects, who literally produce them themselves and offer them for sale in commodity form on the market – and this process is animated by the overall social compulsion of capital to valorize. This independence of capital is particularly evident in the financial markets, where fetishism manifests itself in the abstract form of money, and forms the most important driving force for reactionary crisis ideologies, including anti-Semitism.

Especially in times of crisis, when once again a “market quake” or financial crash threaten the stability of the entire economic system – as most recently in 2008 – it becomes clear that even the capitalist class is by no means “in control” of this fetishistic and destructive dynamic of capital, that the crisis-like course of events under capitalism is by no means controlled by a conspiracy.

The fetishistic reality of capitalism is thus actually scarier than the worst conspiracy ideology. The entire real world, human beings as well as nature, are only transitory stages of a blindly unfolding process of the accumulation of abstract wealth, which is ultimately abstract quanta of spent, “dead” human labor. The whole late capitalist horror consists precisely in the fact that there is no one at the wheel of the valorization train that is constantly hurtling towards the abyss.

Society, however, is a necessary appendage of the real-abstract valorization process of capital running amok, since capital can only be valorized through wage labor and the burning of resources in the production of commodities. In the end, only that which is necessary and financially viable within the framework of this blind cycle of capital multiplication has social existence: that is, only that which contributes directly or indirectly to the expansion of capital.

This applies not only to the category of “jobs” in the economy, but also to the state apparatus in its function as an “ideal total capitalist,” (Marx) and even to cultural production, which has to contribute to location optimization within the framework of neoliberal marketing strategies – social existence under capital is always subject to its ability to be “financed.” On the overall social, global level, capital thus acts as an “automatic subject” of boundless, tautological self-aggrandizement.

The concrete world is thus only the “material” of this independent, real-abstract autonomous movement of capital, which in its boundless growth mania deprives humanity of its social and ecological basis of existence. The global surplus value machine of capital thus burns the world to the ground in order to maintain the irrational end in itself of unlimited capital growth for as long as possible. A growing, economically “superfluous” humanity in the periphery and an escalating ecological crisis are the consequences of this autonomous movement of capital.

In a reversal of the old romanticism of progress, the image of a constantly accelerating train hurtling towards the abyss thus suggests itself, a machine out of control, driven by the autonomous movement of capital, which is produced unconsciously by the market participants, mediated by competition and the market. The transformative act that is necessary for survival is to find and apply the emergency brake, as Walter Benjamin already remarked.

Social structures unconsciously produced by human beings that objectify themselves vis-à-vis individuals; social dynamics that become independent vis-à-vis the subjects that produce them – this absurd form of social reproduction that characterizes the “prehistory of humanity” is illuminated by the concept of fetishism.

Thus the people of “enlightened” bourgeois society are nothing more than sinister fetish servants. Domination in capitalism is thus ultimately subjectless, as the crisis theorist Robert Kurz explained in his text Domination Without a Subject; the capital relation rules as a fetishistic abstraction of reality.

The inner essence of the capital relation, according to Kurz, is not captured by the disdainful greed of all the capitalist philanderers who were able to increase their (largely fictitious) wealth to obscene levels during the neoliberal decades:

Their “individual objectives” are not what they seem: in accordance with their form, they are not individual or voluntary objectives, and for this reason their content is also distorted and flows towards self-destruction. The essential point is not that individuals mutually use one another for their individual objectives, but rather, to the extent that they seem to do so, that they themselves execute a totally different, supraindividual and subjectless objective: the autonomous movement (valorization) of capital.

The subjective, “managerial,” exploitative interests of the capitalists thus form the outward appearance that conceals the fetishistic essence of the irrational, subjectless domination of the capital relation at the “macroeconomic” level. In general, capital can only be understood as a social totality; attempts to project the relations of the reproduction of individual capitals (enterprises, corporations) onto the system as a whole ultimately end up as ideology.

The Question of Guilt and Responsibility in Capitalism

As soon as people act as subjects in the valorization circuit of capital, they become character masks (Marx) of their respective position in the accumulation process – whether as assembly line workers, managers, salespeople or service providers is irrelevant in this respect. They are no longer “within themselves,” but act as the personification of their respective economic function (this is the basis of the feelings of alienation mentioned above).

Marx, for example, describes the capitalist in his function as a character mask “as capital personified and endowed with consciousness and a will,” who functions as the “point of departure and point of return” of the self-purpose of the endless circulation of capital. The “objective content of that circulation – the valorization of value – is his subjective purpose,” according to Marx in Capital.

What emerges here is the absurd position of the market subject within the automatism of capital valorization. On the one hand, capital as an automatic subject turns people into objects of its valorization movement, into things, into commodities that are traded on the labor market – and who have to adapt to this mediated form of subjectless domination as if it were a man-made law of nature, with a subliminal feeling of powerlessness.

At the same time, the only chance to still live out a stale imitation of subjectivity is to cooperate, as the aforementioned economic character mask, in the “subjective” perfection of this automatism of boundless capital valorization – and thus, in turn, to degrade “the others” to objects and “make them equal to things.” Within the all-too-real fetishism that the automatic subject perpetuates, the inmates of the capitalist treadmill are always two things at once: the subject of accumulation as well as its powerless object.

All character masks, as personifications of their respective economic function, therefore function as subject-objects of the autonomous movement of valorization that they themselves perpetuate, whereby the concrete relationship between these two poles depends on their specific hierarchical position in the reproduction process of capital. And it is precisely this hierarchical position of the subjects within the automatism of capital valorization that must also be taken into account in the question of the category of guilt, of personal responsibility. For of course the fetishism of capital does not absolve the actors who carry it out.

While some are obsessed with finding scapegoats, at the other end of the spectrum is a powerless systems theory that exculpates the current actors in business and politics. In this view, it seems as if those responsible can no longer be identified due to systemic constraints and objective structural laws. The concrete perpetrators disappear behind the destructive action of the automatic subject of capital’s collapsing dynamic of valorization.

The fact that the fetishism of capitalist society, in which the market-mediated actions of market subjects confront them as an alien, quasi-objective force, by no means leads to an exculpation of the actions of the perpetrators, was already pointed out by the crisis theorist Robert Kurz at the beginning of the 21st century:

Now, when the common form-context of abstract labor, commodity-form, state-citizenship, etc., moves into the field of vision of critique, where is accountability? Can one make a blind structural connection, can one make the automatic subject responsible for anything, even if it is the greatest crime? And vice versa: if capitalist barbarism is ultimately inherent in the mute compulsions of competition, etc., are not the barbaric acts of the ugly managers, the dirty politicians, the bureaucratic crisis administrators, the bloody butchers of the state of emergency somehow excused, because they are always conditioned and are actually caused by the subjectless structural laws of “second nature”?

Such an argument forgets that the concept of the automatic subject is a paradoxical metaphor for a paradoxical social relation. The automatic subject is not a distinct entity squatting out there somewhere by itself, but it is the social spell under which people subject their own actions to the automatism of capitalized money.

But those who act are always the individuals themselves. Competition, an artificially generated struggle for survival, crises, etc. all increase the potential for barbarism, but practically this barbarism must be carried out by the actions of people, and must pass through their consciousness. And that is why individuals are also subjectively responsible for their actions, the ugly manager and the dirty politician just as much as, on the other hand, the racist unemployed person and the anti-Semitic single mother.

The potential dangers of this society, and the immense anxiety that accompanies them, must be dealt with on a daily basis, and every moment individuals make choices in this process that are never completely without alternatives – neither on a small, daily scale nor on a large, socio-historical scale. No one is simply a puppet, without any agency, but everyone has to deal with the hair-raising contradictions, fears and sufferings of this spell.

Therefore, it is not absurd to direct the necessary critique of society to the level of socially overarching structures, to abstract labor and the automatic subject, but nevertheless to hold the acting individuals responsible for their actions, even if their social character mask leads them to a state of insanity.

Robert Kurz, Marx Lesen

A Donald Trump or Jeff Bezos, as subjects who carry out the contradictory automatism of capital accumulation on a political and economic level, are fully responsible for their actions. This is also true of a Wolfgang Schäuble, who is fully responsible for everything he has done to Greece and Southern Europe during the euro crisis; but it is also true of the little nasty forum troll, who is responsible for all the agitation he spreads on the net – even if these actions only execute the systemic crisis dynamics on a political or ideological level.

Of course, the historical guilt that an egomaniac like Trump or an austerity sadist like Schäuble has brought upon himself weighs far more heavily than the pitiful word-vomit of a single fringe extremist of the New Right in newspaper forums or social networks.

The great question of guilt in relation to the subjectless domination of capital can now also be specified in relation to the dynamics of the crisis and crisis ideology: the crisis as a historical process is a consequence of the increasing internal contradictions of capital, which confront the subjects as ever more severe “factual constraints.”

Specifically, it is the tendency of capital to get rid of its own substance, value-creating wage labor, by automating the production process. This applies not only to the economic crisis, but also to the ecological crisis of capital, which, in its fetishistic compulsion to grow, must burn up the natural foundations of human life at an ever-increasing rate by increasing production.

Therefore, we can simply conclude that absolutely no one is to blame for the crisis of capital. The crisis was certainly not “orchestrated” by any conspirators. The crisis erupted precisely because market subjects are doing more and more efficiently exactly what the system demands of them: exploiting wage labor for the purpose of unlimited capital accumulation. The more effectively wage labor is exploited, the greater the pressure, the tighter the market-mediated noose around the necks of all market subjects.

The first false question, leading to ideological blindness, which imposes itself on the reified consciousness as a matter of course at the outbreak of the crisis, is the question of guilt. But the shoe is on the other foot: personal guilt must be sought in the “everyday life” of capital valorization, in the “normal execution” of the capitalist treadmill, in the concrete economic exploitation, in political oppression and in the production of ideology that keeps the automatism of the system running.

Thus, while no one is “to blame” for the outbreak of the systemic crisis, the dynamics of which unfold quasi “behind the backs of the producers” (Marx), it is precisely the everyday functioning of the system – the market-mediated oppression, exploitation and ideology production – in which all the individuals who consciously execute the systemic constraints as “character masks” of their capitalist functions, are guilty. Even more: in interaction with the dynamics of the crisis, it is precisely the exploitation, the oppression, the production of lies by the system that is taken to the point of absurdity.

If, as in the neoliberal decades, the exploitation of wage dependent workers continues to increase, this points to a systemic process of crisis that is perpetuated on the backs of those same workers. And this is all the more true when a “normal employment relationship” becomes the exception and, globally speaking, more and more people can actually no longer be exploited by capital because they are superfluous and therefore nothing more than “useless eaters.”

Class Struggle as A Struggle for Distribution

The increase in exploitation, impoverishment and precariousness described above, even in the centers of the capitalist world system, must therefore be understood as a systemic reaction to a deep historical process of crisis. This occurred in the 1980s in response to the end of the post-war boom in the 1970s and the crisis period of stagflation. Consequently, neoliberalism prevailed only because Keynesianism was at its wits’ end. In this sense, neoliberalism was not a kind of “coup” against a supposedly ideal world of the welfare state, as many on the left like to imply.

It is precisely the seemingly absurd split between rich and poor, between the masses of precarious and impoverished wage-dependents, and the fictitious millions in largely fictitious capital that a few billionaires seem to possess that points to the systemic crisis, which also brings with it a lack of profitable investment opportunities in the real commodity economy, and a corresponding shift to speculative activities in the financial sphere (“financialization of capitalism”).

It is precisely these consequences of the crisis that confront all actors as increasing, objectified contradictions or “constraints.” The subjects react to this in a system-immanent way with an intensification of competition: politicians and states that enforce social cuts within the framework of the competition for locations, corporations that find ever more brutal forms of exploitation, in the mass media whose opportunism in the production of ideology seems to know no bounds, and wage-earners who increasingly resort to mobbing.

The market-mediated mute compulsion of the ever “tougher” conditions compels the character masks of their respective social functions to execute this compulsion under penalty of their own downfall. The capitalist who is not able to increase the exploitation of his human material in the context of increasing competition on “tighter” markets will perish. The same applies to the capitalist economies as national “locations,” which are also in a race to the bottom due to the crisis.

The Hartz reforms, with their intended strategy of increasing precariousness and fixating on exports, have thus been “successful” in that they have so far been able to pass on the consequences of the crisis to other countries through the export of debt. The same applies to public opinion: the tendency towards opportunism in politics and the media is increasing, and oppositional thinking is being marginalized, especially on the “left.”

Against the background of what has been written above, a clear assessment of the class struggle now also seems possible. Class struggle is thus a struggle for distribution within the process of capital reduction, the intensity of which is determined by the concrete, historical unfolding of its contradictions. In periods of strong economic expansion, as during the post-war boom until the 1970s, forms of “social partnership” can emerge between the functional elites of capital and the trade unions representing the wage-earners (of “variable capital,” as Marx puts it).

