From Detachment to the Negative Integration of Art
The separation of life and art is an old theme of modernity. All artists who want to express a truth and who consume themselves existentially in their creations have always suffered from this separation. Whether art shows well-proportioned beauty or, conversely, the aesthetics of ugliness in its various representations, whether it criticizes society or seeks to rediscover the wealth of forms in nature, whether it is realistically or fantastically oriented: it always remains separated from everyday life and thus from social reality as if by a glass but impenetrable wall. Artistic creations are either ignored or they are world-famous as museum objects, dead before they are even born. The artist thus resembles a figure from the tragedies of antiquity: just as water and fruit forever recede before the thirsty Tantalus, so life recedes before him; just as King Midas had to starve to death because all objects turned to gold under his touch, so the artist as a social being must starve to death because all objects turn into pure exhibits under his touch; and like Sisyphus, he always rolls his stone in vain – his work remains disconnected from the world.
All attempts by art to break out of its glass ghetto have failed. Sculptures set up in factories and paintings on the walls of offices remained foreign bodies; literary readings in churches or schools never got beyond the character of compulsory events. When the Dadaists resorted to provocation out of desperation and dragged toilet bowls or rusty iron pipes into the sacred halls of art to mock the bourgeoisie, this offer was accepted with animal seriousness as an art object and cataloged like Michelangelo’s sculptures or Picasso’s paintings. The tautological definition is: art is everything that society perceives a priori in a separate space, in a reservation called “art,” and which, therefore, in its impregnated artistic objecthood, can be collected independently of any content, like stamps or insects. It doesn’t matter what the art wants and how it presents this, its effects are always defused and trivialized. For the capitalist elites, the artist is not even a court jester, but at best a special supplier like the wine merchant or the confectioner. You wouldn’t buy a used car from him, and you wouldn’t want him to be your son-in-law. At least that is his status in classical modernity.
Modern society has always seen its own mode of existence and its categories as supra-historical and universally human. If there is something rotten and actually unbearable about this system, then it is never supposed to be a historical problem that can be overcome through critique, but always an irrevocable condition of existence per se, which humanity unfortunately has to live with. Modernism also perceives the dilemma of the separateness of art and life through this lens of false ontologization. People pretend that in ancient Greece the artist was just as much a seller of his possibilities as he is today and that even the ancient Egyptians exhibited their images of the gods in galleries and museums or put price tags on them at auctions.
But in ancient civilizations there was no separate social department called “art” or “culture” in the sense that we understand them today. The modern structure of separate and mutually independent spheres, which also determines our language and our thinking, was completely alien to all earlier societies. Whatever human deficits, problems and social power relations they had, they did not divide their existence into separate functional areas. Such a division of social life only developed when the so-called economy was detached from the rest of life in the modern era; an elementary change that cannot be emphasized enough. Recent systems theory regards this as “progress” and the previous state of humanity as a lack of “differentiation,” axiomatically assuming a measure of primitiveness: The more integrated a society is through an overarching cultural context, the more primitive it is from this perspective; and conversely, the more “differentiated” a society is, the more it has split into separate spheres (based on the independence of the capitalist economy), the more “developed” it appears and the more “opportunities” it supposedly offers. This way of thinking has become so self-evident that it no longer seems absurd to see the highest achievement of social evolution in the fact that the functionally reduced human being only represents an intersection of systemic structures.
In reality, however, pre-modern civilizations were not primitive, but highly differentiated; only this kind of differentiation does not correspond to the concept of it accepted today. The old, predominantly agrarian societies did not have a culture, in the way that one “has” an external and random object, but they were a culture. This is even expressed in our scientific language, albeit most of the time unconsciously: we readily speak of the “culture” of ancient Egypt, antiquity, the Middle Ages, etc. and, as a rule, we indicate in this way both the special artifacts and artistic representations of sculpture, painting or literature and, on the other hand, the respective civilization, accompanied by its social structure and its relationship to the world in general. On the other hand, when we talk about “modern culture,” we only mean that particular aspect of artistic forms of expression that have been relegated to a separate sphere and never the social context as a whole. So we unconsciously “know” that culture used to be the whole and not a functionally separate sphere for the edification of the money-earning individual on his Sunday trips to the museum.
