Fairy Tales for the Crisis

Frank Capra’s Autobiography of a Great Court Jester

Robert Kurz

Hollywood is, as everyone knows, kitsch, glamor, technical perfection, sentimentality, fake tears, and fake teeth – and it has been enormously successful for more than 80 years. The grandiose dream machine of capitalism runs like clockwork and produces imaginations for the world on an assembly line; not with the rigid compulsion of propaganda and its lies, but with the tempting power of the offer and its lies. But it cannot be money alone that has made Hollywood great. And it can’t just be the technical tricks that repeatedly melt the minds of viewers. The power of Hollywood does not lie in the fact that we succumb to sophisticated manipulation, but rather that we see through it and let it get to us anyway, while being brilliantly entertained and paying money for it. The power of Hollywood is perhaps the oldest art, the fairy tale, translated into the form of “technical reproducibility” (Walter Benjamin). But even in this modern technological form, there can be no fairy tale without a storyteller.

Many books have been written about Hollywood, but few by its great storytellers themselves. Frank Capra was an exception, and his autobiography is, as John Ford said, “not only the best, but the only book ever written about Hollywood.” This judgment is by no means exaggerated. When Capra, already more than seventy years old, wrote down the almost thousand pages of this magnum opus published in 1971, he not only recounted his own life, but the history of Hollywood itself as one big fairy tale: “Everything we movie people are, have and do comes from the movies, the magic carpet! I was allowed to grab the fringes of this magic carpet, swing myself up and ride towards adventure.” This book contains all the strengths and weaknesses of Capra’s films, and it could also be seen as a “movie” itself, which has to pass the test of credibility.

From beginning to end, Capra unashamedly shows everything that makes up the vices and embarrassments of Hollywood: he talks pompously, postures like a lucky man and superman, and strikes boastful poses like a pubescent ghetto youth. Capra as Napoleon in the wars of the film industry, Capra showered with awards, Capra the greatest! At the same time, he is maudlin to the point of pain (or beyond) and sprays the famous “Capra-corn” by the kilo, pathetic like an itinerant preacher and Roman Catholic to the bone: “Someone should keep reminding the average man,” the unctuous Capra moralizes from his self-made pulpit, “that he is a child of God and an equal heir to God’s rich gifts and that goodness means wealth, kindness means power and freedom means glory.”

If it were only this and nothing else, Capra’s films would have been simply unenjoyable and his mammoth biography would have been unreadable. But in the films, as in the book, the pace is breathtaking, and “the cardinal sin, boredom” doesn’t stand a chance. How is this possible? Perhaps through a single great virtue that the storyteller needs: a stunning naivety! In spite of all his sophistication and bravado, in spite of all his tricks and ruses, Capra, the mischievously grinning little peasant boy from Sicily, always retains bits of Simplicius Simplicissimus. Capra remains naive, which is why he can remain as honest as the innocent boy from the countryside. No sooner has he blown the trumpet of his own fame than he sees himself standing there “with all the composure of a man standing on ice skates for the first time in his life,” and immediately after the triumph always comes the disillusionment: “Reality crashed down on me like a falling sack of sand.” You have to believe his honesty, even if it’s just to make the big slogans come out better.

Capra’s credible naivety would remain one-dimensional if it were not bizarrely offset by the almost opposite virtues of humor and self-irony, the cinematic technique of which he had learned as a gag man in Mack Sennet’s studio, where slapstick was cultivated and the flying cream pie was invented. In his social comedies, Capra has, as he himself says, “merged the heroes and the jokers” from the classic figures of drama “into a single person.” He was well aware that he and his heroes fulfilled a similar function as the “court jesters of the distant past”: “These jesters were usually dwarves or grotesque nobodies who wore jester costumes […] as well as thin marottes (‘slapsticks’) or air-filled bladders as a sign of their special status. The sarcastic talk of the jesters would, the kings hoped, serve as a safety valve and prevent the seething cauldron of the common people’s misery from exploding.” And yet Capra believes in the liberating power of laughter: “In terms of interpersonal relationships, comedy is the complete abandonment of one’s defenses. […] When someone acts superior or when you are afraid of them – you put up your shields. You won’t laugh – neither with him nor at him. […] Dictators can’t laugh. Hitler and Stalin didn’t find themselves funny, nor did the others find them funny.” If anything remains of Capra and his fairy tales, it is the laughter. In Germany, Arsenic and Old Lace (1941), an ingenious work of embarrassment, has become his best-known film thanks to its trademark “black humor.”

Capra’s third great trump card is something that could be described as precision or an eye for detail. Of course, this attention to detail has a technical dimension. Not for nothing was Capra a trained scientist and graduate engineer, a friend of the astronomer Edwin P. Hubble (the discoverer of the red shift of the galaxies and the expansion of the universe), holder of several patents and inventor of various machines; skills that always helped him in his work as a director. Beyond the technical, however, it is Capra’s feeling for the colorfulness of a situation in both the literal and figurative sense that also distinguishes him in his autobiography; for example, when he, as a member of a film delegation to Moscow, describes the giant demonstration in Red Square on May 1, 1937: “We walked between endless rows of Red Army soldiers, between whole canyons of red flags and through roadblocks of controlling, stamping and frisking secret policemen. […] The choleric color was reflected in the eyes and on the faces of the people and made the bayonets flare. The city was red, the mood red. […] Far outside, on the outskirts of the city, the police lines ended abruptly. The sun was setting. In front of us we saw a cloud of dust in an open field. Those marching in front of us stepped out of line and ran towards the cloud. […] And there, under the cover of that gloomy cloud of dust, the biggest mass pissing of all time took place.” A scene from a Capra movie!

Here, the artist’s irony turns against the form of propaganda, against the general and abstract gaze directed at humanity, against the great machinations of social transformation. His gaze is aimed solely at the individual, not only in the sense of the American political ideal, but even more as a method of his own art. For Capra, this is a program: “The mass is a herd concept – unacceptable, insulting, belittling. When I see a crowd, I see a collection of free individuals: each a unique person, each one, in his human dignity, an island unto himself. Let the others make movies about the great storms of history, I would make mine about the guy who gets swept away by the storm. And if this guy is one big bundle of contradictions, […] then I think I can understand his problem.”

Capra takes the side of the individual artistic subject against critical philosophy, of experience against theory: “My films will penetrate the heart not with logic, but with compassion.” If you want, you can recognize an echo of Adorno’s critique of “identity logic” in this, an insistence on the “non-identical” in people that is not absorbed in the determinations of the social structure and its “constraints.” But if this attitude remains one-sided and unreflective, you soon can’t see the forest for the trees. For Capra, there are only the individual trees, and in this he is strictly liberal. Precisely for this reason, however, the social context can only be saved by his heavily applied sentimentality, and the solutions must come abruptly from the miraculous, as if by the “hand of God.” The storyteller feels the ground wobble beneath his feet and the “Capra-style cheesiness” threatens to turn rancid.

What keeps Capra among the greats, however, is his historical position. For even if his fairy tales are sentimentally transfigured, they retain their credibility as films that record reality: as fairy tales of the New Deal and anti-fascism. With his “message of encouragement,” he was able to sing the praises of capitalism and at the same time “the praises of the hard-working people, the cheated, those who were born poor, the beaten-down,” because in the Great Depression there seemed to be a kind of capitalist self-awareness and, with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the hope of social renewal. If Capra himself experienced the “American Dream” of rising from poor immigrant child to millionaire and mirrored this in his naive heroes, it was because he wanted to represent the social containment of the capitalist machine rather than the triumph of money and the unfettered market. The New Deal, to which he was committed, ushered in the era of Keynesianism and deficit spending; and only in this political climate was it possible for Capra to lead his provincial Parzival from the deepest despair to the happy ending of a victory over malice and corruption in films such as Mr. Deeds Goes to Town (1937) or Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939). The naivety of his social fairy tales was covered by a real social campaign, which even thirty years later led the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas to believe that capitalism was now fundamentally civilized by the welfare state.

Capra’s moment of anti-fascism was also real and authentic. In this respect, he was also able to credibly mobilize the naivety of his critical statements or affirmative critique, because Western capitalism was really fighting a great battle against the worst spawn of its own logic and wanted to prevent its ultimate consequence. Capra turned his back on Hollywood and volunteered to join the U.S. Army to put his skills at the service of the anti-Hitler coalition. After seeing Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will, he recognized this “horrifying film” as a propagandistic “stroke of genius” with a message “as naked and brutal as a lead pipe” that heralded the Holocaust. As counter-propaganda, “Colonel Capra” created the film series Why We Fight (1942-45), in which his aim was to use “the enemy’s films” documentary style “to make their enslaving aims clear. Our boys would hear for themselves the Nazis and the Japs shouting their master race nonsense – and our fighters would understand why they were in uniform.”

The fact that Capra’s career only glowed dimly after the war remains incomprehensible to him even decades later. And it is strange how his autobiography becomes weaker in terms of language and thought as soon as he approaches the description of the time when the storyteller’s voice was taken away. Suddenly, the naivety becomes stale and the momentum flagging. Parzival has lost his innocence. Against the youth revolt of the 1960s, he now only barks as a conservative old man and sees “hash-smoking, parasitic parent-haters,” rails against “deviants and masturbators,” uses the denunciatory language of prejudice to attack “homosexuals, lesbians and junkies” and rages against “childish protests with puerile banners” of “spineless hordes.” However, Capra also takes himself to task when he describes the failure of his last film Pocketful of Miracles (1961): “For me, the real cause was a deeply personal one, a deeply moral one: someone who has the incredible power to speak for two hours to hundreds of millions of his fellow human beings, in the dark, must not speak with forked tongue. What he says must come straight from his heart and not from his wallet.”

In reality, the era of capitalist morality was over because the historical resources of Keynesianism were exhausted. Even Kennedy’s myth no longer had a real social equivalent, and Clinton’s show today cannot even be considered a caricature of the New Deal. But it is not the people who have become weaker, but the development of capitalism that has made the personal hero irrelevant. Social critique has disappeared from postmodern art as a whole and the tear of sentiment can now only be shed for animals or extraterrestrials. Conversely, evil can no longer be individualized either: “The villain,” complains old Frank Capra, “began to transform himself from a person into an idea, a state of mind or a condition of life.” Or likewise into an alien. Structuralism has caught up with Capra. But that is no reason to rejoice. He himself suspected it: when the social kitsch of Hollywood’s belief in the personal good in capitalist man has finally degenerated into ridiculousness and become merely boring or a historical genre picture, then “the man-eater masks that children wear on Halloween will reveal reality.” Its last fairy tales must be just as stupid and malicious as unlimited capitalism.

Originally published in Folha S. Paulo on 05/18/1997

Don’t Treat Every “Thing” Alike!

Some preliminary remarks on the papers by J. Ulrich, C-P. Ortlieb and Blaha/Wallner.

Roswitha Scholz

1. In my opinion, Comte is the consequence of Kant: he thinks him through to the end by definitively suspending the “thing in itself,” which was still indispensable in Kant. Despite this, Kant himself had conceptions of “underdeveloped peoples” that were arranged in a hierarchy based on stages of development. From Comte’s perspective, Kant is infantilized or at least implicitly feminized, put into women’s clothing as it were, by still being bound to theology in a certain sense and still asking questions about objects and the possibility of knowing and processing them in general. All of a sudden, the old metaphysics of transcendence is feminized.

Such procedures are themselves entirely part of the value-dissociation repertoire with its shifts in meaning; the opponent is forcibly feminized in the competitive struggle. This points to value-dissociation as a principle of social form. Comparable statements can also be found among German Enlightenment thinkers, for example, when they say that the French are more like women (perhaps because they are simply too immediately attached to positivist thinking, unlike the spirit of grand speculation!), or when in National Socialism the intellectual is considered effeminate and feminized in contrast to the male soldier. The basic principle here is value-dissociation, which reveals its relational and flexible character, i.e. such attributions serve to case the opponent as inferior in an otherwise entirely male-dominated event.

2. However, this does not detract from the fact that both in positivism and in the (old) Enlightenment metaphysics and corresponding theories dedicated to the problem of constitution, a “dissociation of the feminine” can be observed in various colors and forms. A “dissociation” of metaphysics in positivism has always taken place on a common basis with metaphysics; and this happens within the overall context of value-dissociation, which represents the principle of social form.

Kant’s problem of constitution is itself entirely androcentric and Eurocentric. He dabbles, so to speak, only on the value side, the subject side. In a different tradition of ideas, this also applies to Marx up to Postone, among others. Unlike the latter, however, whose concepts need to be developed further, Kant’s investigation of the cognitive apparatus provides nothing for the value-dissociation-critical uncovering of the problem of constitution, except in a negative respect as a component of the object to be criticized.

It is undeniable that Kant, in a way, still takes materiality into account (albeit only abstractly), as opposed to just considering empty form. However, a form-content dualism has always been constitutive for modern thought (including metaphysics), and Kant has always moved within this dualism. In this respect, he has at most served as a hinge between old metaphysics/old ideas of constitution and positivist self-assertion, from which materiality, with its specific weight, is then ultimately completely eradicated.

3. If the old (Enlightenment) metaphysics already involved a “dissociation of the feminine” and thus made itself absolute as a problem of constitution and left out everything that did not merge into it, then this continues in a “value-critical” reductionist assumption of exchange/value as a principle of social form, insofar as it is presented as a – somewhat god-like – total omnipotent. In contrast, the theory and critique of value-dissociation aims to demonstrate the limits of such approaches; quite apart from the fact that it is not exchange that is constitutive, but rather the relation of subjection to “abstract labor,” from which the exchange relation is established in the first place, while dissociation is once again a meta-relation.

Otherwise, there is a danger that the critique of society and cognition, insofar as it merely invokes value in its logic of zero/one, reconstitutes it again in the critique. In doing so, value-dissociation cannot be held up against value as an even more universal, indeed now truly universal principle. With any affirmation of the absolute would immediately come its own denial, insofar as value-dissociation finds itself “automatically” constrained by its own concept to encompass even that which does not fit within it; it thus dares to “think against itself” (Adorno) and engages in a new relationship between the general and the particular, the singular, the contingent, etc., without establishing hierarchies or defining one side as the origin of the others. The assertion of the generality of value-dissociation as a principle of social form also implies that the non-identical is suspended in mainstream modern thought. Thus, with an affirmation of the absolute, the critique of dissociation would undercut its own affirmation.

Incidentally, this also means taking into account the constitution of “sensuality” and “nature” and not ontologizing them; even the “sensual,” which was left out in positivist thought in particular and which must be taken into account, is always already socially constituted. Sensuality cannot simply be interpreted as ontologically given, even if in some patriarchal-immanent concepts it is conceived in this way as the counterpart to abstraction (even in value-critical contexts). On the other hand, it is by no means absorbed in this constitution; nevertheless, it is different whether I satisfy my physiological hunger with maggots or Maggi soup (both of which can be equally miserable).

If such a train of thought is not followed, there is a danger that a relationship of derivation or formal attribution will be maintained, i.e. the logic of zero and the logic of one could, even through a critique of them, lead to an attempt at banishing them in a formulaic-magical way. Value, the subject, the zero and/or the one could then stand on the one side and the corporeality, the individual qualities and also the rest of “what” is abstracted from could be on the other. In this case, it would almost be like an equation: there is a “firm” side (value, subject, etc.), so to speak, which always remains, and a putty side, which can be all kinds of things that are not included in the first side, right up to the state and the androcentric metaphysics of the Enlightenment itself. In this way, the One can then remain as a One in the critique, the value-religion and the value-God are recognized as what they want to make us believe about themselves.

As already indicated, a knowledge of the problem of constitution does not necessarily mean the admission of the non-identical; this was not the case with Hegel, who again included it in the identical, nor was it the case with Marx, since he basically affirmed (surplus) value as being the one, and even in Kant the thing itself, although indispensable to self-constitution, was in itself contradictory; in Kant, the essential thing was the form.

4. Now, the fixation on the violent zero/one has two consequences: on the one hand, the forced equalization of other non-identical moments and, on the other, their suspension in the face of a complex mesh of power in the context of (world) society as a whole.

Firstly, value and the modern subject have, in a sense, arrived at a dissociation harem in the critique of the violent zero/one. Before the law, all are equal, and this problematic assumption is thus still tragically repeated in the critique of the violent zero/one. In fact, from the perspective of the natural sciences and the positivist sciences, it is indeed irrelevant that women, “black” people and “savages” are ascribed similar characteristics which are then dissociated in order to arrive at pure science and maintain it as such. However, only from the point of view of the modern subject are all the dissociated cows gray. Now you could say, well, then you just have to distinguish between different types of dissociation. However, if one chooses the aforementioned value-dissociation approach in its formulaic nature, one remains merely on the epistemological level; to take special qualities into account, however, means to become material and to turn to the matter, the (non-generalizable) content; otherwise this approach itself remains tautological and there is a danger that it will simultaneously exhaust itself in an approach that resembles zoological classification. In this context, violence is not only inflicted by the modern white subject on itself and the object per se, but also on (white) women and “other others.”

On the other hand, however, this tautological approach also leaves other (non-) subjectivities and (non-) egos out of a complex power dynamic by basically assuming a simple general model of repression, even if the (male) subject himself has to abstract from his corporeality. The modern white subject thus acquires the apparent role of the lone actor. In contrast, “black” people, for example, are equally inferior “others” as white woman, but what about “black” men who also see their wives as “others”? What is needed here is a more systemic approach (albeit not in the Luhmannian sense), which no longer takes the violent zero/one as a more or less abstract perpetrator subject without renouncing the concept of it and without drowning it in “differences” in an equally bad, abstract way. The tension between concept and differentiation must be endured without in turn hypostatizing this tension.

In the value-dissociation theory, the concept of “dissociation” is clearly delineated.

It manifests itself on the cultural and symbolic level of discourse, it encompasses the material dimension, women’s responsibility for reproductive activities, and it is also evident in the sphere of social psychology (the male child having to separate himself from his mother in order to achieve a masculine identity). Value-dissociation, moreover, is not simply found in specific spheres, but permeates all areas and levels of society, as it can also be understood as a social process. In post-modernity, in which the patriarchy is becoming feral, it has a different face than in the modern era. Since the theory of dissociation cannot assert itself as something absolute (in terms of the theory of knowledge) without denying itself, it is condemned to admit even what does not fit into it. Thus, it asserts itself as a reflection of a fundamental contradiction, which in its momentary formulation collapses into itself again and for this very reason and only for this reason can it represent the conceptuality of a fundamental relationship which is always relativized.

The precise knowledge of a zero/one that causes violence and (in one way or another) is dissociative, is thus only the first step towards a more complex theory of value-dissociation, that – ceterum censeo – wants to show that this one, precisely in its “oneness” that never fails to present de facto results in social reality, is precisely not what it thinks it is. The violent zero/one is and is not at the same time, at least not in its merely negative self-conception.

5. Incidentally, in relativizing itself, the theory of value-dissociation does not believe itself to be in the least bit beyond the commodity-producing patriarchy. In its recourse to the individual, the particular, the different, it by no means represents a “germinal form” of the Other. It is aware of its historicity and limitations and can only hope to “make conditions dance” in its formulation, in the knowledge that it still has a long and rocky road ahead of it out of patriarchal-capitalist conditions, at the end of which it can hopefully become superfluous itself. For this theory, the non-identical is by no means something that goes beyond the given situation, but taking it into account means first and foremost being able to embrace the existence of negative data much better than a reductionism of identity logic.