As long as markets are expanding strongly, high profits can be agreed upon with wages that turn wage-dependent workers into consumers. This changes relatively quickly in times of crisis, when the main concern of every capitalist is to perpetuate the irrational end in itself of capital accumulation, if necessary at the expense of his own wage-earners.

The class struggle as a struggle for distribution thus has no inherent objective transformative potential. It is a struggle for shares in the real production of value, which is melting away as a result of the crisis, and it does not question this irrational form of social reproduction as such. The class struggle (and this is also historically true of such struggles) thus moves within the forms of capitalist socialization (value, labor, capital, state) and seeks emancipation and recognition within these categories, rather than their abolition.

The intensifying class struggle is therefore a struggle for distribution. The militancy with which this “class war,” (Warren Buffet) which is escalating because of the crisis, is propagated, conceals its lack of radicalism, since the causes of the crisis and the above-mentioned fetishistic form of social reproduction in capitalism are not reflected upon by this movement.

The present social conditions also seem to resemble the impoverishment of earlier times because the historical “ascendant phase” of the working class in the 18th and 19th centuries has social parallels with the present descendant phase of capital and the working class. The current widespread misery within the eroding class of wage-earners in the centers of the world system thus mirrors the misery of its historical formation.

To put it vividly: The foundation on which the class actors operate, the expenditure of wage labor in commodity production, is disintegrating. The one-sided rhetoric of class struggle obscures the fact that the classes themselves are in the process of dissolution as a result of the crisis. The proletariat is disintegrating into precisely that economically “superfluous” layer of people who are desperately fleeing to the core regions of the capitalist world system.

What Do We Do?

To be radical is to grasp a problem at its root in order to find a solution adequate to it. This is precisely what Marxist class struggle thinking does not do. It is not the distribution of commodity wealth that is at the heart of the crisis, but the contradictory form in which wealth is produced for the sake of the irrational self-purpose of unbridled capital accumulation – the commodity form itself. The blatant, ever worsening social division of late capitalist societies is, as explained, precisely the consequence of the escalating internal and external contradictions of capital’s compulsion to grow.

Consequently, the crisis cannot be resolved by social-democratic redistribution. The radical goal should not be to gain “control” (possibly still under the leadership of a dictatorial state and cadre party) over the machinery of capitalist accumulation, but rather to fundamentally transform it in order to finally liberate the production of consumer goods from its commodity form, from the fetishistic end in itself of the valorization of value.

Even the “democratization” of capitalist enterprises, as is currently being discussed in left-liberal circles in the US as direct worker control, would continue to expose these cooperatives to the constraints of the crisis-induced tightening of the markets, and thus change little. The crisis of capital, which is reaching its internal and external limits, can thus only be overcome by overcoming the fetishistic dynamics of the accumulation process – for it is precisely these dynamics of exploitation, unconsciously generated by the market subjects, that are devastating impotent human societies and the global ecosystem.

Ultimately, it is about simplifying social reproduction by organizing it directly, through an all-encompassing process of society-wide communication, rather than – as is currently the case – degrading society to a mere transitory stage of a blind world-burning process run amok. Post-capitalism thus means, at its core, the conscious shaping of the process of social reproduction by the members of society, as opposed to the current state in which people are subjected to a quasi-objective, fetishistic dynamic.

Karl Marx’s seemingly cryptic remark that the overcoming of capitalism would conclude “the prehistory of human society” thus gains clarity. All human history to date has taken place unconsciously, within the framework of fetishistic social systems: from the religious fetishism of early times and the Middle Ages to the secularized religion of capital.

And here is the thing: the crisis is also an irreversible, fetishistic process. It will run its course, and there is no way to stabilize the system in the long run, because the eternal creation of debt will eventually reach its limits, even in the centers. This is not a vision of the future; it is already a reality, especially in the periphery.

The system, choking on its contradictions, is already producing an economically superfluous humanity and collapsing regions known as “failed states,” as the refugee crisis has made clear. The same is true of the climate crisis caused by capitalist growth mania and its monstrous consequences.

Whether the collapsing system will be overcome is therefore not a question of the subjective “will” of the members of society. It is a question of the very survival of human civilization, and ultimately of human existence, how the coming transformation process will proceed: as a chaotic disintegration, in the form of the establishment of a brutal, murderous crisis dictatorship, or in a progressive direction that would open up new emancipatory perspectives for humanity, despite all the climate-related distortions to come.

What is more, this transformation process is already underway – and the increasing political, ideological, and military conflicts are precisely the expression of this upheaval that is unconsciously taking place in humanity, as the sociologist and world-systems theorist Immanuel Wallerstein pointed out at the beginning of the 21st century:

We are living in a transition from our existing world-system, the capitalist world-economy, to another world-system or systems. We do not know whether this will be for the better or for the worse. We shall not know until we get there, which may not be for another fifty years now. We do know that the period of transition will be a very difficult one for all who live in it. […] It will be a period of conflicts and aggravated disorders […]. Not paradoxically, it will also be a period in which the “free will” factor will be at its maximum, meaning that the individual and collective action can have a greater impact on the future structuring of the world than such action can have in more “normal” times, that is, during the ongoing life of an historical system.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Utopistics

Civilization or barbarism – these are the extreme poles in this historical “phase of transition,” whereby it is the New Right, with its extremism of the center, which insists on adhering to the forms of society in decay (nation, “creative” capital, state), that is paving the way towards barbarism.

It is precisely the extreme networks and associations of the New Right that are sometimes consciously preparing for the crisis – which they imagine as the result of a conspiracy against Germany – with death lists and coup plans. A dictatorship planned for the next wave of crisis is supposed to serve to finally “cleanse” the left through mass murder. Thus, neo-fascism is a kind of fire accelerator for barbarism in the crisis.

There is a maxim of political practice that left movements, groups or even parties would have to follow in the 21st century if they still want to function as progressive social forces according to their concept in the current epoch of upheaval and crisis. Capitalism must be consigned to history as quickly as possible, the capital relation as a social totality must be consciously abolished – all practical actions, all tactics, all reform proposals, all broader strategies would have to be oriented towards this categorical imperative.

This is not an expression of leftist “radicalism,” but the formulation of a reasonable bare minimum, that, if not realized, would lead to the end of 21st century civilization in barbarism. Precisely because capital is collapsing, it must be overcome. Progress can only be realized beyond capital, in the transformative struggle to shape a post-capitalist society.

A progressive movement, based on an understanding of the necessity of systemic transformation, would thus fight to create conditions that could steer this transformative dynamic in an emancipatory direction. The maxim of such a post-politics would be, on the one hand, the effort to maintain and further develop the process of civilization, and, on the other hand, the struggle to overcome the inherent destructive dynamics of capitalism.

The goal of a progressive transformation movement would thus be to consciously shape the process of civilization, which is fetishistically carried out by powerless people, within the framework of a process of communication throughout society. The forms in which a self-conscious transformation movement organizes itself in the context of the crisis-related increase in social conflicts would thus possibly become the germinal forms of a post-capitalist society.

Bourgeois politics, the actions of political subjects, are thus “important” again, they have weight. Not because they can solve the crisis, but because they determine the course of the crisis. An example may illustrate this: whether a Schäuble puts Europe on a neoliberal starvation diet (austerity) after the outbreak of the euro crisis, or whether the crisis process unfolds within the framework of a pan-European economic and social policy, is of great importance for the further unfolding of the crisis, as the rise of nationalist and right-wing extremist movements in austerity-ridden “German” Europe shows.

The increasing social struggles against the dismantling of the welfare state, against the dismantling of democracy and police-state tendencies, and for a genuine climate policy should thus be understood as fields in which the social subjects literally fight for the course of the transformation process that is objectively taking place.

And here the class struggle – insofar as it is aware of its role as a means in a struggle for transformation – also has an important role to play. The class struggle is part of the struggle over the concrete course that the transformation process will take.

Which Society Will Undergo Transformation?

For this to happen, the class struggle must look beyond itself and no longer primarily strive for recognition or social satisfaction in a declining capitalism, as the workers’ movement historically did. The historical expansion of capitalism and the wage-labor regime was the precondition for this, which is no longer the case today because of the crisis.

To put it more concretely, understanding the crisis as a maxim of emancipatory praxis means asking in what form late capitalist society will enter the inevitable process of transformation. Will it be an authoritarian, racist, police-state administered oligarchy with absurd social abysses, or a more egalitarian, bourgeois-democratic polity in which there continues to be space for radical critique and praxis?

Superficially, then, an emancipatory left that wants to be progressive in late capitalism resembles an existentialist figure, comparable to Albert Camus’ Sisyphus, who consciously engages in a seemingly absurd practice. The struggle for social improvements against the dismantling of democracy, for the equality of minorities, for the Green New Deal is waged in full awareness of the internal capitalist futility of this struggle – in the face of the escalating economic and ecological systemic crisis.

But this is where the analogy ends. The consciousness and rhetoric with which this “battle for the tea water” is fought is crucial. It is necessary to tell people clearly what is going on, that the old capitalist world is dying, that the new one has not yet been born – and that this is a struggle against social cuts, for redistribution, against racism, climate destruction and warmongering, a struggle for optimal starting conditions for the inevitable system transformation.

Through this openness, which only makes explicit what has long since been unconsciously embedded in society as a dull crisis agenda, coupled with the search for post-capitalist forms of organization within this movement, it would also be possible to overcome the false immediacy that has often led progressive movements to get bogged down in the false whole of late capitalism.

False immediacy is understood here as the tendency of social movements to unconsciously persist in forms of thinking that correspond to the social conditions and contradictions against which they are directed.

A prime example of this is trade union struggles against job cuts, which have to be fought by the actors concerned for the sake of their social survival – but which, without a corresponding awareness of the crisis, reproduce the existing forms of thought – in this case thinking in terms of “jobs” as the only option for individual reproduction – even in times of crisis among the actors.

It is similar with the protests against inflation, a phenomenon which is often reduced to the greed of the capitalists – and which without radical crisis consciousness must end in impotence. It would be crucial to raise the question of the system offensively in the coming crisis confrontations, precisely because capital is perishing from its own contradictions. The concrete protest must be carried out with open eyes as part of a struggle for the transformation of the system.

Such necessary social struggles would thus have to be coupled with a radical emancipatory critique of the capitalist forms of existence and thought that are in the process of disintegration, as Robert Kurz has already pointed out:

The task, then, is to formulate the emancipatory critique of the objectified, socially overarching forms of existence or thought and to assert it from within the social struggle in order to consciously break through this categorical prison. […] What matters is to develop a will against the dominant form of the will and to make conscious its fetishistic character.

The text is an updated version of an article that was published in the magazine Telepolis in 2019, before it was hijacked by a Querfront racket of the Left Party and converted into a Querfront organ. The text can be taken unabridged by anyone interested, with credit to the author.

I finance my journalistic work mostly through donations. If you like my texts, then you are welcome to contribute via Patreon.

Originally republished on konicz.info on 10/02/2022

Turning Point in Ukraine?

A military disaster looms for Russia’s army in northeastern Ukraine

Tomasz Konicz

There is movement in the war in the east – and it is the Ukrainian army that has apparently been able to seize the momentum. While the Western public, to the extent that it still follows the war in Ukraine, which has coagulated into normality, at all, was mainly aware of the offensive around the southern Ukrainian city of Kherson, large territorial gains seem to have been recorded in the northeast by combined Ukrainian units in a rapid attack.

Ukrainian units were able to break through the Russian lines southeast of Kharkov on a broad front and gain dozens of kilometers of ground within a few days, between the 4th and 9th of September. Even pro-Russian propaganda sources openly admit this.[1] Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops are reported to be on the outskirts of Kupyansk,[2] the main Russian-held city in Kharkov Oblast. Moreover, the most important supply route of the Russian army units in the western Donbass around Izium runs through Kupyansk. Consequently, cutting this supply route would be devastating for the Kremlin’s operations in eastern Ukraine. The attacks by Ukrainian troops in the south thus appear to have contributed primarily to weakening the Russian front in the north – and it is precisely these weak points that Kiev’s army leadership – probably evaluating Western information – was able to correctly identify and exploit.

The Russian defense, thinned out by troop deployments to Kherson, sometimes consisting of conscripted reservists from Lugansk and units of barracked police, is said to have literally collapsed. The Ukrainian army, ironically, has successfully employed the same tactics that the Russian army leadership failed to implement at the outset of the war. No mobile units of combined forces have advanced far into enemy territory after breaking through on the front lines without capturing towns and settlements where significant Russian occupation forces are entrenched. The difference so far, at least, is that the demoralized and encircled Russian troops are not leading attacks on Ukrainian supply routes and supply lines, as Ukrainian soldiers did during the Russian advance at the outbreak of war.