In fact, the Latin word “cultus,” from which our concept of culture derives, means both “planting” and “agriculture” as well as “worship,” “way of life,” “sociality,” “education” and even “clothing” (for certain occasions). This multi-layered terminology points to the culturally integrated character of ancient agrarian civilizations. The differentiated contents and forms of both their “metabolism with nature” (Marx) and their social relations and aesthetics did not fall apart as “subsystems,” each with its “own logic,” but were always only different aspects of a single and coherent cultural mode of existence. In modern terms, the description of this culturally integrated existence must sound confusing: production was aesthetic, aesthetics was religious, religion was political, politics was cultural and culture was social. In other words, the social aspects that are distinct for us were intertwined, and each area of life was to a certain extent contained in every other.
One might perhaps be tempted to speak of these agrarian cultures as religiously constituted, because religion was apparently the strongest integrative element of such a “society as culture.” It is well known that not only all kinds of artistic crafts, but also the theater and sporting competitions emerged from cultic acts; more precisely: they were cultic acts of a special kind. But even the quite ordinary activities of everyday life had a fundamentally cultic character; even humor and irony were cultically integrated. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to single out “religion” as the systemically defining moment of such societies, because in doing so we are already thinking of our functional concept of separate spheres. But religion was not a religion in the modern sense either, not a mere “belief,” not a limited opportunity for transcendental thoughts, and certainly not a “private matter.”
We must therefore not simply imagine the religious character of ancient cultures as a restrictive, irrationally coercive relation. The religious was at the same time the public, the so-called politics, the form of debate. It is not for nothing that the Latin word “privatus” has a rather negative, derogatory meaning, which becomes even clearer for us when we look at the corresponding ancient Greek term: there, the “privatus,” who does not participate in public life on a daily basis and as a matter of course, is the idiot. The fact that the religious aspect is both the form of public life and encompasses the whole of everyday life is not, however, an index of the limitations of this society, as the ideology of modern self-legitimization claims. Conversely, it could just as well be said that such a civilization had much more publicity and debate than the modern system, in which most of society’s affairs are settled automatically and without debate through the mechanics of the “detached” economy. Whichever way we look at it, our modern self-image does not allow us to come to terms with the existence of a culturally integrated society. We have no concepts for it.
This modern blindness to the character of pre-modern conditions has created yet another major misunderstanding. At the center of what we call “religion” is basically, in all cultures, the problem of human mortality and death as a process, event and “goal of life.” Along with religion, modernity has also relegated death to a special functional sphere, thus separating it from life just like it has done to art. In this way, the modern secularization of society did not lead to a different and possibly more reflective approach to death, but rather to its being repressed and ignored. What religion had meant in the old societies was not overcome and positively abolished, but merely functionally reduced to an irrational remnant for the private sensibilities of the abstract individual. With regard to bodily mortality, modernity went even further: just as old people who have become “useless” for capitalist reproduction appear even to their own children as mere “waste” and are locked away in institutions separated from normal life, the dead are also “disposed of” like garbage and industrial scrap.
Once modernity had repressed death, it could only understand the earlier integration of life and death as a frightening “fixation on death.” The fact that the ancient Egyptians attached so much importance to their tombs and to embalming the dead is usually interpreted as a sinister death cult, as if they had been preoccupied with nothing else. Modern man is even more disgusted by the widespread Neolithic custom of burying the bones of the dead in the middle of the house under the fireplace. In reality, all these people must have been extremely fun-loving, as ancient studies can now prove in many respects. The natural integration of death into everyday life only seems strange to us because the problem of our own mortality has been “outsourced” to a place that is invisible in ordinary life. Various cultural critics have repeatedly made this separation of life and death, as well as the separation of art and life, an agonizing topic in the history of modernization, without, however, ever radically criticizing the underlying social structure.
In a “society as culture,” which was even capable of integrating death, “art” was necessarily always part of everyday life and was therefore completely unthinkable as an exhibit of a sterilized and dead sphere “behind glass.” But that is precisely why it was not art as art, but a specific moment in an integrated social context. The “artist” could therefore only be an artist and be recognized in the sense of a technical ability, but not as a social representative of “the” art. The problem of functional divisions, which so preoccupies modernity, arose with it in the first place and could not even have been formulated before. The question therefore arises as to where this systemic “differentiation” actually comes from.