In this context, I also don’t think that there is a fundamental tendency within capitalism today for “the structurally male enlightenment subject increasingly striving to make its ‘gentle,’ ‘natural’ and therefore ‘feminine’ characteristics fruitful for the valorization process, while the ‘servant society’ (Frank Rentschler) that is currently emerging in the crisis is simultaneously in the process of relegating ‘feminine nature’ to its supposedly sole and ‘natural’ social place.” It is much more complicated: men are being forcibly feminized and turned into housewives in precarious employment situations; they no longer have the role of family breadwinner. Women, on the other hand, have to become competitive subjects, otherwise they will fail, because they are responsible for both life and survival, although at the same time, in fact, for example in management concepts, the “feminine values” and “sympathies” that also exist in men must also be harnessed in the valorization process. Measured against the old, modern notions of the subject, we now have a postmodern “one-gender model”: women are men (competitive subjects), only different (still responsible for reproduction). Today’s capitalism can no longer afford to reduce women to their (ascribed) “natural” role as in the past, even if women today – having come over from classical modernity – are once again given preference over men for servant and care work. This is why we still have a socialization based on value-dissociation, albeit in decay. Both sides of the relation are now in crisis – both value and the dialectically mediated dissociation, without both being “gone” as a result.

6. Nor do I see religion emerging in the crisis today as the “inscrutable feminine” (if I have understood this correctly at all), as the always other side of “instrumental reason, which today leads itself ad absurdum.” It seems more likely to me that it is not chaos that expresses itself (again?) in religion today; instead, religion today appears regressively as an order-maker, but no longer as a unified-universalist one, but as a fragmented-group-pluralist and also individualized one, as corresponds to the “fall of God into the abyss of his concept” in the decline of capitalism.

I think Jörg Ulrich’s assessment in his book Individuality as a Political Religion seems more accurate to me when he writes that Jörg Bopp describes the “[…] ‘mixture of technical dynamism and pseudo-religious faith’ as ‘one of the greatest dangers facing our civilization today’. With this fear, Bopp ties in with Detlef Clausen’s determination, who places modern anti-Semitism at the center of his considerations and states that here, as in all everyday religions, ‘truncated perceptions […] solidify into a reality-distorting system that can be shared not only by fringe groups, but by the majority of society.’ […] In them, traditional religion is overcome, but the fundamentally religious perception of the world remains and combines ‘with conformist elements of consciousness that spare individuals the pain of asociality’ […] Everyday religious subjects compensate for their fear of the consequences of consistent social modernization and its own processes of individualization and disintegration” (p. 134).

The one who turns the corner here first is Carl Schmitt (as Ulrich has just shown with regard to individualized subjects today), is the sovereign who is supposed to judge the state of exception in a decisionist manner, even if this is no longer possible today in the same way as it was in the era of National Socialism. This “state of exception” is constituted at the level of isolated postmodern individuals, but as a “molecular civil war,” a term coined by Enzensberger, which I transfer to the (apparently) private relational war between postmodern individuals (not only with regard to gender issues) that is raging everywhere today. In addition, of course, the same thing happens on the most varied levels of (world) society in the various civil wars; but also when lawless spaces, camps, etc. emerge and the sovereign (such as the USA) abandons constitutional considerations in order to restore “order.” The sovereign, who corresponds to the value-man-god, is invoked here once again in decaying capitalism, although or precisely because it can no longer consolidate itself today as it did in the past.

When capitalism gets out of hand in the course of the “collapse of modernization” and threatens to drift into the fragmentary and barbaric, there is a renewed need to confront this historically new form of chaos in a harsh order-making manner, even if this can no longer succeed like it did in the past. This new form of chaos and this new form of order-making are in fact mutually dependent and constitute each other; they produce each other in a specific form within the framework of a decaying capitalism.

7. It is possible to say for modernity that the value-god, secularized to a certain extent, now turns the genuinely religious god of pre-modernity, from which he actually originates, into a “woman.” Whereas the latter was previously the law, in modernity he is pushed into irrationality and is now considered chaotic and inferior himself. In my opinion, however, what we observe in religion today has less to do with the blazing chaos and more to do with the paradoxical synthetic resurrection of God after the end of the value-man-God, who himself had defined his precursor as inferior, a precursor who is now taken from the tomb as the great order-maker (albeit in fact in a fragmented, pluralistic form) in order to establish (or return to?) unity, order, and meaning because in fact value-dissociation as a fundamental principle and thus the subject-object split has not been overcome. With the crisis of socialization based on value-dissociation, the traditionally understood patriarchal god with a beard and a half bald head, which has been turned into a woman in modernity, is invoked today in all its obsolescence, ironically making this obsolescence even more apparent. And so it’s no wonder that the apostle Paul has recently been rediscovered as a revolutionary and that there has been a “theological turn of postmodern theory” (Doris Akrap).

Neither the postmodern “one-gender model,” in which competition and service are equally inscribed, nor the phenomenon of a potentially barbaric “(everyday) religion” have anything to do with gentle femininity; rather, both should be interpreted as symptoms of a feralization of the modern commodity-producing patriarchy. The question arises as to which inconsistencies can be taken up today, when inconsistency has already become, so to speak, the essential constituent of the current state of society, the commodity-producing patriarchy in decay and feralization. In other words, the paradoxical question arises as to which inconsistencies an already obsolete socialization based on value-dissociation, which nevertheless still exists in all its harshness, could point beyond itself. At the moment, I don’t think that it is possible to make any concrete statements on this.

In my opinion, however, it is possible today to at least analyze this state of affairs, taking into account a necessary differentiation between the concept and the differences existing in said complexity and enduring the corresponding tension without re-hypostatizing this mediatedness; knowing that this is only a transitory stage towards its abolition.

This is what is needed today, not SIMPLE knowledge of the existence of social “inconsistencies.” The question that leads us in this direction can only be asked if it doesn’t lead to a return to the strict concept of violence in the name of order and security. But this also means going beyond the SIMPLE determination of the violent zero/one with its SIMPLE inconsistencies in order not to unintentionally work towards a false and today anyway impossible resurrection of God in the barbaric fragmentation in the form of a value-concept-God.

Originally published on exit-online.org on 05/06/2005

The Biologization of the Social

The world undergoes a new kind of “disenchantment”

Robert Kurz

The modern world defines ancient societies’ relationship with nature as irrational. The notion that mountains and rivers, animals and plants have souls seems to modern consciousness as ugly as the idea that someone can be bewitched by magic. Max Weber, as we know, spoke of the “disenchantment of the world” by Enlightenment reason, by the rationality of science and technology.

However, this contrast between modern rationality and pre-modern irrationality in dealing with nature is far too simplistic. Firstly, ancient societies were not at all irrational in their “process of metabolism with nature” (Marx), as they had to provide for themselves. In addition, they created admirable artifacts and bequeathed knowledge that modern people still use. Secondly, modern society is not guided by strict rationality in relation to natural objects. The scale on which the current mode of production destroys its own natural foundations of life leaves us in doubt about Max Weber’s statement.

Rather, we should be referring to a “second disenchantment” of the world by modern society. This disenchantment, in fact, surpasses all the previous ones, because its magical pretension is total and unconsidered. The splitting up of feelings, sensitive experiences and dreams by abstract reason has given rise to a sphere of “irrationalism” divorced from rational ends and ideas – and this both in individuals and in society in general. Autonomized abstract reason itself is only rational in its means, not in its end.

That end is the “economization” of man and nature under the dictates of money, which in turn has no rational origin, only a magical one. Not only are the social relations of modernity permeated by the modern magic of money and its irrational end in itself, but also modern science and technology as well. The instrumental rationality of economized consciousness is therefore in eternal danger of turning into irrational affections.

This modern irrationalism doesn’t just make itself known in the guise of religious movements. Just as often, it can be seen in the rational guise of political ideas and even supposed scientific knowledge. This correlation is expressed most clearly when human society and history are reduced to semi-natural objects. Now, if nature is in itself more than it appears to be to the objectifying gaze of the natural scientist, man is also more than just nature, otherwise he would be incapable of conceiving of it. The reductionism of the natural sciences can only know nature unilaterally; human society, however, is entirely ignored. The apparent objectivity of scientific rationality comes across as wild irrationalism as soon as it tries to dissolve social relations into semi-physical or semi-biological factors.

But it is precisely towards this reductionism that modern science tends. Unable to solve “metaphysical” questions, it has thrown philosophy into the dustbin of the history of ideas. The philosophical and revolutionary 18th century still devised reckless critical thinking in order to give a certain legitimacy to the nascent capitalist society. The 19th century, as the “century of the natural sciences,” sought to trim the claws of social theory and placate its mordacity with pseudo-scientific doctrines. At a time of relentless and widespread misery, it was urgent to lend capitalism the dignity of natural laws in order to make it invulnerable and snatch it out of its historical context. Thus, economics became the “physics” of the total market and its supposedly eternal laws, and sociology began to conceive of itself as the “biology” of social relations, in order to cover up the social contradictions of modernity under the cloak of natural necessities.

The universal competition between individuals, social groups and nations, that existed because of capitalism, was increasingly given a biological interpretation backed up by these “scientific” ideologies. Count de Gobineau, a French diplomat, created the so-called “races” of humanity and elaborated a theory about their “natural” inequalities – evidently a pseudo-scientific legitimization of European colonialism, whose empire over the colored population was to be founded on the alleged biological superiority of the “white race.”

When Darwin discovered the history of biological evolution, his theory of natural selection in the “struggle for existence” was immediately transposed to human society. Darwin himself did not fail to take sides. In some of his letters, he criticized the then incipient trade union movement, since its demands for solidarity hindered the process of natural selection and burdened society with specimens unfit for competition.

This social Darwinism maintained an obscene link with the “physics” of the market. At the end of the 19th century, they were joined by what was known as eugenics or “racial hygiene,” which advocated the hereditary transmission of social qualities. The lower classes of criminals and disqualified people were labeled as “hereditarily inferior” men who should be prevented from reproducing. On the other side of the coin was the acclaimed “victorious type” of the beautiful, strong man with a “healthy heritage.”

At eugenics exhibitions held in Germany, England and the United States, entire families were paraded like farm animals as specimens of good stock and “pure blood.” Not even the workers’ movement escaped such madness. Karl Kautsky, the social-democratic theoretician, wrote with all candor in favor of “social hygiene,” and the already well-off specialized workers based their repudiation of the “sloppy lumpen-proletariat” on biological and eugenic arguments.

In this pseudo-scientific imbroglio of ideologies that permeated the whole of Western society around the turn of the century, two distinct sociobiological images gradually gained prominence. On the one hand, a social racism developed that labeled people of color, the sick, criminals, the disabled, the ragged, etc. as “inferior men.” The construction of industrial society fell exclusively to strong white workers, and all superfluous “ballast” had to be thrown away. This malevolent irrationalism went hand in hand with the contempt and degradation of women, who were accused of a certain “physiological imbecility.”

On the other hand, a new anti-Semitism began to spread, without any religious basis. “The Jew” was imagined as the “negative superman,” as a kind of prince of darkness and the antipode of the nouveau prince of labor. This Manichean conception reduced the perniciousness and catastrophes of the monetary economy to the biological constitution of “Jewish finance capital,” which the “good” money of venerable white labor had to confront. The anonymous and non-subjective laws of the expanding world market were therefore translated into the folly of the alleged global conjuring of a “foreign race.”

As everyone knows, National Socialism took the dual biological ideology of the “inferior man” and the “negative superman” to the extreme consequence of annihilation on an industrial scale. After the horrors of Auschwitz, no one wanted to commit themselves to such ideas, which then slipped into the historical background. In the period of great prosperity that followed the Second World War, they flickered only as specters of an inauspicious past that was believed to be banished forever. The economic and social sciences, however, were in fact only superficially cleansed of the conceptual dross of biologism and social Darwinism. More than ever, political economy used a type of social science that was averse to “dim lights,” setting itself up as a “rigorous” semi-natural science.

While growth and evolution beckoned with a global perspective of well-being, the lemurs of social biologism remained locked away in the netherworld. From this perspective, the flowering of critical sociology and neo-Marxism in the 1960s and 1970s was illusory, as it merely repeated the emancipatory ideas of the past and found itself unable to survive periods of economic boom. When the economic crisis made its comeback, left-wing social critique disappeared significantly from the big public stages in Western countries. At that time, the theory of post-modern deconstructivism based on Foucault, which suited the casino capitalism speculation of the Reagan and Thatcher era, was all the rage. The world – including the market system – seemed to dissolve into “discourse” that could be played with at will.

But in the refuge of the jovial and neurasthenic “risk society,” as German sociologist Ulrich Beck called it – referring to the development of the 1980s – the turbulence of a new racism erupted. Since then, racist power has spread around the world in a torrent of bloody excesses. In Germany too, immigrants and refugees have been coldly killed by mobs of right-wing radicals in arson attacks. To this day, the public sphere downplays such crimes as the work of a few disaffected youths. In reality, however, the racist power loose in the streets is the harbinger of a turnaround in the world’s atmospheric conditions.

In the factories of ideas themselves, other winds are blowing. The last decade has seen the biologism of a new “natural science” creep wolfishly into academic discourse, which increasingly mirrors the legacy of the playful, “post-sociological” fashion of deconstructivism. At first glance, it seemed that genetic research would be able to debunk racist nonsense with scientific arguments. Researchers such as the Swedish molecular geneticist Svante Pããbo proved that men from the most diverse nations, by virtue of their DNA sequences, can be genetically more “related” to each other than to their closest neighbors. But these findings are now increasingly strained under the weight of a new “biologization” of social conduct, for which, incidentally, the geneticists themselves are ready to provide the ammunition. American neurologist Steven Pinker claims that language is “congenital to man like an elephant’s trunk,” and that there must therefore be a certain “grammar gene.” For Nobel Prize winner Francis Crick, from San Diego, free will itself is nothing more than “neurological reactions.” Scientists at the Robert Koch Institute in Berlin say they have found a virus that supposedly triggers melancholy and is transmitted by domestic cats. And Dean Hammer, an American molecular biologist, attributes homosexuality to the Xq28 gene, located at the end of the X chromosome.

As is always the case, these are unproven hypotheses that say less about nature than they do about the ideological preferences of scientists. These scholars are often naïve from a social point of view and so perhaps don’t realize how their “purely objective” research is influenced by ideological currents that undermine society. It goes without saying that the reduction of human culture and sociability to the standard of molecular biology provides arguments for the legitimization of a renewed barbarism. The American social scientists Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, in their study entitled The Bell Curve, had already created a correlation between “race, genes and IQ” that excluded black Americans from the “cognitive elite” in a pseudo-biological way. Soon, the ill-fated scientists will provide us with a “crime gene” or a “poverty gene.”

The discovery of genetic underpinnings to people’s social destiny fits the neoliberal policy of cutting costs like a glove. The new academic discipline of “medical economics” is gradually providing carte blanche for the poor, sick and disabled in Western countries to be given “aid in dying” for cost reasons. Debates on the subject are taking place in broad daylight in Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavia. The Australian philosopher Peter Singer, whose grandparents died in German concentration camps, now advocates the National Socialist thesis that defective newborns should be immolated for being “unworthy of life.” In China today, a bill is being passed to legalize euthanasia.

This social-Darwinian brutalization on a global scale is matched by a new wave of anti-Semitism in all corners of the globe. Half a century after Auschwitz, synagogues are once again being burnt down in Germany; from the Atlantic to the Urals and even in Japan, the smear campaign against Jewish communities is flourishing; and to top it all off, Louis Farrakhan, the leader of the “Black Muslims” in the United States, is exercising his defamation in anti-Semitic tirades. All social groups, including civil rights movements, are succumbing more and more to biological arguments in the fierce battle of competition, in order to differentiate themselves from humanity. Under the influence of the globalization of capital and based on the academic arguments of geneticists, we may be facing the threat of a “universalist” biologism that considers all people inept at competing within monetary society to be “inferior individuals” and that, at the same time, wants to blame the future catastrophes of the market economy on a “Jewish conspiracy.”

Neoliberalism, with its ideological pseudo-physics of market laws, has loosened the shackles of all the demons of modern barbarism and thus harked back to the irrationality of 19th century “social scientism.” The naturalization of the economy, however, has the logical consequence of bestializing social relations. Neoliberal thought leaders are not only responsible for the advent of fundamentalism, but also for the current return to social Darwinism and anti-Semitism.

Originally published on 07/07/96

Mindfulness: Propaganda and Narcotic

Thomas Meyer

1. Submission as Freedom: Happiness in the “Best of All Worlds” (Candide/Voltaire)

In the neoliberal regime, people are forced to see themselves as entrepreneurs of their own labor power so that they can properly satisfy the imperatives of the market, with the ultimate aim of “self-determined” submission to the capitalist valorization process and its constraints. In Western democracies, such self-enslavement is understood as freedom. Here democracy, of course, means nothing other than that everyone is formally subjected to the same coercive freedom. Neoliberalism was only the most recent form taken by the “cage of bondage” (Max Weber) that capitalism has always been (cf. Kurz 1999). In the “commodity-producing patriarchy” (Roswitha Scholz), one’s freedom of personality is about as free as a corset. You are supposed to fit in perfectly to the demands of the market, while of course reserving the freedom to tie your own noose however you would like. Everyone has the freedom to strive for their own happiness, which implies nothing less than the fact that failure and falling behind are also one’s own responsibility. Success and failure, suffering and stress are privatized. Subjectivization in neoliberalism throws the individual back on themselves. Social structures are ignored, while collective thinking and action are denied or suppressed. Collective struggle and solidarity seem impossible. Being flexible and remaining resilient is the type of freedom forced upon every individual (see Graefe 2019). Bad health becomes private guilt. Unhealthy people have allegedly eaten the wrong food and exercised too little. According to neoliberal propaganda, this is also the sole responsibility of the individual and is not due to the stress caused by work or the restriction that having a low income places on one’s “freedom of choice” (cf. Mayr 2021). Diseases are becoming a purely medical problem. The so-called diseases of civilization, such as cardiovascular diseases, have a lot to do with the fact that many people are permanently “in overdrive,” or must be, which physiologically results in higher blood pressure. The long-term consequences of higher blood pressure are damage to the blood vessels, which contributes massively to cardiovascular diseases (see Cechura 2018). Furthermore, mental illnesses also become a privatized ailment. Their causes are supposedly located in one’s own brain, and not in the circumstances of life, so that the cure, according to neuroscientific vulgar materialism, is the consumption of psychotropic drugs (cf. Schleim 2021 & Hasler 2023).

This “musical chairs” that everyone is exposed to in varying degrees in the capitalist regime, which is sold as freedom by the dominant propaganda, does not have to end in a psychiatric hospital or a morgue. However, universal competition leads to more and more people being crushed by it, which has negative socio-psychological and health consequences. Those affected by capitalism, especially those who are lonely and isolated, nevertheless try to “somehow” process what is happening to them. There are plenty of self-help books and paid courses that help individuals cope with themselves and the world: You just have to believe in yourself, think positively, be optimistic, change your diet, accept economic or personal crises as opportunities, discover unrecognized potential in and beside yourself, etc. It is a mixture of adaptation to the market, denial of reality and self-abuse. Those who are “realists” transfigure reality and subordinate themselves to it. Esotericism is also part of this context of individual self-optimization. Esotericism promises many people meaning and direction in their lives, seemingly offering a holistic perspective much different from the “cold rationality” of objective science (or medicine). However, instead of placing life crises in a social context and enabling a collective defenseagainst capitalism’s impositions (e.g. through strikes and sabotage), esotericism serves as an opportunity to constantly reinvent oneself as a neoliberal subject through withdrawal into the private sphere and inwardness, through passivation and gobbledygook, through “wholeness” and health, or it helps one endure the stress (cf. Barth 2012). Esotericism often appears to be harmless promotion of the self, but it has always been and still is linked to reactionary and fascist thinking (cf. Kratz 1994, Speit 2021). Of course, esotericism here has nothing to do with its original meaning from antiquity, namely secret or hard-to-access knowledge that not everyone can or should share. What I mean here is the esotericism that is a billion-dollar business. Naturally, elements or aspects of various religious or philosophical traditions are exploited for this purpose and instrumentalized for neoliberal propaganda and self-indoctrination.