Currently, thousands of Russian soldiers are said to be in these cauldrons west of the Oskol River. It’s a disaster for the Russian army that even Western military experts could scarcely have imagined before the war broke out.[3] In the coming days it will be decided whether the Ukrainian forces can maintain these gains in terrain, or whether Kiev overestimated its forces, overstretched its supply routes – and Ukraine faces similar setbacks in Russian counter-offensives as the Russian invasion forces did at the start of the war.

In response to this disaster, in which terrain that had to be painstakingly conquered over months was lost within a few days, the Russian army is supposed to pull together strong formations in the region in order to quickly reverse any of Ukraine’s territorial gains that are not secured by defensive installations, and to dislodge the encircled Russian troops. But this weakens other sections of the front, as Russia attacked Ukraine with a vastly outnumbered army, and the initial military-technical and equipment superiority of Russian forces is increasingly fading due to Western arms deliveries and war-related attrition.

Further attacks by Ukrainian forces thus seem likely. But this would ultimately mean that the strategic momentum in this war would pass to Ukraine after weeks of de facto stalemate. Russia’s invading army would thus be put on the defensive, while Ukrainian formations exploit weak points to break through thinned Russian fronts and make repeated gains in territory. The coming days will show whether this latest offensive by Kiev southwest of Kharkov indeed marked a strategic turning point in the war. The decisive factor will be the extent to which Kiev’s troops will be able to maintain these gains in the face of Russian counterattacks.

On September 10, the first photos of Ukrainian soldiers from the strategically important city of Kupyansk appeared on the web – as mentioned, the most important Russian supply line to the western Donbass runs through here. Apparently, parts of the city were abandoned by Russia without a fight. It takes Russia months to capture Ukrainian cities. Ukraine appears to be taking them in a hand sweep. Russian troops south of Kupyansk, especially near Izium, are now in a very difficult position. Indeed, it seems that Russia is losing all conquered territory west of the Oskil River. Izium is almost surrounded by Ukrainian army, thousands of Russian troops are threatened with capture or death.

But the unexpected aspect of the Ukrainian offensive is its total surprise effect. Russian intelligence and intelligence services (satellites, aerial reconnaissance, informants) seem to have been blind. It’s 2022, every major Russian troop movement is known to the West, and sometimes troop redeployments – as most recently towards Kherson – are discussed on the internet. Russia is apparently hardly able to do this, the Russian army actually seems to have been “in the picture” and not to have noticed the significant deployment, the preparations for the Ukrainian offensive – this in the era of satellite-based reconnaissance.

The desolate state of the Russian army, which suffers not only from corruption and mismanagement but also from an archaic command structure, enormous casualties and rapid wear and tear on material (Putin has made gestures to North Korea to procure ammunition), seems to have put the Kremlin in a similar position to that at the start of the war: When the Russian lightning advance on Kiev and Kharkov failed, Moscow had to choose between withdrawal and escalation. Putin opted for an escalation of the cycle.

The Kremlin will soon face a similar decision if the current Ukrainian offensive is successful: Either the admission of defeat, which will certainly cost Putin his head in the medium term, or further escalation. And Russia certainly has the means to continue following the logic of military escalation – which at the same time increases the danger of a major war.

I finance my journalistic work mostly through donations. If you like my texts, then you are welcome to contribute via Patreon.


[1] https://www.moonofalabama.org/2022/09/the-izium-counteroffensive-success-disaster.html#more

[2] https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1568185503962259459

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U2QOiMeaYYk

Originally posted on konicz.info on 09/09/2022

Armenian Blood for Azerbaijani Natural Gas

Poor, surrounded by enemies, without allies: Armenia finds itself in a desperate geopolitical situation, as Azerbaijan’s renewed attack shows

Tomasz Konicz

The timing of the large-scale attack launched in the evening hours of September 12 was perfect. At the same time that Russia’s army was suffering its biggest defeat since the implosion of the Soviet Union in eastern Ukraine, Azerbaijan was launching massive attacks on the territory of Armenia. Localities, infrastructure and military facilities in the southern Armenian border region were attacked with heavy artillery and drones. Within a few hours, Yerevan had to report dozens of dead civilians and army personnel.

The intensity of the attacks reportedly eased somewhat on September 14, following appeals from the West and Russia, but artillery attacks on Armenian towns and villages continued to be reported. At the same time, according to unofficial Azerbaijani sources, Baku’s army has managed to capture a number of strategic positions in the Armenian border area, allowing Azerbaijani artillery to exercise fire control over large parts of southeastern Armenia.

The attacks by Azerbaijan, which has the full support of its close ally Turkey, come barely two years after the invasion of the Armenian region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which seceded from Azerbaijan in the 1990s during a bloody war that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the fall of 2020, Baku, which considers Nagorno-Karabakh to be part of Azerbaijan, was able to conquer a large part of this Armenian settlement and expel its population through a successful invasion coordinated with Turkey.

Since that defeat – which rekindled the trauma of the 1915 Turkish genocide of Armenians – Yerevan’s army has been effectively unable to hold its own militarily against the overwhelming Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance. Armenia is poor; it has no mineral resources or energy sources. Azerbaijan, for its part, can not only maintain a military budget larger than Armenia’s entire national budget because of rich natural gas and oil reserves, but can also use the “gas weapon” as diplomatic leverage to isolate Armenia.

This was evident not only in the Azerbaijani-Turkish attack in 2020, when neither the West nor Russia could be persuaded to provide Armenia with substantial support, but also in the present, where a similar geopolitical constellation is emerging. Armenia is a member of the Russian-led post-Soviet military alliance CSTO, which the Kremlin wanted to build into a Eurasian counterpart to NATO. Shortly after Azerbaijan’s initial attacks, which were primarily directed against internationally recognized Armenian territory, Yerevan addressed the alliance, which includes six former Soviet republics, in a video conference requesting assistance. But Moscow, whose archaic military machine is currently reaching its breaking point in eastern Ukraine, responded evasively. Putin only agreed to send a team of CSTO observers.

Abandoned by Putin and the EU

It is not only the military catastrophe of recent days in eastern Ukraine that is forcing Moscow, which has had to reduce its troop presence in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, to exercise military restraint. Azerbaijan, swimming in foreign currency, is one of the Russian arms industry’s most important customers, and Azerbaijani dictator Aliyev maintains great relations with Putin. On the very eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, on February 22, both autocratic leaders signed a comprehensive cooperation agreement.

Armenia, on the other hand, experienced a bourgeois “velvet revolution” in 2018, when the corrupt clique loyal to Putin was ousted and liberal, more Western-oriented forces around President Pashinyan came to power, daring a cautious democratization and rapprochement with the West – which Moscow punished with its cold inaction during the 2020 war.

However, Pashinyan’s biggest mistake was probably to have taken the West’s democratic rhetoric seriously, since the EU now wants to develop Azerbaijan into a central gas supplier –especially against the backdrop of the war over Ukraine. In July, the president of the EU Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, was able to agree with the Azerbaijani autocrat Aliyev on the “expansion” of the southern gas corridor leading via Georgia and Turkey, which, at some point in the future, is supposed to transport twice the amount of gas to the EU. On the day of the attack on Armenia, Azerbaijan’s energy minister affirmed that his highly armed country intends to increase gas supplies to the EU by 30 percent this year alone. Azerbaijan is thus engaged in a similar small-scale geopolitical “seesaw policy” between Moscow and the West as Turkey is, in order to gain maximum concessions from both power blocs.

Moreover, for years Baku has simply bribed the Berlin and Brussels political establishment with millions of euros in order to make his point of view prevail. In initial statements EU representatives called on both sides to de-escalate the conflict, thus obscuring Baku’s clear attack.

Brussels and Berlin seem willing to pay for Azerbaijani natural gas with Armenian blood and territory, so that the valorization process in the EU – the material foundation of all airy European values – does not lose its energetic basis. For the current wave of attacks indicates that Baku and Ankara want to use the favorable opportunity to come close to two strategic goals: coercing Armenia to renounce the Armenian settlement areas in Nagorno-Karabakh and conquering a land connection between Turkey and Azerbaijan that would pass through southern Armenian territory.

Originally posted in analyse & kritik on 09/04/2022

The Walking Debt

Over-indebtedness, inflation, the threat of recession and impotent politicians: the current wave of crises is likely to take full hold even in the western centers of the capitalist world system

Tomasz Konicz

New decade, new crisis? In mid-June, the European currency area, which had already been on the verge of collapse in the course of the euro crisis, once again seemed to switch into panic mode. The European Central Bank (ECB) felt compelled to hold a special meeting on June 15 after European financial markets were hit by rising interest rate differentials, or spreads, between German and southern European government bonds. In particular, the spread between German and Italian government securities is considered a reliable crisis indicator because Italy, the third-largest European economy, has a high level of government debt, at 150 percent of gross domestic product (in 2019, before the outbreak of the pandemic, the country’s debt was 135 percent), which makes the interest burden on Italian government bonds grow particularly quickly in the event of any turmoil. Moreover, Italy has below-average growth rates, so there is little prospect of reducing the debt burden in the foreseeable future. The OECD’s economic forecasts, which are regularly revised downwards anyway, assume growth of 2.5 percent for the country this year and only 1.2 percent next year.

The Italian bond market acts as a kind of early warning bell, which struck hard in mid-June: The yield on Italian government bonds rose to more than four percent, and the spread with the Bund was almost 250 basis points (2.5 percent) at one point. What had happened? The ECB had previously held out the prospect of following the Fed’s lead and countering the eurozone’s runaway inflation of 8.1 percent with a monetary turnaround towards a restrictive monetary policy. The European “currency guardians” thus announced that they would abandon the zero interest rate policy that had effectively been pursued for eleven years, i.e. since the last euro crisis, and raise key interest rates. In addition, a gradual phase-out of the government bond-buying programs, which are used to reduce the interest burden in the South and increase the money supply, was to be initiated. The mere announcement of a departure from the expansionary monetary policy led to an increase in the interest burden in the southern periphery of the eurozone.

At its special meeting, the ECB then decided to continue buying the bonds of “weaker euro countries,” if necessary, in order to keep the gap to German government bonds within tolerable limits, which immediately led to a reduction in the risk premium between Italian and German government securities. One of the ECB’s goals is not to further inflate its balance sheet, which grew to eight trillion euros during the pandemic and was less than five trillion euros before the pandemic began, by buying securities. The revenues generated from maturing government securities are now to be used to buy up new bonds until the end of 2024. With a volume of 1.7 trillion euros, the ECB thus still has plenty of leeway to replace German bonds with Italian ones, for example. But with this the central bank has already partially withdrawn from the expansionary monetary policy that was announced for the purpose of fighting inflation.

With the situation developing in Italy, a member of the Eurozone whose gross domestic product (GDP) is around ten times that of Greece is now threatened with a debt crisis. In the coming year alone, government liabilities south of the Alps amounting to almost 290 billion euros are due for refinancing, while Greece has a GDP of 180 billion euros. For this reason, it is effectively impossible for the Federal Republic, as the dominant power within the Eurozone, to subject Italy to a dictate of austerity, such as that imposed on Greece by former German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU), without endangering the existence of the entire European currency area. Italy is indeed too big to fail. So if Berlin were to try to drive the country into a similar downward deflationary spiral that once ensnared Greece, it would be tantamount to blowing up the eurozone, as was already favored during the euro crisis by the openly reactionary sections of the German functional elites in the FDP and on the right fringe of the CDU (the “values union”).

Currently, it is Bundesbank President Joachim Nagel that is pushing back against the ECB’s crisis policy, repeating the old German demand that political conditions – mostly austerity programs – be coupled with financial aid for crisis states. In view of high inflation, Nagel spoke of “dangerous waters” into which the ECB was entering if it bought bonds of southern European states as soon as their interest rate differential with German government bonds reached a speculative level. It is not clear at all how a normal market reaction to the high debt burden in the south of the eurozone can be distinguished from a speculative one.

The ECB’s lurching course of action in monetary policy, which consists of cautiously raising key interest rates on the one hand and continuing to print money by buying up government bonds on the other, is an expression of the power-political constellation within the EU. Berlin, where the monetarists call the shots, will get its interest rate hike, while the south of the Eurozone, which favors an expansionary monetary policy, can count on further bond purchases. That’s why the European central bank is much more hesitant about raising key interest rates than the Fed, which has already raised the key rate to 1.75 percent.

So ten years after the euro crisis German Europe is once again at an impasse: the ECB should actually raise interest rates quickly and significantly to curb inflation. And at the same time the “guardians of the currency” would have to keep interest rates low to prevent a new debt crisis in the South and avert the threat of recession. The battle over the course of monetary policy is not a purely European phenomenon; similar disputes between Keynesians and monetarists are also taking place in the US. The connection between the great pandemic-related flood of money and global inflation was most recently discussed, for example, before the US Senate Finance Committee, which the Biden administration’s Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen had to face at the beginning of June. Berlin’s role was played by the Republican opposition, which claims that inflation and the “overheating” of the economy were fueled by the $1.9 trillion stimulus package.

