The chances that the Russian-Ukrainian talks in Istanbul will lead to a quick or even fair peace are slim.

Tomasz Konicz

The fact that peace talks between Kyiv and Moscow were able to take place in Istanbul highlights just how bad the military situation in Ukraine is. On May 10, four European leaders, who had traveled to the Ukrainian capital in a gesture of solidarity, joined their counterpart Zelensky in calling for a 30-day ceasefire as a precondition for any talks. This unconditional, comprehensive ceasefire would give “diplomacy a chance,” Zelensky demanded in the presence of British Prime Minister Starmer, French President Macron, Polish Prime Minister Tusk, and German Vice Chancellor Merz.

The Kremlin remained unmoved by the EU’s threat of sanctions linked the ceasefire that are aimed at taking stronger action against Russia’s shadow fleet – there will be no ceasefire because it is not in the Kremlin’s interest. The Russian-Ukrainian talks, on the other hand, began under fire, as this strengthens Russia’s negotiating position. In addition, as usual, the Europeans were excluded from these negotiations, which were conducted with the participation of the U.S. administration. By excluding the Europeans, Putin obviously wants to further divide the West. Finally, the Kremlin did not agree to Zelensky’s demands to hold direct talks with Putin.

Realities of the War of Attrition

Russia was thus able to dictate almost all of the preconditions for the negotiations in Istanbul. Ukraine, on the other hand, has little choice but to negotiate, as the war of attrition in the east will inevitably be won by Russian imperialism, which has greater resources (material, technology, manpower). Ukraine’s last major offensive, the advance into the Russian region of Kursk, ended in strategic failure. Kiev’s calculation was to dig in and hold the Russian border region in order to have a bargaining chip in any negotiations – now Russia occupies parts of the Ukrainian border region in the Sumy Oblast. Both sides suffered heavy losses in the fighting in Kursk, which also involved North Korean units. However, the Kremlin is better placed than Kiev to compensate for this through successful recruitment campaigns.

Western think tanks sympathetic to Ukraine, after years of whitewashing, are now being forced to acknowledge the realities of the war of attrition on the front lines. In a recent assessment, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assumes that Russia will not only be able to mobilize enough new forces to compensate for losses on the front, but also to “increase the size of army groups in Ukraine.” The Russian army leadership thus has more manpower at its disposal, even though, according to the ISW, Russia has recently suffered “significant losses with limited gains.” The growing imbalance could serve to “put pressure” on Ukraine in negotiations. In addition, Moscow appears to be in a position to build up a considerable “strategic reserve” through successful recruitment, according to the ISW.

The Atlantic Council is already warning of a major Russian summer offensive that threatens to become “the deadliest of the war so far.” Here, too, the admission of impending defeat can be read between the lines. Although the Russian army continues to suffer losses in “costly frontal attacks,” this tactic is constantly evolving, with these attacks being supported by “drone strikes, glide bombs, and artillery,” which is making Ukraine’s defensive measures more difficult. Russia currently holds the initiative on the front and is “advancing on several points” (Sumy, Kharkiv), with the Russian army leadership planning a major offensive in the Donbas – around Pokrovsk – in the coming months, according to the Atlantic Council. Ukrainian offensive plans have therefore long been a waste of time. The only question now is whether the front can be held in the face of Russian attacks and possible offensives. The summer threatens to become a “test of endurance” full of “brutal fighting” for “war-weary Ukraine” – especially in view of dwindling American military aid.

Direct military intervention by the Europeans against the nuclear power Russia – which was at times publicly debated in the EU – is now considered virtually impossible, despite all public expressions of solidarity. In mid-May, Macron stated that despite all its support, France did not intend to start “World War III” over Ukraine. Shortly before that, Polish government officials denied statements by U.S. envoy to Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, that Warsaw was prepared to deploy army units to Ukraine. Within Germany’s governing coalition, there is controversy over whether Kiev should be supplied with the advanced Taurus cruise missiles at all. While Deputy Chancellor Merz wants to maintain “strategic ambiguity” on this issue, SPD parliamentary group leader Matthias Miersch has explicitly spoken out against the delivery.

A Caricatured Imperialist Deal

Given this military and geopolitical constellation, which is favorable to Russia, the Kremlin can enter negotiations from a position of strength to push through its core demands, which ultimately aim to legalize its imperialist aggression and claim even more Ukrainian territory than is currently held by Russian troops. The logic behind such a deal is clear: to achieve inevitable military conquest through negotiation. Putin’s minimum territorial demands are likely to include the legalization of the annexation of the entire regions of Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Russia’s marginal gains in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions are likely to be used as bargaining chips.