2. Meditation as the “Opium of the Masses” (Marx)

A few years ago, Zen Buddhist and management professor Ronald Purser criticized the neoliberal instrumentalization and exploitation of Buddhist meditation practice in his book McMindfulness: How Mindfulness Became the New Spirituality of Capitalism[1] (Purser 2021). In Western countries, so-called mindfulness has become a widespread fad. Mindfulness, which can be achieved through a certain form of meditation practice, is primarily intended to reduce stress and strengthen concentration. This meditation practice is called Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR). A key agitator and preacher of this method is Jon Kabat-Zinn, who Purser repeatedly refers to in the book. This practice says that you should do things like stay in the here and now, not be attached, not judge, have neither negative nor positive feelings, breathe in and out constantly, eat a raisin mindfully, etc. Corresponding courses are used and offered almost everywhere: at schools, at universities, for stressed managers, for stressed employees, for entrepreneurs, at all kinds of conferences, in Davos, and even in the military (so that the soldiers take a deep breath beforehand and don’t fire at random). The mindfulness preachers claim that if everyone just practiced mindfulness, the world could be changed and everything would be fine. Everything is therefore up to the individual. Nothing else needs to be done (such as getting involved in politics, trade unions or, above all, social critique). Just stay mindful in the now. Do Kabat-Zinn & Co really believe their own propaganda? Either way, this idea is based on a bottomless ignorance that doesn’t have or want to have a clue about how the world really works, how other people really live, or the problems marginalized people face. The mindfulness apostles “assume a false unity of human experience” (ibid., 249) and apparently do not even realize from what social filter bubble they are arguing. On the one hand, the mindfulness preachers emphasize that the meditation practice they offer has nothing to do with Buddhism, but is secular (and therefore legal in U.S. public schools), and that its effectiveness is supposedly (neuro)scientifically proven (the evidence, however, as Purser summarizes, is rather thin, statistically insignificant, indistinguishable from placebo or simply non-existent). On the other hand, the same people emphasize, depending on the occasion and situation – which further underlines the instrumental and intellectually dishonest character of the whole thing – that MBSR is supposedly the essence of the Dharma, i.e. fundamentally and essentially related to Buddhism, and that everything else that makes Buddhism Buddhism is more or less superfluous or nonsense. A certain western-white arrogance comes through here. Buddhism is devalued, and there is no serious engagement with it, since this would apparently be detrimental to the commercialization of meditation in the neoliberal regimes of the West. The title of the book was not chosen by chance: McMindfulness.

According to Purser, none of this really has anything to do with Buddhism. It’s not really accurate to say that a Western school of Buddhism is emerging here (just as Chan Buddhism, for example, gave rise to an independent Chinese Buddhism). On the contrary: the mindfulness programs are a product of neoliberal U.S. society; they are therefore situated in a specific context that is not usually made obvious. Mindfulness, on the other hand, as Purser makes clear, is just one aspect of Buddhist practice that cannot be isolated and certainly cannot be seen as a panacea. Purser therefore has no objections in principle to mindfulness and the meditation practices that cultivate it. The decisive factor, as he always emphasizes, is the social context and the objective to be achieved. Meditation is instrumentalized because it is stripped of its context, because the ethical foundations on which it is based and the goal it strives for are excluded (this is what makes its use in the military possible in the first place).[2] Mindfulness is not solely and certainly not primarily about reducing stress and passively breathing in the now; rather, meditation is part of a cultivation of ethics (sila). Right mindfulness as part of the eightfold path has as its goal compassion, a widening of the gaze and not a narrowing of this gaze and fixation on oneself. It is not the individual as an individual who becomes mindful and “compassionate,” but as part of a community (sangha). Mindfulness, stripped of its ethical context and reduced to the sole purpose of coping with stress, ties in perfectly with the neoliberal ideology mentioned above. Buddhism reduced to the consumption of fast food as a means of coping with stress in the neoliberal regime is, as Adorno would probably say in horror, not even Halbbildung.” Instead of looking for the causes of stress, such as working conditions that we could fight against together, stress is individualized and turned into a private problem. The aim of reducing stress is to remain or become a productive worker and to simply cope better with stress, to simply endure it and to fit in ina good mood and relaxed manner. The purpose of this is to keep the capitalist machinery running smoothly. Lenin is definitely to be agreed with here when he writes that “religion […] is a kind of spiritual fusel in which the slaves of capital drown their humanity and their claims to a halfway decent life” (Lenin 1974, 7). The booze with which reality is drowned here consists of sucking on a raisin for minutes on end and allowing yourself to be persuaded that your problems could be solved or your life improved by focusing on the here and now. The aim of “mindfulness-based stress reduction” is not to criticize stress and its causes, but to adapt to working conditions and life circumstances. Of course, this also has nothing to do with socially committed Buddhism (such as that of Thich Nhat Hanh). And certainly nothing to do with a critique of capitalism. Mindfulness agitators such as Kabat-Zinn are, so to speak, among the priests of neoliberalism.

3. Critique & Solidarity Instead of Self-Anesthetization

Just as one can find content in the Judeo-Christian tradition that supports a critical stance toward capitalism and its ideology, content that makes it possible to spark collective solidarity against the impositions and presumptions of capitalism (see Böttcher 2023 & 2022, Ramminger; Segbers 2018 & King 2022), a properly understood Buddhism has the potential to also contribute to the practical and theoretical critique of capitalism. If mindfulness as a moment of Buddhist practice is not instrumentalized and vulgarized for neoliberal propaganda and used as a wellness narcotic for resilience and the suppression of reality, so that through it “oppressive systems work more gently” (Purser 2021, 237), i.e. if it is not reduced to making the individual more resilient and compliant, a proper mindfulness can broaden our view and help us to stand firm, clear-minded, and of good heart together. In the words of Ronald Purser: “Because liberation is a systemic process, it cannot rely on individual methods. Social mindfulness starts with the widest possible lens, focusing collective attention on the structural causes of suffering. Groups work together to establish shared meanings and common ground, developing a socially engaged motivation before turning inwards. Clearly, this is different to an eight-week program in a boardroom. It goes much deeper and has longer-term objectives, combining resistance with meditative practice. The aim is not to de-stress for more business as usual. It’s to overcome alienation by working with others in a common struggle, using inner resources to seek social justice, resisting unjust power both to liberate oppressors and oppressed” (ibid., 254.).

However, a critique of neoliberalism will hardly suffice to adequately grasp and criticize capitalism as a “concrete totality” (Scholz 2009) with its fetishistic valorizing movement M-C-M’ and the gender-specific bourgeois subject form as well as the manifold manifestations of crisis (cf. e.g. Jappe 2023, Kurz 1999 & Scholz 1992). Nevertheless, Purser’s contribution to a critique of neoliberal ideology in the form of “mindfulness” is no minor matter, as the size of the esoteric and self-optimization scene shows. As is well known, the Christian churches also have esoteric self-management in their “pastoral offerings” (cf. Böttcher 2022, 73ff.). Naturally, the church does not want to miss out on any potential market share, which is why it is chumming up to the prevailing zeitgeist. Without a collective solidarity that liberates the individual from their lethargy and isolation and their futile attempts to cope using all kinds of psycho-techniques and medication, any attempt to defend themselves against the anti-social impositions and the terror of the economy is doomed to failure. Religious or pseudo-religious practices that confirm the individual in his isolation and do not even dream of having the “whole” in view are not an alternative to the “cold rationality” of capitalism, but its realization.

Literature

Barth, Claudia. 2012. EsoterikDie Suche nach dem Selbst: Sozialpsychologische Studien zu einer Form moderner Religiosität. Bielefeld: transcript.

Böttcher, Herbert. 2022. “Auf dem Weg zu einer ‚unternehmerischen Kirche’ in Anschluss an die abstürzende Postmoderne.” Available online at: https://www.oekumenisches-netz.de/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Druck_Unternehmerische-Kirche.pdf.

Böttcher, Herbert. 2023. “Weltvernichtung als Selbstvernichtung: Was im Anschluss an Walter Benjamin ‚zu denken’ gib.” In: exit! – Krise und Kritik der Warengesellschaft 20: 159-207.

Cechura, Suitbert. 2018. Unsere Gesellschaft macht krank: Das Leiden der Zivilisation und das Geschäft mit der Gesundheit. Baden-Baden: Tectum Wissenschaftsverlag.

Graefe, Stefanie. 2019. Resilienz im Krisenkapitalismus: Wider das Lob der Anpassungsfähigkeit. Bielefeld: transcript.

Hasler, Felix. 2023. Neue Psychiatrie – Den Biologismus überwinden und tun, was wirklich hilft. Bielefeld: transcript.

Jappe, Anselm. 2023. The Adventures of the Commodity: For a Critique of Value. London: Bloomsbury.

Kratz, Peter. 1994. Die Götter des New Age: Im Schnittpunkt von “Neuem Denken,” Faschismus und Romantik. Berlin: Elefanten.

King Jr., Martin Luther. 2022. I have a dream. San Francisco: HarperOne.

Kurz, Robert. 1999. Schwarzbuch Kapitalismus. Frankfurt: Eichborn.

Lenin. 1974. On Religion. Moscow: Progress Publishers

Mayr, Anna. 2020. Die Elenden: Warum unsere Gesellschaft Arbeitslose verachtet und sie dennoch braucht. Berlin: Hanser.

Purser, Ronald E. 2019. McMindfulness: How Mindfulness Became the New Spirituality of Capitalism. London: Repeater.

Ramminger, Michael and Franz Segbers. 2018. “Alle Verhältnisse umwerfen… …und die Mächtigen vom Thron stürzen” – Das gemeinsame Erbe von Christen und Marx. Hamburg.

Schleim, Stephan. 2021. Gehirn, Psyche und Gesellschaft – Schlaglichter aus den Wissenschaften vom Menschen. Berlin: Springer.

Scholz, Roswitha. 1992. “Der Wert ist der Mann – Thesen zur Wertvergesellschaftung und Geschlechterverhältnis.” In: Krisis – Beiträge zur Kritik der Warengesellschaft 12:19-52.

Scholz, Roswitha. 2009. “Gesellschaftliche Form und konkrete Totalität – Zur Dringlichkeit eines dialektischen Realismus heute.” In: exit! – Krise und Kritik der Warengesellschaft 6: 55-100.

Speit, Andreas. 2021. Verqueres Denken – Gefährliche Weltbilder in alternativen Milieus. Berlin: Ch. Links.


[1] For reasons of space, page references and citations are largely omitted in the following.

[2] This also applies to the neoliberal use of ancient philosophy, such as the Stoa or Plato.

Originally published on Ökumenisches Netz in 10/2024.

Crisis Imperialism

6 Theses on the Character of the New World Order Wars

Robert Kurz

1

Capitalism is not a Buddhist event; it cannot be understood in an ahistorical way. The logic of the principle of valorization, which remains consistent, does not bring about the eternal return of the same, but rather an irreversible historical process with qualitatively different relations. The respective world constellation can only be explained with reference to the development of world capital. When a certain stage of valorization has been exhausted, the associated political institutions, concepts and ideologies also become obsolete. This is all the more true when the world system has reached the level of maturity that it did at the end of the 20th century.

Since the 1980s, the third industrial revolution of microelectronics has begun to set an internal historical limit to the valorization of living labor. Capital is becoming “incapable of valorization” in the sense that at the level of the irreversible productivity and profitability standards it has itself produced, no further real-economic expanded reproduction (an expansion of valorization) is possible. This “structural over-accumulation” of world capital leads to structural mass unemployment in the metropolitan areas through the application of microelectronics, to global overcapacity and a flight of money capital into the financial superstructure (financial bubbles). In the periphery, the lack of capital power prevents microelectronic rearmament; but precisely because of this, entire national economies and world regions collapse all the faster, because they fall so far below the standards of capital-logic that their social reproduction is declared “invalid” by the world market.

The result is a cost-cutting and shutdown race. Globalization is nothing other than transnational rationalization and, in this respect, is actually something qualitatively new. The traditional export of capital in the form of expansive investments abroad according to modular design is being replaced by the outsourcing of business functions in order to exploit global cost differentials. This, on the one hand, creates transnational value chains, while at the same time growing parts of social reproduction dry up and die off. This process is shaped and controlled by equally globalized financial bubble capital.

However, the old gap between metropolises and the periphery remains even under the crisis conditions of globalization; now no longer as a gap in the degree of capitalist development, but as a gap in the degree of social decay. Transnational value creation is becoming more concentrated in the areas of the “triad” (U.S./North America, EU, Japan/South East Asia), while it is becoming ever thinner in the rest of the world. The dynamics of economic globalization in the context of transnational financial markets are breaking up national economic regulatory spaces.

The state in the metropolises is not disappearing, but it is ceasing to be an “ideal total capitalist” in the classical sense. Because, unlike the business economy, it cannot disperse transnationally, it loses one regulatory function after another and mutates into purely repressive crisis management. However, this is not merely a matter of the social degradation of growing sections of society; capital is also involuntarily destroying a whole series of its own structural conditions of existence. This is reflected not least in a contradiction of a new quality between the transnational valorization of capital and the national form of money (currency).

In the periphery, the state apparatuses are dissolving to a far greater extent – along with the majority of capitalist reproduction. Public services are almost completely disappearing, the administration is capitulating, and the repressive apparatuses are running wild. All that remains are small islands of productivity and profitability in an ocean of disorganization and impoverishment. All national economic development comes to a standstill; the globally active corporations snatch up these insular sectors as components of their transnational business economy. At the same time, an economy of plunder emerges in which the physical substance of the collapsed national economy is exploited, and population groups attack each other according to ethnic or religious criteria in a continuation of competition by other means. Marauding groups take the place of social institutions. A large part of the elite is transformed into the leadership of ethnic or religious bandits and clan militias, into warlords and princes of terror.

These conditions are only a transitional stage of the world crisis at the historical limit of the valorization process. For the time being, the economy of plunder can still dock onto the world market and make the exploitation of economic ruins appear to be a continuing process of valorization, just as, on the other hand, it does through the constant inflation of financial bubbles in the core. But both phenomena are approaching complete exhaustion.

2

Against this background, classical imperialism has come to an end. Just as the business economy can no longer be formed and regulated on a national basis, the subjugation and incorporation of capitalistically superfluous population masses no longer makes sense. The territorial form of domination and expansion has become obsolete. The “hands,” which make up the majority of the world’s population, are no longer useful, but are unable to break free from the capitalist logic which, as a negative world-socialization, is maintained at all costs.

In the post-war period, the competition between the old (mainly European) national expansionist powers had already been replaced by the bipolar competition between two superpowers: the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Here, what was decisive was no longer the struggle for national zones of influence, but the question of the regulating principles and modalities of capitalist reproduction. It was about the competition between the historical latecomers on the world market, the societies of “recuperative modernization” in the reference area of the Pax Sovietica, and the societies of the developed capitalist core in the reference area of the Pax Americana. The U.S. had already matured into the sole leading power of the West on the basis of continental resources and the largest domestic market in the world; it had pulled away unassailably thanks to the dynamics of its military-industrial complex after the Second World War.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of “recuperative modernization” in the crisis of the third industrial revolution, there is no going back to the old intra-imperialist conflicts of national expansionist powers. Instead, we are faced with the planetary unification of the Pax Americana, but this in the context of a precarious minority capitalism based on financial bubbles and an economy of plunder. It is ridiculous to talk of a new intra-imperial competition between the U.S. and the FRG or EU. The U.S. military apparatus built up in the decades of the post-war boom is unrivaled; year after year, the U.S. armaments budget is more than twenty times that of Germany. There are neither military nor political and economic conditions for a new rival power.

Despite a certain relevant rhetoric and individual moments of interest, the U.S. is not acting in the name of national territorial expansion, but as a kind of global protective power of the valorization imperative and its laws under conditions of crisis in the world system. Everyone operates in a context of transnational processes of valorization, while simultaneously feeling the pressure of a growing mass of “superfluous” people. Therefore, the role of the U.S. as the last monocentric superpower is not only to be explained externally by its military weight, but also by the deterritorialized conditions of globalization itself. The entirety of transnational capital, the financial markets, and what remains of the state apparatuses in the core are dependent on the ability of the U.S. to police the world.

What has thus emerged is an “ideal total imperialism” under the sole leadership of the U.S., extended via NATO and other world-capitalist institutions. The image of the enemy is clearly not one of internal imperialist national interests, but one of a democratic, total imperialism against the crisis ghosts of the unified world system. The state capitalist empire of failed “recuperative modernization” has been replaced by a diffuse complex of disruptive potentials, ethno- and religious terrorism, anomic conditions, etc. as a new “realm of evil.”

“Ideal total imperialism” essentially acts as a security and exclusion imperialism of the democratic capitalist core against the crisis conditions created by capital itself, without ever being able to overcome them. Security is to be established in order to guarantee the smooth flow of capitalist transactions, even in the precarious islands of valorization on the periphery. This includes, first and foremost, guaranteeing the supply of fuel for the capitalist world machine. Here too, however, it is not a question of specifically national oil interests, but of the process of transnational valorization. The core’s common interest in excluding the mass global migration movement emanating from the collapsing zones of the periphery lies even farther beyond national territorial claims to power.

3

The contradictions within the framework of democratic imperialism as a whole (such as the current dispute between the FRG, France, Belgium etc. on the one hand and the leading power, the U.S., on the other) are of merely secondary importance. To deduce from this the logic of a new major intra-imperial conflict along the lines of the World War II era would be about as intelligent as trying to declare the differences between, say, Nazi Germany and Franco’s Spain (which, as we know, stayed out of the Second World War) to be the “real” conflict of that time.

It is not old-style national competition that determines the current intra-imperial conflicts, but some subaltern governments’ fears of consequences that may no longer be controllable. NATO and the rest of the world are dividing themselves into submissive and hesitant vassals, without the latter being able or even willing to openly rebel against the U.S. The procrastination stems more from the fear of those who do not have their own finger on the trigger, while the compliant are more likely to be those who have nothing more to lose, but also nothing to say anyway.

While up to now, including the Afghanistan intervention, there has been no opposition to the world wars under the aegis of the U.S. and the Red-Green government has sent its Germanic auxiliary troops into the field with oorah-democratic ideology, the announced pre-emptive strike against Iraq is now raising concerns because international law, the UN and sovereignty – the guarantees of the much-invoked capitalist community of states and “peoples” – are being openly disregarded. The FRG, France and the rest of the world are afraid that they will soon be treated in a similar way and that the existing legitimizing construct could give up the ghost.

The fact that the U.S. is so rudely trampling on the rules of the game of the capitalist world of states that it itself installed after 1945 is a formal consequence of the internal contradiction between the national constitution of the last world power on the one hand and its transnational “mission” as a protective power of the globalized valorization process on the other. The deeper substantive reason, however, is that the principle of sovereignty itself, which consists precisely in uniting populations territorially as a “total labor force,” has become obsolete. Even the core states, including the U.S. itself, are relinquishing more and more internal functions of sovereignty through “privatization,” including the apparatus of force. By declaring the sovereignty of “rogue states” null and void in foreign relations as well, the U.S. is only executing the world crisis on the political-legal level, which heralds the end of all civil contractual relationships (and ultimately the end of the sovereignty of the U.S. itself). The conservative resistance to this dynamic on the part of some European states is doomed to failure. Old anti-American resentments may also play a role here, but no longer a decisive one.