At the same time, these debates between Keynesian advocates of expansionary monetary policy and neoliberal monetarists point to the increasing internal contradictions and tensions of capitalist crisis policy, which can hardly be bridged in the current crisis surge. And an accumulation model that could lead out of the crisis of late capitalism – the economic forecasts for the USA as well as for the euro area are gloomy – cannot simply be conjured up. Basically, both sides in the monetary conflict, which is fueled by national or class interests, are quite right in their diagnoses at the bedside of capitalism, but their “therapeutic proposals” are wrong. Expansionary monetary policy does indeed cause inflation to rise, specifically in the financial sphere, where the “liquidity injections” of central banks in the 21st century led to corresponding speculative bubbles, i.e. to inflation in securities or real estate prices. At the same time, monetarism together with the neoliberal austerity regime – as Schäuble brutally executed on Greece – lead to the economic collapses that are well known from Southern Europe.

The late capitalist crisis policy thus finds itself in a dilemma. Deflation or inflation: there are only different crisis paths along which the unalterable devaluation of value can proceed. Either money is devalued in its capacity as a general equivalent (inflation), or the devaluation process takes hold of capital in its form as constant and variable capital – as factories, machines and wage-dependent people who become economically superfluous.

In the course of the 21st century, not only have global mountains of debt grown faster than world economic output, but interest rates have also declined steadily since the breakthrough of neoliberalism and the financialization of capitalism, because after the bursting of each speculative bubble the world financial system had to be saved from collapse with low interest rates and money printing. The current distortions on the financial markets indicate that the transition to a new speculative cycle is hardly possible. Capitalist crisis policy has ridden its horse to death. And inflation, which previously played out predominantly in the financial sphere, is arriving in the so-called real economy.

It was precisely the failure of Keynesianism at the end of the 1970s that paved the way for neoliberalism, which used a period of extremely high interest rates (the Volcker shock) to get a grip on inflation and lay the foundation for the take-off of the financial markets and the financial market-driven bubble economy of neoliberalism that is currently collapsing. At the time, high interest rates acted as a magnet, attracting investment-seeking capital to the US financial sphere. Now the long-forgotten stagflation is returning on a higher ladder. The most important difference between today’s wave of inflation and the historical period of stagflation is the extreme indebtedness of the world system. A period of high interest rates, as initiated by then Fed Chairman Paul Volcker starting in 1979, no longer offers a way out today.

At present, neo-Keynesians in particular are encouraging the creation of myths that suppress the systemic causes of the crisis in favor of external phenomena. According to them, the causes of increasing inflation are solely the consequences of the pandemic and, even more so, of the Russian war of aggression. This is reminiscent of the interpretation of the historical period of stagflation, which is still popular today, that it was due solely to the oil price shock of 1973. The end of the Fordist boom and thus the structural crisis of capitalism are ignored.

However, the current wave of inflation is not merely war-related “Putinflation.” Even a cursory glance at the development of inflationary dynamics clearly shows that it had already begun before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in response to the central banks’ pandemic-related flood of money. In order to absorb the first deflationary shock after the pandemic outbreak, global stimulus measures reached a multiple of what was spent to stabilize the world financial system after the bursting of the real estate bubbles in 2007/08. In this sense, the “external” shocks act at best as crisis accelerators. The flood of money, in interaction with the bursting of the global liquidity bubble – the “everything bubble” – must be understood as the primary cause of the devaluation of value that is now setting in.

The capping or disruption of global trade and production chains during the pandemic and the Ukraine war explains, above all, the recent acceleration of price inflation. But even in the case of the Ukraine war, the interaction with the crisis process is obvious, since Moscow, in classic imperialist fashion, launched the attack on Ukraine in response to the growing dislocation and unrest in the post-Soviet space, which was instrumentalized by the West. In addition, the full-blown climate crisis is driving inflation because it leads to production shortfalls – such as crop failures – and increased demand for energy – Brazil, for example, had to import more natural gas because a prolonged drought limited hydroelectric power generation.

The socio-economic consequences of the recent crisis will in all probability no longer be able to be passed on from the centers to the periphery. Particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany, which has so far been largely spared by the crisis, and where the fear of the crisis alone has given Nazi parties double-digit election results, the coming political upheavals could be dramatic.

Originally published in konkret in 08/2022

Against The Wall

On the Common Cause of The Ecological and Economic Crisis

Claus Peter Ortlieb

While the public discussion in the capitalist centers interprets the economic crisis, despite its persistence, as a merely temporary phenomenon, it certainly perceives the ecological crisis as a fundamental problem with the modern way of life. The contradiction between economic growth imperatives on the one hand and the finite nature of material resources and the capacity of the natural environment to absorb civilization’s waste on the other is all too obvious.

The foreground of the discussion for some years has been the climate catastrophe, even if these discussions have become somewhat quieter because of other priorities during attempts to cope with the economic crisis. The two-degree target, which would have just avoided the very worst consequences of the warming of the atmosphere, is now widely regarded as no longer achievable. Apart from the slump in the recession year of 2009, global CO2 emissions continue to rise unabated, and climate change is beginning to reinforce itself, for example by releasing more greenhouse gases through the thawing of permafrost soils or by reducing the return of sunlight through the melting of glaciers.

Yet climate change is only one of the battlegrounds on which the “war of capital against the planet” is taking place, according to U.S. sociologists John Bellamy Foster, Brett Clark and Richard York in their book The Ecological Rift. With ocean acidification, increasing water scarcity, soil erosion, rapid decline in biodiversity, and chemical pollution, there are other interrelated and environmentally destructive developments, each of which has the medium-term potential to make large parts of the earth uninhabitable.

Data collected about climate change have made it clear where the perpetrators of the barely avertable catastrophe, which will primarily affect poorer countries, are located: In 2010, CO2 emissions per capita were 4.4 tons worldwide, 17.3 in the USA, 9.3 in Germany, 7.0 in OECD Europe, 5.4 in China, 1.4 in India and 0.9 in Africa (source: IEA). China has caught up strongly here in recent years; in 2004, its per capita emissions were still below the global average. Obviously, this is due to its continued high economic growth rates, while the OECD countries are struggling with the recession and their CO2 emissions are therefore declining slightly.

It is not only from these figures that we can see that the crossing of natural barriers is strongly correlated with the development of capitalist wealth. There are a few exceptions, but as a general rule it can be said that the more developed and wealthy a state is, the higher the contribution of its citizens to global environmental destruction. Yet the effects of this destruction rarely affect those who caused it in the first place. Once again, the developed countries are waging the “war on the planet,” but the poorer countries are the first to suffer the consequences. This is certainly one reason why measures are implemented to deal with the symptoms, while their causes remain undealt with.

The deeper reason, however, lies in the importance that economic growth seems to have for the well-being of every modern society. Crises are always growth crises. For countries like Portugal, for example, to get out of their misery, the general consensus would be that decades of GDP growth of three percent a year would be required, and no one knows where it is supposed to come from; China, according to the ideas of its leadership, needs annual growth of at least seven percent and is launching one economic stimulus program after another to achieve this; and even every G8 or G20 summit, despite all other differences, agrees that everything must be done to boost global economic growth.

Obviously, we are dealing with a dilemma: A modern society must grow, even in competition with others, otherwise it risks breaking apart like the states of “real existing socialism” at the end of the 1980s or those of the “Arab Spring” in this decade – the democratic or Islamist ideologies that supposedly brought about the overthrow were mere folklore here as well as there. But with the kind of growth we are talking about here, environmental degradation grows along with it in the same way. In the end, the only alternative is between social decay and the overexploitation of society’s natural foundations.

The Capitalist Mode of Production as A Blind Spot in The Environmental Discussion

So the question arises whether there is a way out of this dilemma. The problem is that in the bourgeois public sphere, the capitalist mode of production and its categories – labor, commodity and money, wage and profit, market and state – are sacrosanct. It is easier to imagine the end of the world than the overcoming of this historically specific social formation. But if capitalism is considered to be as natural and self-evident as the air we breathe, which it will soon cut off, it is impossible to find an adequate answer to the question of how to get out of this dilemma. The entire discussion of the environmental crisis therefore necessarily comes to nothing and seems strangely unreal, because all sides are working with fictions and at best producing bogus solutions, which all those involved somehow know.

This is most obvious – apart from the simple denial of the problem – in the case of the economic hardliners, who view such an economically unproductive resource as a rainforest with the same indifference with which they view the future, which lies beyond the current cycles of valorization. As far as the more distant times are concerned, they like to operate with so-called discount rates, with which future costs are made to disappear. In 2006, the former chief economist of the World Bank, Nicholas Stern, calculated the costs of climate change in dollars in the report named after him, which is how the climate debate gained momentum in the first place; after all, money was now at stake. According to the Stern Report, the costs of unchecked climate change will amount to between 5 and 20 percent of global GDP by the end of the century, while the necessary countermeasures would only require investments of 1 percent of global GDP within the next twenty years, to be financed by a carbon tax, for example. The question with such calculations is always how future and present costs are compared. The Stern Review operates at a discount rate of 1.4 percent per year, which means that a cost of $1,000 90 years from now would cost $285 today. In contrast, mainstream economists, most notably William Nordhaus, professor of economics at Yale, argued that this discounting was much too low because the world would be much richer in the future than it is today due to economic growth. Nordhaus then presented a calculation with discounting of about 6 percent annually, in which $1,000 to be paid in 90 years is equivalent to $5 today, making future costs largely negligible. The environmental crisis is thus discounted away; it no longer exists.

A somewhat less brute approach is taken by companies and governments that have to take into account the concerns of their customers or voters. Here, the strategy of “greenwashing” has proven successful, i.e. the mere simulation of environmental and climate protection. In the case of companies, it is clear that the only thing that matters is their green (and social) image, which must be polished up so that their products can be consumed without a guilty conscience. What happens behind the beautiful façade, on the other hand, hardly matters as long as it does not come to light. Governments must first and foremost fulfill their task of ensuring the smoothest possible valorization of capital. This is what they were elected for, and their ability to act depends on this through tax revenue. Environmental protection, the importance of which must of course be emphasized, has to reach for this ceiling, which at best may be dyed green. In Germany, this can be observed particularly well when it comes to the interests of the automotive industry, which is central to the German business model: Of course, it is agreed at international conferences to reduce CO2 emissions from road traffic as well, but as soon as someone wants to get serious about this, like the EU Commission in 2007, which demanded levies for CO2 emissions from sedans of more than 130 grams per kilometer from 2012 onwards, a German environment minister (Sigmar Gabriel in this case) can only see this as a “competitive war against German car manufacturers.” And the 2009 scrappage scheme, a stimulus program for the benefit of the auto industry and an environmental mess of the first order, operated under the green label of an “environmental premium.”

Political parties not in government and extra-parliamentary groups, on the other hand, can afford to set priorities in a more balanced way and propagate the compatibility of economy and ecology, which they themselves believe in as long as they do not have to implement it. What then emerges are concepts of a “Green New Deal” or even an “ecological Kondratieff,” i.e., a new long wave of capitalist accumulation based on “green technology” that is supposed to replace the current “finance-driven capitalism.” In this context, the beneficial effect on new jobs and economic development is emphasized, whereby all of a sudden ecology is not an obstacle for the economy, but on the contrary a direct path to new profits. In the German discussion, of course, this refers to jobs and profits of the German market leaders, and in fact a transfer to the whole world would not be possible at all: As long as green energy is more expensive than fossil energy, it will not be able to assert itself in capitalist competition. And vice versa: It can only become cheaper – if at all – by largely rationalizing away the labor (and thus also the profits) from its production. This will then suffice for new jobs at best in Germany or – more likely – China.

The goal of “sustained economic growth” expressed in these concepts, which was advocated at the 2012 UN Summit on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro, for example, is a contradiction in terms, despite all the elasticity of the concept of sustainability, as long as economic growth means what it does in the current sense. And what else could it mean? Anyone who talks like this is merely obfuscating the environmental and climate problems and trying to convince himself that the incompatible can be reconciled.

From the assessment that a decoupling of economic growth and increasing environmental destruction will not be possible, the representatives of a “post-growth society” finally draw the obvious conclusion to completely abandon the concept of growth. In view of the close connection between the capitalist mode of production and an obsession with growth, one would actually expect an abolitionist program in the relevant anthologies on post-growth. In fact, however, the former German President Horst Köhler is allowed to make the demand for a “social and ecological market economy” without contradiction, as if there were such a thing as a non-capitalist market economy. Hope is placed in entrepreneurs who no longer chase profit but are committed to the sustainability of their production. Money as a medium of socialization is not questioned at all, only the handling of it is supposed to be more serious, i.e. more economical, than in recent years. And of course, the followers of Silvio Gesell, who consider interest to be the cause of all evil and want to get to the bottom of “rapacious capital” (see the text “Elendsselbstverwaltung” by Peter Bierl in KONKRET 4/2013), also cavort in this environment. Despite some clever analyses of the deep-rooted connection between the concept of growth and modernity, in the end it does not seem to be enough for more than an abbreviated critique of capitalism, and that can sometimes be worse than no critique at all.