The process of modernization has by no means divided up society evenly and equally. Rather, a certain aspect of human reproduction, namely the so-called economy, was split off from all other aspects and from life in general. It is therefore no more possible to speak of an economy in our sense of the word for the ancient agrarian civilizations than it is to speak of an art or religion, even though the term originates from antiquity. However, while in ancient Greece, as in all pre-modern civilizations, “oikonomia” was a household economy in an integrated cultural context, a factual prerequisite and a means for cultic and thus social or aesthetic purposes, in the modern age it developed into an absurd end in itself and the central content of society. Money, as capital, was coupled back onto itself and thus became a blind “automatic subject” (Karl Marx) that is eerily presupposed for all human and cultural purposes.
As this “valorization of value” (Karl Marx) or abstract economic profit maximization split off from life as a dynamic end in itself, a separate, independent “functional sphere” emerged for the first time, like a foreign body in society, which began to rise to dominance and become the center. And it was only the existence of this detached and simultaneously dominant sector that made all other aspects of social reproduction left over from the capitalist economy appear as separate “subsystems,” that are, however, without exception of merely secondary importance and subordinate to the assumed economic end in itself.
Under the dictates of the independent economy, productive activity has mutated into abstract “labor” in an alienated functional space separate from life, which is only regulated secondarily and under the compulsion of its own uncontrollable “system legality” by the equally separate special sphere of politics. Such a “politics” split off from the culturally integrated society must therefore have been just as unknown to pre-modern civilizations as the “disembedded economy” (Karl Polanyi) of the capitalist self-purpose and the corresponding positive concept of abstract “labor” outside an integrated context of life. Modern politics and the associated institutions of the state and law cannot be equated with the apparently corresponding pre-modern institutions, which, just like “religion,” did not have the character of separate functional sectors. Only in the process of modern social disintegration through the “disembedded economy” did politics, the state and law emerge as complementary “subsystems” of the second order and thus as the first servants (ministers!) of the mute a priori of the capitalist economy.
When the central content and purpose of society has become a split off end in itself, then life must necessarily sink to a mere remnant. Expressions of life beyond the systemic divisions and complementary functional spheres of market and state, economy and politics, competition and law have been degraded to the residual waste of “leisure”; and somewhere in relation to this diffuse remnant, not only religion but also art and culture are located in a special sphere. All things that were once crucially important to people, all existential questions, all associated aesthetic purposes and forms of expression have become this meaningless “remnant” and their representatives have to scramble for the crumbs that fall from the table of monstrous self-purpose.
The situation of art and aesthetics in general is particularly absurd. Although every manifestation of life in itself always has an aesthetic moment for humans, capitalism has negated this elementary fact and separated aesthetics into a separate space, just like all other moments. “Work” is not aesthetic, the economy is not aesthetic, politics is not aesthetic; only aesthetics is aesthetic. It is as if the aesthetics of things lead an abstracted, ghostly existence of their own alongside things; just as the social nature of products leads an abstracted, separate existence alongside the products in the abstract form of money, which has become an end in itself, and abstract formal logic, as the “money of the mind” (Marx), becomes independent and stands alongside the concrete logic of real relationships.
The modern artist’s glass prison consists precisely in this structural separation of the aesthetic. Art flounders helplessly back and forth in this prison; it is no longer the artistic form of a social content, but a dissociated “formality” – either form without content or content as mere form. Art must therefore ape the end in itself of capital, which, as an abstract form (money) that feeds back on itself, would prefer to emancipate itself from any material content, without ever being able to realize this absurdity. “Art for art’s sake” is only the culmination of art as an involuntary caricature of capital, without being able to solve the dilemma at the heart of the capitalist system.
But if, through its own distress, it has become a delusional, self-obsessed end in itself, art, in its unreconciled separateness, can give rise to social hubris: Instead of understanding itself as the product of a system of divisions and mobilizing the radical critique of this destructive self-serving structure, art begins to “aestheticize” the division itself and its functionalist manifestations. Not only its own dilemma becomes an aesthetic subject, but also the glaring capitalist schizophrenia as a whole. However, if the capitalist structure is not criticized but aestheticized, then bodies torn apart by grenades, raped women, starving children and the obscenity of power can also appear as merely aesthetic objects. The detached aesthetic does not return to the social content, but only illuminates it in cynical reflection. An “aestheticization of politics” within the unresolved capitalist system thus leads not to emancipation, but directly to barbarism. Aesthetically staged politics was the secret of fascism’s success and Hitler was the prototype of the artist as politician, who did not reintegrate the separate spheres but stylized their disintegration into a bloody Gesamtkunstwerk.