4

The problem faced by the all-imperial world police force is that it can only act on the level of sovereignty, which it must, on the other hand, destroy with its own hands. This also applies to the high-tech weapons systems that are geared towards classic territorial conflicts. The ghosts of crises, potential troublemakers, terrorist gangs, etc. cannot be reached in this way because they themselves operate in the folds of globalization. Al Qaeda is structured exactly like a transnational corporation. Military superiority is becoming useless, the “war on terror” is becoming a big swing and a miss. At the same time, the end of the financial bubble economy threatens a severe crisis for the capitalist core, especially for its heart, the U.S. economy itself, and consequently a severe world depression. This would also call into question the continued ability to finance the high-tech apparatus of the last world power.

This is why the U.S. administration has switched back from the “war on terror” to the paradigm of “rogue states.” The pre-emptive strike against Iraq signals a double flight forward. On the one hand, the ruin of Iraqi sovereignty with its exhausted army is to be “defeated” as an easy opponent of a classic state-territorial character in order to show the world who is master of the house. On the other hand, the impending economic collapse is to be cushioned by immediate access to the Iraqi (perhaps also the Saudi) oil fields and the dismantling of OPEC. This is less about the material flow of oil, which would be guaranteed even without military intervention, and more about saving the financial markets in the short term. The dwindling recycling from the financial bubbles must be renewed, and this is not possible without a “future option” for a new secular prosperity. After the “Pacific century” option proved to be just as much a flop in this respect with the collapse of the Japanese and South-East Asian models as the new economy of internet and telecoms capitalism, the “oil at pre-OPEC prices” option is now to bring it under direct U.S. control.

However, this could backfire. The Iraqi army is not a serious opponent, but a possible urban battle for Baghdad and other centers with high casualty figures, major destruction and millions of refugees would morally discredit the U.S. around the world. Above all, however, it would certainly not be possible to install a stable regime; Milosevic and Saddam are in any case obsolete models of sovereignty. However, a U.S. military administration of Iraq and the entire oil region in constant confrontation with guerrillas and terror would be neither affordable nor politically and militarily sustainable and, moreover, anything but a signal of euphoria for the financial markets. The “victory” over Iraq will inevitably be a Pyrrhic victory that can only exacerbate the overall crisis of the world system.

5

However, it is not just about the pseudo-rationality of certain “interests,” which are always subordinated to the irrational end in itself of the principle of valorization. The vulgar materialism of interests fails to recognize the real metaphysics of capital as a secularized religion whose irrationality overwhelms the internal rational interests at the boundaries of the system. The valorization imperative, which is indifferent to all sensual content, ultimately demands the dissolution of the physical world into the empty form abstraction of value, i.e. its annihilation. In this respect, we can speak of an almost gnostic death drive of capital, which expresses itself in the logic of destruction in business management as well as in the potential for violence in competition. Because the contradictions can no longer be resolved in a new model of accumulation, this death drive is now manifesting itself directly and globally.

The self-preservation of the system at all costs turns into the self-destruction of its actors. Mass shooters, suicide cults, and suicide bombers are executing the objective madness to an unprecedented extent as a reaction to the crisis devoid of any prospects. Closely linked to this is the anti-Semitic syndrome as the last crisis-ideological resort of the capitalist subject form, which breaks out again and no longer concentrates on a specific national-imperial constitutional history (such as the German-Austrian one in the past), but floods the world in diffuse post-modern and post-national amalgamations, especially of religious provenance.

Because the capitalist internal rationality of the bourgeois subject of enlightenment cannot represent itself in a new model of accumulation, it no longer forms an immanent potency against the systemic death drive, but itself immediately turns into a moment of this irrationality. Enlightenment and counter-enlightenment, reason and delusion, democracy and dictatorship fall into one. Democratic imperialism as a whole is unable to pacify its own world of crises, but instead becomes the “ideal total mass shooter,” right up to the use of nuclear weapons against the zones of insecurity, the intangible specters of crisis and the masses of the “superfluous,” as the U.S. administration has already openly threatened.

6

There is no longer an immanent alternative. But because the left knows nothing other than to occupy immanent alternatives on the ground of capitalist ontology and developmental history, it largely flees into the past and engages in an absurd argument about whether we are writing 1914 or 1941. Both factions are intellectually stuck in the era of a capital based on national economies and national-imperial powers of expansion, both are illiterate in terms of crisis theory and, more generally, with respect to the critique of political economy, and both cling to the capitalist internal rationality of the bourgeois enlightenment subject.

The nostalgics of 1914 and followers of Lenin’s mummy conjure up the phantasm of an “anti-imperialist” alliance of left-wing pacifists in the metropolises with the “sovereignists” and “peoples” of the Third World, who are supposed to defend their bourgeois independence against Western imperialism. The nostalgics of 1941, on the other hand, are delirious with the idea of an “anti-Hitler” coalition led by the “good” Western powers against “Islamic fascism” and its German accomplices to protect Israel and “civilization.”

But Saddam’s regime is neither a world-threatening Nazi empire nor a hopeful force for national development, and bin Laden is neither a Hitler nor a Che Guevara. The Palestinian state is disintegrating even before it can be founded, because statehood is no longer an emancipatory option at all; conversely, the barbarism of intifada and suicide attacks cannot be equated with the factory extermination of Jews at Auschwitz. The false friends of the Third World subsume Israel under imperialism and ignore its essential quality as a result of global anti-Semitism; the false friends of Israel glorify the reactionary-ultra-religious forces responsible for the murder of Rabin and themselves fall into primitive racist agitation. Some negate Israel as a place of refuge, others ignore the fact that its existence is more endangered by its own internal crisis barbarism than by external military threats.

The zombies of 1914 accept the völkisch-anti-Semitic, culturalist-anti-American neglect of “class struggle” and “anti-imperialism.” The zombies of 1941 abandon any critique of the imperial war for world order, unrestrainedly denouncing both the beleaguered Israeli as well as the U.S. left-wing opposition and distorting the necessary criticism of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism to legitimize democratic bombing terror. What is needed instead is a radical opposition to war that confronts the real world situation and develops a categorical critique of capitalist modernity beyond the false immanence of pseudo-alternatives, which only represent different forms of the same cosmopolitan crisis barbarism.

Originally published on exit-online.org on 03/01/2003.

Crisis Management in Times of Change

The end of neoliberal globalization is giving a boost to neo-fascist crisis management – especially in the former “export world champion”

Tomasz Konicz

It would be wrong, and reminiscent of the bad Marxist tradition, to postulate a one-sided causal inevitability between the development of the economic base and the political-ideological superstructure. Economic development, the unfolding of the internal contradictions of capital, does not unilaterally determine the political system. There are clearly interactions between the two, and the capitalist functional elites have various options open to them when reacting to the consequences of the crisis. Here – and this is crucial – the further course of the crisis can actually be influenced by politics, even if it is, of course, not in a position to overcome the systemic crisis from within capitalism. Many of the emergency measures discussed by politicians in response to crisis episodes can be implemented by governments or regimes of various political orientations. This is particularly evident in the severe crisis phase of the 1930s, when protectionism, labor programs and statism were pursued by states as diverse as Roosevelt’s U.S. and Nazi Germany.

Nevertheless, the latest phase of the crisis, which began at the latest with the pandemic and the surge in inflation, makes a fascist option at least viable, especially in countries with corresponding “traditions.” The fundamental upheaval in the process of crisis and its handling of contradictions was initiated by the pandemic-induced crisis surge. The war in Ukraine is in fact a reaction to this new crisis phase, which is putting an end to neoliberal globalization. This phase is characterized by stagflation, deglobalization, protectionism, active industrial policy, nearshoring and vertical integration.

The four decades of neoliberalism – from the 1980s to around 2020 – were in fact a reaction to the crisis, and they prolonged the unfolding of the internal contradiction of capital. This fundamental contradiction of the capitalist mode of production unfolds as follows: Productive wage labor forms the substance of capital, but at the same time the process of capital valorization strives to displace wage labor from the production process through competitive rationalization measures.

Marx introduced the ingenious term “moving contradiction” for this auto-destructive process. This contradiction of capitalist commodity production, in which capital minimizes its own substance, wage labor, through competition-mediated thrusts of rationalization, can only be maintained by “moving,” by the continuous expansion and further development of new fields of exploitation in commodity production. The same scientific and technological progress that leads to the melting away of the mass of expended wage labor in established branches of industry also gives rise to new branches of industry or production methods.

The result of this is precisely the kinds of change to the overall industrial structure – the ability of capital to constantly “reinvent itself” – that the bourgeois apologists of capitalism are so proud. Since the beginning of industrialization in the 18th century, the capitalist economy has been characterized by a structural change in which the textile industry, heavy industry, the chemical industry, the electrical industry and, most recently, Fordist vehicle manufacturing served as leading sectors that exploited wage labor on a massive scale. With the advent of automation and the IT revolution, the process of changing the structure of industry began to fail in the 1970s and 1980s. These new technologies created far fewer jobs than were rationalized away by their application to the economy as a whole. The productive forces thus burst “the fetters of the relations of production” (Marx) and capital came up against an “inner barrier” (Robert Kurz) to its ability to develop.

How Neoliberalism “Rescued” Capitalism

That capital as a moving contradiction had reached its inner limit was demonstrated very concretely in the crisis period of stagflation that followed the post-war boom, as no new leading industrial sector with mass valorization of wage labor could be developed. The late 1970s and early 1980s were characterized by anemic economic growth, frequent recessions, rapidly rising mass unemployment and an inflation rate that sometimes reached double digits. From a historical perspective, the stagflation of the 1970s – a portmanteau formed from the words stagnation and inflation – was precisely the period of crisis that paved the way for neoliberalism, as Keynesian crisis coping strategies has failed.

In addition to destroying or disempowering the labor movement (Great Britain, U.S.), which led to a long-term stagnation of wage levels in the U.S., neoliberalism reacted to the crisis by removing the “safety nets” from capitalism, with a flight forward in which the markets – especially the financial sector – were deregulated. In order to avoid collapsing due to its internal contradictions, capitalism effectively left the ground of labor exploitation during the neoliberal turn of the 1980s in order to take to the lofty heights of an economic structure dominated by financial markets. The system reacted to the failure of a change to the industrial structure by establishing the financial system as the “lead sector.”

Capital valorization was thus increasingly simulated on the financial markets under neoliberalism. Since no real capital valorization can be carried out within the financial sphere in the long term, growth in the four neoliberal decades was ultimately fueled by a historically unique boom in the most important commodity that the financial sector has to offer: credit. The capitalist world system thus runs on credit, on the anticipation of future utilization, which is pushed further and further into the future through lending. Credit generates the demand that sustains capitalist commodity production, which is choking on its productivity. This can be seen in concrete terms in global debt, which has risen much faster than global economic output in the neoliberal era: from around 120% in the 1970s to 238% in 2022.[1]

The central mechanism that transformed the increasing financial market-generated debt into real economic growth was the speculative bubble. Since the 1980s, the system has thus been increasingly based on the “hot” air of various speculative bubbles that are constantly forming anew: from the dot-com bubble at the turn of the millennium, when the emergence of the Internet led to wild speculation in high-tech stocks that crashed in 2000, to the real estate bubble in Europe and the U.S., to the large liquidity bubble maintained by central banks, which was only brought to an end by inflation in 2020. When a bubble would burst, there would be a threat of a more widespread crash, which would then be prevented by the emergence of a new speculative bonanza. One could speak here of a veritable transfer of bubbles, in which all the fiscal and monetary policy measures used to combat the consequences of a burst speculative dynamic contribute to laying the foundations for the formation of a new bubble. Ultimately, capitalist financial policy can only put out the speculative fire with gasoline.

The End of Neoliberalism

However, this was not a linear process, but a dynamic one. The costs of stabilizing the global financial system increased more and more as each bubble burst until, in the inflationary phase of monetary policy, outside of the U.S. with its world reserve currency, there was no alternative but to stop the expansionary monetary policy that had been at the root of the boom in the financial markets. Capitalist crisis policy has ridden its financial market-driven, neoliberal horse to death after using this horse to flee from the inner barrier of capital for over four decades. The neoliberal postponement seems to be coming to an end, and the stagflation that has been forgotten for decades is returning on a much higher level. The most important difference between today’s wave of inflation and the historical phase of stagflation is that a phase of high interest rates, such as that initiated by Fed Chairman Volcker from 1979, no longer offers a way out in view of the unstable financial sphere.

With the end of the global deficit economy, the global deficit cycles, which in fact formed the base of neoliberal globalization, were also damaged. Not all economies became equally indebted in the neoliberal era; export-oriented locations were able to export their production surpluses to deficit countries as part of these cycles. The largest, namely the Pacific deficit cycle between the U.S. and China, was characterized by the fact that the People’s Republic, which was rising to become the workshop of the world, exported gigantic quantities of goods across the Pacific to the de-industrializing U.S., thus creating enormous trade surpluses, while a financial market flow of U.S. debt securities flowed in the opposite direction, so that for a time China became Washington’s largest foreign creditor. A similar, smaller deficit cycle developed between Germany and the southern periphery of the eurozone in the period from the introduction of the euro to the euro crisis.

Globalization was thus not only characterized by the establishment of global supply chains, it also consisted of a corresponding globalization of debt dynamics in the form of deficit cycles, which, as mentioned, grew faster than global economic output – and consequently acted as an important economic engine by generating credit-financed demand. The globalization that brought about these gigantic global imbalances was a systemic reaction, a flight forward from the increasing internal contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, which is choking on its own productivity.

The Return of Protectionism

The euro crisis is, to some extent, a good case study for what is now unfolding globally: As long as the mountains of debt are growing and the financial market bubbles are on the rise, all of the countries involved seem to benefit from this credit-based growth. However, as soon as the bubbles burst, the battle over who should bear the costs of the crisis begins. In Europe, as we know, Berlin has used the crisis to pass on the costs of the crisis to southern Europe in the form of Schäuble’s infamous austerity dictates. Now, on a global level, the collapse of the much larger debt-financed deficit economy, which has recently been kept alive primarily by the expansive monetary policy of the central banks, is imminent. Rising nationalism and neo-fascism, the acute threat of world war: they are an expression of this very crisis process. An analogy can therefore be drawn with the pre-fascism of the 1930s, when the fallout from the global economic crisis that broke out in 1929 was exacerbated by a rapid rise in protectionism.

Which brings us to Germany’s misery. With the erosion of globalization, the long-term economic strategy of strict export orientation pursued since the introduction of the euro by the Federal Republic, whose economic “business model” was based on achieving the highest possible trade surpluses within the framework of the aforementioned deficit cycles, is also failing. With this so-called beggar-thy-neighbor policy, debt, deindustrialization and unemployment are exported to the target countries of the export surpluses. After Berlin had ruined the European crisis states through draconian austerity policies, this export strategy was directed at non-European countries – such as the U.S.[2]

However, this export-focused strategy is increasingly coming into conflict with the protectionist tendencies in Washington, where the Biden administration is effectively continuing Trump’s economic nationalism aimed at reindustrialization. Washington is no longer prepared – precisely because of increasing domestic political instability – to continue accepting the high trade deficits that stabilized the hyper-productive world system during neoliberal globalization. These deficits were, of course, only made possible by the dollar serving as the world’s reserve currency. As early as mid-2023, the Financial Times described this change in Washington’s economic policy strategy, which was initiated by the Trump administration and further promoted by Biden. At its core, it is a protectionist rejection of globalization. By means of a “foreign policy for the middle class,” the White House wanted to counteract the “hollowing out of the industrial base,” the emergence of “geopolitical rivals” and the increasing “inequality” that threatens democracy.[3]

A visible expression of the full onset of deglobalization is nearshoring, in which the U.S. is seeking to replace its economic dependence on the Chinese export industry by building up industrial capacities in Mexico. In addition, German automotive suppliers continue to face the threat of exclusion from U.S. production chains due to provisions of the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act. A substantial concession from Washington is also unlikely, as protectionism appears to be working. German companies in particular are increasingly investing in the U.S. in order to benefit from Washington’s subsidies. In effect, there is an economic decoupling between the U.S. and the EU, with Washington pulling away economically while the Europeans in particular have to bear the consequences of the crisis.

The Danger of “Authoritarian Revolt”

Berlin thus spent the 21st century orienting the Federal Republic – and from 2010, in the wake of the euro crisis, the eurozone – towards an export-fixated economic model aimed at achieving trade surpluses in the globalized world economy of the neoliberal era. With the onset of deglobalization, the former export surplus world champion has found itself in an economic policy impasse, which in the medium term not only calls into question the political stability of the Federal Republic of Germany, but also the continued political existence of the eurozone. And it is precisely this return of protectionism that is giving the New Right an additional boost. The properly functioning export economy acted as a kind of civilizational safety mechanism in Germany, with its terrible authoritarian-fascist tradition, as it provided a solid economic argument against nationalism. After all, Germany was a “winner” during the process of globalization.

However, it is the German export industry that is currently experiencing a downturn, which is actually just the beginning of the end of the export-focused German economic model. The sharp decline in exports in 2023 has contributed significantly to the poor economic development in Germany, with little improvement expected in the coming years. This also means, however, that the prosperous years made possible by export surpluses will inevitably come to an end for the Federal Republic. The power-political weight of the German export industry will therefore diminish at a time when, for the first time in a long time, Germany will also enter a long-lasting crisis phase, from which the New Right once again threatens to benefit.

Yet it was precisely the functionaries of the large-scale export industry who repeatedly took a stand against the New Right. The AfD and the dull Nazis were seen as an image problem that was damaging the “Made in Germany” brand in its quest for global success. The BDI (Federation of German Industries) and top managers such as Siemens CEO Joe Kaeser were able to cite real economic interests in their arguments against the right. The capital faction that is most resolutely opposed to AfD participation in government is therefore the German large-scale export industry, which is currently losing influence due to the crisis. The reactionary avant-garde within the functional elite, which made pacts with the AfD and the Querfront very early on, consists of small business owners and SMEs, as can be seen from the links between the association of “family entrepreneurs” and the AfD. Capitalists focused on the domestic market (“Müller Milch”) also appear to be more inclined to consider far-right options.

The AfD is already the second strongest force at federal level. The fact that the rise of the AfD took place during a phase of relative economic prosperity shows just how thin the civilizational ice has become in Germany; it was fueled by German fear of crisis, not by an actual outbreak of crisis, such as the one southern Europe had to endure during the euro crisis. Since the refugee crisis, the entire bourgeois-liberal anti-fascism, which was largely in line with the arguments of the export industry, has emphasized the economic “usefulness” of globalization, open borders for the movement of goods and immigration: refugees are economically useful due to the ageing of the Federal Republic, the export country must remain attractive for skilled workers, at least according to the common arguments. However, these narratives cultivated in the liberal mainstream will disappear as soon as stagnation and recession become entrenched in Germany, while exports will continue to decline in order to give further impetus to the “German fear” that so readily turns into hatred of the socially disadvantaged.

The crux of the matter is that this authoritarian revolt will never come to power unless a substantial part of the ruling elite opts for this fascist option. And there are signs of an open split within the German ruling elite regarding the participation in government of a party that is drifting towards the extreme right. This is the decisive breach in the dam: will entire factions follow the previous AfD sympathizers such as Mr Müller von der Müllermilch or the Mövenpick billionaire Baron August von Finck? In the middle class? Among family entrepreneurs?