What is it That is Growing So Compulsively?

If you want to get away from the compulsion to grow, you must first understand what it is. To hold excessive consumption responsible for this compulsion misses the real constraints, because contrary to what the economics textbooks would have us believe, consumption is not the purpose of capitalist production. If that were so, there would be no need for advertising. As is well known, the Protestant ethic of asceticism and renunciation, which is now being propagated again by some post-growth ideologists, was at the beginning of capitalism: Earning money, not in order to squander it, but in order to make more and more money out of it, has since then been the insane end in itself of all economic activity. Capitalism is thus doomed to grow: If it can sell them, it produces goods without end; if it cannot, it falls into crisis. In this process, consumption is a mere means, because the goods have to be sold for the purpose of making money.

For a more precise understanding, a distinction must be made here between surplus value production, material output and resource consumption. To produce more and more surplus value is the very purpose that drives the process of production. The exploitation of labor creates surplus value, and the concrete activity is not important for the abstract wealth produced by labor, but only the labor time in which “muscle, nerve, brain, etc. are expended” (Marx). However, abstract wealth requires a material bearer, and for the realization of surplus value the goods must first be produced, but then also sold, which presupposes a corresponding solvent demand.

The increase of productivity in the course of the history of the capitalist mode of production has dramatically changed the quantitative relationship between the abstract wealth measured in labor time on the one hand and the material effort required for its production. The increase in productivity itself has its origin in the hunt for extra profits, which beckon to those who can produce more cheaply than their competitors. This development leads to labor being increasingly removed from the production process and replaced by machines. With less and less labor, more and more material wealth can be produced. However, since this is not the actual meaning and purpose of production, working time is not reduced, as would be sensible and possible in material terms, but the reverse calculation is made: For the production of the same abstract wealth measured in working time, an ever higher material output and – since labor is replaced by machines – an even more strongly growing consumption of resources is required. There are countervailing trends, such as in increasing energy efficiency, i.e., when the energy input per final product decreases. However, the ratio of material input per unit of working time is clear: It is constantly growing in the sectors producing surplus value, visible, for example, in the material and monetary input per industrial workplace.

In this “moving contradiction” (Marx), which consists in the fact that capital increasingly removes labor from the production process, on whose exploitation its wealth is based, which it must chase, lies the common cause of economic and ecological crisis. The material bearers of abstract wealth, which is forced to grow without measure, are finite, so that expansion must necessarily come up against two barriers: those of limited solvent demand (economic crisis) and those of natural resource exhaustion (ecological crisis).

At the same time, the treatment of the symptoms of the crisis, which is at best still possible within capitalism, comes into contradiction with itself: Every attempt to even mitigate the economic crisis by economic stimulus programs leads to increased environmental destruction. Conversely, to reduce this, the world economy would have to be prescribed a deep permanent depression, with all the social and material consequences this would have for the occupants of the capitalist mode of production. In fact, the only small bend in the growth curve of global CO2 emissions was in the recession year of 2009.

What would be necessary is social planning according to concrete considerations of the production and distribution of material wealth alone. But in capitalism, the dominance of abstract wealth and the compulsion to its permanent increase stand in the way, as Robert Kurz states in the epilogue of his “Black Book Capitalism” in a more general context:

“The problems that must be solved are actually poignantly simple. Firstly, the real and abundantly available resources of natural substances, equipment and not least of human ability must be utilized in such a way that every person is guaranteed a good pleasurable life, which is free of hunger and poverty. There is no need to mention that this would long have been easily possible if the organizational form of society did not systematically deny this fundamental demand. Secondly, there must be an end to the catastrophic misallocation of resources (insofar as these are even capitalistically mobilized) into senseless pyramid projects and destructive production. Needless to say, this equally obvious and dangerous “misallocation” is likewise brought about by none other than the prevalent social order. And thirdly, it is after all of elementary interest that the vast increase in additional time available to society as a result of the productive forces of micro-electronics should be converted into an equal amount of leisure

All this is akin to an insane fairy tale, in which the absurd seems normal and the natural entirely unintelligible: that which is there for all to see and need not actually be mentioned is completely repressed in social consciousness, as though a spell had been cast over it. Despite the blatantly obvious fact that even a reasonably sensible use of common resources has become entirely irreconcilable with the capitalist form, discussions only ever focus on “ideas” and approaches that take for granted precisely this form.”

This does not deny the usefulness of many an individual measure to preserve the environment. However, the often and gladly invoked “peace with nature” will only be available beyond capitalism.

Foster, John Bellamy, Brett Clark, and Richard York. 2010. The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth. New York: Monthly Review.

Seidl, I., and A. Zahrnt, eds. 2010. Postwachstumsgesellschaft: Konzepte für die Zukunft, Marburg: Metropolis.

Welzer, H.,  and K. Wiegand, eds. 2013. Wege aus der Wachstumsgesellschaft, Frankfurt a. M: S. Fischer.

Kurz, Robert. 2009. Schwarzbuch Kapitalismus. Ein Abgesang auf die Marktwirtschaft, Eichborn, Frankfurt a. M, as PDF at http://www.exit-online.org/pdf/schwarzbuch.pdf.

Originally published in KONKRET in 11/13

The End of The Game

Why A General Demonetization Is Only A Question Of Time

Claus Peter Ortlieb

Still the very recurrence of crises despite all the warnings of the past, in regular intervals, forbids the idea of seeking their final causes in the recklessness of single individuals. If speculation toward the close of a given commercial period appears as the immediate forerunner of the crash, it should not be forgotten that speculation itself was engendered in the previous phases of the period, and is therefore, itself a result and an accident, instead of the final cause and the substance. The political economists who pretend to explain the regular spasms of industry and commerce by speculation, resemble the now extinct school of natural philosophers who considered fever as the true cause of all maladies.

Karl Marx: The Trade Crisis in England, 1857, MECW 15, p. 401

The vast majority of economists still seem to regard “fever as the true cause of all diseases,” even 130 years after Marx. If one follows their logic, the crisis in which we still find ourselves began in 2008 with the financial crash in the wake of the Lehman bankruptcy. The cause, according to their thinking, was a crisis in the banking system, whose financial securities became largely worthless overnight. To save the financial system from complete collapse, governments had to bail out the banks with taxpayers’ money.  The bursting of the speculative bubbles also led to a severe recession in the real economy. To combat it, in the following year alone, 2009, government stimulus programs to the tune of around 3 trillion dollars were launched worldwide, thus preventing a depression like that of the 1930s – with some regrettable exceptions in southern Europe.

Since then, we have been dealing with a “sovereign debt crisis” and a still weakening economy, and “neoliberals” and “Keynesians” are arguing about what to do in this situation. While the prevailing free-market extremist doctrine, ignoring even the history of the crisis that has been shortened to the period after 2008, believes that it must fight government debt according to the microeconomic model of the “Swabian housewife” because “we have lived beyond our means,” Keynesian macroeconomists such as Nobel laureate Paul Krugman point to their textbooks: “The upswing, not the downturn, is the right time for austerity measures. Today, governments would need to spend more money, not less, and to do so until the private sector is again able to sustain the recovery.”

Common Ground Between the Adversaries

These two opposing points of view have more in common than they might like to believe. Their similarities lie in the fact that – unlike Marx – they are not familiar with a systemic concept of crisis and can only ever see the causes of the crisis phenomena (which cannot be overlooked) in the misconduct of economic actors, which is why the way out of the crisis is only a question of time and of choosing the right means.

In the standard neoclassical textbooks, the keyword “crisis” does not appear at all. It cannot exist because, according to this doctrine, markets are always and everywhere in equilibrium, apart from short-term disturbances, and supply and demand therefore coincide; and if empirical evidence shows otherwise, this can only be due to non-market influences, which therefore have to be eliminated, a line of thought that justifies, for example, austerity policies to restore “competitiveness.”

Keynesianism, on the other hand, is acquainted with the situation of crisis, as Keynes defined it for the 1930s, as a “chronic state of subnormal activity which lasts a considerable time without clearly tending toward recovery or complete collapse.” But “thanks to the analyses of contemporary economists like Keynes and the insights of their successors, we now know what actions policymakers should have taken at the time. And these analyses also tell us what we should do in today’s crisis.” Thus, for Paul Krugman, quoted here, the crisis as a permanent condition only exists if policymakers do the wrong thing, or nothing at all, and this is precisely the main accusation he makes of German policymakers in particular in his book Forget the Crisis. It should also be noted that the justification of Keynesian measures is practically devoid of any prior determination of the causes of the crisis. Crises seem to be operational accidents, something that happens from time to time, but can be fixed using knowledge from past experience.

The lack of a systemic concept of crisis has to do with the misconception of the meaning and purpose of capitalist economic activity, as propagated, for example, in the introductions to economics textbooks. There, capitalism is not mentioned, but it is stated that from the Stone Age to the present day, the goal of the economy has been the provision and consumption of goods, which are unfortunately in short supply, and it is for that reason that not everyone can have everything they want. Nowadays, every child knows that it is not the goods that are scarce, but only the money needed to acquire them, and that the purpose of all capitalist economic activity is exclusively to turn money into more money, while the satisfaction of needs is at best a welcome, though not always achievable, side effect. Only economists are ignorant of this fact. In this respect, economics can be understood as an attempt to systematically drive this knowledge out of its students, which has already made many an entrepreneur lament that they should read Marx, who after all knew how capitalism works.

The Systemic Concept of Crisis in Marx

It is left to the Marxian critique of political economy alone to make capitalism recognizable as a mode of production with two forms of wealth: In addition to concrete material wealth, as all social formations have known it, in capitalism there is a second, abstract and dominant form of wealth, expressed in money, measured in labor time, “value” in Marx’s terms. The goal of capital valorization is the multiplication of abstract wealth, whether with the production of bombs or children’s shoes is irrelevant, but the production of material wealth cannot simply be dispensed with. However, it is only a side effect and not the purpose of the activity, which consists solely in the production of surplus value. Political economy before Marx and political economy after him simply identified these two forms of wealth as “wealth par excellence” and thus missed the particular historical specificity of the capitalist mode of production. In particular, they were blind to the crises associated with this mode of production.

The systemic concept of crisis developed by Marx is based, in short, on the fact that the two capitalist forms of wealth can, and do, come into contradiction with each other again and again and to an ever-increasing degree. Since the increase of abstract wealth requires the production and sale of material wealth, successful capital valorization and accumulation presupposes the constant expansion of material production and consumer markets. As soon as the growing and in principle unlimited supply of commodities is confronted with only a limited solvent demand, the valorization process enters a crisis. The consequences are overproduction, i.e. unsellable goods, and over-accumulation, i.e. capacities that can no longer be valorized, mass layoffs, shutdown of production capacities and finally the flight of capital that can no longer be valorized into speculation.

These crises, which occur again and again in the history of capitalism, are not the return of the same thing over and over again; rather, with growing productivity, the two forms of wealth move further and further apart, which Marx characterizes as a “moving contradiction”: “Capital itself is the moving contradiction, [in] that it presses to reduce labor time to a minimum, while it posits labor time, on the other side, as the sole measure and source of wealth” (Grundrisse, 706, translation amended). Capital requires the valorization of labor while at the same time it gradually removes labor from the production process, thus destroying its own basis. Because labor time is the measure of value, the growing productivity has the consequence that, in order to achieve the same abstract wealth, an ever greater material output must be produced and sold. The crises thus increase in space and time and intensify: “Capitalist production continually strives to overcome these immanent barriers, but it overcomes them only by means that set up the barriers afresh and on a more powerful scale. The true barrier to capitalist production is capital itself” (Karl Marx: Capital: Volume III, 358).

The Long-Term Causes of The Crisis

Capital was able to satisfy the compulsion to expand resulting from the boundlessness of abstract wealth on a large scale for the last time in the period of the Fordist boom after World War 2, the “golden age of capitalism” (Eric Hobsbawm) and, at the same time, of Keynesianism. Fordism was based on mass industrial labor on the assembly line and mass consumption and presupposed a corresponding increase in real wages and the expansion of social security systems, as well as state investment in infrastructure and the education system. During this expansionary phase, economic fluctuations could indeed be balanced out by government stimulus programs (“global control” and “concerted action” in the FRG), and it is from this period that the Keynesian textbook recipes draw their justification.