Added to this are the restrictions on Ukrainian sovereignty, which the Kremlin is selling under the label of “denazification.” On the one hand, this amounts to preventing Ukraine from becoming part of the Western sphere of influence, which could be achieved through neutrality commitments and arms restrictions for the Ukrainian army, as well as a “regime change” in which new elections would be scheduled in Ukraine. Russia does not want to occupy the entire country, but rather to bring it back into its imperial orbit. In the medium term, the Kremlin hopes to maneuver the “remaining Ukraine” into a state of sham sovereignty, similar to that currently enjoyed by Belarus. Formally independent, the former Soviet republic is in fact already part of the Russian Federation, both economically and militarily.

Russia therefore has no need to rush the negotiations, and one must wonder whether or not they are being held purely for propaganda reasons. Kiev, on the other hand, has few cards left to play in this imperialist poker game, which is why Zelensky had to agree to send his delegation to Istanbul on Putin’s terms—the longer he waits, the worse his position will become. In addition, tensions are rising on Ukraine’s western border, where the Ukrainian secret service has arrested two Hungarian citizens who are alleged to have been spying for the Orbán government in Budapest – they are said to have been gathering information on military installations, the mood among the population, and the defense capabilities of the Transcarpathian region, which is inhabited by a Hungarian minority. Since then, relations between Hungary and Ukraine have been frozen, with both countries expelling diplomats from the other side. The authoritarian head of government Orbán, from whose circle there are repeated calls for the annexation of Transcarpathia, is considered close to Russia.

Kiev’s only chance to retain some leverage seems to be to effectively capitulate to Trump’s extractivism: Kiev has had to sign a humiliating resource agreement with the U.S. in order not to lose its support completely. Kiev’s calculation: this caricature of an imperialist deal, signed at the beginning of May, would only make sense if Ukraine’s resource-rich eastern territories remained under Ukrainian – well – sovereignty. Kiev is hoping that Washington will back up its interest in extracting raw materials with military force. This would effectively tear Ukraine apart between East and West.

At least the Financial Times claims to have noticed a “quiet shift” in favor of Ukraine within the bluntly imperialist U.S. administration as early as mid-May. Speaking at a public meeting in Washington, Vice President JD Vance said that his administration was aware of a number of Russian demands that would make it possible to end the war: “We think they are asking for too much,” Vance said. At the same time, however, the vice president pointed out that despite “widespread criticism” of Putin, it was necessary to understand the Kremlin’s point of view in order to understand the “motivation of the other side.” Vance believed that Russia remained “interested in a solution.”

What might this solution look like? The Kremlin also has the upper hand in Ukraine’s resource poker game: Back in late February, when Kiev was still blocking the sale of its natural resources, Putin offered his American counterpart to jointly exploit the resources of eastern Ukraine and sell them to the U.S. A large part of the natural resources are already under Russian control anyway.

Tomasz Konicz is an author and journalist. His latest book is Climate Killer Capital: How an Economic System is Destroying our Livelihoods. More articles and donation options (Patreon) can be found at konicz.info.

Originally published in analyse & kritik on 05/16/2025.

Trump’s move will probably lead to an end to the war, but how much will Ukraine have to pay?

Tomasz Konicz

Are the imperialists in the Kremlin on the home stretch of their war of aggression in Ukraine? With right-wing populist Donald Trump taking office, Ukraine’s already hopeless military situation appears to have deteriorated abruptly on a geopolitical level. Immediately after taking office, the Trump administration froze all foreign aid – including aid programs for Ukraine. Trump has now entered into direct talks with Vladimir Putin.

He has now also specified what a geopolitical “deal” to end the war could amount to: Russia receives large parts or even all of the claimed territories in Ukraine (he is not particularly interested in which territories Putin gets, Trump said), the U.S. gets access to the mineral resources of the attacked country, the Europeans are to take care of security guarantees, and NATO admission for Ukraine is off the table. The EU states reacted with alarm and demanded to be included in the negotiations. However, the Trump administration does not appear to be willing to grant it a role in the negotiations, nor Ukraine.

Putin’s strategic calculation – which was based on a protracted war of attrition and Trump’s election victory – therefore appears to be working. The last time Russia’s head of state was challenged was back in November, when long-range Western missile systems were deployed against Russia. Putin declared this a “red line” in the fall of 2024, which would effectively drive the Kremlin into a state of war with NATO.

But Putin did not escalate at the end of 2024 because he believes he is on the road to victory in his war of aggression against Ukraine. And this in two respects. On the one hand, the protracted war of attrition means that Russia’s greater resource potential is increasingly coming to bear. It has already become apparent in recent months: Russia’s territorial gains in the east are accelerating, while the Ukrainian army is barely able to mobilize enough manpower for the front. Drones and information technology function as the great equalizer on the battlefield of the 21st century, making offensive warfare more difficult – similar to the machine gun during the First World War.