Fascist movements only come to power in times of crisis when the shocks and upheavals have reached such an extent that functional elites perceive these movements as the “lesser evil.” To put it vividly: only when capital managers are so deeply mired in the crisis that they are up to their necks in water do they hold their noses and reach out to the extreme right. And then there is no stopping them, as the fascist authoritarian revolt, which always craves the approval of the authorities, is further fanned by this (which, incidentally, also defeats the left-wing intention of shaking up their supporters by unmasking the powerful fascist backers. Authoritarian characters are not deterred but attracted by the cronyism of AfD functionaries and billionaires).


[1] https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/09/13/global-debt-is-returning-to-its-rising-trend

[2] https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0003.html

[3] https://www.ft.com/content/77faa249-0f88-4700-95d2-ecd7e9e745f9

Anti-Semitism From the Left

Reactions to The Attack on October 7

Herbert Böttcher

Initial reactions to the Hamas terror attack were characterized by cautious expressions of empathy with the victims, condemnation of the terror, and solidarity with Hamas. At pro-Palestine demonstrations, however, there was soon hardly any sign of shock at the terror. The focus was on the “liberation” of Palestine and Hamas as part of the struggle for “liberation” from Israel. “Hope for Palestine […] Left-wing resistance groups support offensive against Israel,” cheered Junge Welt.[1] During such offensives, the hatred against Israel is discharged in slogans such as “Zionists are fascists, they murder children and civilians.”[2] Around the stands at the Rosa Luxemburg Conference, tones could be heard with which the official program did not wish to identify, but which nevertheless provided a glimpse into what moves left-wing hearts and minds: Hamas is needed to strengthen “socialist class consciousness,” their attack is “an expected response to decades of oppression.” These statements are not intended to justify the attack, but to help “understand” it.[3]

The “Understanding” of the Left

It is “understood” that Israel is the perpetrator and that the victims are defending themselves against this perpetrator. This shift between victims and perpetrators is one of the anti-Semitic stereotypes present on the left. This view gained momentum with the start of the ground offensive. High casualty figures and images of Palestinian suffering can be used to mobilize media-effective and emotionalized outrage against Israel and delegitimize Israel as a state. Although Israel’s reaction in the face of such a terrorist attack was predictable, perhaps even calculated by Hamas, the denunciation of Israel can be used to score points with a public in which anti-Semitism in the form of hostility towards Israel is resonant. Behind the outrage over the “humanitarian catastrophe” in the Gaza Strip, the barbaric terror of Hamas disappears, along with the anti-Semitism found in its charter, which also strategically pursues the goal of destroying Israel and all Jews.

The memory of the extermination of the Jews during the Nazi era is an obstacle to the fight for the “liberation” of Palestine and to the expression of hatred towards Israel. It blocks uninhibited criticism of Israel and solidarity with the Palestinians. Thus the slogan: “Free Palestine from German guilt.” Academically, it seems to be backed up by genocide researcher A. Dirk Moses’ attack on the German culture of remembrance. According to him, this culture has become a supervised, cultishly celebrated staging and is combined with the devaluation of colonial crimes in particular and a reflexive solidarity with Israel.[4]

Anti-Semitism And Capitalism

Judith Butler situates the Hamas attack within the history of violence in the Middle East. She refers to what she sees as the systematic seizure of land and its protection through arbitrary measures such as controls and arrests.[5] She also says it is wrong to blame the “apartheid regime alone” for Hamas’ terror. That Israel is an “apartheid regime” seems indisputable to her. Categorically, colonialism and racism are the reference variables for Butler’s contextualization of terror. In such postmodern culturalist post-colonialism, any reference to capitalism remains vague and its crisis unnoticed. Thus, anti-Semitism as a projective way of processing capitalist crises cannot come into view. Instead of reflecting on anti-Semitism, racism and colonialism in their references to each other and in their differences, as well as the context of the crisis of global capitalism, Butler denounces violence “on both sides,” pleads “for true equality and justice” and wishes for “a world that resists the normalization of colonial domination and supports the self-determination and freedom of the Palestinians.” The domination of capital becomes colonial domination. What is hallucinated is an “Eden of the innate rights of man”[6] that abstracts from commodity production and ends up in an abstract universalism. Contextually, however, the universal critique of violence and calls to end it are related to Israel as a military and occupying power, which arbitrarily holds the Gaza Strip in check as an “open-air prison” and is now also bombing it. It is no coincidence that Butler also attacks the German culture of remembrance. It no longer allows compassion for anyone other than the Jews. However, the particularity of the conflict constellations can neither be separated from the generality of capitalist forms nor derived from them in terms of identity logic. Accordingly, different levels such as cultural differences and psychological crisis management must be taken into account. Colonialism, racism, anti-Semitism and antiziganism cannot therefore be understood “beyond” capitalist forms. But they can’t be derived from them in the logic of a mechanistic scheme of cause and effect either.

Actionist left-wing movements, on the other hand, may consider reflecting upon these distinct yet interconnected levels too complicated and find that this reflection contributes little to the desired self-efficacy. Without such reflection, however, practice degenerates into dull actionism that feeds on moral indignation. Practice is directed against Israel as a supposedly imperial and colonial actor and is lived out in Israel-related anti-Semitism in an experience-intensive way and with the good gut feeling of being on the right side in the global struggle for liberation. Taking sides sorts people into evil imperialists and good colonized people. Such certainties ignore the fact that the struggle is fought within the framework of the collapsing capitalist forms of market and state, capital and labor, subject as agent in competition, etc. and is without an emancipatory perspective, because liberation is sought as national liberation within the collapsing state form. This ignores the fact that capitalism has reached a limit with the microelectronic revolution. Capitalism can no longer overcome this limit because of the disappearance of labor as a substance for the accumulation of capital, and this limit is expressed in the various processes of disintegration, not least in the disintegration of states. It is precisely these crisis processes that fuel anti-Semitism as a projective crisis reaction that cannot be separated from capitalism and its crises.

The Dual Character of The State of Israel

Against the one-sided classification of Israel as a capitalist state, Robert Kurz has pointed out the dual character of the state of Israel. It is not simply a colonial product, but essentially a rescue project for Jews threatened by persecution and annihilation and, as such, a project against anti-Semitism. As a capitalist state, it is exposed to all the same processes of social and state disintegration as other capitalist states. Like them, it has to deal with these crises, but it is surrounded by an environment that threatens its existence, and above all it is unable to fall back on reserves of anti-Semitism to deal with the crisis. In this context, national-religious and racist processing strategies come into play. Secular and socialist-oriented Zionism is moving closer to nationally and religiously orthodox movements and parties. Identitarian and authoritarian tendencies in Israel are taking on the form of theocratic, national-religious movements that are combined with anti-Arab projections. These tendencies are gaining more and more influence on government policy and are institutionally anchored in the Netanyahu government. Rational security policy strategies to defend the existence of Israel are mixed with irrationalisms of ultra-orthodox promises of salvation. However, authoritarian, identitarian, right-wing mobilizations are not simply “typically Israeli.” They can be seen in all capitalist states as an attempt to cope with global processes of disintegration. With regard to Israel, it is noteworthy that the shift to the right is being met with resolute criticism and a determined struggle, which is primarily directed against the judicial reform aimed at restricting the control of the government by the Supreme Court.

Anti-Semitism Instead of a Radical Critique of Capitalism

Instead of advancing towards a radical critique of capitalism in the face of the global crisis processes, left-wing movements stick to the familiar. They continue to see themselves as national liberation movements without acknowledging that, in view of the failure of recuperative development due to the immanent limitations of capitalism, an autonomous state cannot be a prospect. All dreams of a “two-state solution” fail because the basis of modern statehood breaks away with the barriers to capital accumulation that can no longer be overcome. In this paradoxical situation, traditional forms of state-building are combined with denationalization in the form of warlodization and mafia-like structures. The global crisis processes have long since steamrolled the possibilities of national revolutionary liberation. This means that all strategies that rely on a pole of capitalist immanence – be it class struggle or the state as a regulating authority or even as a haven of liberation – are failing.

In this way, an emancipatory overcoming of capitalism cannot come into view and the core of the crisis as an internal barrier to capital accumulation must remain incomprehensible. As long as the left remains blind to the critique of the capitalist constitution in its fetishistic forms, it remains open to a crisis ideology in which the crisis is processed ideologically by projecting it onto “the Jews” and the “Jewish state.” In anti-Semitism, which feeds on the collective unconscious, Israel is pilloried as “the Jew” of states and becomes the object of projective crisis processing. This can be linked to stereotypes such as the differentiation between rapacious capital and the creative capital that is tied to labor. This expresses the separation of the abstract (money) and the concrete (labor), whereby the abstract can be projected onto “the Jews.” They become masters of money and the mind. They are ascribed a superior power by means of which they are able to conspire and rule the world.

The imagination of a world conspiracy was a core element of the Nazis’ anti-Semitic propaganda. It turned up again in the Hamas charter of 1988 and becomes effective in battles aimed at the annihilation of Israel and all Jews. In the anti-Semitic world view, the militarily defended existence of Israel is worse than any other form of oppression and violence. The delusion that the world would be liberated if it were “free of Jews” is therefore obvious in this view. The abstract domination of capitalism can be concretized in “the Jews” and in the “Jewish state.”  Seen as perpetrators of conspiratorial deeds, they can be identified as the masterminds behind oppression and domination. Liberation from “the Jews” takes the place of liberation from the capitalist socialization constituted in the fetishistic interrelation of value and dissociation, capital and labor, economy and politics. The empty and uncanny irrational capitalist self-purpose of turning money into more money can supposedly be identified and made tangible. Powerlessness becomes an imagined power to act. Capitalism appears to be transformable without one having to touch its fetishistic structure. Money and labor, a state that regulates the market, etc. can be retained and the dissociation of female-connoted reproduction can remain in the kitchen of being considered a secondary contradiction. Transformation can become a return to an “original” capitalism of honest work and good political regulation that also brings crises under control. Normality seems to be saved. “Under the spell of the tenacious irrationality of the whole, the irrationality of people is normal.” It is always “ready in political attitudes to overflow even this instrumental reason.”[7] In times of escalating crises, it is tempting to cling to the normality of the irrational social whole and to defend it by fending off and destroying anything that supposedly threatens it – be it refugees, foreigners, the supposedly “work-shy” or, above all, the Jews.

The anti-Semitism of the left reflects the deficits of left-wing critiques of capitalism. What is decisive is that, despite the failure of commodity production and its promise of immanent emancipation, the left shies away from criticizing the fetishistic social context of the capitalist constitution, which confronts individuals as abstract domination. Instead of making this the object of emancipatory critique – the interrelation of value and dissociation, production and circulation, capital and labor, market and state – the attempt is made to attribute domination to specific actors. This paves the way for personalization, emotionalization, indignation, and conspiracy fantasies – a conglomeration that can be “unleashed” and aggressively discharged at any time in projective anti-Semitism.

In a situation in which the social contradictions can no longer be overcome immanently, leftists have also contributed to a mixture of class struggle thinking, practice fetishism and theoretical hostility so that categorical critique can be disarmed and the supposedly “concrete” can be positioned against the supposedly “abstract.” In contrast to the Nazis, whose anti-Semitism was linked to Fordist accumulation, capitalist accumulation in the current crises comes to nothing and also leaves the subjects “naked” in their lack of prospects. Their ability to compete has been deprived. In such hopelessness, the boundaries between murder and suicide threaten to become blurred. The delusion of projective crisis management could mix with tendencies that lead to the destruction of the self and the world in the capitalist form in an immanently hopeless situation. In the “Middle East,” the disintegration of world capital comes to a head in the unpromising and at the same time dangerous actions of state actors who, in the midst of the disintegration processes, are looking for a “foothold,” not least militarily, and at the same time for strategic advantages within the disintegrating state constellations.


[1] junge Welt from 09/10/23

[2] Jüdische Allgemeine from 2/9/24

[3] Tagesspiegel from 1/13/24

[4]Der Katechismus der Deutschen

[5] Freitag no. 42, 2023.

[6] Marx, Capital Volume 1, New York, 1976, 280.

[7] Adorno, “Opinion, Delusion, Society

Originally published, in a slightly modified form, in konkret 4/2024

The Great Regression

Tomasz Konicz

When reflecting on the catastrophe of the German left, it seems counterproductive to point the finger at individual actors who, through their actions, promoted the disintegration that is now openly taking place. If a new beginning based on radical critique is still possible, it would be fundamentally wrong to try to pin the causes of the rise of the Querfront and the corresponding loss of significance of the Left on individual perpetrators – no matter how influential they may have been – because this would ultimately amount to simple personification. It would be the first step in the wrong direction. The causes of the rise of the Querfront, which has been able to develop far greater weight in the current systemic crisis than in the 1920s or 1930s, lie deeper than the striving for power and the megalomania of someone like Sahra Wagenknecht.

It seems to make more sense to start with the terms and ideological concepts of the old left, which proved so susceptible to the New Right. These are anachronistic ideas that have fallen out of time and are seeking to catch up with their stock conservative bearers, who literally cannot or do not want to understand the late capitalist world due to their blindness to the crisis. They are feral remnants of the old social-democratic or orthodox communist left, most of whom think in 20th century categories. Social democrats, Leninists, parts of the anti-Germans caught up in a World War II loop – these regressive splinters of a world-historical attempt that failed in 1989 are mutating into carriers of right-wing ideology by means of the Querfront, as their entire political reference system has become increasingly decoupled from the reality of the crisis of late capitalism.

Sahra Wagenknecht, the figurehead of the German Querfront, has coined the oxymoronic term “left-wing conservatism” for this decaying form of the left, which is no longer a left-wing left. The delusion is aptly named: a left that no longer acts progressively, one that is backward-looking, can no longer be called left-wing. In fact, the conservative longing for the past dominates this old (post-)left. They long for the FRG of the economic miracle, for the Soviet Union and/or GDR, for the clearly demarcated power constellation of the Second World War, etc. – while the unreflected, relentlessly advancing socio-ecological crisis process, together with the corresponding process of fascization, promotes a comprehensive regression in the scene.

Regression, the fear-induced relapse into earlier forms of development, here means above all different types of ideological defense against the crisis, as the crisis process threatens to blow up the anachronistic ideological edifice in which the old left has made itself at home – this distinguishes left-wing regression from the usual reactionary tendencies of the right. In concrete terms, regression on the left takes the form of a reactionary struggle against radical crisis theory, against a categorical critique of capitalism. Regression thus ultimately strives to fend off the establishment of a radical crisis consciousness that has reflected on the necessity of overcoming capital as a social totality in order to survive. This would inevitably be tantamount to breaking out of the capitalist thought-prison, which would ultimately also leave behind the forms, institutions and levels of mediation of subjectless capitalist domination. This would be a deep rupture that also affects one’s own identity – an expression of socialization in late capitalism. And this also affects the subject, including the worker, who could only be “revolutionary” if he no longer wanted to be a worker. People no longer have to want to be what they were socialized to be under capitalism.

The old left shies away from this deep, categorical break with its beloved enemy, capital.[1] This hesitancy can be traced back to the ambivalence towards the proletariat in Marx’s work.[2] The widespread repression and marginalization of radical, transformational crisis consciousness that has been pursued by the old left and the Querfront in recent years has not only resulted from ideological blindness and a literal identitarian fear. It has also been promoted by a left-wing crisis opportunism that is still eyeing posts and positions in the late capitalist crisis administration.[3] The modest degree of reflection on the systemic crisis that had already been achieved has largely been lost; the consciously conducted categorical critique of capital in its fetishistic rampage has been replaced by affectless, irrational reactions to the crisis.[4] The rise of the Querfront  in the left went hand in hand with the marginalization of radical crisis theory and categorical critique of late capitalism.

What, then, is meant by this old left, most of which absurdly believes in the state? The old left does not necessarily have to be old; there are also an increasing number of young people in orthodox communist or Keynesian groups, networks and associations – precisely as an ideological expression of the increasing tendencies towards state capitalism caused by the crisis. The common denominator of the old left is formed by various rudiments of an anachronistic ideology that is fading into decay, turning brown, and opening itself up to the fascism of the 21st century. What is preached by the old left is a return to the old – social democratic or Leninist – truths, either to the social democratic struggle for redistribution, to the social question, to Keynes, to Lenin or even to Stalin, to truncated class struggle thinking and to the fetishization of labor and the proletariat.

This return to the ideas and concepts of the past was originally intended to bring to light the simple truths that had been lost and to counter the flat out lies and agitation of the right. Right-wing populism was to be countered by left-wing populism. What this great regression, in its blindness to the crisis, actually brought to light when rummaging through old left-wing ideological canned goods were stale, anachronistic terms and concepts that had fallen out of their time. These terms were gutted – stripped of their historical context – and themselves fell victim to regression, seeking connection with or docking onto the Querfront and right-wing delusion. They are ideological splinters in regression, anachronistic decaying forms of old-left ideology on its way to the New Right.

First and foremost is the concept of the proletariat as a revolutionary subject, a concept that is experiencing a regression towards a populist belief in the people and the will of the people. Since the working class, which is also variable capital, has not fulfilled its revolutionary destiny, a regressive substitution began in parts of the left, in which the people were generally imagined to be the new, blurred reference point. The will of the people was to be given populist expression, with the interests of the people being imagined in opposition to the ruling class or – to a lesser extent – to profiteers/the rich. But what happens when the people do not want to take a stand against the “rich profiteers,” but instead take refuge in racism and xenophobia? Doesn’t this popular will also have to express the legitimate interests of the people, doesn’t it also have to be able to be turned in a social direction by linking social demands with stronger border protection?

The cult of the proletariat, which has degenerated into a “popular belief,” is closely linked to the old-left class struggle paradigm. According to this paradigm, capitalism is nothing more than the front line in the battle between two two classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, each of which has its own class interest and is engaged in a permanent – sometimes open, sometimes covert – class struggle, which is imagined as the main contradiction of capitalism. To this class struggle thinking, everything appears in terms of interests. All capitalist phenomena can accordingly be traced back to interests, which the class struggle leftists ask about with the famous Leninist “Cui bono?”(“Who benefits?”). Here, a conflict in the realm of distribution is blown up into the main contradiction of capital, while its inner contradiction is ignored. This inner contradiction tends to melt away the substance of capital – wage labor in commodity production – and capital can only prolong this “moving contradiction” in ever new spurts of expansion.

The current social and ecological world crisis is being fueled precisely by this contradiction-driven compulsion of capital to constantly grow, and this is quite obvious.[5] However, the class struggle left, with its truncated critique of capitalism, can only ask the question: cui bono? This blindness to the crisis, which ignores the fetishism of capital, leads directly to scapegoating and the reactionary belief in conspiracies that characterize right-wing crisis ideology.[6] Even if entire parts of the world threaten to become uninhabitable in the wake of the climate crisis, even if a pandemic rages, the old left, sometimes together with the new right, can only manically search for the influential, shadowy backers who are somehow responsible because they stand to profit from it.

The ideological division of capital into a “good,” nationally creative industrial capital and an “evil,” “globalist” financial capital is also part of the complex of the truncated critique of capitalism. As is well known, the Nazis took this delusion of an all-powerful Jewish banker conspiracy, which was apparently responsible for all kinds of crises and distortions, to an eliminatory extreme by enriching it with fanatical anti-communism in the form of the delusion of the “Jewish-Bolshevik world conspiracy.”

Historically, this anti-Semitic delusion of “destructive Jewish finance capital” was the most important starting point for Querfront efforts, for example those undertaken by the KPD in 1923 as part of the so-called “Schlageter course,” which nevertheless remained merely an episode (see the quote at the beginning of this text).[7] In the current left, the one-sided critique of the financial markets was mainly pursued by Keynesians and by the notorious “financial market critic” Wagenknecht after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008. This truncated critique turned the actual nature of the crisis on its head, as the causes of the crisis are, in reality, to be found in the hyper-productivity of commodity production, which must be supplied with credit-financed demand through the formation of bubbles and mountains of debt.[8] Even in her most recent works, Wagenknecht produced variations of this reactionary “financial market critique,” which has an open flank to anti-Semitism.