That time has passed. As early as the 1970s, the Fordist boom reached its limits – due in part to the strong growth of productivity – against which Keynesian economic policy proved powerless. The phase of “stagflation” followed: government stimulus programs were no longer able to trigger self-sustaining capital accumulation, but only led to high inflation rates, which in some cases were in the double-digits. Those who, like Krugman, propagate a relaunch of such programs as a way out of the crisis should first and foremost deal with the failure of Keynesianism at the time. For it is here – and not in 2008 – that the origins of the current crisis lie.

Neoliberalism was the answer to this failure, a reaction to the crisis of the real economy with the aim of allowing the generation of profits to continue, even though the real capitalist basis for it began to shrink. One component was the deregulation of the financial sector and thus the expansion of the possibilities for credit-based money creation. It is part of the normal crisis roadmap that already realized profits, in the absence of real investment opportunities, flow into the financial markets and fuel speculation there. Neoliberalism, however, has elevated this crisis-postponing evasion to a program and thus created the illusion of the new mode of regulation, of a “finance-driven capitalism.” The independence of finance capital has always been a symptom of capitalist crises, but never their cause. What is special about the current crisis, which has been going on for almost forty years, is the spatial and temporal scale in which this process is taking place. Historically unprecedented, for example, is the deindustrialization of entire economies – like that of Great Britain under Margaret Thatcher – in favor of the new financial “industry.”

Contrary to its own monetarist doctrine, neoliberalism was, in this respect, a continuation of Keynesianism by other means, namely at the private level. The state was replaced by private lenders, who also financed the real economy through loans and thus kept it going. By shifting large amounts of money from mass consumption to the financial sector, inflation disappeared at the same time; more precisely, it shifted from the consumer goods to the stock and real estate markets (asset inflation), a thoroughly welcome effect, because the owners of the corresponding property titles could count on it to make them rich.

The “most gigantic credit-financed economic stimulus program that has ever existed” (Meinhard Miegel), ultimately the financing of credit by new credit, can of course no more be sustained in the long term than an attempt to generate wealth by chain mail. As a result, global monetary and fixed assets have increased twenty-fold in the last thirty years as if by magic, but without being matched by a corresponding increase in real values. Even the bursting of a small part of these bubbles was enough in 2008 to drive the banking system into a near total collapse, from which it could only be saved by the intervention of the states, which have since been struggling with their own debt crisis and a more or less severe recession.

Tinkering with The Consequences of The Crisis

Because of the unimaginable size of the accumulated money supply, which has been further inflated by the zero-interest rate policy of the central banks, a general demonetization is only a matter of time. The Keynesian argument that all this money apparently does not lead to inflation is likely to prove deceptive. There is no danger of inflation only as long as this money is circling self-sufficiently in financial heaven. As soon as it turns to earthly things, however, it fuels inflation there. This has already been observed on commodity and food markets, as well as on various real estate and housing markets, as a result of which rents in major German cities have recently become unaffordable for many of those affected.

In view of this situation, the proposed countermeasures, if they are really intended as a way out of the crisis, seem strangely unreal. Both sides fail to recognize that for almost forty years the real economy has been kept going only by creating debt. Austerity policies that seek to end this must necessarily lead to depression. Keynesian stimulus programs, on the other hand, amount to a mere continuation of debt policy ad infinitum, because the private sector will never again be able to sustain the upswing.

In the last forty years of crisis (measured as gross value added per hour worked according to German data from the Federal Statistical Office), productivity in industry has tripled once again, and in agriculture it has even increased six-fold. For the production of material wealth, labor becomes more and more unnecessary, and the real surplus value production based on the exploitation of labor thus becomes an impossibility. The inability of the capitalist mode of production to deal with the possibility of a life without labor that appears here is shown, for example, by the fact that, for the sake of the phantasm of “competitiveness,” the siesta is now slated to be abolished in southern Europe, with the Protestant work ethic finally due to be introduced instead.

The exit from the crisis is only possible by overcoming the abstract form of wealth and thus the capitalist mode of production, which would have to be replaced by some kid of social organization that was based solely on material wealth. As long as such a perspective is unrealistic, i.e., as long as we really only seem to have the choice between austerity measures and Keynesian stimulus programs, the latter is admittedly to be preferred. The neoliberal austerity policy amounts to sacrificing the ever increasing number of people who are no longer “systemically relevant” because they have become superfluous to capital valorization in order to maintain a system that has become unsustainable. The Keynesian programs also have the illusory goal of saving the system, but they pursue it in a more compatible way, because they do not completely lose sight of the aspect of material wealth production.

But such programs could possibly be a little more intelligent than they have been up to now: Since the last forty years have been very detrimental to the public infrastructure, the last of the money could be spent wisely on its partial restoration, as well as on the run-down social security systems. But please, no more “scrappage premiums”; after all, there is also the ecological crisis. But that’s a discussion for another time.

Originally published in KONKRET in 08/13

The Necessary Break

The Climate Movement Needs Anti-Capitalist Guardrails for Its Coming Actions

Tomasz Konicz

The climate movement should not be afraid of being accused of radicalism. Given the civilization-threatening dimensions of the climate crisis, solving this monstrous problem is a matter of sheer collective will to survive. It is obvious that global capitalism, in its unbridled compulsion to grow, is incapable of reducing resource consumption and emissions. This has long been empirically proven, since in the 21st century global emissions of CO2 could only be reduced in the short term at the cost of world economic crises, only to rise again all the more rapidly as a result of subsequent economic stimulus measures. The entire world is being turned into the mere fuel of this irrational cycle of valorization.

Moreover, since wage labor forms the substance of capital, increases in productivity increase the hunger for resources of the capitalist profit machine, since the value of the individual commodity decreases and more commodities have to be produced in order to successfully complete the cycle of valorization (this results in the tendency towards many products being produced in such a way that they break down faster). The climate crisis is a capitalist climate crisis. Without overcoming capital, there is no hope of averting the impending climate catastrophe.

Being radical means first and foremost saying what’s what. The fight against the capitalist climate crisis must be waged with open sights, given the fact that we are rapidly running out of time. It is necessary to tell people openly that sustainable climate protection, i.e. the alleviation of the climate crisis, is only possible if the capitalist compulsion to grow is overcome. The climate struggle must thus be waged as a struggle for transformation into a post-capitalist society. The absolute minimum is to overcome capital’s valorization compulsion, which is running amok.

With this confrontation, the ideological hex that makes the discussion of alternative systems impossible would finally be broken. Most people already suspect that late capitalism is heading for the abyss; the apocalypse is omnipresent in the culture industry, in films and video games. But the difficulty would be to convince people who are lapsing into resignation that an apocalyptic climate catastrophe is not inevitable. The demand for a transformation of the current system would also put a stop to the opportunism rampant among the left-leaning political parties, who still see even the climate crisis as a vehicle for their career aspirations in crisis management.

What Does Anti-Capitalist Climate Policy Mean?

The vision of a climate-friendly and resource-conserving post-capitalist society, which seems so abstract, results from the concrete necessities of climate protection. The demands of an anti-capitalist climate policy must not be concerned with the irrational coercive logic of eroding and ailing late capitalism; they must be oriented towards the objective, scientific necessities of climate protection, as well as towards the technological possibilities of society. The productive forces that capitalism developed would break the fetters of capitalist production relations.

In concrete terms, this also means countering the current fears of wage earners: The killer argument of job preservation in fossil industries would have to be countered, for example, by saying that the reproduction of people must no longer be linked to the reproduction of capital via their jobs. For this confronts wage-earners in late capitalism with the tragic choice between social survival and the threat of climate collapse. The same applies to the admonitions about the financial viability of climate protection measures, which could be countered by intensifying and extending the debate about socialization and expropriation.

The ideological constraints that capital has erected in the neoliberal era must be countered by the very real constraints of climate protection. Such a transformational climate policy, linking concrete actions with demands that clearly go beyond the logic of capital, would be tantamount to a first breakout from the capitalist thought prison.

But what actually needs to be overcome? Even the most powerful capitalists are helplessly vulnerable to the inherent dynamics of capital, which it generates via market mediation. The uncontrollable self-movement of money functioning as capital in its forms of commodity, money and labor power is called fetishism. This is why capitalists cannot“save the world,” even though the impending social and ecological collapse ultimately threatens their businesses as well. For it is precisely this dynamic of valorization, unconsciously generated by market subjects, that devastates powerless human societies and the global ecosystem.

Marx’s seemingly cryptic remark that the overcoming of capitalism would conclude “the prehistory of human society” thus acquires its clarity. All previous human history took place unconsciously, within the framework of fetishistic social systems: from the religious fetishism of early times and the Middle Ages to the secularized religion of capital.

The Systemic Crisis of Capital Is Irreversible

Overcoming this state of affairs would mean simplifying social reproduction. The organization of society would then be organized directly through an egalitarian process of direct communication by the members of society. This goal would also have to appear in the organizational structure of the transformational movement, which plans its course of action in open discourse – thereby at the same time rehearsing for the post-capitalist future.

And here is the crux of the matter: the systemic crisis of capital is also an irreversible, fetishistic process, as it chokes on its increasing economic and ecological contradictions and passes into transformation. It is not a question of the subjective will of the members of society whether the collapsing system will be overcome. It is a question of the very survival of human civilization, ultimately of human existence, in which way the coming transformation process will proceed: as a chaotic disintegration, in the form of the establishment of a brutal crisis dictatorship, or in a progressive direction that would open up new emancipatory perspectives for humanity in spite of all the coming climate-related disasters. What lies ahead is a struggle over the course of how the system will be transformed.

What’s more, this process of transformation is already underway – and the increasing political, ideological and military conflicts are precisely the expression of this upheaval that is unconsciously taking place over humanity. Civilization or barbarism – these are the extreme poles in this historical “phase of transition.” The struggle for transformation toward a post-capitalist future worth living in should be the common denominator of many seemingly disparate movements and struggles.

As the system is in upheaval and the formerly fixed social structures – from the eroding state, to the political landscape in disintegration, to the constantly crumbling economy – are in a certain sense liquefying, collective actions have a far greater influence on shaping the future than in periods when capitalism seemed more stable. Bourgeois politics, the actions of political subjects, are thus also important again, they carry weight. Not because they solve the crisis, but because they can determine the course of the crisis. Whether Donald Trump or Bernie Sanders sits in the White House is certainly relevant to the course of the crisis process.

Tasks for Radical Movements

The task for radical movements is thus to understand even seemingly reformist decisions as setting the course for transformation and to position themselves accordingly. Here, too, it is important to emphasize the necessity of system transformation in order to finally anchor a discourse on social alternatives in society as a whole. Even protest movements like Fridays for Future and uprisings like the “Arab Spring” are similar in that they can erupt spontaneously when social tipping points are crossed. However, these very different movements, which have erupted in reaction to the same socio-ecological crisis process, are only able to take an emancipatory course if they are supported by an adequate crisis consciousness that is broadly anchored in society.

To understand the crisis as a maxim of emancipatory praxis, then, is to ask in what form late capitalist society will enter the inevitable process of transformation. Should it be an authoritarian, racist, police-state administered oligarchy with absurd social abysses in which the fossil fuel industry buys its parties, or a more egalitarian, bourgeois-democratic polity in which there continues to be space for radical critique and praxis? A progressive movement, borne of an understanding of the necessity of systemic transformation, would thus struggle to establish conditions that could steer this transformational dynamic in an emancipatory direction. The maxim of such a post-politics would consist, on the one hand, in the effort to maintain and further develop the process of civilization, and, on the other hand, in the struggle to overcome the destructive inherent dynamics of capitalism.

There is a maxim of political practice that left movements, groups or even parties must follow in the 21st century if they want to act as progressive social forces in the current epoch of upheaval and crisis. Capitalism must be transformed into history as quickly as possible, the capital relation as a social totality must be consciously abolished – all practical actions, all tactics, all reform proposals, all broader strategies would have to be oriented towards this categorical imperative.

This is not an expression of leftist “radicalism,” but the formulation of a reasonable bare minimum, which, if not realized, would lead to 21st century civilization ending in barbarism. It is precisely because capital is collapsing that it must be overcome. Progress can only be realized beyond capital, in the transformational struggle to shape a post-capitalist society.

Originally published in analyse & kritik on 08/12/2022

Embrace the Chaos

The cruel lobbying and business practices of the app-based ­transport service ­Uber are in line with its brutal business model. And they are an expression of the processes of barbarism in the ­centers ­caused by the crisis.

Tomasz Konicz

Some 124,000 internal documents comprise the so-called Uber Files, leaked to the press by Mark MacGann, the transport service’s former chief lobbyist for Europe, the Middle East and Africa. The corporate correspondence, analyzed by the UK’s Guardian, exposes the cruel, early-capitalist methods used by arguably the best-known company in the internet-based gig economy to pursue its aggressive expansion strategy between 2013 and 2017.