The precarious situation of art in the capitalist structure of divisions also has a gendered aspect. In order for the “disembedded economy” of capitalist self-purpose to establish itself at all and produce the modern separation of spheres, an elementary precondition was necessary: Everything that was not absorbed into this system of divisions had to be primarily dissociated in its turn. And these were those aspects of life that were once culturally integrated but were then shifted onto modern women: family, “housework,” childcare, caregiving, “love,” etc., along with their associated characteristics. This also included a supposed special receptivity to aesthetics: women, as “natural beauties,” adorn themselves and the homes of their loved ones. This social space, which could not be completely absorbed by capitalist structures but nevertheless remained necessary for human reproduction, emerged as a separate kind of privacy in contrast to the entire social structure of capital and the internal divisions it contained. A paradoxical “separation from the overall system of divisions” (Roswitha Scholz) thus emerged, which forms its “dark reverse side” and is connoted as “female,” while, conversely, the official system as a whole is occupied and dominated by “masculine” elements.
This realization of the elementary and primary gendered dissociation, which emerged from feminist critique, points to a peculiar gendered relationship between the private and public spheres, which also affects the detached aesthetic sphere of art and culture. In the culturally integrated pre-modern societies, there were indeed strong patriarchal moments, but not in the “differentiated” and exaggerated modern form. The culturally integrated differentiation, for which we no longer have terms, did not separate “privacy” and “publicity” in the way we understand them today. In modern terms, much of what is considered private today was public, and vice versa; insofar as the public sphere was “male,” it remained limited, or there were “male” and “female” public spheres simultaneously and in parallel in the cultural context.
The paradoxical forms of disintegration based on the “disembedded economy,” however, have gendered the public and private spheres in a twofold way. On the one hand, there is the intimate space of privacy, in which “the woman” is the so-called fairer sex and at the same time responsible for the warmth of the nest, the comfort of the master, loving care, etc. – and for this very reason is considered inferior and “weak of spirit.” In contrast to this inferior private sphere, the entire system of capitalism with the “disembedded economy” at the top appears as the “masculine” sphere of bourgeois public life and as society proper. On the other hand, there is also a second internal split between the private and public spheres within this official “male” structure: absurdly, the activity for the subjectless end in itself of the system appears here as the “male” private sphere of the capitalist subject with specific interests, the “homo economicus” and money earner, while the complementary sphere of politics, which is also “male,” is defined as the public sphere. And the dissociated sphere of aesthetics or art and culture is merely an extension of this internal public sphere within the “male” capitalist pseudo-universe.
Therefore, “the artist” is in principle a male being within the capitalist public sphere, albeit in a particularly precarious place. There are also female artists, just as there are female politicians, entrepreneurs, scientists, etc. – but firstly, they are merely exceptions that prove the sociological rule; and secondly, they always have to adapt to the “male” rules of the game, which only proves that these are not biological conditions, but socio-historical attributions. The structurally “male” artist in his glass cage of dissociated aesthetics becomes a particularly schizophrenic being: On the one hand, he is a thoroughly capitalist “man” and moneymaker who rests on bourgeois privacy of the first order and needs “the woman” as an inferior caregiver in the background like any ordinary car salesman. On the other hand, within the “male” bourgeois public sphere, he represents a dissociated “female” element in the form of aesthetics itself, which is not absorbed into the functionalist system but is nevertheless part of the capitalist public sphere.
Only in the form of detached, sterile, museum-like art objecthoods can the “feminine” appear within the male pseudo-universe. The artist is thus the capitalist man who is the only one allowed to show his female side and even be homosexual if necessary – but only as the social aberration of the narcissistically self-centered aesthetic, who also robs “the woman” of her ascribed attributes and is thus the superman precisely because he even incorporates the “feminine” in a masculine way and degrades “the woman” as a model, object, or muse to a mere object of beauty. At the same time, however, bourgeois society chalks up his representation of the feminine in the masculine as a shortcoming and the “feminine inferiority” rubs off on him, so that he is regarded by his fellow car salesmen as a social exotic and is not really taken seriously.