The decay products of anti-imperialism, which, in the 1980’s, already had to deal with the problem of many of the modernization regimes that emerged from the great wave of decolonization simply failing socio-economically or being arch-reactionary and/or mass murderous – such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – form another old-left transitional milieu to the Querfront. At the time, these regimes were described as “objectively anti-imperialist powers,” seen as progressive simply because of their opposition to the U.S., even if they bloodily persecuted the left (Iran after the revolution) or massacred minorities (Iraq’s poison gas war against the Kurds).

The sympathies of the anti-imps for reactionary regimes or bloody modernization dictatorships in the periphery of the world system, which are usually accompanied by primitive anti-Americanism, found in Vladimir Putin’s Russia the appropriate object to tie in with the emerging New Right, which ideologically docked onto the “Eurasian” Russia because it also sees itself as a culturalist-reactionary counterweight to the West.

The war in Ukraine sparked by the Kremlin also led to a further disintegration of the German left, which on the one hand – in the form of the left-liberal spectrum – uncritically adopted the Western narrative and defected to the NATO camp, while many anti-imps finally degenerated into alternative imperialists, mouths for hire of Russian imperialism. Incidentally, even in May 2024, the Putin-loyal Junge Welt, as the mouthpiece of the anti-imp spectrum, still maintains a benevolent line towards Wagenknecht and the BSW, even though its protagonists now openly spout AfD rhetoric. There are also personal entanglements between Junge Welt and the Querfront organ Telepolis, for example.

Anti-Americanism as a major ideological hinge between the old left and the New Right often corresponds to different types of opposition to Western liberalism. While the left condemns the excesses of privatization and the social dismantling that neoliberalism brought about, New Right thinkers such as Alain de Benoist criticize liberalism for its cosmopolitanism, rootlessness, identity void and lack of values. Here too, transitions are possible, for example by means of a nationally based, truncated critique of globalization. The critique of globalization can certainly degenerate into mere ideology, into an urge for right-wing renationalization. The critique of bourgeois freedom and neoliberal individualization/atomization can consequently turn into a nationalist/fundamentalist community ideology – which, however, would only ideologically legitimize the current post-neoliberal crisis phase, in which state capitalism, nationalism and protectionism are on the rise. Here, too, Wagenknecht has already done the groundwork.

Finally, conflict in the Middle East – and since the molecular massacre of Jews by Hamas on October 7, 2023, especially Israel’s war against Hamas – forms a similar starting point for the migration of leftists to the right. On the one hand, there are the usual reflexes of frothing anti-Zionism, which increasingly turns into open anti-Semitism as the protests progress.[9] Criticism of the Israeli army’s actions is increasingly mixed with projections (“genocide”), including genuine anti-Semitic delusions that see the U.S. government or the media as being dominated by a Jewish conspiracy. At the same time, resentment can also appear in the pro-Israeli movement, as right-wingers instrumentalize the mass murder of Jews by Hamas to fuel anti-Muslim resentment, xenophobia, and isolationism. The multiple ways that this crisis constellation is open to slipping into right-wing extremism – a consequence of the crisis-induced advanced brutalization – is reflected in the disputes on the right, where the two possible strategies for instrumentalizing the war are being debated. How the conflict should be exploited, with racism or anti-Semitism? That is what the right is debating.[10]

A truncated critique of Islamism, stuck in bourgeois enlightenment ideology, also formed the most important right-wing tipping point within the anti-German scene. The confrontation with the ideology of Islamism, which – for example in the form of the Islamic State or Hamas – can indeed take on genocidal traits, leads to pure racism when combined with late bourgeois ideology.[11] In the hardcore faction of the anti-Germans, in the Bahamas magazine, anti-Muslim resentment is now openly articulated, for example by calling for a “reversal of the burden of proof” for Muslims.[12] The anti-Germans are also an old-left current, so to speak, which sees the late capitalist world system as trapped in a time warp in which the constellation of the Second World War continues to exist forever: with Islamism occupying the role of the Nazis. Nevertheless, it must be noted here that this small scene, whose significance is often exaggerated by its opponents from the anti-imperialist spectrum, only represents a secondary aspect of the Querfront tendencies.[13]

As outlined above, the Querfront is primarily fed by regressive traditional communist and old social democratic currents. And in the current crisis it has taken on a far greater significance than was the case in the 1920s or 1930s, when such efforts always remained merely episodic. With the BSW, the Querfront has taken on the form of a party, and it could well oust the panicky Left Party, which made it big in the first place, from many of its remaining parliamentary positions. Incidentally, the Left Party’s reaction to the split of the Querfront in the 2024 European election campaign was to adopt the Querfront ideology of focusing on the (German) “social question.” In the midst of the current systemic crisis, the Left Party is focusing on an anachronistic “social policy” that can no longer be realized in the unfolding crisis chaos, instead of arguing about transformative paths out of the permanent capitalist crisis – all while Left Party grandees are sending coalition signals to Wagenknecht.

The depressing final stage of the Left Party thus culminates in taking Wagenknecht’s ideological excuses, with which she legitimized her drift to the right, at face value. This is, in fact, boundless opportunism to the last breath, which aims at being be able to form a coalition with the Querfront – and thus accepts the normalization of fascization. The Querfront is not seeking a confrontation with fascism, but rather an opportunistic adaptation to the right-wing zeitgeist that is emerging as a result of the crisis. This is the common denominator between the left and the old left in the Left Party and the BSW. And it is no coincidence that this is reminiscent of the bourgeois-democratic method of “fighting” right-wing extremism by aligning oneself with it – as was recently the case with refugee policy in the fall of 2023.

But what actually is the Querfront? It is Querfrontler in particular who like to obscure this term by calling all sorts of things a Querfront. Former Left Party MP Dieter Dehm, for example, asked in an interview published in the far-right magazine Compact, whether the anti-Hitler alliance could not also be described as a kind of Querfront.[14] For the Querfront, everything is a Querfront. This allows them to disguise the monstrosity of its pact with the right –  especially in view of historical experience. Querfront does not simply refer to cooperation between left-wing and right-wing parties or forces – for example, when the Greens, SPD or CDU enter into a coalition – but to cooperation between forces on the left and right of the political spectrum. Historically, these were the isolated attempts at rapprochement between the KPD and the national right and/or NSDAP, which remained episodes; currently, it is the very real, lasting rapprochement between the Wagenknechtian post-left, which was formerly to the left of the red-green party, and the AfD. It is as if Querfrontler wanted to make the old Cold War theory of totalitarianism, which was circulated by the CIA from the 1950s onwards, come true (Sahra Wagenknecht a CIA agent? Wouldn’t that be a nice conspiracy theory that would surely catch on in this spectrum?).

The objective function of the Querfront, however, is that of an ideological transmission belt that, on the one hand, carries right-wing ideas into left-wing and progressive milieus and, on the other hand, constantly feeds the New Right with new, blinded human material. For many left-wingers, the Querfront thus functions as a kind of “gateway drug” to the delusional world of the New Right. Its success is based on packaging right-wing ideology in left-wing rhetoric. The development of the Querfront over the last ten years is impressive proof that all the hopes of being able to “pick up” the blinded angry citizens by opening up to the right have failed miserably – they were either illusions or mere excuses to somehow legitimize the intended move to the right. The Querfront is ultimately the result of the crisis blindness of an opportunistic left that shies away from radical critique and the thematization of the system transformation necessary for survival. The Querfront – this is the left’s path to extremism of the center, which is spreading in the current systemic crisis as soon as the systemic question is not posed offensively and accompanied by a transformative practice.

The texts collected here provide a historical overview of the genesis, formation and advance of the Querfront over the past ten years. It is a history of this literally “national-social” movement, written in the present tense. The account begins with the outbreak of the civil war in Ukraine and the “vigils for peace,” it presents the disputes within the left during the refugee crisis and concludes this overview with the lateral thinking mania and the first positions taken by the BSW after its foundation. Many of the collected texts not only trace the contemporary historical development of the Querfront, but also outline its ideological formation, which interacts closely with the capitalist crisis process and the corresponding rise of the New Right.

Due to thematic overlaps, three texts and one interview have been taken from the e-book Fascism in the 21st Century, which deal with the lateral thinking mania that was essential for the extensive entanglement of the New Right and the Querfront.


[1] This also includes, for example, the eroding state as an “ideal capitalist” and the devaluing money as a general value equivalent.

[2] On the one hand, Marx defined the worker in the production process as variable capital; he defined wage labor as the substance of capital. At the same time, however, he assumed – in line with the belief in progress at the time – that the proletarians had a historical mission to fulfill as a revolutionary subject. However, Marx also severely criticized the labour movement in his critique of the Gotha Programme of 1875, which is still worth reading today.

[3] https://www.konicz.info/2020/12/09/der-linke-bloedheitskoeffizient/

[4] Scapegoating for crisis surges, greedflation, “critiquing financial markets,” etc.

[5] https://www.mandelbaum.at/buecher/tomasz-konicz/klimakiller-kapital/

[6] https://exitinenglish.com/2023/01/23/the-subjectless-rule-of-capital/

[7] https://www.rote-ruhr-uni.com/cms/texte-und-vortrage/Die-KPD-und-der-Nationalismus

[8] https://www.labournet.de/politik/wipo/wipo-deb/kapitalismuskritik/buch-kapitalkollaps-die-finale-krise-der-weltwirtschaft/

[9] See, for example, the junge Welt of October 10, 2023, in which the Hamas massacre of Israeli civilians was described as an “offensive against Israel” and spokespersons for Palestinian groups were able to describe the mass murder as a “hope for Palestine.” junge Welt, 10.10.2023, “Hope for Palestine, Lebanon: Left-wing groups support offensive against Israel.”

[10] https://blog.campact.de/2023/10/angriff-israel-rechte-reaktionen/

[11] https://www.kritiknetz.de/religionskritik/1259-globalisierte-barbarei

[12] https://www.redaktion-bahamas.org/hefte/93/Es-geht-um-Israel.html

[13] For a discussion of the anti-Germans, see: Robert Kurz, Die antideutsche Ideologie, Vom Antifaschismus zum Krisenimperialismus: Kritik des neuesten linksdeutschen Sektenwesens in seinen theoretischen Propheten, 2003 Münster.

[14] https://www.compact-online.de/diether-dehm-ueber-querfront-in-compact-3-2023/ (Dehm denies that he gave his consent for this interview to be printed in Compact)

Originally published as the introduction for Deutschlands Querfront: Altlinke auf dem Weg zur Neuen Rechten by Tomasz Konicz.

Artificial Intelligence: A Myth and Fetish

Thomas Meyer

Progress and development have always been among capitalism’s core articles of faith. The (often dubious) successes of the technical transformation and exploitation of nature and human beings cannot be overlooked. However, such developments can also have fatal psychosocial and ecological consequences. We can’t say that technical progress is a good idea in itself or that it actually leads to greater prosperity, as is often claimed. Technical developments, or rather technical development paradigms, exist in the context of the valorizing movement of capital. If a new technology promises a cost advantage or opens up new possibilities for accumulation in the form of process innovation in production or in the form of an (expanded) mass consumption of commodities, it is developed and produced, while at the same time people proclaim its necessity and inevitability. (Whereby it can also be cheaper to wear out workers than to rationalize them away through technology. Automation is by no means implemented everywhere that it is theoretically possible, and in practice automation is not always feasible, see Becker 2017 and Moody 2019.) The capitalist ideology of progress and development always comes with a certain optimism and many promises of happiness. And, conversely, it also comes with a pessimism regarding the familiar and the implicit or explicit threat that we must accept progress as fate and are driven to adapt and reinvent ourselves in the process of “self-determination.” Otherwise, one is simply one of the “losers,” a status for which biologistic rationalizations can undoubtedly also be found, rationalizations that provide a genetic or neurological “explanation” for poverty and conservatism, etc. It is no coincidence that these promises of happiness are based on an ideological or completely exaggerated claim that is often untenable and is based on assumptions and vulgar materialist or utilitarian anthropologies that are not investigated further (see Schnetker 2019). At the same time, technological development with its sometimes insane promises is linked to a corresponding background music of legitimation. People emphasize how unstoppable technological development is, how desirable and unavoidable it is, and what opportunities, but also risks, it holds. When people say that “development can no longer be stopped,” then this development appears unstoppable to the optimists/apocalyptics as well as the “realists,” since the social dynamics underlying this development are not scrutinized and questioned as such. We are not dealing here with an assertive natural law (as in the case of an imminent volcanic eruption, which is actually impossible to stop), and yet the fetishistic valorizing movement of capital appears to the subjects living under its influence as just that, even though it is not (cf. Kurz 2012).

No matter what the issue is: “progress” is the solution, which often amounts to nothing more than digitalization and cost cutting. The digitalization critic Evgeny Morozov called this way of thinking, where one has the perspective of a hammer and everything appears to be a nail, “solutionism” (Morozov 2013). Particularly zealous disciples of solutionism are Silicon Valley ideologues, especially representatives of transhumanist ideology, who do not even shy away from considering the rationalization of humans as such and even consider it desirable for humans to either disappear or transform into “cyborgs” (cf. Wagner 2016). Transhumanism is therefore a technocratic death cult (see Konicz 2018 and Meyer 2020) that updates social Darwinism and eugenics (see Jansen 2018). These legitimizing ideologies and their “prophets” do indeed have aspects that are usually found among religious fundamentalists. It is not for nothing that the term “technological evangelist” has arisen. AI ideologues believe that humans, because of their fallibility, need a man-made artificial intelligence to deal with things like climate change, for example. Transhumanists strive for salvation through technology, even if this may mean the destruction of humans. In addition to big data and digitalization (Meyer 2018), an almost omnipresent hype in the current capitalist regime (to which “Chinese-style socialism” naturally belongs) is so-called artificial intelligence (cf. e.g. Simanowski 2020). Artificial intelligence has been on everyone’s lips since, at the latest, the publication of ChatGPT at the end of 2022.

What can we make of the hype surrounding artificial intelligence? Some are predicting massive disruptions in the economy (Industry 4.0, Internet of Things) and AI overtaking and replacing humans. Humans are essentially seen as a discontinued model. According to this line of thought, AI can and will be used in education, medicine, logistics, the culture industry, journalism, the military, art, etc., or in other words, everywhere. People hold out the prospect of many jobs or kinds of work disappearing altogether, while once again downplaying the social consequences that this would have. They tend to numb themselves with ignorance or optimism, assuming that many new job opportunities will be created, whereby there is always a latent threat against those who fall by the wayside in this game of “musical chairs” and do not prove to be flexible or resilient enough. However, AI is not creating a high-tech paradise, as the fundamentalist AI preachers would have us believe, but rather predominantly precarious work. AI as “capitalist intelligence” (see wildcat no. 112, 42ff. and Seppmann 2017) serves to rationalize capital, i.e. to cut costs, speed up logistics, compress work, accelerate and maintain the valorization process and continue competition at all levels.

As current or “upcoming” developments show, AI systems are ideally suited for managing the crisis (see Konicz 2024). They are predestined to subjugate capitalist “human material” by evaluating huge amounts of data (big data) and assessing and selecting this human material according to its usability or “future viability” (law enforcement, insurance, health, surveillance, etc.). When AI systems make predictions, they always do so on the basis of a statistical evaluation of “what already is.” This leads to fatal positive feedback loops: for example, someone does not get a job or a loan because they come from a “social hotspot” or presumably from a “criminal milieu,” as evidenced by corresponding “police work.” The police are in turn mobilized to screen said milieus, since crime is also likely to occur there in the future, as their work has already shown in the past and will show again due to AI and algorithms (search and find!). And thus it is “confirmed” that the criminal milieu is a criminal milieu and that black people or foreigners are more “inclined” to commit crimes than those who are less in the crosshairs of the police and justice system (cf. O’Neil 2016). A racist reality is thus perpetuated algorithmically.

If you are caught in the “tentacles” of an AI system or algorithm due to a misjudgment, it is usually not possible to “object” (and the users of an AI system themselves do not know why an AI has “decided” one thing and not another in a specific case – even if the “trade secret” were abolished, the “decision-making” of the AI would remain opaque). The fact that AI systems make mistakes (i.e. mistakes from the point of view of the user and those affected) has to do with the fact that reality cannot be clearly sorted and that AI systems cannot understand (the social and situational) context (which is why language programs have problems with sarcasm and irony). Statistical evaluations of the frequency of words or word combinations do not result in meaning. Statistical evaluations of data do not lead to an understanding of the genesis of said data (or of the social phenomena that are reflected in the data). The fatal flaw of AI is that it is impossible to know what mistakes these systems (will) make and when, or how exactly these mistakes come about. The mistakes that AIs, such as speech and image recognition programs, make show that they do not understand what they have “learned” (cf. Lenzen 2023, 48ff., 133ff.). If AI systems produce nonsensical results, it is very difficult to “repair” them through retraining (in contrast to “normal” computer programs, which can be repaired by finding the errors in the program code).

Artificial intelligence and “computational thinking” in general have a long history and AI has already gone through several periods of hype (see Weizenbaum 1982, Dreyfus 1978, Irrgang; Klawitter 1990, Larson 2021). The fact that such hype always returns at a “higher level,” despite all the criticism, is obviously because of its capitalist “usefulness” and the optimistic promises and apocalyptic fears associated with it. These promises and fears often accompany technological developments and are rehashed again and again. They may have been repeatedly disappointed or denied, but they cannot be killed off. The fact that AI research and the interest in funding it have had a “winter” on several occasions is due to an underestimation of the complexity of developing artificial intelligence and the fact that computer technology has long been inadequately developed (as well as the insufficient amount of digitized data available to train “artificial neural networks”).

Regardless of the repressive applications and capitalist use of AI systems, apt objections are formulated against the concept of intelligence commonly used in the “AI scene.”

The media liked to report, with a great deal of sensationalism, that an AI could play chess or Go better than any human, which some interpreted to mean that humans would soon become a “discontinued model.” Artificial intelligence is indeed far superior to human intelligence when it comes to storing huge amounts of data and evaluating it statistically (with certain weightings and model assumptions). However, conceptualization and judgement are not the same as memorizing a telephone directory or every bit of insurance data. There is no doubt that AI systems can recognize patterns from huge amounts of data that would otherwise have been overlooked. However, a human would never have been able to cope with this amount of data in their lifetime, as the data volumes are simply too large, which is why AI systems should more correctly be referred to as pattern recognition programs. It should be noted that correlations, i.e. patterns that are detected, don’t come close to actually proving causality. This applies to statistics in general, something that those who believe that more and more data will lead to an increase in knowledge (so that theory could therefore be dispensed with) do not seem to consider! In fact, such programs can be usefully employed as a scientific tool (and not as a substitute for theoretical thinking) (for example in astrophysics, medicine, molecular biology, solid-state physics, etc., cf. Bischoff 2022, 109ff.) but they are not suitable solely for the repression or selection of people.