Uber’s core business consists of organizing and exploiting day laborers who are placed on a digital marketplace for passenger transportation. The group collects a commission of 25 percent of the fare on ­all transport provided through its app, although in many countries the providers of this service are pseudo self-employed workers who have to bear all the risk and provide their own vehicles.

In some cases, it was perfectly clear to Uber’s management that the transport service was simply operating beyond the applicable laws and regulations. Senior management correspondence stated, for example, that the group should refrain from making “antagonistic statements” because its business model was “not legal in many countries.” Managers joked in internal emails that they had now “officially become pirates.” The company’s head of communications explained in a 2014 email that the company often gets in trouble simply because its practices are “illegal as fuck.”

In order to secure its own legal position, according to the correspondence analyzed, Uber made efforts to press for corresponding changes in the law as part of an elaborate lobbying campaign. In 2016 alone, the company, which is endowed with lavish venture capital, is said to have budgeted around 90 million US dollars for greasing the political machine. Leading politicians from the US and the EU are said to have been receptive to the demands of the rapidly expanding gig company, which, according to the Guardian, liked to seek “unofficial routes to power” by acting on “friends and intermediaries” of decision-makers and preferred to seek out politicians for intimate talks “without the presence of advisers.” Influential officials were turned into “strategic investors” to ensure their support in countries such as Russia and Italy. In addition, Uber bought academics who ­gave the company a good report on ­its business practices in commissioned reports.

Hundreds of politicians are said to have been worked on by Uber lobbyists. Among the prominent targets of the lobbying campaign is even the current US president ­Joe Biden, who according to the leaks had a meeting with Uber co-founder Travis Kalanick on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2016 when he was vice president. In an email, Kalanick complained that Biden was running late and that he let the vice president know that “every minute he is late will be one less minute with me.” Biden, who supported Uber at the time, gushed after the Davos meeting that Uber gives millions of workers the freedom to “work as many hours as they want, live their own lives as they want.”

Another prominent Uber supporter currently resides in the Élysée Palace. The Uber Files reveal that French President Emmanuel ­Macron met several times with representatives of the transport service during his tenure as Minister of Economics and intervened on its behalf in 2015 in the southern French port city of Marseille, where a ­de facto transport ban was to be imposed on Uber ­following ­disputes and protests by taxi drivers. Macron reportedly agreed to “look into the matter personally” after MacGann intervened. Shortly ­after, the ­Marseille ­police prefect’s order was defused. In an assessment by the group, ­this was chalked up as a success achieved through “massive pressure from Uber.” According to internal correspondence, the meetings between Macron and Uber representatives took place in a “warm, friendly and constructive atmosphere.”

How the notorious revolving door between politics and business works in concrete terms is made clear by company correspondence about former EU Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes, who informally lobbied for Uber while still on maternity leave after leaving office – even though the EU Commission ­had forbidden her to do so. According to the group’s email correspondence, Kroes, who is Dutch, allegedly intervened with the Dutch government during a police raid on Uber in Amsterdam to “force the authorities to back down.” However, the ­email went on to say that the ­cooperation with the former EU commissioner was “strictly confidential” and should not be ­mentioned in ­company documents.

Due to legal conflicts with authorities and frequent police raids, ­Uber branches are even reported to have installed “kill switches” in their IT systems, which can be activated to make all sensitive data inaccessible. This software is also said to have been used in searches in several countries, including France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Moreover, the ­company’s management is ­said to have been ­prepared to risk or even provoke violent clashes between Uber drivers and taxi drivers. After riots by taxi drivers in Paris, Kalanick called for counter-protests to be organized. Kalanick downplayed warnings of attacks that could come from “far-right thugs,” saying that “violence would guarantee the success” of the protests.

Uber’s strategy, according to the Guardian, has been to use drivers as “weapons” and to exploit the violence directed against them in order to gain political concessions on rules and regulations. This method was used in Italy, Spain, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands. The “violence narrative should be allowed to run for a few days,” emails about riots in the Netherlands said, “before offering a solution.” Internal correspondence sometimes encouraged management to “embrace the chaos” of a crisis-ridden late-capitalist world in which even legal business practices were becoming increasingly brutal and mafia-like. Uber needs to generate growth even when “fires are breaking out,” Kalanick said in a ­motivational email to managers; that’s “a normal part” of the Uber business: “Embrace the chaos. It means you’re doing something meaningful.”

Although this forced ­expansion did not succeed in all countries and cities, the lobbying investments were successful overall: Uber is now valued at 43 billion US dollars with an annual turnover of 17 billion US dollars and handles 19 million rides in 72 countries every day. Tens of thousands of pseudo self-employed workers, who sometimes have to sleep in their cars because of their wretched wages, eke out a living as day laborers for the internet platform.

Uber’s meteoric rise was hardly slowed down by legal regulations and a political establishment that was always open to lobbying money – only the pandemic, which led to a decline in sales and heavy losses, did that. In addition, the critique of digital day labor, on which the platform economy of Uber & Co. is based, has received new ammunition with the publication of the Uber Files. In Italy, taxi drivers protested against the corporation and the liberalization plans of Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s government in response to the revelations. At the same time, in the Swiss canton of Geneva, trade unions called on the state to intervene, as Uber was effectively continuing to circumvent the labor regulations according to which Uber drivers are employees.

Originally published in jungle world on 07/28/2022

One Bitcoin Please

What Bitcoin’s Development Reveals About the State of The Money Medium

Claus Peter Ortlieb

The savages of Cuba regarded gold as a fetish of the Spaniards. They celebrated a feast in its honor, sang in a circle around it and then threw it into the sea.

(Marx, 1975/1842, MECW pp. 262-263)

Under the title “Bits and Barbarism,” Paul Krugman, mentioned here many times before (most recently in The End of The Game), in his New York Times column of December 22, 2013, tells a fable of three kinds of money creation, two of which represented monetary regression owed to the strange decision of many people to turn back the clock on centuries of progress.

The Porgera gold mine in Papua New Guinea, currently one of the largest gold producers with a terrible reputation for both its human rights violations and the environmental destruction it causes, is cited as an example of the first type of monetary creation. But because the price of gold, despite its collapse since its last peak, is still three times what it was a decade earlier, the digging must continue.

Krugman cites the “Bitcoin mine” in Reykjanesbaer, Iceland, as a paradigmatic site for the second, much stranger type of money creation. Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency (see appendix). Why it has value is hard to say, he says, but its value is based first on the fact that people are willing to buy it because they believe other people are willing to do the same. It is a kind of virtual gold: Bitcoins can be mined, i.e., new Bitcoins can be created, by solving very complex mathematical problems, which, however, require high computer performance and a large amount of electrical energy to operate the computers. And because electricity is cheap in Iceland and there is enough cold air to cool the hot-running computers, it is the ideal place to mine Bitcoins.

Krugman contrasts these two, in his view, regressive ways of creating money with a reasonable third, supposedly hypothetical way, which is Keynes’s 1936 advice that governments in crisis spend money they don’t have. Then, as now, there were political reservations about this suggestion, he said, which is why Keynes ironically recommended as an alternative that the government bury money in bottles and then have private investors dig it up again. He also said that completely nonsensical government spending would stimulate the economy. Finally, he said, gold mining was not far removed from this kind of senseless activity: there, gold was taken out of the ground in one place to be reburied elsewhere as the central banks’ gold hoard. The gold standard, Keynes said, was a “barbaric relic.” And – now Krugman again – Bitcoin adds to the nonsense by burning resources to create “virtual gold” consisting of nothing but electronic strings.

Apparently, not only neoclassical economists but also Keynesians like Krugman face the problem that economic agents behave differently than envisioned by their respective theories. At least Krugman still recognizes this discrepancy, but can only explain it with the tendency of many people toward regression and irrationality. It remains unclear where this tendency is supposed to come from.

Seen from the outside, that is, from a purely material point of view, it is striking that the whole debate bears traits of insanity. The “barbarism” in question here is rooted in a social relationship that demands completely nonsensical or even socially harmful activities from people so that they can survive the next few days or weeks. As is well known, this is one of the lesser evils of the ruling mode of production, which, of course, is not limited to the creation of money, but pervades labor relations in declining capitalism: from the (Keynesian recommendations) scrappage premium to the preventive administration of antibiotics in factory farming to the devastation of entire swaths of land for the last drops of oil, to name just a few of the rather harmless examples.

And what is barbaric about gold is not the metal, but the fact that it is made into a fetish, which, however, would not be possible without the underlying fetish of commodities and money, as shown by the “savages of Cuba” Marx tells us about: Without money as a social relation, gold can be dealt with quite loosely.

Finally, bitcoin mining, while also crazy in this context, is comparatively harmless; it is the farce that history repeats itself as, in Marx’s words, here the story of the gold fetish. Bitcoins can be created from nothing like book money. Nevertheless, in order to simulate value, a gold costume is put on them. As with gold, a certain amount of work and resources must first be expended before the Bitcoins appear. But this is mere pretense, because this effort is completely unnecessary; the Bitcoins could be created without it. It’s different with gold, because the labor (including the exploitation and environmental destruction associated with it) is actually necessary to get it out of the ground.

Ultimately, bitcoin is counterfeit money that doesn’t even bother to look like “real” money. If it can nevertheless make a career for itself, if it can be turned into dollars or euros without any problems, then money issued by central banks can’t be all that bad either. In fact, cryptocurrencies are only pushing a development that has been going on for decades to the extreme. Since the end of the Bretton Woods system and thus the gold backing of the dollar in 1972, central bank money has also had less and less to do with real wealth. In the last thirty years, for example, global monetary and fixed assets have grown twentyfold without, of course, being backed by corresponding real assets. This is a consequence of the credit-financed economic stimulus program made possible by the neoliberal deregulation of the financial markets, with which the real economy has been kept going for almost forty years, entirely in the sense of Keynes, except that private financiers have taken the place of governments and there is no sign of a self-sustaining upswing.

The huge amounts of money circling in financial heaven, looking for investment opportunities, lead to inflation in all markets to which they turn, such as stock, real estate and commodity markets. For example, the Dow Jones Index, a measure of the stock market’s valuation of U.S. public companies, rose by a factor of seven between 1982 and 2000, adjusted for inflation, at a time when the U.S. real economy was stagnating. For stock owners, such “asset inflation” is quite welcome, because they can sell their shares at a higher value. The fact that seven times the financial assets represent the same company value is irrelevant.

Bitcoin was able to generate an even bigger bubble in the first eleven months of 2013, as its exchange rate against the dollar increased by a factor of 93.5 (see Appendix) without representing even the slightest real value. Ironically, the ideological justifications for cryptocurrencies include talk of the loss of trust in financial markets and central banks, which are contrasted with “reputable” currencies that cannot be manipulated. But behind the backs of the players, the instrument then unexpectedly becomes another object of speculation. After all, some of them get rich in the process.

However, the distrust of central bank money in view of its lack of backing by real values is quite appropriate and also explains the flight into gold as a means of storing value. It remains to be seen whether gold is really a suitable means for this purpose; after all, a bubble has formed here, too, which, like all bubbles, can burst.

In the capitalist sense, money is productive only where surplus value is generated through the valorization of labor. Apparently, there are no longer sufficient investment opportunities for the money available, so that more and more money is merely multiplied fictitiously or simply hoarded, for example as precious metals. Even if Keynesians cannot or do not like to imagine it, this development points to the fact that money as a social relationship has become obsolete in the forty years since the end of the Bretton Woods system.

Appendix: Bitcoin & Co.

Traded since 2009, Bitcoin is the first, most prominent, and weightiest of the so-called cryptocurrencies, nearly a hundred of which now populate the Internet’s marketplaces. A list of the most important ones can be found together with their common characteristics under the Wikipedia entry “cryptocurrency”.

Bitcoins can be exchanged for dollars or euros on the Internet. If one has acquired any, they form an account on one’s own hard drive, integrated into a peer-to-peer network and protected by cryptographic procedures. All Bitcoin transactions are public in this network, but the owners of the Bitcoin accounts remain anonymous. According to the idea, digital currencies are money without banks and without the state. However, apart from its potential use for money laundering, drug trafficking and other covert activities, the utility value of Bitcoins as a means of payment is modest. The few companies that accept Bitcoins (see, for example, http://go-bitcoin.com, also on the grotesque overestimation of the scene) also accept cash and other of the usual payment methods, of course, and paying with them is considerably easier.

Indeed, for electronic payments to be possible without banks, a fixed exchange rate between bitcoin and dollars would be adequate. In fact, this exchange rate is left to the market, and this makes Bitcoins an object of speculation. The vast majority of Bitcoins are not used for purchases, but for currency speculation. Those who hoarded Bitcoins in 2013 could get rich: Between January 1 and November 30, the Bitcoin price rose by a factor of 93.5 from $13 to $1216. It then plummeted by 50 percent before recovering. In January 2014, the price fluctuated between $770 and $900. The high volatility calls bitcoin into question as a means of payment: no one spends bitcoins when they are expected to be 15 percent more valuable in the next week, and no one accepts them when a price collapse is imminent.