However, this structure of divisions, which is the essence of modernity, is already perceived as a historical past. The capitalist dynamic has blown up its own social form and yet continues to proceed unabated. Mass culture and new media seem to level out the systemic “differentiation”: What critics denounced half a century ago as the “culture industry” (Adorno) is now celebrated by postmodernists as the reintegration of art and life. Mediatization is seen per se as emancipation from the constraints of capitalist reality; the world is declared to be a digital game. Everywhere is teeming with “opportunities” that can be seized in the spirit of media “democratization.” And in the amusing habitual masquerade of the sexes, the brave new postmodern world believes it has also overcome gender inequality. The transvestite is almost being proclaimed the new revolutionary subject.
The rhetoric of opportunity in postmodern cultural professional optimism, even if it sometimes presents itself as radical left-wing, is suspiciously reminiscent of the Orwellian language of neoliberal economists. In fact, it is not art that is returning to society as “democratic mass culture” but, conversely, the market is overstepping its boundaries and renewing its claim to totality harder than ever. Once the capitalist economy had detached from the cultural context of life and transformed its remnants into separate subsystems, its dynamics could not remain in this state of disintegration. While the sectors of art and culture, sport, religion, “leisure” etc. initially seemed to be able to assert a certain logic of their own against the dominant system of the “disembedded economy,” they are now being successively “economized” themselves.
These areas were dependent and secondary from the outset: if the structuring social context of society is determined by the end in itself of money, then priests, athletes, and artists must also “earn money,” whether directly as sellers in the market or indirectly through the state’s siphoning of money from market processes. But for a long time, this dependence was only external. As long as art was not subject to the economic laws of the market in its own production, it could not yet be a completely capitalist commodity, but only became so retrospectively in circulation. But the capitalist end in itself is as voracious as it is insatiable, and so it ultimately had to devour the already mutilated remnants of life: the detached art and culture as well as the meager “leisure time” and limited family intimacy.
Art only returns to life to the extent that life has already dissolved into the economy. Now art no longer has an existence of its own, not even as a sphere of a separate aesthetic, but has itself become a direct economic object and therefore its production is already taking place with a view towards how it can be marketed. In the boundless capitalism of the late 20th century, all objects in the world and in life no longer have any intrinsic qualitative value, but only the economic value conferred on them by their marketability.
What postmodernism would like to see as an emancipatory opportunity for art in capitalist mass culture is in reality its destruction. If the “cheerful positivists” (Michel Foucault) of postmodernism today want to place this prophetic insight of Adorno in the vicinity of conservative cultural pessimism, then they are only proving that they themselves have capitulated unconditionally to the economic imperative and are no less affirmative than the conservative pseudo-critics. If conservative cultural pessimism criticizes the destruction of art by the capitalist culture industry only from the point of view of its own past, when it was still a self-purposeful aesthetic in classical modernism, postmodernism twists the final push of the dissolution of art into economics into its re-appropriation by society. And while conservative cultural criticism mourns the bourgeois family and the elitist subjects of the old educated bourgeoisie, postmodernism misjudges the lonely media misery of the atomized “decentered subject” as an emancipatory spring. Some cling to the capitalist past, others to the capitalist present, both deny a new perspective for the anti-capitalist future.
Men and women, artists and car salesmen have become identical today only insofar as they have
all assumed the same empty identity of “homo economicus” and are no longer themselves as will-less agents of the “automatic subject.” The “differentiation” of sectorally split subjectivities is crushed by the market economy until everyone is a kind of car salesman, no matter what they do. The naïve belief in the cultural-industrial postmodern consumer democracy is disgraced under the dictatorship of capitalist supply. The culture industry is therefore not to be criticized because it is mass culture, but because it is absorbed in the alienated form of the “disembedded economy.” Its aesthetics are not the aesthetics of man, but the aesthetics of the commodity.
In the democracy of commodities, people as human beings no longer have anything to say. The aesthetics of commodities does not integrate the disintegrated individuals, but the commodities as ghostly pseudo-subjects. It is not the aesthetic form of a content, but the “design” of economic abstraction. This final stage of modern aesthetics can be described on several levels:
- Firstly, it is an aesthetics of particularism. Contexts and connections are not taken into account. It ignores the fact that the whole is more and something qualitatively different than the sum of its parts. The design is the glittering aesthetics of the abstract single commodity for the consumption of the abstract single individual, while the whole of the landscape, the cities and the social space is transformed into a stinking garbage dump.