The fact that a computer program can beat a world chess champion has a lot to do with the fact that this program has memorized billions of move combinations (and can estimate the most advantageous next moves based on a programmed heuristic, i.e. it does not have to memorize all of them). What is usually not mentioned is that these programs are hyperspecialists. A chess program (in the sense of an “artificial neural network”) cannot also learn to play Go. A human being can learn both without unlearning something previously learned at the same time (cf. Larson 2021, 28ff.). This is also the reason why some people, when talking about AI, are not referring to such hyperspecialists (weak AI). Instead, they believe the term “artificial intelligence” should be reserved for an artificial general intelligence, i.e. for one that can potentially do “everything” and is capable of doing “everything,” and is ultimately capable of developing consciousness (whatever that is exactly) (which is also called strong AI). However, this kind of intelligence is (and will presumably remain) pure fiction outside the world of science fiction and the delusional world of transhumanists (Schnetker 2019) and the “millenarian redemption rhetoric” of Silicon Valley ideologues (Nida-Rümelin; Wiedenfeld 2023, 252). It should not be forgotten that “artificial intelligence” is also a marketing term; it is used to describe various things that often have nothing to do with AI, but rather with banal statistics programs or databases. This is why you don’t come across too much in-depth theoretical reflection when this term is commonly used in the press (of course, there are always exceptions). This applies all the more to the propaganda of the tech giants (for example, the chatbot LaMDA developed by Google has allegedly developed sentience and consciousness).

A central objection to “computational thinking” or artificial intelligence is the equation of intelligence with computation or rule-based instructions. The computer scientist Erik J. Larson points out that computer programs (regardless of what they are called) can only proceed deductively (symbolic AI) or inductively (sub-symbolic AI) (training an AI with data is nothing other than induction). However, according to Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), to whom Larson refers, what characterizes human thinking is abduction, which combines inductive and deductive elements without being reducible to them. Human thinking can neither be limited to deduction (logic, i.e. the derivation of a concrete from a universal) nor to induction (the collection of facts or data and the generalization that may result from this). Abduction is rather something that could be described as hypothesizing. Hypothesizing implies initially ignoring certain facts or interpretations in order to allow them to appear in a new light in a different context, within the framework of a new “paradigm.” Larson illustrates this with Copernicus: “When Copernicus posited that the earth revolved around the sun and not vice versa, he ignored mountains of evidence and data accumulated over the centuries by astronomers working with the older, Ptolemaic model. He redrew everything with the sun at the center, and worked out a useable heliocentric model. Importantly, the initial Copernican model was actually less predictive despite its being correct. It was initially only a framework that, if completed, could offer elegant explanations to replace the increasingly convoluted ones, such as planetary retrograde motion, plaguing the Ptolemaic model. Only by first ignoring all the data or reconceptualizing it could Copernicus reject the geocentric model and infer a radical new structure to the solar system (And note that this raises the question: How would ‘big data’ have helped? The data was all fit to the wrong model).” (Larson 2021, 104).

Any thoughts of a “difference between essence and appearance” remain alien to logical reasoning and statistics. With induction and deduction alone, without them being mediated by some third thing, neither “novelty” nor “creativity” can be explained. Artificial intelligences are therefore nothing more than “stochastic parrots” (Emily M. Bender).[1] If you were to train an AI only with circles, it would never suddenly start drawing squares. Artificial intelligences can basically only interpolate, i.e. operate with known values, i.e. with “what has already been,” and not extrapolate (Otte 2023, 60ff.). Only the latter would produce something new, as the new or creative cannot be formalized. In principle, computers and thus artificial intelligences, i.e. “AI devices” (Ralf Otte), can only solve problems that can be represented in terms of an algorithm (an algorithm is a calculation or rule for action that can be formalized and translated into binary numbers, which arrives at a result after a finite number of steps), i.e. that can be translated into a formal language. AIs therefore basically only operate in a world of mathematics (and even this cannot be completely formalized and there are also mathematical problems that have no solution, for which no algorithm can be found), and those aspects of reality that cannot be represented by an algorithm remain alien to AI. This is where an AI device has its fundamental limits, no matter how clever it may seem. This is why autonomous driving, for example, is likely to be an illusion, as AI expert Ralf Otte points out. The only way to realize autonomous driving would be to mathematize the environment, i.e. “transform the natural environment […] into a deterministic environment.” Autonomous driving takes place in a natural environment, and it is not possible to transfer reality as such into algorithms or “artificially enrich the whole world with [IP] addresses or cameras, even with the mass use of 5G technology, just to make it more predictable for the robot cars” (ibid., 342).

Another objection to the concept of intelligence in the prevailing AI discourse, according to philosopher Manuela Lenzen, is the limitation of intelligence to human intelligence (cf. Lenzen 2023). Instead of understanding artificial intelligence as a quality in its own right, people are all too quick to compare it with human intelligence. This leads to unrealistic assessments and a misjudgment of human intelligence. People tend to get hung up on nonsense and ignore what AIs can and cannot actually do. Lenzen argues that we can talk about artificial intelligence without devaluing humans and without falling into mythology (for example, the idea that AI will soon surpass humans in everything and take over the world, etc.). Rather, intelligence should be understood as a more general phenomenon that also occurs in nature and is by no means a monopoly of Homo sapiens (even though Homo sapiens is capable of a capacity for abstraction that far eclipses that of “non-human animals” and is therefore indeed a “unique specimen” in nature). Intelligence is the property of an organism that allows it to be part of an environment and to act in this environment in a “sophisticated” way, i.e. ultimately to survive. Thus, as Lenzen explains, intelligence is by no means just something “mental,” purely cognitive, but is linked to a body acting in an environment. This can be described as embodied cognition/intelligence. The approach of robotics is to “teach” a physical machine to act in a certain environment through trial and error (i.e. not so much by feeding in large amounts of data). Just as a small child learns to grasp or walk (learning by doing), a robot is trained to be able to do the same. Of course, we are infinitely far from being able to create artificial intelligence in the sense of general artificial intelligence.

We can therefore say – and this has been repeatedly stated (cf. e.g. Weizenbaum 1982, 268ff. and Larson 2021) – that the AI discourse reduces the idea of human intelligence to an overly simplistic image. Quite a few AI theorists have adopted a tautology: intelligence is defined as something calculable (rule-based thinking/action), i.e. something that can be translated into an algorithm, and computers can do exactly that. And then you realize with astonishment that computers have intelligence (or at least appear intelligent, so that they would be on a par with humans if humans could no longer tell whether a computer or a human was talking/writing to them; this is known as the Turing test), and will soon have more computing power than the human brain (which assumes that the brain is essentially a computer). The fact that this reduction seems plausible and credible to many is probably due to the actual reduction of human intelligence to the imperatives of the capitalist valorization process (see Seppmann 2017). The panic that AI will replace and enslave us is precisely the echo of capitalism’s general imposition in that a person must always prove and rationalize themselves, as well as the threat of a failure to do so, which is nevertheless rarely expressed. The humanization of machines makes sense precisely when man tends to be reduced to a machine or can “willfully” reduce himself to one and consequently experience himself as little more than an apparatus executing algorithms (undoubtedly with the corresponding psychological consequences, cognitive dissonances and repressions). Emil Post, a (less well-known) computer theorist alongside Alan Turing, used an assembly line worker as a model to theoretically understand a computer and what it can or should be able to do (cf. Heintz 1993, 166ff.). The computer essentially does what humans do (or should do!) when they work on an assembly line, i.e. perform identical actions based on rules. It is therefore not at all surprising that a machine can in principle perform actions much better and more efficiently than a human reduced to machine-like behavior ever could. The fact that artificial intelligence could surpass human intelligence and will almost inevitably enslave humanity suggests that those who propagate and seriously believe this have a rather limited horizon. Take, for example, the “philosophy professor” Nick Bostrom, who spends hundreds of pages in his book Superintelligence dreaming up all kinds of horror scenarios and worrying about how they could possibly be prevented – without, of course, questioning capitalism at any point. So when people talk about humans as a “discontinued model,” this means that the human being, reduced to variable capital, is in fact increasingly a discontinued model, and with it capitalism itself (cf. Konicz 2024a). However, neither optimists nor apocalyptics want to know anything about a crisis of capitalist society, or an inner barrier to capital valorization (cf. e.g. Ortlieb 2009 and Kurz 2012).

Literature

Author collective. 2023. wildcat no. 112.

Becker, Matthias Martin. 2017. Automatisierung und Ausbeutung: Was wird aus der Arbeit im digitalen Kapitalismus? Vienna: Promedia.

Bischoff, Manon (ed.). 2022. Künstliche Intelligenz: Vom Schachspieler zur Superintelligenz? Berlin: Springer.

Bostrom, Nick. 2014. Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dreyfus, Hubert L. 1978. What Computers Can’t Do: The Limits of Artificial Intelligence. New York: HarperCollins.

Heintz, Bettina. 1993. Die Herrschaft der Regel: Zur Grundlagengeschichte des Computers.  Frankfurt: Campus.

Irrgang, Bernhard and Jörg Klawitter (eds.). 1990. Künstliche Intelligenz (Edition Universitas). Stuttgart: Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft.

Jansen, Markus. 2018. Radikale Paradiese: Die Moderne und der Traum von der perfekten Welt. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

Konicz, Tomasz. 2018. AI and Capital: In the Singularity Longed for By Silicon Valley, The Automatic Subject Would Come into Itself. Available on exit-online.org.

Konicz, Tomasz. 2024. AI and Crisis Management. Available at https://exitinenglish.com/2024/08/01/ai-and-crisis-management/.

Konicz, Tomasz 2024a. AI: The Final Boost to Automation. Available at https://exitinenglish.com/2024/08/03/ai-the-final-boost-to-automation/.

Kurz, Robert. 2012. Geld ohne Wert: Grundrisse zur einer Transformation der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie. Berlin: Horlemann.

Larson, Erik J. 2021. The Myth of Artificial Intelligence: Why Computers Can’t Think The Way We Do. Cambridge: Belknap.

Lenzen, Manuela. 2023. Der elektronische Spiegel: Menschliches Denken und künstliche Intelligenz, Munich: C.H. Beck.

Meyer, Thomas. 2018. Big Data and The Smart New World as the Highest Stage of Positivism. Available at: https://exitinenglish.com/2022/02/07/big-data-and-the-smart-new-world-as-the-highest-stage-of-positivism/.

Meyer, Thomas. 2020. “Zwischen Selbstvernichtung und technokratischem Machbarkeitswahn: Transhumanismus als Rassenhygiene von heute.” Available on exit-online.org.

Moody, Kim. 2019. “Schnelle Technologie, langsames Wachstum: Roboter und die Zukunft der Arbeit.” In Marx und die Roboter: Vernetzte Produktion, Künstliche Intelligenz und lebendige Arbeit, edited by Florian Butolo and Sabine Nuss. 132-155. Berlin: Dietz.

Morozov, Evgeny. 2013. Smarte neue Welt: Digitale Technik und die Freiheit des Menschen, Munich: Karl Blessing.

Nida-Rümelin, Julian and Nathalie Weidenfeld. 2023. Was kann und was darf künstliche Intelligenz? – Ein Plädoyer für Digitalen Humanismus. Munich: Piper.

O’Neil, Cathy. 2016. Weapons of Math Destruction:  How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy. New York: Penguin.

Ortlieb, Claus Peter. 2013. “A Contradiction between Matter and Form: On the Significance of the Production of Relative Surplus Value in the Dynamic of Terminal Crisis.” In Marxism and the Critique of Value, edited by Neil Larsen, Mathias Nilges, Josh Robinson, and Nicholas Brown, 77-122, Chicago: M-C-M’.

Otte, Ralf. 2023. Künstliche Intelligenz für Dummies. Weinheim: Wiley-VCH.

Schnetker, Max Franz Johann. 2019. Transhumanistische Mythologie: Rechte Utopien einer technologischen Erlösung durch künstliche Intelligenz. Münster: Unrast.

Seppmann, Werner. 2017. Kritik des Computers: Der Kapitalismus und die Digitalisierung des Sozialen. Kassel: Mangroven.

Simanowski, Roberto. 2020. Todesalgorithmus: Das Dilemma der künstlichen Intelligenz, Vienna: Passagen.

Wagner, Thomas. 2016. Robokratie: Google, das Silicon Valley und der Mensch als Auslaufmodell. Cologne: PapyRossa.

Weizenbaum, Joseph. 1978. Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.


[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stochastic_parrot

Originally published on exit-online.org.

AI: The Final Boost to Automation

The broad implementation of artificial intelligence systems in the labor society will push the dynamic internal contradiction of capital to the extreme.

Tomasz Konicz

The euphoria was followed by misery and disappointment. The introduction of the Internet at the turn of the millennium was accompanied by mass media hype and a speculative bonanza for high-tech companies (“Neuer Markt,” Nasdaq) on the stock markets, in which the internet industry was hailed as a new leading economic sector and millions of small investors started investing on the stock market (T-share, Infineon). For months on end, dubious IT companies were sometimes worth more than giant industrial groups such as Daimler. When the big high-tech bubble burst and a series of dubious IT start-ups went bust, a phase of disillusionment set in. The internet was ridiculed as a mere fad, merely a network for virtual sales outlets. And yet it cannot be denied that the internet industry fundamentally changed capitalism. Although no new leading economic sector in which the mass exploitation of wage labor would take place has been established, the former IT cliques that survived the massacre of 2000-2001 on the stock markets are now actually worth more than industrial corporations.

Late capitalism is currently in a similar phase with regard to the economic potential of artificial intelligence. The great hype already seems to be dying down, as the first disappointing stock market results are being recorded – besides NVIDIA.[2] Furthermore, AI fatigue and disappointment are spreading among the public, as the grand visions of the AI gurus and transhumanists are still awaiting realization due to the clear shortcomings of the artificial learning systems used to date.[3] The internet boom at the turn of the millennium, similar to the waves of industrial rationalization in the last two decades of the 20th century, when industrial robots transformed Fordist assembly line production, also seems to confirm a central thesis of bourgeois economics: While new technologies may render masses of jobs obsolete, the same technological progress creates enough new occupational fields that – despite all the frictions –ensure the continued existence of the capitalist labor society.

MIT’s Technology Review, for example, recently propagated this thesis of the labor market’s ability to regenerate. Their article drew a wide arc over the crises and technological boosts that have occurred since the 1930s, when the question of whether “technological progress, through the increasing efficiency of our industrial process, is taking away jobs faster than it can create new ones” was also controversially discussed within the Roosevelt administration in the midst of the Great Depression.[4] In view of the development of the U.S. labor market in recent decades, where in 2018 around 60 percent of wage earners were employed in occupations that did not even exist before 1940, the Technology Review saw no signs of the adaptability of the labor market being outstripped by the rationalizing effects of automation. According to the Technoblatt, talk of the “end of work” is a “distraction” from the question of how artificial intelligence can be used to grow the economy and create new jobs. German trade union officials such as DGB head Yasmin Fahimi, who described a crisis in labor society triggered by increasing “digitalization” as “nonsense,” argue in a similar vein.[5]

A Look Under the Hood of The Valorization Machine

Labor is indeed the basis of capitalist society; according to Marx, it forms the substance of capital through its objectification in commodity-bodies during the production process. Labor creates commodity values. And it continues to be spent on a massive scale. The bare employment figures seem to support the arguments of the MIT magazine and the DGB, especially against the background of the current labor market situation in the U.S. and the FRG; after all, the officially calculated unemployment rate in the United States is particularly low.[6] In Germany, there is a shortage of skilled workers.[7]

However, this is, to a certain extent, a positivist view of things, which simply adds up the wage labor performed while failing to recognize the function of different types of labor, especially with regard to the valorization process of capital. The work offered for sale on the capitalist labor market must therefore be viewed in its overall social context in order to be able to make judgments about the stability of the labor society. Even if they appear profitable from a business perspective, not all forms of labor contribute to the valorization of capital in society as a whole. Capital is a totality that can only be understood in terms of its own social dynamics, which in its fetishistic irrationality is distinctly different from the narrow-minded, seemingly rational interest-based calculations of the market subjects (many on the left also have difficulties with this approach).

The Financial Times (FT) certainly knows how to differentiate when assessing the U.S. labor society.[8] In a negative summary of the neoliberal era written in 2023, the business journal  criticized above all the formation of a service society, in which employment in the service sector rose from 45% in the 1970s to more than 60% in the second decade of the 21st century. At the same time, the proportion of workers in industry and the construction sector has fallen from 55% to less than 40%. According to the FT, the U.S. has been overtaken by China in terms of industrial production. Why is this a problem? Deindustrialization has been a key factor in the recent strategic economic policy paradigm shift in Washington, in which neoliberal free trade has been replaced by increasing protectionism.

From an economic perspective, all work is not created equal, as American technology magazines and German trade unionists imply in their milquetoast calculations. The commodity-producing industries form the “foundation,” so to speak, of the capitalist labor society. It is only on top of this that a service sector and a financial superstructure can be built – specifically in the form of wages and taxes. The welfare state, the education and care of future or former wage earners, and the maintenance of infrastructure must also be withdrawn from the capital valorization process as economic costs, even if individual companies (private kindergartens, universities, construction companies or retirement homes) profit from this on a business level. After all, not all wage earners can become hairdressers, financial managers, civil servants or waiters if there is no broad valorization of labor in industry.

A service society dominated by the financial sector, such as the deindustrialized, “rust belt” covered U.S. until the great real estate crash of 2008, can only reproduce itself by means of debt and bubbles until the inevitable crash. This is the lesson from the real estate crisis, as discussed by the FT, which led Washington to take a major protectionist turn. The role model is now Germany, which has been able to maintain its industrial base in the era of globalization through enormous export surpluses and a beggar-thy-neighbor policy (and this is precisely why Germany’s export industry is increasingly suffering from American protectionism).

Without a broad employment base in industrial production, there is no stable labor society – this is the conclusion from the era of neoliberal financialization and globalization, in which Marx’s concept of value, which distils the value of a commodity to the quanta of socially necessary labor time spent in its production, is also confirmed. Marx spoke of productive and unproductive labor with regard to the process of capital accumulation in society as a whole. Productive labor contributes directly to the valorization of capital within commodity production, while unproductive labor – as useful and socially necessary as it may be – does not do so directly. The crisis of labor society must therefore be seen as a crisis of productive, value-creating labor in industrial commodity production. The crisis of labor society is a crisis of productive labor, understood in the Marxian sense, meaning only the labor that contributes directly to the valorizing movement of capital.

This trend towards a shrinking industrial workforce, which has been lamented by the Financial Times based on what has happened in the U.S., can be empirically proven in almost all Western “industrialized countries.” Even in the export-oriented Federal Republic of Germany, which still has the strongest industrial sector in Europe, the proportion of people employed in manufacturing fell from just under 50% at the beginning of the 1970s to around 23% in 2023 as a result of automation in industrial production – while at the same time German industrial goods, such as machines and cars, flooded half the world.[9] The industrial foundation of capitalist labor societies is thus becoming increasingly fragile.

What’s more, with the onset of the third industrial revolution in the late 70s and 80s, which led to the major push toward automation in industrial production, total global debt rose faster than global economic output.[10] The late capitalist world system is thus increasingly running on credit; this debt creates demand for the sale of commodities, leading to a situation where many of the industrial jobs that still exist are simply dependent on demand generated by credit. The late capitalist world system is thus increasingly dependent on debt. However, this debt dynamic cannot be maintained for much longer in the face of the increasing distortions in the financial sphere and stubborn inflation. The illusion of an intact capitalist labor society, which German trade unionists and American technology magazines like to indulge in, can only be maintained by ignoring the conditions in the periphery of the world system – from whose collapsing regions and failed states economically superfluous wage earners are desperately trying to flee to the core.

A look under the hood of the capitalist valorization machine thus makes it clear that the optimism spread by American technology journals and German trade union officials on the eve of the great AI rationalization push is misplaced. Not only is the capitalist labor society gripped by a progressive erosion process in which its industrial base continues to melt away – the methods of delaying the crisis, in which this deficit-ridden zombie system produces ever greater mountains of debt, are also reaching their limits due to increasing instability in the financial sphere and stubborn inflation. The internal, moving contradiction of capital, which is getting rid of its own substance, wage labor, through rationalization, can therefore no longer be intercepted by these methods of credit-financed crisis delay during the next wave of automation.