Another market is opening up in connection with “bitcoin mining,” the “mining” of new bitcoins. Those who want to produce them and channel them to their account have to solve complex computational tasks in competition with others. In the early days of Bitcoin, a normal PC was enough to do this, but now computing machines are needed whose waste heat could heat an entire house and whose purchase price is that of a mid-range car. And despite this effort, success is not certain because the competition is fierce and the number of new Bitcoins is limited by the underlying algorithm. In the end, as with gold, it is not the prospectors who profit, but those who sell them the prospecting tools.

The maximum amount of Bitcoins is set at 21 million; at the end of January 2014, there were 12.3 million worth a total of about $10 billion. But that can change again quickly.

Originally published in Konkret in 03/2014

Russian Victory in The Economic War?

The invasion of Ukraine is a military disaster for the Kremlin. But in the economic showdown Russia seems to have the upper hand – for now.

Tomasz Konicz

In the first weeks of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, when the Kremlin’s megalomania led to the humiliating Russian retreat from Kiev and northern Ukraine, that military defeat seemed to be accompanied by economic disaster in Russia. The historically unprecedented sanctions imposed by the West in response to the invasion sent Russia’s economy and currency crashing in their initial shock waves. Western derision of the military impotence of Putin’s imperialism was accompanied by derision of the depreciation of the ruble, which briefly plummeted from a dollar exchange rate of 75 rubles at the start of the war of aggression to 135 rubles.

Russia’s inefficient, archaic, and highly corrupt military machine may still be stuck in eastern Ukraine, leaving the Kremlin to celebrate the laborious conquest of Luhansk Oblast as a military victory, but on the economic battlefield the tide has turned – for now. The ruble, which regained its pre-war exchange rate against the dollar back in May, is now trading at 58 rubles per greenback. After barely half a year of war, the Russian currency is worth more than it was before the invasion of Ukraine. Against the euro, this rise of the ruble, which reflects Russia’s economic stabilization, is even more evident: at the beginning of February, around 86 rubles had to be spent for one euro, now it is only 58 rubles. One of the most important goals of the Western sanctions strategy, namely to politically destabilize the Russian “home front” through currency devaluation, which is accompanied by spikes in inflation and losses in prosperity, has thus – so far – failed.

Not only that: now it is the over-indebted Eurozone, dependent on energy imports, that is suffering from the devaluation of its currency, while the skyrocketing prices for raw materials and fossil fuels have given the European currency union a whopping foreign trade deficit of 31.7 billion euros.[1] The further the euro falls, having already reached parity with the dollar,[2] the more expensive the imports of raw materials and energy sources become. The wind has thus shifted. It is now the eurozone that must fear for its stability, as the depreciating euro and high inflation lead to increased political tensions in the currency union. The return of a euro crisis seems likely, while the diverging economic policy interests of the German core and the southern periphery are creating new potential for conflict.

The Eurozone as the “Weakest Link” in the Economic War

With an EU-wide inflation rate of more than eight percent,[3] Italy, which has been in crisis for years,[4] is in debt to the tune of about 150 percent of its economic output,[5] so that any interest rate hikes demanded by Berlin from the European Central Bank (ECB) to combat inflation would quickly make this debt burden south of the Alps unsustainable. This is why the implied conflicts over crisis policy between Germany and the southern periphery are emerging, with Berlin opposing the continuation of expansionary monetary policy and attaching political conditions – such as austerity programs – to aid programs for European countries in crisis.[6] The over-indebted eurozone, plagued by economic imbalances and the place where the dominant German export industry is also increasingly suffering from supply bottlenecks and protectionism, can thus be seen as the West’s “weakest link” in the economic war with Russia. Even the FRG must reckon with a tripling of debt servicing costs due to rising interest rates.[7]

The economic war has thus – by means of the sanction-induced price explosion for fossil fuels – reinforced the already existing inflationary dynamics in the West.[8] The rapid interest rate hikes now being implemented by the US Federal Reserve to combat inflation[9] are causing financial market crises and recession in the US and Europe,[10] and economic collapses and debt crises in the periphery of the world system are likely this year or next as well (more details in the upcoming Konkret 08/2022).

Russia’s Surplus and Economic Slump

The Kremlin, whose military machine is embarrassing itself in Ukraine, has simply chosen the last good strategic moment for its war. The West, especially “German” Europe, has only just begun the already half-hearted, often sabotaged by lobbying, attempt to phase out fossil fuels,[11] so it is still highly dependent on these energy sources, which now gives Russia an advantage in the economic war – the financial fallout of the sanctions thus hits the Western core countries harder than Russia.

This is no exaggeration. Sanctions, which in the West have manifested themselves in widening deficits and an acceleration of inflationary dynamics, have led to rich surpluses for commodity exporter Russia, which has been able to tap new markets. The Russian Federation’s current account surplus (it captures goods, services and remittances) reached a record high of more than $70 billion in the second quarter of this year, as rising export revenues for Russian gas, oil or coal were accompanied by a sanctions-induced slump in imports of Western high-tech or consumer goods.[12] Moscow’s budget surplus is expected to have added up to more than 20 billion euros in the first half of 2022,[13] and this was mainly made possible by export revenues from the sale of oil and gas, which reached the equivalent of 100 billion euros in the first half of the year, around 66 percent of the previously forecasted annual volume.

The Western sanctions, on the other hand, appear to be having the intended effect, at least in terms of economic development. According to current forecasts, Russia’s recession will be far more severe than initially assumed (minus 7.1 percent), at 10.4 percent.[14] Despite all the fears of recession, it is almost certain that neither the USA nor the EU will experience a similarly deep economic slump this year. The situation is similar for the inflation rate. Inflation in the Russian Federation will be in double digits this year at 14.4 percent, significantly higher than in the USA and the EU, which are likely to keep their price increases below the ten percent mark.[15]

And yet these bare numbers can also be deceptive, as they do not simply lead to a proportional political and social fallout depending on their relative magnitude. Authoritarian-ruled Russia, a semi-peripheral country that lives off commodity exports, may ultimately win the economic war despite a more severe economic collapse and higher inflation. The goal of the economic war that accompanies the imperialist war in Ukraine is to shake the enemy’s “home front” through socioeconomic disruption and thereby force it to surrender.

Economic War and Crisis

Here, however, the Russian Federation seems to have a number of advantages that enable the Kremlin to politically survive a far more difficult economic situation than is the case in the West. One is simply the post-democratic character of the Russian state, which tends toward the overtly dictatorial. The possibilities for repression in Russia, where the mere criticism of the Russian invasion of Ukraine can result in prison sentences of several years, are much more far-reaching than in the West, where democratic standards such as the separation of powers and the rule of law still exist – and although they are rapidly eroding, they are still largely valid in substance.

In view of the increasing social and ecological crisis of capital, this authoritarian constitution of Russia or Belarus does not make these societies into discontinued models, but rather into capitalist models of the future. The Belarusian head of state Lukashenko is not Europe’s “last dictator,” as he is often dubbed in the European press. On the contrary: Lukashenko is Europe’s first dictator, he forms the vanguard of the authoritarian capitalist crisis administration, which “west-oriented” countries like Hungary or Poland can also join. The bare, unrestrained state power gives Moscow advantages in manifest crisis situations that the West – as yet – does not have,[16] as was most recently evident in the suppression of the uprisings in Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Moreover, in the entire post-Soviet region – to a lesser extent also in the eastern periphery of the EU – there are still historical and cultural moments that have a stabilizing effect, which are simply not present in the West. The memory of the chaotic and, especially in Russia, catastrophic system transformation in the 1990s is still vivid, so that the current crisis is perceived in a very different contemporary historical context than in the Western core of the world system, where there have been no comparable shocks to the social fabric for more than half a century. While the people of the West feel as if the sky is falling on their heads due to galloping inflation and looming energy crisis, in the East they are confident that things have been much worse before. What’s more, Putin can exploit the memory of the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially among the older generation, to maintain power, because he presents himself as a “factor of order” who can prevent the fall into crisis chaos, which according to Russian state ideology always comes from the West.

Moreover, in the post-Soviet space, subsistence crisis strategies, such as the dacha economy, are still alive, strategies which have been lost in the West due to the complete internal colonization of the core societies by capital under Fordism. In the majority of cases in the EU and the US there are simply no practical conditions for making ends meet by growing one’s own food, selling at informal markets and gathering wood in the forest, as was often the case in Russia in the 1990s. Russian wage earners are far more likely to be able to escape their wage dependency by moving into this informal sector than their Western class counterparts.

No Winners in Crisis Imperialism

And yet it is unlikely that this economic war can be won by Russia – or that it will have any “winners” at all. For one thing, the interaction between the events of the war and the situation on the “home front” is much more pronounced in Russia than in the West. Strategic setbacks on the front in Ukraine can quickly erode any remaining support for the war of aggression, especially given the Russian army’s losses. But crucial is the fact that Putin cannot order a general mobilization to rapidly advance the invasion with a similar manpower level as the Ukrainian army. After all, the most important prerequisite for rule by non-totalitarian authoritarianism is to maintain apathy and de-solidarization among the population, the majority of which somehow opportunistically comes to terms with dictatorial power, seeks its niches, cares only about its own advancement, and so on.

A general mobilization would deprive the population of this option to look the other way, to simply remain inactive and to continue to persist in political apathy. When one’s own life is at stake in a war of imperialist conquest, the people concerned are automatically awakened. In view of the military incapacity of the Russian army, the Kremlin should actually order general mobilization – and at the same time it can’t, if it wants to prevent the emergence of a broad protest movement that can’t be so easily crushed either.

Finally, the military as well as economic war between Russia and the West cannot be understood without taking into account the profound social and ecological crisis process into which the late capitalist world system is sinking. In this respect, it is a crisis imperialism that has entered its bloody, murderous stage in Ukraine.[17] The economic crisis not only formed the decisive factor that contributed to the outbreak of war,[18] it is also executed through economic warfare. The increasing clashes and power struggles of the state monsters, which turned Ukraine into an imperialist battlefield, make the losers of this crisis-imperialist “Great Game” socially and economically relegated, as they become completely trapped by the crisis process. Actually, in the medium term, there are no winners in crisis imperialism. The “winners” only descend more slowly. These power struggles, previously conducted using economic and political means, turn into military conflicts as the crisis intensifies.

Thus, on a systemic level, viewed objectively, the war over Ukraine functions as a crisis accelerator,[19] which further aggravates already existing crisis processes. As inevitably as late capitalism breaks down at its internal and external barriers, the course of the crisis is not set in stone. The impending devaluation of value can take the form of inflation or deflation. In the case of deflation, a fall in prices triggered by interest rate hikes, recession and a collapse in demand, Russia’s wartime fortunes would turn very quickly.

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[1] https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/handel-handelsbilanz-der-eurozone-mit-rekorddefizit-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-220615-99-672712

[2] https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/euro-dollar-113.html

[3] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/14636256/2-31052022-AP-EN.pdf/3ba84e21-80e6-fc2f-6354-2b83b1ec5d35

[4] https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wie-gefaehrdet-ist-italien-wirklich-18126250.html

[5] https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/italy/government-debt-of-nominal-gdp

[6] https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/bundesbank-chef-skepsis-bei-ezb-werkzeug-gegen-rendite-ausschlaege-18166596.html

[7] https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/staatsverschuldung-die-zinsexplosion-warum-sich-lindners-kosten-fuer-schulden-fast-verachtfachen/28496844.html

[8] https://www.konicz.info/2021/08/08/dreierlei-inflation/

[9] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/16/business/global-recession-risk.html

[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/15/business/stock-market-recession-half-year.html

[11] https://www.konicz.info/2021/12/29/der-dealmaker-in-der-sackgasse/

[12] https://finance.yahoo.com/news/soaring-energy-prices-help-russia-164334271.html

[13] https://www.handelsblatt.com/dpa/wirtschaft-russischer-staatshaushalt-erzielt-trotz-sanktionen-deutliches-plus/28501534.html

[14] https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/ukrainekrieg-eu-sanktionen-gegen-russland-zeigen-offenbar-wirkung-a-86078bfd-3b75-4a9c-8719-370d0c5c18c7

[15] https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russias-2022-inflation-seen-145-more-rate-cuts-expected-2022-06-30/

[16] https://www.konicz.info/2022/07/13/wahlen-unter-vorbehalt/

[17] https://www.konicz.info/2022/06/23/was-ist-krisenimperialismus/

[18] https://www.akweb.de/politik/russland-ukraine-konflikt-kampf-auf-der-titanic/

[19] https://jungle.world/artikel/2022/10/krieg-als-krisenbeschleuniger

Originally published on konicz.info on 07/17/2022