- Secondly, this design corresponds to an aesthetic of arbitrariness. Form and content no longer have any relationship to each other, because the content itself is redefined as form. Capital is indifferent as to whether it valorizes itself through the production of pig carcasses, anti-personnel mines or laxatives. Art, which has been economized into design, must be just as indifferent to what it produces – if only it presents itself as marketable and capable of being staged in the media. This eliminates any yardstick. While conscious cultural integration must always develop standards, even if it is aware of their relativity and can change them, commodity aesthetics is a priori without standards – in keeping with the postmodern “decentered subject,” who literally “doesn’t care about anything.” A world without standards, which makes everything indifferent, can only produce one thing: endless boredom.
- Thirdly, art and culture degraded to the design of the commodity world proves to be the aesthetics of simulation. The crazy postmodern idea of a media-induced de-realization of reality (Jean Baudrillard et al.) is only too eager to believe in the appearance of design because it produces it itself. Media simulation attempts to build a parallel virtual and dematerialized world in which capitalism no longer faces any natural or social barriers and the growth of the “disembedded economy” can continue indefinitely. In economic terms, the virtual illusory worlds of the media correspond to the casino capitalism of the last 15 years: the decoupled financial markets simulate an accumulation of capital that has long had no real economic ground under its feet. Capitalism continues to run on air, so to speak, after it has crossed the edge of the abyss. In this economic milieu of “fictitious capital” (Karl Marx) of stock market booms, debt, gambling, and “risk” sociology (Ulrich Beck), a zeitgeist has developed that wants to cover up the intolerability of capitalist impositions by “pretending.” In the simulative pose of media self-aestheticization, individuals act “as if” they were competent, successful, beautiful and reflective, while their real social relationships collapse.
Particularism, arbitrariness, and simulation reveal that destroyed art, through its mutation into commodity aesthetics, is only negatively integrated into a social life that is no longer life at all. The old problem of the separation of art and life has not been solved, but has become irrelevant because social man himself has become irrelevant. But even this irrelevance proves to be mere appearance, in which the “automatic subject” creates illusions about itself in people’s minds, so to speak. Capitalist reality must be de-realized because it has reached the absolute end of its development without any way out, while systemically conditioned people refuse to acknowledge this historical crisis. But behind the smooth design of commodity aesthetics, its true negative existence is relentlessly revealed. They cannot escape their real suffering, even if they try to de-realize themselves through the media.
The “disembedded economy” can only ever integrate itself tautologically into itself, but its claim to smooth totalization must fail, because although it can make real, sensual life negative it cannot incorporate it into its surreal world of independent abstractions – just as it is incapable of de-realizing death. The repressed does not return; it is always already there. Only on the surface of the design does the system of divisions appear to be dissolved into the economization of the world. Behind this appearance, however, the disintegrated real world becomes unbearable. Just as gender dissociation does not disappear in travesty, but rather the postmodern “feralization of patriarchy” (Roswitha Scholz) continues to shift the burdens of the social crisis primarily onto women even after the decomposition of the bourgeois family, the aesthetic misery of the functionalist world does not disappear in commodity-aesthetic design, but emerges all the more starkly in the desolation of economized public spaces.
When the real crisis can no longer be suppressed, media de-realization proceeds to “aestheticize” the unconquered and painfully perceived misery, even if this aestheticization of the crisis no longer takes on the political forms of the 1930s, but even appears “economized” in politics itself. But the motifs of fascism grin out of the commercial, commodity-aesthetic mediatization of poverty, violence and the degeneration of gender relations. The aesthetics of media de-realization and boundless arbitrariness is the aesthetics of civil war and barbarism, because they ultimately eliminate civilizational inhibitions.
There can be no return to classical modernism, just as there can be no return to the old agrarian forms of culturally integrated society. But continuing to live in capitalist disintegration is just as impossible. Art, too, can only positively transcend itself by consciously becoming the moment of a new social movement that goes beyond the old workers’ movement Marxism and exposes the root that has produced the system of divisions and functional separations. Cultural integration of society on a new, higher level of development will only be possible if the self-purpose of the economy is broken and the basic gender dissociation is abolished. The prerequisite for a new emancipatory debate today is self-defense against the capitalist economization of the world.
Originally published on exit-online.org on 01/11/2002
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