In addition, a lack of investment in the welfare state, education and infrastructure increases the susceptibility of late capitalist societies to crises. This reflects the increasing imbalance between productive labor (the valorization of capital in the production of commodities) and unproductive labor (necessary expenditures on social infrastructure and the welfare state) in society as a whole. The particularities of the situation of Germany, which are often used to trivialize the crisis of the working society, do not change this. The universally lamented shortage of skilled workers and the ageing of society are precisely due to the fact that the dwindling share of wage labor performed in the production of commodities is offset by ever greater expenditure on the “dead costs” of social infrastructure (education, care, the welfare state, children seen as career killers and cost factors, etc.).

Office Workhorses Threatened with Extinction

In contrast to German trade union officials, who are probably plagued by a kind of job anxiety in this discussion, U.S. investment banks are certainly addressing the “disruptive” potential effects of the AI revolution on the global labor market. In a study published in mid-2023, Goldman Sachs estimated that “generative AI” (bots trained for specific work processes using mountains of data) will either downgrade or make obsolete around 300 million jobs worldwide. In a similar forecast published in early 2024, management consultants McKinsey concluded that in the United States alone, up to 30% of current working hours could become redundant by 2030, with low-paid, simple office work, customer service and sales being particularly at risk.[11]

Accountants and office workers in administration are particularly vulnerable. The first major wave of automation in the course of the third industrial revolution of microelectronics and the IT industry hit the workforce in the late 70s and 80s – now it’s white-collar workers’ turn to face the same fate. Office work could soon become obsolete on a massive scale. The more schematic the procedure, the less individual leeway there is in the work process, the easier it will be to automate it using AI systems, which can be “trained” for these work processes based on gigantic amounts of data that large corporations and offices have access to, following the example of the “large language models.” The office worker, the entire class of white-collar workers that first emerged en masse in the first half of the 20th century, is now threatened with extinction.[12] This class of petty-bourgeois wage earners, whose emergence dashed the old Marxist hopes of a revolutionary subject, is itself in the process of dissolution. The white-collar worker thus appears to have a relevant social span of existence of only about 100 years.

Humanity will soon have the ability to collect and organize information automatically, especially since administrative systems have already been almost completely digitized. The coming big AI wave will therefore build on the groundwork of the digitization that has been taking place in offices since the early 1980s. And it will be relatively easy to implement, as the investment costs are relatively low. The computers and administrative programs can continue to run; only the people operating them will disappear. The costs for office space and other “life support systems” will also be, for the most part, eliminated. On the other hand, companies must make substantial investments in data centers in which trained AI systems perform the former office tasks with minimal personnel costs, but these expenses are still low compared to cost of the industrial rationalization wave that began in the 1980s. Back then, the whole Taylor system had to be replaced and entire assembly lines equipped with robotic systems, each of which could cost millions.

Compared to these efforts to rationalize industry, which have cost billions of euros and caused the proportion of industrial workers to continue to decline, the investments being made in digital infrastructures, which will make employees obsolete, are insignificant. It is much cheaper to automate the white-collar worker now than it was for the industrial worker. In this respect, the late capitalist tendency to work from home, in the home office, which became established primarily in the wake of the pandemic, also points to the beginning of the capitalist labor society in the early modern era. As part of the so-called putting-out system, wage labor crept into the homes and huts of tenants, small farmers and craftsmen, who received materials and tools from the early capitalist “contractors” for the home production of commodities, which they then bought up and offered for sale on the market. Now capital is gradually releasing its wage-dependent employees into home-based work before the coming AI automation push makes them completely obsolete. In a classic dialectical negation of negation, the historical final stage of capital thus once again reflects moments of its history of ascent to a higher stage of development.

Digital Day Laborers: The Chatbot Takes Over the Call Center

Call center workers tend to be precariously employed and miserably paid. They often work at home. So at first glance, the automation of the call center industry could appear to be a progressive process, in view of these poor working conditions. Unfortunately, the people affected, who only have their labor to sell on the market, have their very existence threatened by this process. The obsolescence of call center employees is no longer a dream of the future, but a reality. The Swedish payment service provider Klarna was able to cut around 700 jobs after the company used an AI bot developed by OpenAI to handle service requests.[13] According to the company’s management, the AI system handled standard tasks such as cancellations or refunds just as successfully as its human competitors.

According to Klarna, customer satisfaction has remained as high as it was with human interlocutors. The decisive advantages of the system are obvious: the system speaks 35 languages, it is used in 23 countries, it has no limits on working hours, no wage demands or trade unions. According to initial internal forecasts, the service savings from using AI should translate into a profit of more than $40 million. The OpenAI system has already handled two thirds of all chat queries in customer service accurately, saving customers a lot of time. The company now sees itself as an “AI-supported global payment network,” according to the company’s enthusiastic conclusion in February 2024. At the same time, the share prices of call center operators such as Teleperformance and Concentrix have plummeted on the stock markets.[14]

At first glance, it would therefore appear that this wave of rationalization is primarily affecting simple jobs that require a low level of technical qualification. Cashiers and cab drivers, for example, are acutely at risk. At the moment, however, the AI-related losses in the service sector still seem to be cushioned by the AI industry’s need for unskilled workers who are used in the pattern recognition of artificial neural networks, known as the “learning phase” (see AI and The Culture Industry). Hundreds of thousands of precariously employed people, especially in the periphery of the capitalist world system, are busy coding the gigantic data sets of the AI systems with “labels” (similar to captchas when logging in) for miserable wages in order to enable these systems’ pattern recognition in the first place. The neural network only “learns” what a bicycle is when countless images of bicycles are given the label bicycle – the more, the better. The same applies to words, videos, music, etc. Of course, this does not mean that the AI understands what a bicycle is, as it is a purely external relationship that is established here.

What is actually taking place in this pattern recognition managed by digital day laborers is a process of internalizing all the digitizable images of external reality into the neural networks of AI systems. It is a gigantic process of scanning the mere surface of reality, without being able to take into account its dynamic character, its having become and its contradictions. The outer social shell, the false manifestation of late capitalism, becomes the inner essence of the AI systems, which will be incapable of critical reflection in principle, even in the event of rapid technological development – for example through quantum computers. The key point here is that the digitization of the surface of life, the universe, and everything else will be completed at some point, insofar as this is possible in algorithmic systems that know no causalities and only work with correlations. Consequently, the need for this mindless “learning work,” in which click-workers distribute labels for causalities and images of reality, will collapse, while AI will be able to handle many complex tasks. And this, precisely because it is fundamentally incapable of critical reflection in the emerging era of brutal crisis management (see “AI and Crisis Management”).

The Automation of The Middle Class

Mass media opinion-making is already being partially automated. The BILD newspaper, Germany’s most influential tabloid, wants to counter its internet-related loss of circulation and reach with a restructuring announced in mid-2023, in which the old business model will be brought up to date using AI.[15] A third of the tabloid’s 18 local editorial offices will be closed and a “three-digit number” of employees will be made redundant, while large language models will take over many everyday tasks. The Springer publishing house said that it was getting rid of “products, projects and processes that would never be economically successful again.” Generative AI should “contribute to supporting the entire journalistic process,” so that – literally – “journalism creation” becomes the core task area, while journalistic production becomes a by-product.

In the future, the large language models will be used for the tedious research that so often gets in the way of the seasoned BILD editor’s journalistic “creations.” Layout design, social media tasks and search engine optimization (SEO) will also be added. The fact that the AI models can already handle many “creative” everyday tasks in media operation was demonstrated by a recent scandal involving the renowned sports magazine Sports Illustrated. They secretly used texts generated by generative artificial intelligence, to which fictitious authors were also assigned – on top of that, the portraits of the fictional sports journalists were also generated by the AI.[16] The technology website CNET also secretly published AI-generated content.

In fact, the profession of journalist is one of a whole range of well-paid middle-class jobs that are threatened by partial automation and devaluation, according to a study by AI company OpenAI.[17] In addition to journalists, writers, mathematicians, interpreters and programmers are also at risk of becoming obsolete. A good proportion of middle-class jobs will therefore at least be devalued. The same applies to lawyers, graphic designers, financial advisors, analysts and stock market traders,[18] as well as the media industry from film to video games.[19] Wherever large amounts of data and information have to be processed in order to reach clear conclusions – for example in the legal system and legal advice – large language models are already ready for use. Memorization is becoming obsolete. Financial advisors and market analysts operate with probabilities resulting from the processing of empirical market data, which can now also be done efficiently by AI systems.

The second pillar of the automation of middle-class jobs is the modification of the data material that the large language models have scanned, such as the creation of new images, graphics, videos, texts, books, etc. Many tasks in the advertising industry are likely to be eliminated. Here, the simple, superficial modification of existing material by AI coincides with the ideological tendencies and the business model of the late capitalist culture industry, which thrives on the constant aesthetic repetition of the same old thing, which makes this type of automatic generation of “content” particularly seductive (see “AI and The Culture Industry”). The creation of films, entertainment books, and video games is predestined to be largely automated. A large proportion of jobs in the culture industry are under threat – precisely because it produces ideologically standardized content that only reflects the surface of social reality.[20]

In addition, well-paid jobs in advertising and sales that require direct work with customers also appear to be disappearing in the medium term (so it’s not just call centers that are affected). The insurance industry, for example, is spending billions on automating its administration and extensive legal departments and developing chatbots to streamline insurance sales and customer service.[21] In the meantime, photos of claims are even being analyzed by AI in a test operation. However, the chatbots, which are to be unleashed on customers as artificial insurance representatives, are still in the “test phase,” according to Spiegel-Online, as they first have to learn the jargon of the industry.

The marketers of the 21st century, the influencers running rampant on YouTube, Instagram, TikTok & Co., who try to sell their audience shit without labeling it as simple advertising, have already begun to be automated. Meanwhile, “hyper-realistic” (Ars Technica) virtual models are about to break into the approximately $21 billion market for “content” on social media.[22] In December 2023, Ars Technica reported on a successful AI model that was able to accumulate a following of 200,000 internet users in order to sell product placements for around 1,000 dollars per post. Such bots not only have the advantage of being completely controllable, which makes them more stable given the escapades of famous influencers.[23] What’s more, the mouths for hire that are rampant on social media have themselves contributed to their obsolescence by standardizing their appearance and look, which is imposed by the requirements of search engine optimization (SEO) and must be followed in order to get the highest possible number of hits. The influencer is already a sterile advertising product, largely shaped by algorithms, and they are now ripe for automation.

The reports about the possibilities of automation for the middle class are usually accompanied by reassurance pills: automation could never completely replace the professions concerned – lawyers, journalists, programmers, designers, creative professionals, etc. The professions concerned could concentrate more on creative activities and decision-making, while AI would deal with the daily grind, the schematic tasks. Of course, these objections should be taken seriously, and they are likely to correctly predict the near future, in which journalists, lawyers, book authors, etc. will continue to exist. However, the resulting higher productivity will lead to a displacement of workers from the professions concerned. Market-mediated capitalist production by isolated competitive subjects will lead to stronger predatory competition on the labor market, so that here too only a smaller number of labor providers with higher productivity will survive. Market competition will thus ensure that only the most productive wage earners, freelancers or self-employed workers with the most favorable price-performance ratio will survive.

The AI Ghosts They Summoned: The Slow Death of The Programmer

The AI revolution thus also leads to a devaluation of the skills of the commodity of labor, which can suddenly only be offered for sale on the labor market at a fraction of its former value – a constant tendency of capital as a moving contradiction, which led to the outbreak of the desperate Silesian weavers’ revolts as early as the 19th century. The U.S. magazine New Yorker recently published an interview with a programmer who described from his own experience how this technologically induced devaluation process is taking place in his industry.[24] At the beginning of the 21st century, when the internet experienced its big breakthrough, web designers could still earn good money by creating homepages – but these activities have now been largely devalued by software that almost anyone can use.

The situation is similar with the new AI programming bots that are now commonplace in the industry. A superficial, quickly acquired level of knowledge is now sufficient to solve complex problems quickly and efficiently. The subject of the interview, who became a programmer during the IT boom when he could set his salary more or less at will, described the successes of an acquaintance who used an AI bot for programming. The amateur with a cursory knowledge of programming languages was able to solve even complex problems in his hobby projects faster than the highly paid software developer. The AI tool GPT-4 is not only good at solving “tricky” small problems, it also has the “qualities of an experienced software developer,” as it can suggest good solutions and development paths for projects from a “large knowledge base.”

Until now, the motto in the industry has been that qualifications, that lifelong learning is the best protection against obsolescence, but now he would advise his children against wanting to become software developers. The infinitely complex art of programming machines in abstract programming languages is giving way to the technical dialog between user and AI programming tool that the vast majority of computer users can learn to use.

In fact, software development is an important focus within the automation efforts of the AI revolution, as the self-programming machine represents the Holy Grail of transhumanism, so to speak. This high-tech ideology hatched in Silicon Valley sees humans as a mere transitional phenomenon that are to be replaced by a permanently self-perfecting artificial intelligence – the so-called singularity.[25] This dystopia could only succeed if the process of programming AI bots can be accomplished autonomously, or in other words, if the AI can write its own code.

AI and The Outer Barrier of Capital

However, the high-tech Taliban and AI gurus who want to rake in billions in profits from human obsolescence face another external barrier: the finite resources of planet Earth, which is in the midst of a manifest climate crisis. The AI industry is already consuming huge amounts of energy and water.

According to studies from 2022, information and communication technology was responsible for 2.1 to 3.9% of global greenhouse gas emissions, which is roughly equivalent to air traffic emissions.[26] Added to this is the electricity demand of AI systems, which is set to explode to up to 134 terawatt hours by 2027 – roughly equivalent to the energy consumption of the Netherlands. At the beginning of 2024, the International Energy Agency (IEA) published its estimates regarding the energy consumption of the crypto and AI sector, which together were already responsible for around two percent of global energy consumption in 2022, with this share set to double by 2026.[27]

Added to this is the high water consumption of the hot-running data centers, which require water cooling systems. The annual water consumption of neural networks is expected to explode to 6.6 billion cubic meters by 2027, which would equal the water consumption of Denmark. During a “conversation” with GPT-3, in which 10 to 50 questions are answered, around half a liter of water is evaporated. As a reminder, two billion people around the world do not have regular access to clean drinking water, and 771 million people on earth cannot even reliably meet their basic needs.[28]

In order to train Microsoft’s GPT-3 with its 175 billion artificial neurons for a new task using gigantic amounts of data, an estimated 700,000 liters of water evaporate during the cooling process.[29] The electricity consumption for a single “training session” is equivalent to the annual consumption of 130 American households.[30] The learning phase of the large language models is considered to be particularly energy-intensive, but everyday operation, such as queries, is also characterized by high computing and energy consumption. A simple query answered by a large language model consumes around 30 times as much energy as the typical google search.

Just because it is sheer madness to waste gigantic amounts of energy on artificial neural networks in a manifest climate crisis does not mean that this project will somehow be stopped. For one thing, the fetishistic dynamics of capital are blind to the ecological and social consequences of their valorization compulsion. The world is merely a transitory stage for turning money into more money. Moreover, for transhumanism and similar ideologies, it is in fact a race between the ecological decay of the foundations of human life and the formation of the “singularity” inheriting humanity, which would no longer be dependent on such trifles as an intact environment. The hope is to reach the singularity before the social and ecological collapse. “Can what is playing you make it to level 2?”, as the accelerationist Nick Land put it.[31] Thus, capitalist rationality turns out to be a sinister idolatry, especially in the cult of AI, in which humans and nature are slaughtered on the altar of capital blindly moving as an automatic subject, which would come into its own in the singularity.


[1] https://getyarn.io/yarn-clip/813709cb-ba6e-435c-a171-c5450ce60533

[2] https://www.wallstreet-online.de/nachricht/17892567-konkurrenz-waechst-adobe-enttaeuscht-schwachem-ausblick-ki-gewinne

[3] https://www.konicz.info/2017/11/15/kuenstliche-intelligenz-und-kapital/

[4] https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/01/27/1087041/technological-unemployment-elon-musk-jobs-ai/

[5] https://www.spiegel.de/karriere/kuenstliche-intelligenz-auf-dem-arbeitsmarkt-beschaeftigte-fuerchten-jobverlust-durch-ki-a-452166c9-26c9-4805-a0f2-07e894292080

[6] https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf

[7] https://www.verdi.de/themen/arbeit/++co++74debf86-472f-11ee-894c-001a4a160129

[8] https://www.ft.com/content/77faa249-0f88-4700-95d2-ecd7e9e745f9

[9] https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/275637/umfrage/anteil-der-wirtschaftsbereiche-an-der-gesamtbeschaeftigung-in-deutschland/

[10] https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/09/13/global-debt-is-returning-to-its-rising-trend

[11] https://www.businessinsider.com/jobs-at-risk-from-ai-replace-change-chatgpt-automation-study-2023-7?IR=T

[12] https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Die_Angestellten

[13] https://www.newsweek.com/klarna-artificial-intelligence-tool-takes-700-jobs-1874002

[14] https://www.derstandard.de/story/3000000209642/bei-klarna-kann-ki-schon-hunderte-mitarbeiter-ersetzen

[15] https://www.forschung-und-wissen.de/nachrichten/technik/bild-zeitung-ersetzt-redakteure-durch-kuenstliche-intelligenz-13377679

[16] https://www.golem.de/news/kuenstliche-intelligenz-sports-illustrated-nutzte-heimlich-ki-texte-von-fake-autoren-2311-179818.html

[17] https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/wirtschaft/kuenstliche-intelligenz-ki-arbeitsplaetze-chatgbt-100.html ; https://arxiv.org/pdf/2303.10130.pdf

[18] https://www.businessinsider.com/chatgpt-jobs-at-risk-replacement-artificial-intelligence-ai-labor-trends-2023-02?IR=T#legal-industry-jobs-paralegals-legal-assistants-3

[19] https://www.konicz.info/2024/03/05/ki-und-kulturindustrie/

[20] https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2024/02/i-just-dont-see-how-we-survive-tyler-perry-issues-hollywood-warning-over-ai-video-tech/

[21] https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/ki-experiment-der-versicherungen-wenn-herr-kaiser-ploetzlich-ein-chatbot-ist-a-b50e7bf7-fc7e-4e65-a136-c8c3ab65caa5

[22] https://arstechnica.com/ai/2023/12/ai-created-virtual-influencers-are-stealing-business-from-humans/

[23] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KuTsTjFZf5M

[24] https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/11/20/a-coder-considers-the-waning-days-of-the-craft

[25] https://www.konicz.info/2017/11/15/kuenstliche-intelligenz-und-kapital/

[26] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666389921001884 ; https://www.nzz.ch/technologie/chat-gpt-vs-googeln-der-massive-stromverbrauch-der-ki-ist-ein-problem-ld.1774379

[27] https://www.vox.com/climate/2024/3/28/24111721/ai-uses-a-lot-of-energy-experts-expect-it-to-double-in-just-a-few-years

[28] https://www.fr.de/wirtschaft/ki-studie-strom-verbrauch-umwelt-klimawandel-energie-zr-92745772.html

[29] https://mindsquare.de/karriere-news/chatgpt/

[30] https://www.theverge.com/24066646/ai-electricity-energy-watts-generative-consumption

[31] http://www.ccru.net/swarm1/1_melt.htm

Originally published on konicz.info on 04/19/2024