What remains is the firing of material and people on the largely static front until one of the warring parties collapses. This is why Russia’s gradual successes in the east are so decisive, as the best-developed defense lines in Ukraine have been overcome. Every other Ukrainian front line is weaker. Since the West will in all likelihood not intervene directly in Ukraine, the bloody law of war mathematics dictates that Kiev must lose the war of attrition if it is fought to the last consequences.

Logic of Escalation and a War of Attrition

The only realistic chance of a military victory for Kiev was a shake-up of the Russian power vertical, i.e. the loss of important decision-makers below Putin. This possibility briefly emerged during the revolt of the Wagner group around the mercenary leader Prigozhin. However, he has since been removed by the Kremlin, meaning that the opposition within the Russian elite lacks a military-organizational core that could spark an oligarch uprising against Putin’s disastrous war – which is also a socio-economic and demographic disaster for Russia.

The Kremlin is speculating along similar lines. Russia’s winter terror campaign against the Ukrainian infrastructure, especially against Ukraine’s energy sector, aims to erode the morale and resilience of the Ukrainian “home front” in order to minimize and ultimately destroy the mobilization capacity of the Ukrainian army and society. The increasing desertion in the Ukrainian army shows that this tactic is successful in the context of the war of attrition.

What both sides – realistically speaking – can aim for is the erosion of the statehood of the opposing warring party. Another form of victory, especially against Russia, is hardly conceivable. The enemy state should become a failed state – this war aim is indeed realistic because it is woven into the crisis-ridden course of events. The crisis of capital causes the brutalization and disintegration of state apparatuses – war only accelerates this tendency. Military conflict, as the ultimate form of geopolitical crisis competition, is the means by which this crisis process will be consummated.

However, the Kremlin has its sights set on victory primarily due to Donald Trump’s new term in office. During the election campaign, Trump repeatedly stated that he would be able to end the Ukraine war quickly through negotiations. For the Kremlin, the prospect of a victorious peace at the negotiating table therefore seemed realistic – especially since the U.S. is now entering into open fascization, complete with a reactionary political climate and an oligarchic power structure, which is also characteristic of Russia under Putin. It is obvious that the crisis of capital in the Western core has now progressed so far that they are approaching the shattered power structures of the post-Soviet semi-periphery. A dirty geopolitical deal on the corpse of Ukraine, concocted by authoritarian leaders of highly corrupt, fascist, oligarchic statesmen, is what the Kremlin is hoping for this year, and it now seems closer than ever to this goal.

Which brings us back to the Kremlin’s aforementioned red lines, which were crossed by the West at the end of 2024 in the form of long-range missile strikes on the Russian hinterland. From Moscow’s perspective, it seemed that these attacks only had to be accepted until January 20, when Trump took office. Why risk a nuclear war when victory seems so close? In the West – in Washington as well as in many EU capitals – the panic of closing the door was spreading. Much of the foreign policy initiated by Washington or the EU after Trump’s election served to make geopolitical processes and developments irreversible. The new faces, who are now allowed to live out their nationalism and imperialism in Washington, should be deprived of as many options as possible. Ukraine was supplied with weapons for the last time and its negotiating position was to be improved through far-reaching military options.

New Cuban Missile Crisis

In fact, however, it is only a matter of damage minimization, as the West’s defeat in the battle for Ukraine has long been openly discussed, even in the West. How much of Ukraine will have to be thrown at Russian imperialism in order to end the war – this is now the logic that is finding its way into Western think tanks. The only question still being discussed is whether it will be possible to give the “rest of Ukraine” any kind of sovereignty.

The crossing of Putin’s last red line, the release of missiles that can reach Russia’s territory, was a clear escalation at the end of 2024 that was sought by the U.S. in the interregnum between Biden and Trump. In practice, it only served to drive up the price that Russia had to pay for its victory in Ukraine. It was a kind of nuclear Russian roulette that both sides played at the end of November 2024. Largely unnoticed by the Western public, the world was on the brink of nuclear escalation for days. The difference between this and the the Cuban Missile Crisis, however, was that in 1962 the world held its breath in shock, while in 2024 Putin’s threats were merely annoying and barely noticed. Putin threatened nothing less than the use of nuclear weapons.

The new volatility in the geopolitical sphere, the increasing tendency towards war as a means of politics, even in the core, and the willingness to take ever greater military risks are an expression of the new crisis phase into which the capitalist world system is entering after the exhaustion of the neoliberal deficit cycles. The crisis era of neoliberalism with its construction of global debt towers, the corresponding speculative bubbles and its world wars in the periphery is finally coming to an end with Trump’s re-election. What now follows is a phase of open authoritarian crisis management, state erosion and military conflicts at all levels – including between the world’s political and economic centers. Putin’s state-oligarchic Russia, authoritarian Belarus – both manifest the future of crisis management in their unstable authoritarianism.

Originally published in analyse & kritik on 02/18/2025